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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
 
 
1. The setting  
 
Technology innovation in the markets outpaces innovation in the legal domain. Changes in law 
could be seen as a reaction to the observed changes in society. Lawmakers react to changes in 
socio-economical spheres of society, sometimes specifically having in mind the changes that 
technology innovations bring about.1 The advent of Internet forced lawmakers and scholars to 
ponder on the applicability of traditional legal institutions in the information society.2 The rise 
of e-commerce stirred questions on the appropriateness and applicability of legal institutions 
supporting dispute resolution.3 The major theme was the inadequacy of traditional courts to 
                                                          
1 John T. Delacourt, International Impact of Internet Regulation, The, 38 HARVARD INT. LAW J. (1997),; Philip J. 
Weiser, Future of Internet Regulation, The, 43 U.C. DAVIS LAW REV. (2009),; Lyombe Eko, Many Spiders, One 
Worldwide Web: Towards a Typology of Internet Regulation, 6 COMMUN. LAW POLICY 445–484 (2001),. 
2 Bert-Jaap Koops et al., Starting Points for ICT Regulation: Deconstructing Prevalent Policy One-liners 
(Information Technology and Law),  (2006). 
3ME Katsh, Dispute resolution in cyberspace,  CONN. L. REV. (1995). Ethan Ethan Katsh, M. Ethan Katsh & Janet 
Rifkin, Online Dispute Resolution: Resolving Conflicts in Cyberspace,  (2001),; Ethan Katsh, ODR : A Look at 
History,  in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE: A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 21–
33 (2012).; Koops et al., supra note 2.; COLIN RULE, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR BUSINESS: B2B, ECOMMERCE, 
CONSUMER, EMPLOYMENT, INSURANCE, AND OTHER COMMERCIAL CONFLICTS (2002). 
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handle online originated disputes, due to the nature of online relationships. Given the easiness 
of cross-border transactions, courts among others would have to deal with an array of issues 
associated with the private international law: jurisdiction, applicable law enforcement issues. 
In order to circumvent the problems that the judiciary system entails, users have often turned 
to alternative dispute resolutions (ADR).4 ADR, encompassing different methods of out-of-
court dispute resolution, provided options for solving disputes not solely on rights-based 
adjudication but also interest-based negotiation and mediation, which some scholars proclaim 
to lay in “the shadow of the law”. 5 
Still, it was considered that the courts, as well as traditional ADR providers, will have issues 
in handling disputes and enforcement in a world which is seemingly borderless, easily 
accessible and supported by instantaneous communication across the globe. However, from the 
inertness of the courts, a potential solution arose. As it was suggested by many scholars, most 
notably Ethan Katsh, disputes that originated online could be best dealt with online, ushering 
the new field of online dispute resolution (ODR).6   
Online dispute resolution is a method of resolving disputes using technology as a facilitator or 
as a “fourth party” in the dispute.7 While it resembles to be a natural extension of ADRs, since 
it includes online negotiation, mediation-arbitration, ODR has also developed innovative 
methods using technology such as double-blind bidding, visual blind bidding and assisted 
negotiation.8 It has proven to be difficult to define precisely the characteristics and types of 
ODRs, but there is a consensus that we can divide them on adjudicative (i.e. online arbitration, 
UDRP) and consensual (i.e. mediation, assisted negotiation).9 Proponents of ODR claim 
advantages (such as accessibility, the speed of the process, asynchronous communication, 
lower costs, flexibility.) although, at the same time fully aware of corresponding disadvantages 
(confidentiality issues, higher privacy risks, lack of human “feel “).10 However, following the 
                                                          
4 JEROME T. BARRETT & JOSEPH BARRETT, A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, 
AND CULTURAL MOVEMENT (2004). 
5 RH Mnookin & L Kornhauser, Bargaining in the shadow of the law: The case of divorce,  YALE LAW J. (1979); R 
Cooter, S Marks & R Mnookin, Bargaining in the shadow of the law: A testable model of strategic behavior,  J. 
LEGAL STUD. (1982), http://www.jstor.org/stable/724200 (last visited Feb 7, 2016); H Jacob, The elusive shadow 
of the law,  LAW SOC. REV. (1992). 
6 Katsh, Katsh, and Rifkin, supra note 3; RULE, supra note 3. 
7 Katsh, Katsh, and Rifkin, supra note 3. 
8 See more on it in chapter 5. 
9 FELIX STEFFEK, REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION : ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS (2013). 
10 RULE, supra note 3.Consultation Paper, CONSULTATION PAPER On the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
as a means to resolve disputes related to commercial transactions and practices in the European Union, . 
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initial rise of providers of ODR, in the midst and shortly after of the dot-com bubble, the 
number of active providers has diminished and only a handful selected ODR providers can 
claim successful practice.11 
Recently ODR developments have entered a new phase with new public support on the horizon. 
The EU has recognized the potential of ODR and chose to connect the existing network of 
ADRs in Member States through an ODR platform on the EU level.12  At the same time, 
UNCITRAL’s Working Party III on ODR was trying to propose a framework for global 
redress. Both initiatives envisioned a system for solving high-volume low-value buyer/seller 
disputes. Even though the UN proposal has failed to reach consensus on one model (or two) of 
a framework for ODR, and the EU model is subject to certain criticism, we could say that we 
are witnessing bestowing of public trust in the vision of ODR.13 
Having in mind advantages and characteristics of ODR, relevant authors in the field distinguish 
ODR for its potential suitability for e-commerce fully-online disputes and consumer 
protection.14 With the notable exception of the practice of eBay, PayPal, Squaretrade and few 
other providers of ODR, we still wait for a wider confirmation of a concept of online dispute 
resolution in different settings. Even in these exceptions, e-commerce giants like eBay and 
PayPal have been mostly the providers of ODR for the disputes between their own customers 
(consumer-to-consumer dispute, C2C) and not direct parties to the disputes. It remains to be 
seen if ODR (or ADR for that matter) can serve its role of fair resolution in the dispute where 
there is a significant imbalance in parties’ negotiation power. The goal of this thesis is to 
examine the appropriateness of available dispute resolution mechanisms on such scenarios. 
 
 
                                                          
11 Katsh, supra note 2.  pp. 21–33 
12 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, REGULATION (EU) NO 524/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 21MAY 2013 ON ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR CONSUMER DISPUTES AND 
AMENDING REGULATION (EC) NO 2006/2004 AND DIRECTIVE 2009/22/EC (REGULATION ON CONSUMER ODR) THE 1–12 
(2013). 
13 J Hörnle, Encouraging Online Dispute Resolution in the EU and Beyond-Keeping Costs Low or Standards 
High?,  QUEEN MARY SCH. LAW LEG. STUD. RES. … (2012). 
14 PABLO CORTÉS, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR CONSUMERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (ROUTLEDGE RESEARCH IN 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND E-COMMERCE LAW) (2010).P. Cortes, Developing Online Dispute Resolution for 
Consumers in the EU: A Proposal for the Regulation of Accredited Providers, 19 INT. J. LAW INF. TECHNOL. 1–28 
(2010).Louis F. Del Duca et al., Designing a Global Consumer Online Dispute Resolution ( ODR ) System for 
Cross-Border Small Value-High Volume Claims — OAS * Developments, Cl 221–264 (2010). 
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2. The problem  
 
A more recent trend of e-commerce that achieved significant growth capable of redefining the 
service industry is cloud computing. Cloud computing in simplified terms could be understood 
as the storing, processing and use of data on remotely located computers accessed over the 
internet.15 More commonly, as a starting point, authors take the broad NIST definition: cloud 
computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a 
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, 
and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction. 16 Cloud services are services, products and solutions, based on 
cloud computing and consumed in real-time over the Internet.17  
One of a more prominent characteristic of cloud services is a shift in payment model to pay-
per-use, which compared to similar IT infrastructure investments and software licensing brings 
significant savings to enterprises and consumers. It also cuts the costs of upgrading needs of 
hardware and software. Based on the previous lowering of prices of some of the biggest cloud 
providers, coupled with the influence of Moore’s law and Kryder’s law, 18 we also point to the 
likelihood of an increase in the offer of low-cost services and high utilization of free model (or 
freemium) for certain cloud services.19 
To obtain cloud computing services users generally accept a predefined contract of adhesion, 
where the terms should be accepted on “as is” basis.20 Cloud contracts usually comprise Terms 
of Service (and-or conditions), Acceptable Use Policies, Service Level Agreements and 
                                                          
15 European Commission et al., COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF CLOUD COMPUTING IN EUROPE. 
16 Peter Mell, Timothy Grance & Peter Mell, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-145, 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf. 
17 See more in chapter 3. Frank Gens, IDC EXCHANGE » BLOG ARCHIVE » DEFINING “CLOUD SERVICES” AND “CLOUD 
COMPUTING” (2008), http://blogs.idc.com/ie/?p=190 (last visited Aug 18, 2014). 
18 GORDON E. MOORE, CRAMMING MORE COMPONENTS ONTO INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (1965); Chip Walter, Kryder’s Law,  SCI. 
AM. (2005), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=kryders-law&ref=sciam (last visited Feb 6, 
2014). 
19 Cloud Economics: Visualizing AWS Prices over Time | eScience Institute, , 
http://escience.washington.edu/blog/cloud-economics-visualizing-aws-prices-over-time. 
20 Simon Bradshaw, Christopher Millard & Ian Walden, Contracts for Clouds : Comparison and Analysis of the 
Terms and Conditions of Cloud Computing Services Contracts for Clouds : Comparison and Analysis of the Terms 
and Conditions of Cloud Computing Services 1,  (2010).RON SCRUGGS, THOMAS TRAPPLER & DON PHILPOTT, 
CONTRACTING FOR CLOUD SERVICES (2011); Kristof De Vulder & Sourcing Group, Legal considerations Cloud 
computing contracts,  (2010). 
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Privacy Policies.21 Within the Terms of Service as a more general document depicting service 
agreement, we can usually find dispute resolution clauses which express preferences of 
jurisdiction and methods for dispute resolution. Even though the services are available globally, 
the terms in contracts are typically set in favor of provider’s local jurisdiction and choice of 
law. Since most of the offered cloud services are non-negotiable for consumers and SMEs, the 
provider biased terms are potentially hindering cloud users from access to appropriate redress. 
Additionally, disputes over services that are being offered for a low price or for free seem 
disproportionate or inadequate to the costs for waging disputes before courts or traditional 
models of ADR. Cloud service disputes are a subcategory of e-commerce disputes in general, 
with the emphasis on the imbalance in negotiation power, cross-border nature, an automatic 
delivery of services with minimal human involvement and rapid provisioning of services that 
are fully delivered online. 
With awareness of  the growth of cloud services and trends of adoption, as well as growing 
trend of Internet of things, where products in real time rely on cloud services for proper 
functioning (which could also beg the question of liability in case of malfunction), it is expected 
to have increase in disputes over services that are cloud-based and cross-border in nature.22 
However, do we have the appropriate mechanisms to handle low value cross-border and 
sometimes technical disputes? Having in mind the previously mentioned limitation of judicial 
systems, at first glance, it could seem only natural that we use ODR for cloud service disputes. 
In fact, cloud services (of a modern variant) became widespread after the occurrence of ODR, 
and it would seem practical for a globally scalable business to cover a large user base. 
Nevertheless, cloud providers rely on courts, especially in local jurisdictions of the provider, 
to handle disputes placing a significant part of their global user base in difficult position to 
obtain redress if they are to obtain redress in the jurisdiction of providers’ domicile. On the 
other hand, private dispute resolution in the shadow of the law does not necessarily guarantee 
fair and appropriate redress by itself, if the initial positions and negotiation power are 
significantly in favor of one party. 
 
 
                                                          
21 Chirstopher Millard, Cloud Computing Law,  (2013). 
22 DAVE EVANS, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: HOW THE NEXT EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNET IS CHANGING EVERYTHING (2011). 
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3. Approach and Scope 
 
Considering the initial setting of the stage, where cloud users are placed in a position where 
presumably they are unable to find appropriate redress and access to justice, while at the same 
time different dispute resolution mechanisms exist and could be appropriated depending on the 
context of a dispute or environment, we formulate research questions to properly investigate 
the issue and offer our ideas on how some of the problems could be mitigated or solved. We 
frame the principal research question as follows: 
Do the current dispute resolution mechanisms provide adequate means to resolve 
cross-border low-value disputes between cloud providers and users, and if not, what 
legal measures can be taken to improve access to justice and fairness in this domain?  
The principal research question is supported and built upon by answering following sub-
questions: 
 How are access to justice and fairness understood in dispute resolution?  
 How parties negotiate on dispute resolution in cloud services? 
 What is the international legal framework relevant to dispute resolution over cloud 
services? 
 What are the characteristics of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for cloud 
service disputes? 
 To what extent the dispute resolution mechanisms under current international legal 
framework are adequate for cloud service disputes to ensure access to justice and 
fairness?   
 What is the most appropriate legal framework for dispute resolution between cloud 
providers and users that provide access to justice and fairness? 
 
The first question sets the theoretical framework and seeks an answer on how are access to 
justice and fairness understood in dispute resolution. To do this, we turn to normative legal 
theories which are grounded in moral and political philosophy. The second question examines 
the current practices in contracting cloud services and how the contractual negotiation frames 
the dispute resolution in cloud domain. The third question provides answers on an international 
legal framework for dispute resolution over cloud services, by digging deeper into the private 
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international law and the framework for alternative dispute resolution. Having in mind 
international framework for ADRs we assess the characteristics and data on alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms for cloud service disputes?  Building from all the previous discussions 
in conjunction with the theoretical framework set by answering the first sub-question, we assess 
to what extent the dispute resolution mechanisms under current international legal framework 
are adequate for cloud service disputes to ensure access to justice and fairness. Finally, on 
conclusions from previous parts, we look into the most appropriate legal framework for dispute 
resolution between cloud providers and users and what legal measure need to be taken for 
achieving access to justice and fairness in these scenarios.  
Even though some of the issues are comparable, e.g. the lack of access to justice, we chose to 
restrict our research on individual dispute resolution and stayed out of issues of collective 
dispute resolution. The reflection and approach to the issues of collective redress are different 
than appropriating the system design to certain types of individual disputes. The number and 
interests of stakeholders are also quite different. Some issues might be borderline, but due to 
the resources available for the completion of the thesis and time limitations, we opted for 
research focusing on individual party dispute resolution. 
Also, having in mind the global reach of the cloud services and potential exposure to the 
multiple jurisdictions we chose to concentrate on a limited number of jurisdictions with the big 
emphasis on regional and international regulatory framework. Coming from a civil law legal 
tradition significant emphasis is placed on European civil law systems with small but 
appropriate consideration and analysis of common law systems, mainly of the United States 
and the UK. We focus on EU law since it is regional supranational regulatory regime, 
applicable to 28 Member States, with spillover effects on multiple countries worldwide.  
 
4.  Outline and methodology 
 
In Chapter 2, we set the theoretical framework for the whole thesis. To explain what we deem 
“adequate”, “appropriate” or “suitable” in the context of dispute resolution we need to illustrate 
why we are emphasizing certain values and elements of dispute resolution and what is the 
nature of their relationship. Discussion about values and preference of normative solutions 
invokes normative legal theories to the table.  Normative legal theories tend to be grounded in 
moral and political theories. Therefore, we have to shed some light on associated moral or 
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political philosophy. We rely on a moral and political theory, particularly on Rawls’ theory of 
justice, as a philosophical construct on which we ground our choices based on values, moving 
towards normative individualism as a starting point of regulating dispute resolution. Later in 
the chapter, we will illustrate how principles and ideals of civil law, regarding dispute 
resolution and its regulation, relate to moral philosophy. We will explore access to justice, its 
development from initial legal aid ideas to more contemporary notions. We propose a common 
thread between the philosophy of Rawls and access to justice while at the same time using the 
Rawlsian principles of justice as fairness on the elements of access to justice, for setting the 
lens through which we are going to observe available dispute resolution mechanisms while 
seeking for appropriate setting in cloud service context. In order to get operational framework, 
we determine four key concepts within access of justice. Then we work out those concept into 
operational variables/questions which we use in later chapters as a base for comparison.  
Chapter 3 builds on technology description and definitions of cloud computing and then moves 
forward to the second part to the more appropriate definition for the services from the point of 
view of users. In the third part, it discusses contracts as the legal foundation for cloud services, 
and in the fourth part, it examines dispute resolution in cloud contracts and analyzes data from 
a significant number of cloud providers’ terms of services. We have undertaken a substantial 
sample for our empirical data gathering from available cloud providers which validates the 
relevance of the findings in subsequent data analysis. This will provide the basis for the analysis 
and cross-reference in following chapters. Finally, the last part of the third chapter addresses 
the problem of adequacy of existing dispute resolution practices according to cloud contracts 
in relation to access to justice and fairness. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, we use the critical-descriptive method for state of the art and critical-
analytical and comparative approach on the traditional source of legal and policy document, 
and literature study. In these chapters, we analyze relevant international and regional legal 
framework for dispute resolution. We start in Chapter 4 with an overview of the private 
international law and its principles. We analyze national rules in setting jurisdiction of selected 
number of states. Then we move on to the legal framework established by the European Union 
through regulations and directives. At the same time, research pays attention to the Hague 
Convention on Private International Law as one of the most relevant international instruments 
working on the issues of PIL. In Chapter 5 we describe developments and applications of 
different alternative dispute resolution mechanisms with an analysis of respective legal 
framework in an international context. We conclude chapters 4 and 5 with analysis of the 
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available characteristics and data of mentioned dispute resolution bodies in cross-reference to 
criteria established in Chapter 2. 
Given the parameters of theoretical framework established in Chapter 2, we conduct 
comparison of the most relevant forms of dispute resolution for the cloud service disputes in 
Chapter 6, to assess how the different dispute resolution entities fare in context of cloud service 
disputes and which method currently is the most appropriate or achieve the most in the context 
of our theoretical framework. Based on of our assessment we get to answer to what extent the 
current legal framework is adequate for cloud service disputes. We examine adequacy in the 
sense of criteria established in Chapter 2, given the available data at the time of writing of the 
chapter.  
Chapter 7 examines online dispute resolution as a relatively newer dispute resolution 
mechanism that relies on new technologies. We analyze the legal framework for dispute 
resolution in international law value disputes scenarios, as presumed most appropriate 
mechanism for the likes of cloud service disputes. Building on criticism and inconsistencies, 
based on our theoretical framework for appropriate dispute resolution we are recommending 
guidelines for the design of fair dispute resolution body that allow access to justice in cloud 
service disputes. 
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Chapter 2 –Access to Justice as Fairness 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The very fact that we have a variety of different tools or mechanisms to cope with disputes is 
a good indicator that there is a need for research on appropriate mechanisms under different 
circumstances. How to establish what is an appropriate or adequate approach to dispute 
resolution, especially in the context of cloud services, which very often have burdening facts 
of international element, power imbalance and lack of effective remedies?23 We will attempt to 
assess the appropriateness of general elements of dispute resolutions, inspired by the access to 
justice movement and Rawls’ theory of justice, and to address them in different contexts of 
cloud service disputes. Said framework will be the foundation for assessing various aspects of 
cloud service disputes and dispute resolution regimes in the following chapters.  
                                                          
23 See Ch.3 
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No matter which form dispute resolution has taken, or whether the dispute at hand has been 
guided by contract and the will of the parties or if the rules have been more or less mandated 
by the state or an international organization24, at the center of the dispute we have at least two 
parties. We choose to put the parties and their interests as a starting point of any discussion 
about dispute resolutions, as opposed to interests of the states or any other groups. In the end, 
parties will be the ones who will certainly bear the consequences of the disputes. For that 
reason, we observe the problem and appropriateness of solutions from a normative 
individualism point of view. Normative Individualism places individuals at the center of 
regulatory issues and demands justification for a limitation of individual freedoms by powers 
that determine the rules.25 Party autonomy is one of the basic pillars in normative individualism, 
guaranteeing that the will of the parties to the contract has to be obeyed. However, placing that 
much legal significance on parties’ self-regulation and distribution of rights and obligations, 
makes us question what kind of a role fairness plays, especially when a single party has bigger 
negotiation power to dictate the terms of an agreement. Hence, we look into fairness between 
“autonomous parties” and how society has intervened by regulating practices that were deemed 
unfair.  
Normative Individualism is also crucial when we observe the dominant ways of establishing 
jurisdiction in e-commerce contracts, i.e. the will of the parties or the party autonomy and the 
way it influences regulation. The issue of fairness in imposing jurisdiction of one party has 
been debated in academia for a while. We will offer our take on it using cloud services as an 
example of imposed unfair contract terms in regards to dispute resolution clauses in the third 
chapter. From the normative individualism point of view, on the following pages, we reflect on 
principles of fairness to guide us in access to justice.  
The title of this chapter is casting a wide net and could lead the reader to several different paths 
on what is it about. To simplify, in this chapter we are attempting to define appropriateness in 
dispute resolution by going to its core function of solving conflicts, with regard to parties’ 
relationship, established standards of access to justice and specific expectation within parties’ 
domains. In another wider sense, we are looking into the interplay between principles of 
                                                          
24 Such as Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy by ICANN, see 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/help/dndr/udrp-enor , or  World bank’s International Center for 
Settlement of Investor Disputes – ICSID, see https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/Pages/default.aspx;  
25 Felix Steffek, PRINCIPLED REGULATION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION - TAXONOMY, POLICY, TOPICS (2013).STEFFEK, supra note 
9. 
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fairness and access to justice within a specific field of the application. But we first need to 
answer what are disputes and what is the connection of dispute resolution and these principles? 
 
1.1. Disputes: where, how and is it worth it? 
 
In order to get to the elements of dispute resolution and the regulatory choices, we will 
shed some light on the nature of dispute resolution and its functions. History books are filled 
with stories about conflicts and disputes between individuals, groups or nations.26  Conflict 
arises wherever two or more actors have incompatible desires concerning the future state of the 
world, and then try to do something about it.27 Brian Barry distinguishes the following social 
decision procedures for solving conflicts: combat, bargaining, discussion on merits, voting, 
chance, contest and authoritative determination.28 All these types, except authoritative 
determination, are one way or the other settling the dispute by the parties themselves. 
Bargaining and discussion on merits are forms of negotiation. Inversely, authoritative 
determination is a type of social decision procedure where a third-party, recognized by all as a 
legitimate, resolves the dispute.29 These types of social decision procedures respond to the more 
modern distinction between consensual and adjudicatory dispute resolution methods.30 The 
adjudicatory method involves a binding authoritative third-party decision about the dispute, 
while the consensual dispute resolution is dependent on the parties will to participate and come 
to a solution.31 
Due to its variety, frequency, and effects, disputes and conflicts had to be managed by 
organized societies, ultimately leading to a separate branch of government in modern states.32 
The judiciary branch of government or judicial system is vested with the power to resolve 
disputes through judicial processes, however, even though the state reserves the monopoly over 
the use of force, it doesn’t have a monopoly over dispute resolution methods. In the case of a 
dispute, parties are often faced with the choice of where and how they’re going to resolve it. 
                                                          
26 We use terms conflict and dispute interchangeably, although some scholars prefer to use “conflict” for social 
sciences and “dispute” for legal studies. 
27 BRIAN BARRY, 3 POLITICAL ARGUMENT: A REISSUE WITH NEW INTRODUCTION (1965). p. 84 
28 Id, p.86. 
29 Id, p. 90. 
30 THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, (2012). p.318, 350 
31 Id. 
32 The Spirit of laws : Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, baron de, 1749, 
https://archive.org/details/spiritoflaws01montuoft (last visited Oct 11, 2015). 
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Every dispute has a certain context, and possible varieties make it impossible to claim a single 
ultimate fashion of dispute resolution as superior. In order to argue the appropriateness of 
certain mechanisms within a certain field, we need to understand the disputants, the context of 
dispute and possible processes of resolution. 
Classical argumentation mandates the question of the forum of disputes prior to any discussion 
of merits.33 Without accepting the forum where participants are going to have a discussion, 
either by the will of the parties or by the law, it is futile to get into a discussion about specifics 
of the dispute mechanisms as the other party will consider it inappropriate, illegal or irrelevant.  
Therefore, prior to discussing the fairness of procedural rules guiding dispute resolution 
mechanism we should also take into account the fairness of selection of dispute resolution 
forum. As we will see in Chapter 4, a significant amount of legal knowledge and rules about 
establishing the jurisdiction of a court or arbitration is a backbone of judicial systems. This is 
especially relevant in an international context, where often national jurisdictions overlap, which 
led to significant advancements in conflicts of laws as a field of law. 
Having this in mind, to discuss the appropriateness of dispute resolution mechanism we need 
to answer both where and how resolution takes place in order to be fair. Then again, even the 
forum that is acceptable to both parties and which has the procedure with all the elements of 
fairness, by itself does not mean that it is the best or the most appropriate way for every dispute 
possible. The previous distinction of social decision procedures indicates that in some 
situations certain mechanisms are more appropriate than the others relative to its context. The 
context of the dispute is also essential for the party’s decision to escalate a conflict to some 
form of a social decision or to proceed with imposed process. The decision of a rational party 
should be influenced by certain estimations or expectations of the dispute resolution process 
and potential gains of it. So our task is to establish where, how and under which circumstances 
certain dispute resolution method is appropriate or adequate.  
Nevertheless, prior to discussing the specific context in Chapter 3, we need to establish general 
criteria and preferences based on which we will be able to assess the context and draw 
conclusions about the appropriateness. Having in mind the general function of dispute 
                                                          
33 The concept of stasis of place or conjecture point of argumentation as described in Antoine Braet, The 
Classical Doctrine of “Status” and the Rhetorical Theory of Argumentation, 79–93 (1987). And "Stasis" in 
Encyclopedia of Rhetoric - Oxford Reference, p. 741–745. , 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195125955.001.0001/acref-9780195125955 (last 
visited Jan 27, 2015). 
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resolution mechanisms i.e. solving disputes, and starting from a presumption that participants 
prefer just outcomes, we will establish our criteria by looking at the concept of access to justice, 
that developed as a societies’ demand on fairness within the rule of law, and then we look into 
a more general idea of fairness as a guiding concept to deal with specific issues and to prioritize 
between different criteria within access to justice. The movement of access to justice has been 
dealing with the requirements for justice and dismantling the obstacles to the proper role of the 
third party as an administrator of justice. 
 
2. Access to justice 
 
Access to justice as a concept has changed over time. With the development of the notion 
of the rule of law, access to justice emerged as a treat of equality or equal rights. Steadily over 
time, the idea of access to justice evolved from issues of legal aid and legal representation of 
collective or diffused interests to more modern interpretations.34 
Access to justice is not easily defined. Black’s Law Dictionary centers on the traditional 
definition: “the ability within a society to use courts and other legal institutions effectively to 
protect one’s rights and pursue claims”.35 The United Nations Development Programme defines 
access to justice as the “ability of people to seek and obtain a remedy through formal or 
informal institutions of justice, and in conformity with human rights standards”.36 Cappelletti 
and Garth defined the term through its function within the system. According to them, it serves 
the basic principles of the legal system by vindicating rights and resolving disputes. 37 They 
emphasize that the legal system must be equally accessible to all, and it must lead to results 
that are individually and socially just.38 However, even though they put a strong emphasis on 
effective access, they also remind us of importance on social justice that, according to them, 
presupposes any notion of justice stemming from effective access.39 
                                                          
34 SUTATIP YUTHAYOTIN, ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN TRANSNATIONAL B2C E-COMMERCE: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSUMER PROTECTION MECHANISMS (2014).  
35 B. A. Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary (9th edn, St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 2009), p. 16. 
36 UNDP (2005), Programming for Justice: Access for All, Bangkok: United Nations Development Programme.  
37 MAURO CAPPELLETTI, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A WORLD SURVEY. EDITED BY MAURO CAPPELLETTI AND BRYANT GARTH (Mauro 
Cappelletti & Bryan Garth eds., 1978).p.6.  
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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In the following section, we will give a historic overview of the development of access to 
justice and how the concept changed over time. The overview is largely based on extensive to 
work by the people behind the “Access to Justice Project” or the “Florence Project”, undertaken 
at the European University Institute in Florence. Then we will briefly discuss the connection 
of access to justice with due process/ procedural justice and how these concepts are represented 
by positive law, primarily through international conventions. We will exemplify social justice 
aspect by illustrating consumer protection ideas and also how effectiveness and efficiency 
come to play with alternative dispute resolution methods and how they relate to access to 
justice. 
2.1. Development of access to justice 
 
Historically, industrialization had pushed the development of the rule of law in the early 
19th century, and its basic concept of equal rights.40 Reforms have been put in place to make 
laws easily understandable and enforceable through universally applicable judicial processes. 
Unfortunately, even though the equal rights have been proclaimed, equality under the law was 
hampered by the high costs of judicial processes, making protection of rights accessible to more 
privileged, but not to all. At the time states were not concerned with the effects of “legal 
poverty”, and it was only in the middle of the 20th century that the notion of assisting in the 
legal representation of poor became a strong influence of legal reforms. 
Starting from the 1960’s, a new push to the public policies of the protection of certain groups 
of the society that were deemed worse off in specific legal situations (poor, consumers, 
employees, lessees) broadened the scope of access to justice movement.41 Initially, the focus 
of reforms was on legal representation, primarily of the poor. Cappelletti and Garth called it 
“the first wave” of access to justice movement. The idea was to enable them to participate in 
judicial proceedings with free legal representation funded by state legal aid agencies.42 This 
reform corresponded with the development of welfare states, putting into practice the ideas the 
                                                          
40 YUTHAYOTIN, supra note 34. , L. M. Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 Rutgers Law Review 11–53 (1969–
1970) and E. Sotrskrubb and J. Ziller, Access to Justice in European Comparative Law, p. 178–9. 
41 The most important research in the field of access to justice has been done by the Access-to-Justice Project 
(Florence Project) carried by Mauro Cappelletti at the European University Institute, Florence, during 1970s. 
See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 37. 
42 Id.p.22 
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states should provide for social services, and especially should take care of underprivileged.43  
Even though Universal Declaration of Human Rights was enacted in 1948 by United Nations, 
the rights recognized in this Declaration lacked the proper implementation in different states. 
In the second half of the 60s, the idea of access to justice has spread further to new categories, 
allowing “the second wave” of access to justice. Only during the 60s, the ideas of consumer 
protection became prevalent and obvious, expanding access to justice to new groups, as 
Cappelletti and Garth call it, “of diffuse and fragmented rights”.44 The common theme about 
these groups points to the fact that individual members for various reasons (costs, speed, 
difficulty) would face much lesser chances in courts if aggregate interests, potential injuries, 
and damage to the wider group would not be taken into account, i.e. the context. Collective 
interests of these groups and their impact on the population pushed the initiatives within legal 
systems to introduce group litigation, class actions, representative actions, etc. The United 
States introduced the public advocate, or the public institution to protect public interests in 
litigation, especially in the fields of consumer, labor, and environmental protection. In Europe, 
Sweden introduced the Consumer Ombudsman, to represent collective consumers’ interests, 
including the litigation against businesses engaging in unfair practices.45 Sweden’s model was 
influential in continental Europe. However both the European and US government agencies 
required significant funding for the effective scale of protection of diffuse and fragmented 
rights of various groups. The economic reasons steered governments to look for alternatives in 
the private sector. Laws emerged encouraging private groups to litigate the smaller cases in the 
interests of their individual members and the public.46 These solutions led to a more efficient 
way of dealing with cases through a group action47, where an individual party represents a 
larger group suffering from the same injury or harm. The invention of collective actions 
reinforced consumers’ rights and bargaining power when faced with big business. Especially 
in the US we have seen the growth of the culture of private group actions in consumer 
protection, but also in environmental and health claims. 48 
                                                          
43 See Ramsay, Consumer law and Policy, Text and Materials on Regulating Consumer Markets 4 (2007). p 14, 
also see E. Sotrskrubb and J. Ziller, Access to Justice in European Comparative Law, in F. Francioni (ed.), Access 
to Justice as a Human Right 177, 178 (2007) p 179, 
44 Id.34-35 
45 see http://www.konsumentverket.se/ 
46 England and Australia and Germany, see YUTHAYOTIN, supra note 34.page 43 
47 Depending on the jurisdiction it is also known as class action, collective action or public-interest action. 
48 STEFAN WRBKA, STEVEN VAN UYTSEL & MATHIAS SIEMS, COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: ENHANCING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND 
RECONCILING MULTILAYER INTERESTS? (2012). 
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Moving away from focusing only on legal justice, representation, and diffuse/collective 
interests, scholars gathered around the Florence Project pushed the notion of access to justice 
to encompass a more preventive aspect of dispute resolution. 49 Motivated by bringing the equal 
access to justice to members of society, these scholars place emphasis on effectiveness, relying 
on other methods, and not relying solely on traditional judicial dispute handling, ushering “the 
third wave” of access to justice movement. However, when it comes to dispute resolutions as 
a way of administering justice, the new approach popularized alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) methods such as mediation, conciliation, and arbitration, which were depicted as 
simple, fast, convenient and accessible. Several states integrated ADRs into their legal system, 
experimenting with compulsory forms in certain processes.50 The ideas of ADR’s 
complementary role to the traditional judiciary, with all the perceived benefits, is active today 
and it drives new initiatives for the protection of rights, especially in commerce and consumer 
protection.51 
Another sway on legal systems that more wholesome idea of access to justice had (influenced 
by economic/organizational research52) was introducing specialized courts or specialized 
agencies to deal with specific types of claims, like low-value claims.53 The traditional court 
system with a general approach to all cases could not serve efficiently specific needs of certain 
claims as well as specialized courts. Hence, from economic reasons (meaning in less time more 
specialized professional is dealing with the case in more effective manner) reform of court 
systems meant more access to justice due to effectiveness. 
To add to these procedural reforms, a more holistic approach of the generalists’ access to 
justice, which advocated the welfare state in various facets of society, also came to fruition in 
a certain number of states.54 This included legal aid initiatives as mentioned before, but also 
improving the position of the less privileged in education, labor, medical services, etc. Though 
this processes had happened roughly at the same time as the publication of Rawls’s theory of 
justice as we will see later55, nobody claims that Rawls or philosophy of justice in distribution 
influenced any of these moments. The idea of improving the position of less privileged in 
                                                          
49 For the list of Scholars participating Florence project, see CAPPELLETTI, supra note 37. 
50 Id.p.60-61., 
51 EU, UNCITRAL among some of them, see more in chapter 5.  
52 HÉCTOR FIX FIERRO, COURTS, JUSTICE, AND EFFICIENCY: A SOCIO-LEGAL STUDY OF ECONOMIC RATIONALITY IN ADJUDICATION 
(2003). 
53 CAPPELLETTI, supra note 37.p. 67. 
54 Id 21. 
55 John Rawls, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 67/2 (1958) 164–194 (1958).  
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various scenarios within access to justice movement was more likely an intuitive reaction to 
the notion of what is fair or just under certain circumstances.  
Contemporary scholars are offering a multifaceted or multidimensional approach to access to 
justice. Recalling the history of development, they’re pointing to new steps, offering more 
interdisciplinary observations. Stefan Wrbka is considering the concept from the point of value-
oriented justice.56 Andre Tunc is building his point of view in several stages, going from access 
to legal justice, to access to the machinery of justice of the welfare states, finally coming to 
that stage of equality and social justice.57 Sutatip Yuthayotin is proposing multileveled access 
to justice for consumers which couples legal protection with economic mechanisms for 
consumer protection.58  
The issues of collective redress in cross-border cases have also been researched in more recent 
times, as the number of these cases grows with the development of the internet as a global 
means of communication and commerce.59 It provides a clear example of development and 
protection of collective and diffuse interests colliding with issues of new technologies and the 
global economy. 
Given this brief historical overview of the development of access to justice, we could notice 
that it has been developed in layers over time. The initial layer (or wave) was primarily focused 
on legal justice, allowing access to dispute resolution mechanisms (primarily courts; though 
ADR existed they were not in focus as much) and legal representation for the underprivileged, 
and allowing the remedies and removing barriers from rights to redress. Building on the first, 
the second layer is all about introducing and protecting collective and diffuse interests. These 
two layers have been universally recognized in various national legal systems. Additional 
layers of more holistic flavor, offering solutions that are intertwined with social politics and 
economic philosophy have had a different level of success in different states. At the outset of 
the thesis we chose to focus primarily on legal justice, by assessing legal aspects without going 
into economy or social implications of access to justice, although we will search inspiration 
                                                          
56 STEFAN WRBKA, 20 EUROPEAN CONSUMER ACCESS TO JUSTICE REVISITED (2014).6. 
57 Andre Tunc, The Quest for Justice,  in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1981).p. 
315, 315–17 (1981).. 
58 YUTHAYOTIN, supra note 34. 
59 See chapter 4. And 5. Also see STEFAN WRBKA, STEVEN VAN UYTSEL & MATHIAS SIEMS, COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: ENHANCING 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND RECONCILING MULTILAYER INTERESTS? (2012). 
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later in a more general all-encompassing concept of fairness through Rawls` philosophy that 
by itself has implications for the social and economic order. 
 
2.2. Forms of access to justice and positive law  
 
Looking at the history and development of the concept, we can say that access to legal 
justice is a cornerstone of a more general approach still being expanded today. Legal access to 
justice in this sense would be a set of established procedural rules that governs dispute 
resolution mechanisms towards just outcomes. The Florence project, identified in the first wave 
the need for legal aid for pure to access the justice and placed focus on access to a fair trial 
under guarantees of due process of law. In the second wave, the diffuse and collective interests 
of categories like consumers have been given protection, by giving them specific treatment 
before various institutions. In each of the waves beneficiaries of the protection were becoming 
entitled to access the relevant institution dealing with disputes and guaranteed the fair trial and 
due process. The provisions concerning access to justice can be found in numerous regulations, 
conventions, and acts of different levels: international, regional or national. Without disregard 
to more modern approaches and focusing on its core foundation we place access to justice on 
the intersection between human rights, and procedural laws and certain laws dealing with 
substantive protection of various categories (consumer protection, environmental protection, 
labor, etc.). We’re now going to take a look at the relationship of access to justice with these 
disciplines, focusing on consumer protection in the last segment. 
 
2.2.1. Access to justice and human rights 
 
Human rights scholars consider the development within the first wave of access to justice 
as the development of the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy.60 Though the 
scholars leading the Florence project were not coming primarily from a human rights 
perspective, they recognized the overlap between universal doctrines. Both the right to a fair 
trial and the right to an effective remedy, became an integral part of the international and the 
                                                          
60 ANTÔNIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE, THE ACCESS OF INDIVIDUALS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, ТОМ 18;ТОМ 937 (2011). 
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regional conventions on human rights, as well as a constitutional guarantee in the large majority 
of states.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in its art 10 proclaims that everyone is 
entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal; 
in article 8 it provides for the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals 
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted by the constitution or by law. The Universal 
declarations framing certainly influenced a great deal of international and national provisions, 
dealing with equal rights to a fair trial. 
At the European level, access to justice guarantees fall under the article 6 (the right to a fair 
trial) and the article 13 (the right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR)61, and in the article 47 (both right to a fair trial and right to an effective remedy) 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The European Convention on 
Human Rights in its Article 6. Section 1. states:  
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone 
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be 
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a 
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so 
require, or the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.”  
Article 13 of ECHR says: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation 
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity”. 
We witness devotion to the idea of equality in rights as well as proclaimed procedural 
guarantees in civil and criminal proceedings. As we recall, the mere proclamation of equality 
of rights does not necessarily mean that everyone has equal access to judicial instances, which 
gave birth to the first wave of access to justice: legal aid for the poor. Francesco Francioni, 
makes the logical argument, that without legal aid, judicial remedies would be available only 
to those who dispose of with sufficient financial resources;62 therefore, equality in human rights 
                                                          
61 The European Convention on Human Rights was drafted in 1950 by the new body-Council of Europe, it 
entered into force on 3 September 1953. 
62 F. Francioni, ‘The Rights of Access to Justice under Customary International Law’ in F. Francioni (ed.), Access 
to Justice as a Human Right (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 1. 
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requires legal aid for those who can’t afford access to the judicial system and/or its own defense 
within it.  
The Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, after confirming the same rights 
as in the ECHR, also literally refers to first wave of access to justice by adding: “Legal aid shall 
be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure 
effective access to justice”63 Similar formulation that confirms success of the first wave of access 
to justice can be found in national constitutions of EU Member States.64 
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) in article 8 (the right to a fair trial) and 
in Article 25 (the right to an effective remedy) confers the same rights as in UDHR and ECHR. 
Both Inter-American Courts of Human Rights and European Courts of Human Rights, although 
hesitantly in the beginnings, confirmed that effectiveness of the right to the effective remedy 
is to be measured in the light of the criteria of the guarantees of the due process of law (Article 
6 of the ECHR).65 Mertens proposes, that Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR – which correspond 
to Articles 8 and 25 of the ACHR – should be “invoked together”.66 Although said conventions 
primarily place foundation for states’ obligations, scholars like Trindade clearly recognize 
individual right to initiate proceedings before international human rights courts, and more 
importantly the guarantees of due process of law, and the right to protection by means of 
compliance with judicial decisions, which according to him constitutes a right of access to 
justice.67 
The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), in a recent study, evaluated 
access to justice within the context of human rights and antidiscrimination laws. While trying 
to define access to justice, FRA’s experts came to the conclusion that it is a multifaceted 
concept which could be portrayed through five different rights: 
1. the right to effective access to a dispute resolution body; 
2. the right to fair proceedings; 
3. the right to timely resolution of disputes;  
4. the right to adequate redress; 
                                                          
63 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2000 No. C364/1. 
64 Article 18, sec 2, of the Dutch Constitution; Article 24, Sec 3, of the Italian Constitution states that: ”the poor 
are entitled by law to proper means for action or defense in all courts” 
65 A.Trindade, ‘The Access of Individuals to International Justice’ (Oxford University Press, 2011) 
66 P. Mertens, Le droit de recours effectif devant les instances nationales en cas de violation d’un droit de 
l’homme, Bruxelles, Éd. de l’Univ. de Bruxelles, 1973, pp. 19–20, 24–5, 27–9, and cf. pp. 37–9 and p.93.  
67 A.Trinidade, p. 71. 
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5. the principles of efficiency and effectiveness’.68 
 
These rights have been an integral part of several international human rights legal frameworks 
and have been transposed to national legislations as the essential principles of law. Due process 
or procedural justice guarantees are at the conjoining point of human rights and procedural law, 
governing civil and criminal proceedings. Since we are mainly interested in dispute resolution 
in civil matters, we are interested to see in what way universal principles of civil law could be 
extracted and how do they correspond to access to justice. 
 
2.2.2. Access to justice and principles of civil law 
 
In the previous section, we source and connect equality, legal aid and due process to human 
rights conventions. Article 6 of the ECHR, according to the jurisprudence of European Court 
of Human Rights in Strasbourg, consists of three elements: 
 a tribunal established by law and fulfilling the imperatives of independence and 
impartiality; 
 a tribunal endowed with a sufficiently wide jurisdiction to pronounce on all the aspects 
of a complaint to which Article 6 of the Convention is applicable; 
 a tribunal to which individuals have free and full access69 
We can also add trial within a reasonable time, as a growing number of cases before European 
Court of Human Rights is confirming the significance of the element of timeliness or efficiency 
in the administration of justice.70 Nevertheless, when we speak about disputes within cloud 
services context we usually have in mind an international element, so we need principles that 
transcend national procedural rules. 
The American Legal Institute (ALI) and the International Institute for the Unification of Private 
Law (UNIDROIT) have undertaken the task of identifying and interpreting a certain number 
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of legal principles that they called principles of transnational civil procedures.71 They itemized 
31 main principles, which we consider all elemental procedural aspects for access to justice in 
judicial/adjudicatory methods of dispute resolution: independence, impartiality, and 
qualifications of the court and its judges, jurisdiction over parties, procedural equality of the 
parties, due notice and right to be heard, languages, prompt rendition of justice, provisional 
and protective measures, structure of the proceedings, party initiative and scope of the 
proceeding, obligations of the parties and lawyers, multiple claims and parties; intervention, 
amicus curiae submission, court responsibility for direction of the proceeding, dismissal and 
default access to information and evidence, sanctions, evidentiary privileges and oral and 
written, public, burden and standard of responsibility for determinations of fact and decision 
and reasoned costs, ,immediate enforceability of judgments, appeal, lis pendens and res 
judicata, effective enforcement, recognition, international judicial cooperation. 
 
Neil Andrews produced a similar but succinct list in his efforts of categorizing principles of 
civil justice which he placed under 4 main headings72: 
 
Regulating access to court and to justice  
1. access to court and to justice (including, where appropriate, promoting settlement and 
facilitating resort to alternative forms of dispute resolution, notably mediation and 
arbitration) 
2. rights of legal representation (right to choose a lawyer; confidential legal consultation; 
representation in legal proceedings) 
3. protection against bad or spurious claims and defenses 
Ensuring the fairness of the process: a responsibility shared by the court and the parties 
4. judicial independence 
5. judicial impartiality 
6. publicity or open justice 
7. procedural equality (equal respect for the parties) 
8. the fair play between the parties 
9. judicial duty to avoid surprise: the principle of due notice 
10. equal access to information, including disclosure of information between parties 
                                                          
71 ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: COUNCIL DRAFT NO. 2 (SEPTEMBER 29, 2003), 
(2003). 
72 NEIL ANDREWS, THE THREE PATHS OF JUSTICE: COURT PROCEEDINGS, ARBITRATION, AND MEDIATION IN ENGLAND (2011). 
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Maintaining a speedy and efficient process 
11. judicial control of the civil process to ensure focus and proportionality (tempered, 
where appropriate, by procedural equity; the process is not to be administered in an 
oppressive manner) 
12. avoidance of undue delay 
Achieving just and effective outcomes 
13. judicial duty to give reasons 
14. the accuracy of decision-making 
15. effectiveness (provision of protective relief and enforcement of judgments) 
16. finality 
 
Principles of civil justice or principles of procedural law were already quilted in legal systems 
through a multitude of international conventions and constitutional guarantees. For our 
consideration, of particular importance should be principle number one, which asserts access 
to justice by promoting alternative dispute resolutions, as an equal or more adequate form of 
dispute resolution in cases where it is appropriate. Having in mind Andrews’ principles were 
arranged for a single legal system based on observation in England, we will reflect later on 
access to justice through ADRs having in mind appropriateness in cloud computing services 
context. 
 
Alan Uzelac synthesizes goals of civil justice to the two main goals in the broadest sense: one, 
resolution of individual disputes by the system of state courts, and two, implementation of 
social goals, functions, and policies.73 However, as he admits, the goals of civil justice are never 
fully separated, and social goals and policies may play a role at the level of system design.74 
He illustrates the interplay between goals with two extreme examples from history. First, in the 
19th century, laissez-faire economy civil litigation considered courts as referees on private 
proceedings, where parties could dispose of their claims freely, and the only role of a court was 
to put an end to a dispute. However, the logic behind simple referees indicated that the matter 
is res judicata only for the parties (and their conflict) but should not be a public’s business.75 
Second, was the Marxist critique of private law, which proclaimed that all bourgeois law is 
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(2014). p.6.  
74 Id. p.6-7. 
75 Id. 
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private law, reflecting an imperialistic capitalistic exploitative system of a government.76 We 
could say that the access to justice movement represents balancing of goals of civil justice; its 
policies, somewhat painted welfare state ideals, and at least from a civil law/procedural law 
aspect were universally accepted when it comes to first two waves of access to justice. 
 
Principles of civil law will be further discussed in Chapter 4 where we examine legal 
framework for disputes over cloud services, and we pay special attention to private 
international law rules determining jurisdiction as they are vital to the issues of access. Our 
focus is influenced by the nature of cloud computing as a cross-border service model with 
difficulty of establishing jurisdiction, and one of the primary concerns of users is being unable 
to access redress in case of need. 
 
Looking at the Neil Andrews’ four headings under which he classifies principles of civil justice 
we easily notice the similarities with FRA’s multifaceted definition of access to justice. Since 
we’re looking at the broader scope of dispute resolution, and not just civil law litigation, we 
need to set the common denominators relative to alternative dispute resolution as well. These 
common denominators could be also seen as indicators but also as goals of said principles. We 
propose four indicators of access to justice that encompass most common methods of dispute 
resolution: 
 
1. Access to a dispute resolution body 
2. Fairness of the process 
3. Efficiency of the process  
4. Effectiveness of the outcomes  
 
Each rational party would prefer a maximum level on any of the indicators. However, having 
in mind the diverse characteristics of different methods of dispute resolution, it is not expected 
of different conflict resolution types to score equally on the spectrum that any of these 
indicators have. Even between two same dispute resolution bodies (e.g., civil courts within a 
single city or a country), we could get different results if we would have researched the cases 
and the obtained level on those indicators after the final outcomes of the cases. Those results 
could vary depending on different aspect or approach to access to justice and also could vary 
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between different jurisdictions.77 Obviously, the data-gathering process is very complicated 
and difficult having in mind some dispute resolution methods are by their nature private and 
closed to the public. 
But we are not focusing on the empirical measurement of the quality of the access to justice as 
that would be the completely different approach in research that would heavily rely on accurate 
empirical data gathering, especially on the outcomes of procedures.78 Such research would 
demand significantly more resources to be able to draw conclusions even on a national scale, 
let alone international.79 We are approaching access to justice from the point of parties 
expectations based on largely non-contestable characteristics of the systems.  
 
 
2.2.3. Access to justice and consumer protection 
 
One of the more interesting effects of the Florence project was that Cappelletti and Garth 
introduced the notion of “diffuse interests”80- the articulation necessary for the groups of people 
who lack access to justice regarding some issues and whose individual position does not suffice 
for adequate protection before courts even with guaranteed equality in rights. Diffuse interests 
have been recognized in consumer, labor, environment, lessees’ issues, etc. and they become 
more apparent when faced against disputant from the opposite side and its relative power. Only 
with the recognition of the inferiority of the legal position of individuals and the need to 
regulate the issue at the collective level, as it touches upon the diffuse interests of the group, 
the regulators could address problems properly and amend inadequacies within regulations. 
This recognition brought forward a significant number of policies and legislative initiatives 
concerning the protection of groups of diffuse interests, introducing both substantive and 
procedural norms to address the issues. 
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The European Union promotes itself as a leader in the field with a long tradition of strong 
consumer protection.81 Consumer protection as a policy in the EU has been fruitful in a number 
of directives and regulations. Substantive mechanisms of consumer protection include 
regulating misleading advertising, provisioning remedies for the poor or defective quality of 
goods and services, unauthorized use of personal data and other ways businesses can use 
deceptive and unfair practices against consumers. The EU also introduced significant 
substantive rules regulating contract law when it comes to consumers, specifically: standard 
terms (e.g., Consumer Rights Directive82 and E-Commerce Directive83 ) and unfair terms 
(Unfair Terms Direct84 ), information disclosure rules, withdrawal rules, privacy protection 
rules (Data Protection Directive85), etc. These rules are going to be discussed in upcoming 
chapters as they are essential for both the context of the disputes and legal environment. 
Correspondingly, substantive rules were complemented with procedural rights that were 
deemed necessary in order to guarantee effective rights and access to justice to consumers. 
Specific mechanisms oriented towards consumers were mechanisms for small claims, 
collective redress, and regulatory agencies dealing with consumers.  
Small claim procedure as an instrument consumer protection was introduced by regulation in 
2007.86 Its primary purpose is not to replace national authorities in dispute resolution, but to 
offer an alternative for cross-border civil and commercial cases when the value of the case is 
not exceeding €2000 (in July 2017 threshold will be raised to €5000). Small claims regulation 
was not intended to be reserved for business- to-consumer (B2C) disputes but also for business-
to-business (B2B) disputes of low value. The intention was to provide a low-cost, efficient and 
simplified form of cross-border redress on the EU level exclusively for transnational disputes. 
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As we will see later, the feasibility of the idea of European small claim procedure largely 
depends on extensive use of information and communication technologies. 
While one`s rights may be recognized as a member of a group or collective, this doesn’t mean 
that consumers seek collective redress on every occasion. Collective redress mechanisms in its 
several forms are designed to allow collective litigation of the group affected by the same unfair 
practice. Recently the EU Commission initiated a discussion on a series of common, non-
binding principles for collective redress mechanisms in the Member States so that citizens and 
companies can enforce the rights granted to them under EU law where these have been 
infringed.87 At this point, it seems that the European Union and its Member States are still not 
on the level of development of collective redress mechanisms of the United States. 
Nonetheless, many scholars consider collective redress mechanisms on the appropriate way to 
handle a huge number of weaker claimants against big business.88 
Regulatory agencies play a bigger role on the member state’s level as there is no European 
consumer ombudsman or similar kind of agent on the EU scale. However, on the national level, 
consumer ombudsmen89 or independent agencies provide significant support and sometimes 
take legal action on behalf of consumers. The role and effectiveness of ombudsman or agency 
largely depend on national regulation and vested powers. 
From a procedural point of view, we need to mention also the Injunctions Directive90 and the 
Legal Aid Directive91 as important instruments in consumer protection and providing legal aid 
in cross-border cases, since international element to the dispute adds to the disadvantaged 
position of consumers. 
Above-mentioned institutions were designed to provide effective redress and access to justice 
for consumers, as well as to act preventively (consumer’s Ombudsman), in order to balance 
pre-existing inequalities and distribution of power between sellers and consumers, from an 
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economic and informational stance. We will address specifics of mentioned redress 
mechanisms later in following chapters.  
Additionally, of particular importance from the point of view of access to justice are the 
mechanisms supporting alternative dispute resolution and online dispute resolution in the EU. 
 
 
2.2.4. Access to justice and methods of dispute resolution  
 
According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, alternative dispute resolution is the procedure 
for settling a dispute by means other than litigation, such as arbitration or mediation.92 This is 
a simplified definition that focuses on the extrajudicial character of ADRs. Looking at the 
methods of alternative dispute resolution, we recognize the same consensual (like negotiation, 
mediation, conciliation, etc.) and adjudicatory (arbitration) dichotomy. The United States have 
a long tradition of using private dispute resolution mechanisms to solve conflicts in different 
fields of application. The rise of ADRs could be attributed to the costs and inefficiencies of 
traditional (especially common law) court systems.93 Praised for the flexibilities and lower 
costs these mechanisms found fruitful grounds in international commerce.94 After all, their first 
significant usage came with the development of Lex Mercatoria in medieval Europe as a 
response to conflicts in cross-border trade.95 With the rise of e-commerce, it is perfectly 
understandable that the use of ICT’s and the Internet led to the appearance of online dispute 
resolution (ODR)-an extension of existing ADR practices by means of new technologies.96 
The promise of cheap, efficient, easy to access dispute resolution mechanisms as seen in ADR 
and ODR, has sparked the interest of EU policymakers in the field of the consumer protection; 
especially its usefulness for cross-border disputes was the selling point in various policy 
documents in last 20 years.97 
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In the first communications on ADR, The EU Commission focused on introducing the 
standardized complaint form which would facilitate communication and beginning phases of 
dispute resolution in a single fashion.98 It was a starting step that paved the way for further 
legislation in the upcoming years, most notably: the Mediation Directive, the ADR Directive, 
and the ODR Regulation. 
The Mediation Directive 2008/52/EC was intended to facilitate cross-border amicable 
settlement of disputes encouraging the use of mediation and by ensuring a balanced relationship 
between mediation and judicial proceedings.99 Albeit it wasn’t aimed solely at consumers, the 
Mediation Directive did not suffice in promoting alternative dispute resolutions, which resulted 
in subsequent and more innovative proposals and finally accepted regulations. 
The ADR Directive 2009/22/EC has a more ambitious agenda on harmonizing various different 
ADRs under a single framework, setting the EU standards in the field and giving mandatory 
instructions to the Member States to set the relevant institutions in support to ADRs under a 
new framework.100 Its scope applies only to consumer disputes, but its provisions are applicable 
to both domestic and cross-border disputes, covering almost every possible alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism. By setting EU standards for ADR and Members states, The Commission 
opened the door by facilitating even easier access to ADRs through a pan-EU ODR platform 
which was introduced in the parallel proposal and adoption of the ODR Regulation. 
The ODR Regulation’s goals is to create an ODR platform at European Union level and that 
such platform should take the form of an interactive website offering a single point of entry to 
consumers and traders seeking to resolve disputes out-of-court which have arisen from online 
transactions, by allowing filing in e-complaint form on all of the official languages of the EU.101 
The success of the ODR platform will largely depend on standards and harmonization set by 
the ADR Directive, applicable to the network of available ADRs in Europe. This network 
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builds on the practices of a network of European Consumer Centres (ECC-Net).102 We will 
discuss in the chapters 5 and 6 positive and negative sides of said regulations and possible side-
effects they could have. 
The previous section illustrates EU’s effort to facilitate access to justice by allowing consumers 
the most accessible redress through ADRs. Sometimes, it is the only realistic means of settling 
the disputes, having in mind context of cross-border shopping where placing consumers in 
unfair legal position leads to a lack of trust in e-commerce in general and lack of access to 
justice in the view of the relevant international legal framework. 
By enhancing consumer protection, the European Union reveals its preference to just 
advancements in positions of certain less advantaged groups, of Cappelletti and Garth’s diffuse 
interest. Even though all the policies and actions were not coming from specific philosophical 
stances or by invoking philosophical discussions, we can look for understanding or support of 
these social policies within philosophical discourses, especially on the distribution of social 
responsibilities and fairness of institutions. For that purpose, we need to explain what we 
consider to be just distribution or fairness in distribution.  
 
 
 
3. Justice as fairness 
 
3.1. The concept of justice 
 
The notion of justice has been contemplated in the minds of philosophers for a long 
time. It has been also very common theme in art, giving rise to a somewhat vague concept of 
“poetic justice”, whose origins could also be traced to Plato.103 It usually represents the 
deserved punishment of an actor in the story. Such artistic concept could be linked in an ethical 
or philosophical discussion about justice and its relation with moral desert- the concept of 
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deserving something according to one’s actions or virtues.104 Insightful and concise description 
of justice was the subject of writings of many philosophers, but the difficulty of a clear 
definition of the concept of justice had always confronted them, by strenuous effort to produce 
abstract concept applicable to all or majority of situations. 105 
The earliest notable contemplations about justice and its role in society in western philosophy 
are attributed to Plato and Aristotle. In Plato’s “Republic”, justice is mentioned as a 
compilation of virtues in Socrate’s treaties on issues of justice in the city, but also the idea 
(spoken by Polemarchus) that justice is all about giving people what is their due according to 
our sense of right.106 However, a more concrete definition of what is might not articulated in 
the discussion of Plato’s Republic.  
Aristotle in an attempt to describe justice, proposes at maxim to treat equal things equally and 
unequal things unequally.107 Aristotle also proposed a distinction between distributive and 
corrective justice.108 Distributive justice, according to Aristotle, is dividing benefits and 
burdens fairly among members of a community. Corrective justice would be a way to restore 
a fair balance in interpersonal relations where it has been lost. When a member of a community 
has been unfairly benefited or burdened with more or less than is deserved in the way of social 
distributions, then corrective justice can be summoned by a court of law or some other 
mechanism. His division would later be in theory widely accepted and built upon in 
distinguishing distributive and retributive justice. It also relates to the distinction between 
distributive and procedural justice, which is more widely used in contemporary political 
philosophy. 
Still, the question of justice in law remains. Even though he makes reference to Aristotelian 
concepts of justice as the proper balance of rights duties and goods between two parties109, 
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Kelsen recognizes the subjective interpersonal notion of justice and chooses to build his “pure 
theory” of law without reference to morals or justice of norms, based on moral values within 
this relations.110 He sees them as a matter of discussion in political philosophy and not the 
foundation of legal theory. 
Hart explains that “the distinctive features of justice and their special connection with law begin 
to emerge if it is observed that most of the criticisms made in terms of just and unjust could 
almost equally well be conveyed by the words 'fair' and 'unfair'”.111 He also recognizes that 
justice is traditionally thought of as maintaining or restoring a balance or proportion and 
treating like cases alike (and vice versa different things differently)112. He places significant 
emphasis on equality as the foundational principle of justice and distinguishes a just law from 
a just application of a law113. From a procedural point of view he emphasizes principles of 
impartiality and objectivity as in Latin phrase 'audi alteram partem.'114 Additionally to the equal 
treatment of parties, he also observes that sometimes discrimination is required from a point of 
view of specific needs or specific capacities of parties (e.g., the legal capacity of children to 
make contracts). As with Kelsen, Hart discusses justice as a digression or side note explanation 
to his primary legal theory. His positions on justice and morality became even more obvious 
in the Hart-Fuller debate, where Hart argued for a separation of positive law and morality, 
while Fuller grounds positive law in the morality, indicating that the morality is the source of 
binding power of positive law.115 
It is also necessary to mention utilitarian ideas, pioneered by Bentham and Mill, where justice 
is the total maximum sum of individual well-being/utility/happiness. Justice, according to them 
is not an intrinsic value, but the measured value that is expressed rationally in different 
situations. 116 
Looking at the said philosophers, the idea of equality and equal treatment was the main pillar 
in the discourse on justice. But from a normative legal point of view, it was only after the 
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emergence of the theory of John Rawls that the discussion about justice gained new grounds 
and fresh interest in modern legal and political theory. 
 
 
3.2. Rawls’ theory of justice 
 
As an answer to the utilitarian concept of justice as a maximizing of benefits, and drawing 
from a Kantian moral philosophy, Rawls revitalized interest for the concept of justice in 
political theory in the second half of the 20th century. Rawls’ paper “Justice as Fairness”, which 
he later extended into a substantial book called “Theory of Justice”, sparked discussions about 
the abstract concept of justice and its role in society. 
 
3.2.1. Principles of justice 
 
Rawls uses the idea of social contract117, already well known in philosophy, as the 
foundation for his arguments, and modifies it into his own thought experiment which he dubbed 
“original position”118. According to Rawls, principles of justice could be attained if people 
would rationally decide upon rules, by which they will be governed, from the original position 
under “the veil of ignorance”119. The veil of ignorance is a metaphorical explanation of inability 
of people in an original position to know which group of society they belong to or which natural 
characteristics or traits they possess. In the original position, people blinded by the veil of (self) 
ignorance, would according to Rawls, choose rationally rules and principles from the point of 
risk (as they do not know what would be their interest but, they would be willing to minimize 
the risk in case of ending in socially less advantaged group). He asserted this kind of reasoning 
as the “maximin” principle. 
Governed by the rationale of the maximin principle, and deciding from the original position 
covered by the veil of ignorance, people would determine rules based on fairness. The fairness 
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from this original position was abstracted into two famous principles of justice, according to 
John Rawls: 
 First principle: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. 
 Second principle: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to 
positions and offices open to all. 120 
Rawls also imposes lexical priority to the first principle over the second one.121 The priority 
clearly indicates his devotion to liberty of people, which stands in contrast with the egalitarian 
notion of equality as a starting point. However, he guarantees an equal right to the most 
extensive scheme of equal basic liberties. By basic liberties he understands political liberty (the 
right to vote and to hold public office) and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of 
conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person, which includes freedom from 
psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person); 
the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by 
the concept of the rule of law.122 These principles are considered equal by Rawls.  
 
Rawls second principle is a cornerstone of his philosophy. Being also called “the difference 
principle”, it is his most recognizable idea that the social and economic inequalities are to be 
distributed, so that worst off members of society are to benefit from such inequalities. The 
interpretation of this second principle could have various implications on societies’ tax policies, 
social programs, property, etc. 
 
We would also like to emphasize at this point that Rawls didn’t include freedom of doing 
business or freedom to contract within basic liberties: “Of course, liberties not on the list, for 
example, the right to own certain kinds of property (e.g.,, means of production) and freedom 
of contract as understood by the doctrine of laissez-faire are not basic; and so they are not 
protected by the priority of the first principle”.123 However, the fact that freedom (or right) of 
                                                          
120 RAWLS, supra note 118 
121 Id.p.220 “The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be restricted 
only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases: (a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of 
liberty shared by all, and (b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those citizens with the lesser 
liberty”.  
122 Id. 53. 
123 Id. 54. 
36 
 
the contract is not under the scope of the first principle doesn’t mean that specific aspects of 
the contract or private law that are grounded in public or constitutional law are to be completely 
disregarded as being irrelevant  to Rawls principles.  
 
 
3.2.2. Basic structure of society 
 
Although his principles tend to be universal, as they were the result of the reasoning from 
an original position, Rawls recognizes that there are certain requirements that need to be met, 
in order to allow principles of justice. These requirements which he calls “background 
conditions” are needed for “basic structure of society” which is the set of major social 
institutions that need to cooperate with single scheme.124 By institutions, he understands a 
public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers 
and immunities, and the like.125 It is understood that the basic structure of society is requirement 
and domain of application of his theory, but Rawls does not give a clear explanation of all the 
institutions of the basic structure of society. The basic structure is the primary subject of 
Rawlsian justice. And while he speaks about the constitution and constitutional law as parts of 
the basic structure of society, clarification is needed on exactly which legal institutions should 
be considered within this basic structure of society and therefore under the influence of 
principles of justice. 
 
The scope of basic structure from the point of contracts has been debated.126 A narrow 
interpretation of Rawls basic structure excludes most of the contract law, as private regulation 
of parties’ rights and duties, from the scope of his theory and therefore his principles of justice. 
One of the reasons for this kind of interpretation is Rawls explanation and distinction from 
Lockean reasoning about justice as a local relational concept between individuals.127 He negates 
this local justice concept and demands the basic structure as a prerequisite for the more 
universal abstract concept of justice. For him, justice is a social concept and not merely an 
aspect of the relationship between individual persons conducting private transactions.128 
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According to Kordana and Tabachnik claims of justice made by Rawls are not simply a matter 
of informed consensual transactions between persons, but instead must be defined, in some 
measure, in terms of whether or not certain conditions exist in the background to individual (or 
local) transactions.129 They conclude: “the necessity of background conditions to social justice 
creates a demand for basic structure that establishes these conditions”130 
 
3.2.3. Procedural justice  
 
To better explain his theory, Rawls introduces the notion of treating the question of distributive 
shares as a matter of pure procedural justice. Pure procedural justice is the idea of social system 
design so that the outcome of the process is always just as long as it is in a certain range.131 He 
further explained his pure procedural justice in contrast to perfect and imperfect procedural 
justice. The distinction between these three types of procedural justice is centered on the 
existence of independent criterion of fairness. 
 
Perfect procedural justice guarantees the just outcome through existence and application of the 
independent criterion of fairness. Rawls illustrates perfect procedural justice with the example 
of division of cake:  
 
“A number of men are to divide a cake: assuming that the fair division is an equal one, which 
procedure, if any, will give this outcome? Technicalities aside, the obvious solution is to have 
one man divide the cake and get the last piece, the others being allowed their pick before him. 
He will divide the cake equally since in this way he assures for himself the largest share 
possible. This example illustrates the two characteristic features of perfect procedural justice. 
First, there is an independent criterion for what is a fair division, a criterion defined separately 
from and prior to the procedure which is to be followed. And second, it is possible to devise a 
procedure that is sure to give the desired outcome.”132 
 
Therefore the criteria for perfect procedural justice could be determined in advance and if the 
procedure is properly applied leads to a fair outcome. In the given an example equal treatment 
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or division by a cake cutter is insured by his incentive to cut as equal as possible to get the most 
of the cake. 
 
Obviously perfect procedural justice is difficult to reach in a practical situation. We are quite 
more accustomed to imperfect procedural justice. Within imperfect procedural justice, we have 
an independent criterion of fairness, but we cannot guarantee that the process will lead to just 
outcomes.133 We take an example of imperfect procedural justice in criminal trials. The criteria 
for fairness in criminal law in broader terms would be that, if guilty, it is fair to sentence a party 
to appropriate punishment. However, it is difficult to design legal rules that they always lead 
to correct results and even though a procedure is conducted by the law, an innocent man could 
be found guilty (while they, in fact, are innocent). 
 
By contrast to imperfect procedural justice, pure procedural justice doesn’t have an 
independent criterion of fairness, so the results of the process are fair by itself, provided that 
the procedure was followed properly.134 This type of procedural justice is illustrated by 
gambling. Results and division made through gambling are fair if we had proper process of 
gambling (no cheating etc.) A distinctive feature of pure procedural justice is that the procedure 
for determining the just result must actually be carried out in order to have fair results. 
 
Rawls requires setting up an administration of the just system of institutions, in order to apply 
pure procedural justice to the distribution of societal shares. The second part of the second 
principles of justice, so-called principle of fair opportunity is required in order to ensure the 
system of cooperation by pure procedural justice.  
 
Rawlsian fairness as a foundation of procedural justice can be found in works of modern 
scholars like Julia Hörnle, who extracts specific building blocks for procedural fairness in 
dispute resolution.135 Her definition of fairness in dispute resolution consists of three main 
principles: equal treatment, a rational approach to decision-making and effectiveness.136 
Effectiveness is specifically comprised of general access and mechanisms to counter-balance 
existing procedural inequalities between the parties (the “counterpoise”). The difference 
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principle, as in Rawls second principle, was the most influential for construing the counterpoise 
requirement between parties in the process as fairness. 
 
Julia Hörnle also distinguishes a fourth type of procedural justice: quasi-pure procedural 
justice. It is one where the rules also defined the outcome as fair, but the rules themselves could 
be contentious since it’s not statistically verifiable whether or not they lead to fair results.137 
The role of a quasi-pure procedural justice is to define the limits of discretion of decision-
makers while deciding on fair outcomes if there are more fair outcomes possible.138 
 
Some authors place Rawlsian principles of fairness as an influence or as an additional 
dimension to the existing body of procedural rules that have been established, with the goal of 
ultimately creating more just institutions. Stefan Wrbka, argues that Rawlsian value-oriented 
justice should complement procedural justice to be pillars of, as he coined it, “access to justice 
2.0”.139  
 
Having in mind all of the above, we distinguish two types of procedural justice. First, 
procedural justice in the sense of fair outcomes that are consequential to the procedure, with or 
without independent criterion (with or without of idea of just outcome); this is procedural 
justice observed from the point of view of outcomes.  Second, (pure) procedural justice in the 
design of procedural rules: procedural justice as fairness. While giving an example of an 
independent criterion for fairness in criminal law procedure, Rawls did not explain how we as 
a society come to independent criterion in the first place.  However, it is implied when Rawls 
talks about “the four-stage sequence” in the application of the two principles of justice that 
society gradually goes through in order to build basic structure.140 In the first phase, a group of 
people in the original position, covered by the veil of ignorance, decides upon the first 
principles according to maximin logic; according to Rawls, they formulate the two principles 
of justice. In the second phase, the veil is partially lifted, to receive some information on 
circumstances, so the people could decide about the constitution.141 In the third phase, with the 
assumption that the principles of justice influenced the group to deliver a just constitution, the 
veil is lifted even more so that, with the additional information and a fair political procedure, 
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the group can enact legislation in accordance with the two principles and the constitution. 
Finally, the fourth stage is the stage of application of rules by judges, administrators, and 
people. In the final stage, everyone has complete access to all the facts.142 These four stages 
illustrate the influence of fairness, particularly fairness of procedure on “background 
conditions” of the system. Of course, these stages are for illustrative purposes and not a 
proposal for actual legislative processes.143 In assessing the fairness of positive legal 
framework, we are assessing virtual work on the third stage and its compliance with the 
established two principles of justice and just constitution and comparing it with positive legal 
norms that distribute rights and duties.   
 
 
3.3. Critique of Rawls and alternate theories  
 
3.3.1. Nozick’s libertarian response 
 
Shortly following the publication of Rawls theory of justice, his colleague from Harvard, 
Robert Nozick in his book “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” criticized the theory from a libertarian 
point of view.144 Nozick is trying to defend the theory that even though the state has the 
monopoly on coercion, it should not be involved in the redistribution of income and wealth as 
this is not a legitimate use of state coercion. He criticized Rawls for emphasizing benefits to 
society while advocating as he called it “separateness of persons”. Contrary to that, Nozick 
prioritizes individual goods over common goods. According to him, there is no societal entity, 
but there are only different individual people in their own interests.145 
He proposes “the entitlement theory of justice” in holdings which consist of three main 
principles: 
1. a person who acquires the holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
acquisition is entitled to that holding 
2. a person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
transfer, from someone else entitled to that holding, is entitled to the holding. 
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3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2.146 
Nozick’s libertarian response to Rawls theory illustrates the difference both from the 
philosophical point as well as the practical side. Arguing for states to restraint from private 
transactions as well as minimal involvement in public affairs has been accustomed to the 
laissez-faire and neoliberal economic models. As we will argue later in the thesis, these models 
are also demonstrable in a cloud economy, where terms of service set in click-through 
agreements, imposing conditions which are considered unfair by many legal scholars, even if 
libertarians like Nozick disagree.147 Both Rawls and Nozick are committed to liberty as the 
foundation of their theories. However, Nozick is opposing any kind of intervention in 
individual liberty on the grounds of social or economic equality, since he perceives it as an 
illegitimate coercion over the entitled holder. 
And even though he claims that the complete principle of distributive justice is simply put as 
“…a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the 
distribution”148, he doesn’t give sufficient explanation what does he mean by principle of justice 
and acquisition and principle of justice in transfer. He, however, hints that his understanding 
of legitimate acquisition and transfer corresponds to legal institutions and regulation of 
property acquisition and transfer of ownership by accepted legal system. He further 
differentiates his ideas about justice from Rawls by advocating a non-patterned approach, one 
accustomed to libertarian views against the patterned idea of liberalism.149 
Both Rawls` patterned approach and Nozick’s non-patterned approach are based upon 
contemplation of a single society and justice within it. We would argue that Nozick’s principles 
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logically indicate (as well as the title of his book) that having discussed justice within a single 
state (or a single society) and proposing a laissez-faire doctrine (or just minimal intervention) 
as a model for what is fair, it would not be a big stretch to conclude that it would apply as a 
guiding principle to international matters as well: if conditions of the principles of justice in 
acquisition are met then justice lies in whatever the outcomes of the international contracts 
between parties may be.  
 
3.3.2. Communitarian and global justice 
 
So far we have only focused on two theories on distributive justice, where one stands in 
contrast to another. It is only fitting to mention some other theories and the briefly describe 
them for later reference and argumentation when discussing our positions towards access to 
justice. 
Michael Walzer advocates a communitarian approach to justice which is dependent on goods, 
or rather sets of complex goods that could be identified as primary goods. He is also pointing 
to the necessity of defining primary goods in accordance to a specific society150. All societies 
are not alike, and therefore their preferences are not the same. There is a spatial and temporal 
dimension to the goods that are identified as primary according to a certain society. He 
considers the theory of (complex) goods an essential prerequisite for justice. Inability to 
identify common goods would exclude the need for a society to regulate just distribution. He 
believes that justice is a moral standard associated with a particular society or nation, while he 
is reserved to the idea of an abstract universal notion of justice. We would argue that Walzers’s 
communitarian approach is difficult to put in the practical term when it comes to regulating 
international private relationship, especially where parties could come from different cultural 
backgrounds and different expectations. 
Another contemporary communitarian philosopher is Michael Sandel who is arguing that the 
benefits of a community outweigh individual liberties.151 According to Sandel, justice 
determines what is right according to the goods and values that are established within a 
community, and not individually. He especially criticizes Rawls for abstracting principles of 
justice while divorcing them from individual values by using the thought experiment of the veil 
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of ignorance. Same as with Walzer, it would be difficult to establish global values, other than 
in some general terms, that could be practically applicable in the context of, for instance, private 
international relationships. 
Amartya Sen proposes a capabilities approach where justice is evaluated through the prism of 
human capabilities and in connections with human rights.152 Sen proposes a comparable 
alternative to Rawls thought experiment of the veil of ignorance, but instead of insisting on not 
knowing his own position in society, he insists on impartiality of the one who decides. He calls 
them impartial spectators. It is safe to state here that the impartiality is a recurring theme and 
is essential for the notion of fairness or justice. 
Thomas Pogge, while being a critic of John Rawls’ theory of justice, extends his ideas and 
concepts even further to the international arena.153 Even Rawls conceded that his ideas are 
based on a single society, which usually could be placed in a single nation or state, and any 
attempt to international justice would be done through the cooperation of states. Pogge rejects 
criticism of Rawls by the likes of Nozick and Sandel and reinforces Rawls’ central ideas that 
the morality or justice must reflect upon our basic social institutions and that the justice of 
institutions is to be assessed by how well are its worst off participants. Pogge develops his own 
interpretation of Rawls’s principles of justice, relating it to different fundamental rights, the 
ideal and the just organizations of institutions. From our point of view most importantly Pogge 
pushes for extending the Rawlsian criterion of justice to the international arena and attempts to 
identify justice as the main criterion for international institutional reforms.  
 
3.4. Independent criterion of fairness 
 
To be able to answer the primary research question of the thesis, we need to define 
appropriateness for dispute resolution in cloud services’ context. We define appropriateness 
through the fair distribution of rights and duties having in mind the context. In the first step of 
painting the picture of what is appropriate, we are aiming for justice, as it should be the final 
outcome of any dispute resolution. Lacking the proper way to measure justice outcomes for 
possible disputes154, we turn to procedural justice as a means to produce just final outcomes 
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following a certain procedure. Rawls distinguishes perfect, imperfect and pure procedural 
justice, where independent criterions of fairness are known only in first two types. Nonetheless, 
in cases where we do not know the independent criterion of fairness, he proposes the use of 
pure procedural justice, by going to the “original position” with “veil of ignorance” covering 
our eyes, and to reflect on fair solutions.  Rawls assumes that people following the maximin 
principle (minimization of risks) would choose two overarching general principles of justice 
he formulated. The two principles of justice help us formulate an independent criterion of 
fairness relative to the context and issues we are facing.  
Robert Nozick’s approach, where justices is a result of freedom and individual negotiation, is 
not particularly fair (in Rawls’ sense of fairness behind the veil of ignorance) especially having 
in mind potential lack of negotiation power, which could deprive the powerless of justice. If 
Nozick’s philosophy would allow for intervention in terms of power relations, rendering some 
situations unfair, we would still remain without the criterion of fairness or justice other than 
what is already available in the form of established rules through various regulations due to a 
current power setting of a libertarian society. Nozick’s defense of individualism doesn’t help 
in our search for a criterion of fairness, but in fact, leaves the markets to regulate themselves. 
In looking for the criterion for appropriateness for dispute resolution in cloud scenarios, the 
“veil of ignorance” and the “difference principle” are better tools when faced with ambiguities 
and complexities of regulating disputes and steering potential choices among appropriate 
means to settle the dispute. 
Communitarian approaches require identification of common goods prior deliberation on 
justice. To identify common goods, we need to examine the context of our research: cloud 
service disputes. The cloud market is international in its nature, meaning cross-border 
transactions are quite usual, with the diversity of providers and users with unequal negotiation 
power and a variety of interests and cultures. If we observe global cloud “community”, it would 
be difficult to reduce the interest of the various stakeholders in a community of identifiable 
common goods, or even if identify them they would be loosely based concepts and the principle 
that are already part of the legal framework. If we focus on smaller niches, we would have to 
assess goods in specific smaller communities but then it could be inconsistent with other 
communities and would get a combination of communitarian and libertarian market regulation 
approach. Sen’s capabilities approach, with cross-cultural awareness, given the global market, 
makes it harder to develop criteria that are universally recognized, unless we reduce our 
consideration to a similar position like in Rawls starting point.  
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Pogge, on the other hand, accepts Rawls’ arguments and extends them to the criterion for 
international institutions. This is the step that Rawls himself didn’t propose, but remained in 
single society frame, leaving international justice to agreements between the states. 
Sympathetic to Pogge’s arguments and searching for an independent criterion, we have to turn 
to existing sets of procedural rules defining general procedural justice principles under various 
terms: the right to a fair trial, due process, access to justice, etc. Since access to justice is a bit 
more general in relation to due process and the right to a fair trial, encompassing both of them 
and more, we’re taking  the access to justice as a common denominator through which we can 
get closer to the independent criterion of fairness having in mind Rawlsian principles. 
Building on Rawls idea of fairness as a decision making the process from an original position 
behind a veil of ignorance, and its influence on background conditions of society, we need to 
observe access to justice from the Rawlsian point of view.   
 
 
4. Access to justice as Rawlsian fairness  
 
All of what has been written so far leads us to the question: what is the relationship between 
access to justice and fairness? What is an independent criterion or criteria of fairness when it 
comes to dispute resolution mechanisms? Simply put, the connection, and the focus of our 
interest is the fairness of the background conditions and institutions that are essential to access 
to justice; and its fair setting where the distribution of rights and duties is to the greatest benefit 
to the least advantaged. 
While access to justice can be a matter of choice, due to party autonomy that allows parties to 
freely regulate and choose dispute resolution mechanism, under certain restrictions, we do not 
intend to propose intervention in the will of the parties expressed in the contracts. Rawls also 
excluded private orderings and contracts from the scope of his subject matter. He does not 
include freedom to contract within the scope of basic liberties. If we would compare the right 
to hold property to the contract law, he expressly states that even the right to hold property is 
not the basic liberty and therefore not the subject to the first principle of justice. However, the 
right to hold property entails social and economic matters and indirectly fall under the scope 
of the second principle-the difference principle. Mutatis mutandis, the same logic should apply 
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to contract law, and while the direct distribution of rights and duties by private parties should 
not be under the scope of the difference principle, the various institutions supporting, enabling 
or imposing provisions of contract law are to be considered under the second principle.155 These 
institutions and rules form the background conditions of society and have to be in line with the 
just constitution as indicated by Rawls. They are the subject of the third stage - the legislative 
deliberation with the imperative to be in line with the principles of justice and the just 
constitution. Hence, substantive and procedural rules defining the position of the party, even if 
the party is free to dispose of with some of the default rights, are subject to the Rawls’ principles 
of justice. 
Since we are talking about dispute resolution, offered by dispute resolution mechanisms, which 
provide the essential social function of conflict resolution, either by a state or by a state 
approved private scheme, it falls under the constitutional level of deliberation in the second 
stage of Rawls’ four stages, as it is constitutional category in law. The issues of equal access 
to justice, right to a fair trial and right to effective remedy, fall under the human rights specter 
of law and are usually guaranteed in the constitutions, thus any derogation or distribution is of 
significance to fair background condition as a subject matter of the second principle of justice. 
Human rights are universally applicable to natural persons and come closest to the logic of 
deciding behind the veil of ignorance on a global scale. Principles of civil law, often extracted 
from human rights, are also governing principles of an institution of law, essential for the rule 
of law in society. As such it clearly is the subject matter of principles of justice. 
Even if we consider Rawls’ restriction to the single state or nation as grounds for his ideas, in 
the context of international commerce, where parties contract under various legal frameworks 
to which the single state or state of the relevant nation conceded, it is still under the scope of 
Rawls’ principles. We don’t see how we can completely divorce regulating peoples or 
institutions of a state and disregarding the international element simply because the group of a 
single state did not participate solely in creating the extensive scheme of liberties and right 
under the principles of justice. The act of regulating the Constitution that allows the 
government in all its forms to interact and sign international conventions, is by itself by the 
people from the people, and hence obligatory to the people, and should be just. Finally, when 
it comes to a single state or a nation in Rawls teaching, we could argue that it could extend at 
least to a single market, as in EU internal market. The Union is a supranational organization 
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that has attributes of a federal state in many aspects, especially regulatory which in turn could 
be influenced by Rawls philosophy.  
Now that we have pointed that regulating the institutions of access to justice fall under the 
justice principles, we can reflect also on the idea of the similarity behind Rawls philosophy and 
logic behind the development of access to justice movement. The difference principle promotes 
the positions of the disadvantaged:”… social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage…” One of the 
reiterations of the same principle, especially in the context of multiple worse off parties, is 
explicitly reformulated to:”… are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest 
expected benefit of the least advantaged….”156 Through advancement in access to justice over 
time and extension of its breadth, we can notice a similar thread of improving the position of a 
party or a group that is worse off. Even though this movement largely predates Rawls and his 
philosophy, it sheds light on principles of fairness underpinning the idea of access to justice.  
And while an intuitive notion of fairness based on equality was sufficient for the development 
of the ideas of access to justice, we believe that philosophical support is needed in justification 
of certain policies, especially of the third wave of access to justice. Even if we deal primarily 
with the procedural aspects of access to justice, they are also defined and limited with socio-
economic positions of the individuals and require legislative intervention that improves their 
procedural position (i.e. consumers). 
Both substantial and procedural aspects of fairness, have an influence on access to justice as 
more generalized notion that is intrinsic to the access to justice. We are treating access to 
(procedural) justice, primarily. We are also using (procedural) justice as fairness methodology 
to deliberate on what is just or fair. Therefore to assess the first term as the subject by the 
second term as methodology we are formulating access to justice as fairness.  
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4.1. Theoretical framework for access to justices as fairness  
 
We selected the four indicators of key concepts of access to justice that encompass all or 
majority of traits in different methods of civil dispute resolution as proposed earlier (in section 
2.2.2): 
1. Access to a dispute resolution body 
2. Fairness of the process 
3. Efficiency of the process  
4. Effectiveness of the outcomes  
 
And while the specific principles that serve to these four goals (like judicial independence) are 
difficult to compare in an exact manner when it comes, for instance to the comparison between 
court proceedings and an arbitrage, they are sufficiently comparable, due to the characteristics 
of the two processes to be placed in opposition to each other and to draw conclusion which 
form of dispute resolution is superior in certain aspects (i.e., judicial independence guarantees 
are in general higher in judicial proceedings than in arbitrages due to the formal and procedural 
requirements). We will be guided by the broader classification that Neil Andrews devised.157 
In order to explore the context of the dispute, we need to know the characteristics of each 
possible method of dispute resolution. It will be the subject of the subsequent chapters to assess 
and evaluate each method relative to each other and put in a frame of the limitation imposed 
by various regulation or “background conditions”. As we finally get the picture of how the 
methods of dispute resolution stand relative to each other within specific context, it will be 
again the subject of reflective equilibrium and using the principles of justice, notably the 
difference principle, to establish what do we consider to be the fairest method, considering 
abovementioned goals, and how the background conditions could improve to obtain the goals 
reasonably to everyone’s advantage.  
 
Now that we have established the main indicators in our conceptual framework, we need to 
operationalize those four aspects and to further elaborate them into more observable 
components.158 We propose 9 variables which set the stage for further examination of the 
performance of different ADR mechanisms.  These variables are parts of the key concepts or 
                                                          
157 NEIL ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1994). 
158 The method of operationalization has been modeled by Percy Williams Bridgman  ideas presented in The 
Logic of Modern Physics is a 1927. 
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indicators that elaborate on them and could be measured or observed in some aspects. While 
we do not intend to measure directly but to use indirect sources of data since a good number of 
empirical studies, have focused on some aspect of them and data on specific disputes are 
protected by confidentiality in many dispute resolution mechanisms. Selected variables would 
be availability of dispute resolution body, accessibility to dispute resolution body, 
independence and impartiality, equality of arms, rules on costs of dispute resolution, duration 
of processes, costs, success rate, and enforcement of outcome. Each variable will be observed 
and quantified (if possible). To break down on the variables, we introduce more quantifiable 
elements on each of them, and we will focus on them as primary input on variables. The 
operationalization of the key concepts will be through following questions: 
1. Do jurisdictional rules or competence rules allow or make available use of a dispute 
resolution mechanism in regards to clouds dispute context? 
2.  Do travel costs, language, and need of professional help, impede the access to DR relative 
to the low value of the dispute.  
3. Are there procedural guarantees in place for transparency and fairness in 
selection/appointment procedure of adjudicators/neutrals? 
4.  Are there procedural guarantees in place to ensure equality of arms in presenting the case? 
5. Are the rules for the cost of dispute resolution prohibitive for small value or other disputes 
in cloud dispute context? 
6.  Could average time of proceedings before DR, measured by average time spent to resolve 
the issue, be described as fast relative to others forms of DR? 
7. Are the average costs of the proceeding before DR, measured by average institution fees per 
case, high compared to others forms of DR? 
8. Is the voluntary compliance necessary for the success of the dispute resolution? 
9. How many legal actions are needed for the enforcement? 
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These are presented in the table: 
  
 Framework: 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
Rawlsian 
fairness in 
access to 
justice 
  
Or  
  
Access to 
justice as 
fairness 
  
  Key 
concepts 
/indicators 
 
Variables  How different dispute resolution mechanisms 
compare in following operational definitions 
 
Access  Availability of dispute 
resolution body 
 
 
 Accessibility to dispute 
resolution body 
 Jurisdiction/competence allow or make 
available dispute resolution entity? 
 
 
 Do travel costs, language, professional 
help impede in access to the body? 
Procedural 
fairness 
 Independence and 
impartiality  
 
 
 Equality of arms 
 
 
 
 Rules on costs of DR 
 Are there guarantees for transparency 
and fairness in selection/appointment 
procedure? 
 
 Are there guarantees that each party has 
the reasonable possibility to present its 
cause? 
 Who bears the costs of proceedings and 
in what manner? 
Efficiency  Duration of processes  
 
 
 Costs  
 Average time needed for completion of 
process 
 
 Average costs of the proceeding 
(institution fee) 
Effectiveness  Success Rate 
 
 Enforcement of outcome 
  
 Is the voluntary compliance with 
outcome necessary? 
 
 How many steps needed for the 
enforcement? 
 
 
Table 1. Conceptual framework for research 
In order to bring down the abstract concepts to observable level we had to devise variables that 
are an essential part of the concepts and that are applicable to all or majority of observable 
dispute resolutions.159 We did not want to put emphasis on a single concept, so we sought a 
balanced inquiry. Of course, many more variables and questions could have been proposed but 
limitations placed on our research in time and resources influenced drawing up an achievable 
scope. More than 9 could potentially be too much and with each additional, the potential 
workload increases and focus drifts. Since we had to place some limitation to the framework, 
we decided that 9 would be appropriate for the purposes of the thesis. 
When it comes to the concept of access, we proposed availability that is focused on regulatory 
aspects of jurisdiction and competences of different entities. Jurisdiction could be influenced 
by mandatory regulation and contractual grounds, while competences also determine whether 
                                                          
159 See more in Chapter 5 on different forms of dispute resolution and how they interact 
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a dispute resolution body is capable of handling a specific dispute, whether on consensual or 
mandatory grounds.  Placing definition into the strict legal terminology of judicial system limits 
the aspects of ADR, so we approach it through the wider term of availability. Accessibility is 
focused on other obstacles, and since reoccurring issues in international disputes are travel 
costs, language, professional help, we chose to focus on them.  
Looking at the procedural rules for different dispute resolution bodies, we get an impression of 
variety and possible feeling of comparing apples and oranges when it comes to certain forms 
of dispute resolution (i.e. mediation and court procedure). Therefore, we need a common 
denominator, a common baseline that applies to all the forms of dispute resolution. We draw 
inspiration from a regulatory instrument that set such common standards for various disputes 
resolution bodies without having to specify the details for each.160 Since all those elements (and 
more) could be found in the judiciary, the common denominator was established. Rules on the 
cost of dispute resolution have to be differentiated from efficiency through costs, as these are 
procedural aspects dealing with issues for example: does losing party bear all the costs of 
waging disputes, including other party’s attorney’s fees. These rule could directly incentivize 
or dissuade potential disputants, hence they are appropriate in access to justice model.161  
Different aspects of efficiency could be observed, but we had to consider our resources and 
availability of data in mostly confidentiality cloaked private dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Hence, we selected two most pertinent ones to give a solid comparable picture on different 
dispute resolution bodies. Most of those nine variables proposed could be researched from the 
point of efficiency as a thesis for itself.  Thus, the framing of the model has to be limited to few 
relevant aspects with accessible data.  
We observe the effectiveness of dispute resolution mechanisms by looking at their outcomes. 
The outcomes of dispute resolution mechanisms vary significantly due to the fact that the 
mechanisms by itself are different and sometimes intended or selected for different purposes. 
There are several methods to measure the effectiveness of the dispute resolution. All these 
methods require some form of extensive empirical research into the produced effects of the 
outcomes, satisfaction, and perception of the process and the outcome, perception of justice 
                                                          
160 See more in Chapter 5 and 6 on ADR Directive.  
161 CHRISTOPHER J. S. HODGES, STEFAN VOGENAUER & MAGDALENA. TULIBACKA, THE COSTS AND FUNDING OF CIVIL LITIGATION : A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2010). 
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(procedural or substantive) reached through the process, etc.162 Given the variety of possible 
disputes, parties to the dispute (consumers, enterprises), international aspects of the dispute, 
complex international legal framework and potential technical aspects of the dispute, it would 
be hard to devise methodology that encompasses all of these facets and produce significant 
conclusions on the outcomes, other than general observations already established by previous 
research under different methodologies and interpretations. Because of the variety of dispute 
resolution mechanisms and respective regulations we chose to focus on two aspects of dispute 
resolution process which are essential for the effectiveness of all different dispute resolution 
mechanisms. These two aspects answer our questions from conceptual framework regarding 
effectiveness: is the voluntary compliance necessary for the success of the dispute resolution 
and how many legal actions are needed for the enforcement? The first addresses the issue of 
voluntary compliance and how success rate of the proceeding could depend on will of the 
opposing party. If after all the steps in the process, one party simply refuses to comply with 
recommendation or agreement, then no matter how accessible, efficient or fair the process is, 
the outcome is ineffective. Therefore is important to see what is the success rate based on 
voluntary compliance and how it could be improved.  Having an enforcement mechanism 
available is an incentive for voluntary compliance, but the question is how many legal steps, 
especially in international adjudication are necessary to obtain enforcement of decision. If the 
enforcement is too costly or too complicated, it also renders the resolution ineffective, so we 
need to address that issue as well.  
Once, the proper input is finalized, and we get the reading on the indicators of access to justice 
by different dispute resolution mechanisms, to answer our research questions we will turn to 
Rawls again for the final assessment of the fairness based on inputs of different indicators. We 
will assess the results by asking does dispute resolution allow for equality in access to the 
elements of the variables. This question would be in logic with Rawls first principle of equality 
of most extensive scheme of liberties, hence equal access to any of those indicators. The first 
principle of justice has priority according to Rawls. However, if the equality is not attained, 
and if there is inequality, is it set up to be in favor of worse off party (weaker party)? The 
wording of the second principle of justice is “reasonably expected to be to everyone’s 
advantage” which is also later reinterpreted by Rawls as to advantage to the worse off party. 
                                                          
162 Gramatikov, Barendrecht, and Verdonschot, supra note 77.Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute Resolution 
and the Vanishing Trial: Comparing Federal Government Litigation and ADR Outcomes, 24 OHIO STATE J. DISPUT. 
RESOLUT. (2008).Jin Ho Verdonschot et al., Measuring Access to Justice: The Quality of Outcomes,  SSRN 
ELECTRON. J. (2008); Gramatikov, Barendrecht, and Verdonschot, supra note.77 
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However, we would like also to point to the first version of “everyone’s advantage”, which 
should be interpreted as different from redistribution to exclusive advantage to worse off party 
and unnecessary disadvantage to better off party. If we could find a less disadvantaged position 
for better off party, and at the same time give an advantage to worse off party at a comparable 
level, it should be considered fair as it is “reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage”. 
Thus, we do not simply indulge worse off party without a certain sense of balance.  
Now that we have established our conceptual framework for the assessment of fair access to 
justice, we need to further assess the research problem and elaborate on the perceived lack of 
access to justice. 
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Chapter 3 – Dispute Resolution in Cloud Service 
Contracts  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
We have stepped into a service economy.163 Service economy refers to the phase of economic 
development where economic growth has moved from production of goods onto provisioning 
of services.164 Powered by new technologies, services are becoming delivered with minimal 
human involvement. The National Academy of Sciences explains the phenomenon with growth 
induced by the rapidly falling cost of procession power (also known as Moore’s law165) and 
                                                          
163 Francisco J. Buera & Joseph P. Kaboski, 2012. "The Rise of the Service Economy," American Economic 
Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2540-69, October 
164 Id. 
165 MOORE, supra note.18 
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significant corporate investments in information technology.166 Some authors describe the IT-
induced transformation of services as dramatic, pervasive, and far-reaching.167 To build a 
service economy, that can leverage its full potential, leading to a dynamic knowledge economy, 
services should be provided on-demand, according to technical and economic conditions 
required by the consumers, and supported by a transparent and automated business process 
back-end.168 Cloud services are the current model for providing on-demand, easy to access and 
affordable services. However, a services driven society or economy also facilitates the growth 
of disputes coming from the services it relies upon. Since cloud services are bringing us closer 
to a knowledge-based service economy, we also need to consider the aspect of dispute 
resolution within such environment. We propose access to justice and fairness as a measure of 
successful handling of the disputes is in this rapidly changing economy. 
We will start this chapter by defining cloud services and their characteristics. Even though we 
will begin from technology description and definition, we will move forward in the second part 
to the more appropriate definition for the services from the point of view of users. In the third 
part, we will discuss contracts as the legal foundation for cloud services.  In the fourth part, we 
examine dispute resolution in cloud contracts and analyze data gathered on a significant 
number of cloud providers’ terms of services. Finally, in the fifth section, we address the 
problem of adequacy of existing dispute resolution practices in relation to access to justice and 
fairness.  
 
 
1.1. What is the cloud? 
 
When it comes to information technology services (IT), it is always difficult to delineate certain 
technology and argue that it is an entirely new way of a delivering or providing a service. Most 
of the time the “new” is just a slight improvement of existing technology and business practices. 
                                                          
166 Dale Weldeau Jorgenson and Charles W. Wessner, eds., Enhancing Productivity Growth in the Information 
Age, Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2007.  
167 Brie et al., The New Challenge to Economic Governance : The Digital Transformation of Services .‖ in Inno,  
(2011).p.3 
168  Philipp Wieder, Joe M. Butler, Wolfgang Theilmann, Ramin Yahyapour eds. Service Level Agreements for 
Cloud Computing , Springer  p.4.; Yasheng Pang et al. Risk Assessment and Classification of Focusing SLA 
Requirement in Cloud Computing, 7 243–256 (2013)  
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Trying to define innovation in IT would be a too arduous task and unnecessary for the purposes 
of this thesis. However, to answer the primary research question, we need to focus on a 
particular domain of interest. That domain is a delivery of a newer generation of services: cloud 
services and disputes that come out of it.  
Cloud services could be simply described as information technology services based wholly or 
partially on cloud computing technology. It is a simple definition that emphasizes an end user’s 
point of view, without regard to particular and distinguishable characteristics of cloud 
computing technology. Another would be: cloud service is any resource provided over the 
Internet169. This would not be an appropriate starting point as we analyze different facets of 
misunderstanding and conflicts between users and providers at the end-point or final phase of 
the service, having in mind the technology and its characteristics as the defining point of the 
service. Similarly, the purely technological definition would not be appropriate as it focuses on 
processes rather on the results of those processes and it is more suitable for the defining 
technology itself. However, without understanding the basic elements of underlying 
technology, it would be difficult to assess the complexity of the legal problems surrounding it. 
 
1.2. Cloud computing - the underlying technology 
 
If we are to trust the marketing of numerous IT companies and industry expert’s opinions, we 
are in the middle of the new evolution in the delivery of computing.170 This new “thing” is 
called “cloud computing.” However, what exactly is cloud computing? We should try to offer 
some clarity on the definition of cloud computing before we embark any deeper into the 
analysis of cloud computing services and potential disputes that can come out of them. 
Paradoxically, the definition has been the point of debate for quite some time, fueling the 
argument that the cloud is nothing more than a buzzword introduced by clever marketing. 
“Cloud computing” in simplified terms could be understood as the storing, processing and use 
of data on remotely located computers accessed over the internet which would allow users 
                                                          
169 Margaret Rouse, WHAT IS CLOUD SERVICES? - DEFINITION FROM WHATIS.COM (2011), 
http://searchcloudprovider.techtarget.com/definition/cloud-services (last visited Aug 18, 2014).  
170 See more at :http://www.cloudscaling.com/blog/cloud-computing/the-evolution-of-it-towards-cloud-
computing-vmworld/ (last accessed April 2014) 
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unlimited computing power on-demand without major prior investments.171 Christian Baun et 
al. define cloud computing as the use of virtualized computing and storage resources and 
modern Web technologies, which provides scalable, network-centric, abstracted IT 
infrastructures, platforms, and applications as on-demand services172. They also point that these 
services are billed on a usage basis. 
Following three years work and lots of debates, US National Institute for Standardization and 
Technology (hereinafter: NIST) settled final, the 16th version of the definition of cloud 
computing. So-called NIST definition is a starting point for various research related to cloud 
computing: 
“Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to 
a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, 
and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction.”173 
The NIST document described cloud computing through five essential characteristics174:  
 On-demand self-service - allows automatic provisioning of computing without human 
interaction,  
 Broad network access - capabilities are available over a networked infrastructure 
allowing thin (e.g. mobile devices) and thick clients easy access. 
 Resource pooling - resources are pooled together to serve multiple consumers using a 
multi-tenant model; dynamic sharing of the resource while at the same time creating a 
sense of location independence. Examples include storage, processing, memory and 
network bandwidth  
 Rapid elasticity- rapid and elastic provisioning of capabilities to quickly scale up or 
down as required, creating a sense of unlimited resources to consumers. 
 Measured service - automatic control and optimization of resources coupled with 
metering capability allowing a pay-per-use model  
                                                          
171 Jonathan Cave & Svitlana Kobzar, Regulating the Cloud, p.14. EU COMMISSION. THE FUTURE OF CLOUD 
COMPUTING OPPORTUNITIES FOR EUROPEAN CLOUD COMPUTING BEYOND 2010 - Expert Group Report 
172 CHRISTIAN BAUN, CLOUD COMPUTING WEB-BASED DYNAMIC IT SERVICES (2011) p.3. 
173 Peter Mell, Timothy Grance & Peter Mell, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-145, p.2, 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf. 
174 Id.p.2 
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These computing services are delivered through three service models which we will discuss in 
next section. In the same document NIST also distinguished four deployment models175: 
o Private cloud – provision of cloud infrastructure for exclusive use by a single 
organization comprising multiple consumers, which cloud be owned, managed and 
operated by the organization, a third party, or some combination of them, and it may 
exist on or off premises. 
o Community cloud - provision of cloud infrastructure for exclusive use by a specific 
community. It cloud be owned, managed, and operated by one or more of the 
organizations in the community, a third party, or some combination of them, and it may 
exist on or off premises. 
o Public cloud – provision of cloud infrastructure for open use by the general public. It 
may be owned, managed, and operated by a variety of parties and it exists on the 
premises of the cloud provider. 
o Hybrid cloud – where the cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more distinct 
cloud infrastructures (private, community, or public) that remain unique entities but are 
bound together by standardized or proprietary technology that enables data and 
application portability. 
 
Kuan Hon and Cristopher Millard gave another good definition describing cloud “as a way of 
delivering computing resources as a utility service via a network, typically the Internet, scalable 
up and down according to user requirements”.176 
 
Competing definitions of cloud computing in academia relate to approaches that are taken by 
different researchers. Some of them are more software oriented defining cloud computing as 
“software offerings where the application is executed in a web browser, via software code that 
is downloaded (as needed) from a remote server that also stores users’ files”177. Other 
definitions are more focused on the outsourcing aspect of the cloud: “outsourcing’ computing 
functions traditionally controlled by a consumer – operating and maintaining hardware, 
installing and running software, storing data – to a third-party service via the Internet”178. 
                                                          
175 Id. 
176 Millard, supra note. 20 p.1.  
177 Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 
Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. HIGH TECH. LAW (2010), p.364. 
178 N Ozer & C Conley, Cloud Computing: Storm Warning for Privacy?, ACLU NORTH. CALIF. 1 (2010). 
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2. Cloud services - definition 
 
Even before the NIST definition, the International Data Corporation (IDC)179 has made efforts 
to distinguish cloud computing from cloud services. According to IDC cloud computing is “an 
emerging IT development, deployment, and delivery model, enabling real-time delivery of 
products, services and solutions over the Internet”, while cloud services are “Consumer and 
Business products, services and solutions that are delivered and consumed in real-time over the 
Internet.”180 
 
NIST, subsequently, made a clear difference between characteristics of technology and the 
services that could be provided using it. The standardization body categorized various forms 
of services into three service models181: 
 
 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). The capability provided to the consumer is to provision 
processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources where the consumer 
is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and applications 
at will stations. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure but 
has control over operating systems, storage, and deployed applications; and possibly limited 
control of select networking components (e.g., host firewalls) 
 
 Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) - The capability provided to the consumer is to deploy onto the 
cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired applications created using programming 
languages, libraries, services, and tools supported by the provider. The consumer does not 
manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating 
systems, or storage, but has control over the deployed applications and possibly configuration 
settings for the application-hosting environment. 
 
 Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) - The capability provided to the consumer is to use the provider’s 
applications running on a cloud infrastructure. The applications are accessible from various client 
devices through either a thin client interface, such as a web browser (e.g., web-based email), or 
                                                          
179 See more at:  http://www.idc.com/  (last visited Aug 20, 2014) 
180 Gens, supra note. 17 
181 Peter Mell, Grance, and Mell, supra note 16 .p.3 
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a program interface. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud 
infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even individual 
application capabilities, with the possible exception of limited user- specific application 
configuration settings. 
 
For the illustration of the models, Infrastructure-as-a-Service (from now on: IaaS) access to 
remote physical or virtual machines model of service could be compared to hardware in the 
sense of personal computer. In the same sense, Platform-as-a-Service (from now on: PaaS) 
would represent operating system on the personal computer since PaaS typically includes 
operating system programming language, execution environment, and database. Software-as-
a-Service (from now on: SaaS) could be compared to application software and databases 
installed on the operating system. 
 
However, these are not only as-a-service models out there. We could also mention desktop-as-
a-service, data-as-a-service, backup-as-a-service, mobile backend-as-a-service, unified 
communication-as-a-service, monitoring-as-a-service. The desire to distinguish itself from the 
market caused “as-a-service” phenomenon where every niche on the market tries to represent 
itself as a special model of cloud service.182 With the constant rise of cloud market, many of 
the preexisting services are rebranding themselves into the as-a-service model183, thus 
contributing to further confusion with the term. Some definitions even introduce humans-as-a-
service184 as a combination of human service (usually by crowdsourcing185 certain tasks) and 
computing, forming an “everything-as-a-service” paradigm. Considering all above it is 
understandable that NIST limited the list of service models on three wide but distinct 
categories.  
 
IDC in their early publication (with rather a skeptical attitude towards innovation of cloud 
computing technology) has given eight distinguishing attributes of cloud services: offsite 
service/provided by third-party provider, accessed via the internet, minimal/no it skills to 
“implement”, provisioning/self-service, fine-grained & usage-based pricing, browser (and 
                                                          
182 Mike Elgan, THE RISE OF VAGUENESS AS A SERVICE | COMPUTERWORLD MAY 10 (2014), 
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successors) user interface, system interface - web services APIs and shared resources/common 
versions186. 
 
What makes cloud computing services complex compared to some other IT service models is 
the cloud supply chain. Virtualization or abstraction of service layers and possible 
combinations of layers of service providers in the stack allows additional flexibility to the 
providers, but from the end user's point of view complicates the service model. Consumers of 
SaaS, most commonly,  do not know if their provider uses its own infrastructure or not, where 
are the servers and location of their data, who has access to it, what kind of physical security 
measures to protect their data are being taken, etc. The conditions and terms for processing and 
storing data could depend on several service providers in different jurisdictions. Having in 
mind the multi-tenancy characteristic of cloud computing where load balancing of servers is 
optimized by moving data from server to server, it is hard to have an exact answer to where the 
data is stored in some cases. The cloud supply chain is dependent on how many service 
providers are in the chain of IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS. For example, we could have Software-as-
a-service, built upon Microsoft Azure platform187, deployed on Amazon Web Services IaaS188. 
However, most of the details of the underlying layers of the service remain unknown to the 
ordinary users.  
 
Since we are approaching the subject mostly from the end-users point of view, we are interested 
in a definition oriented around consumers/users and their expectations. Simple but vague in the 
way of what is to be expected the definition of cloud service is given by Amazon Web Services: 
“Cloud computing by definition refers to the on-demand delivery of IT resources and 
applications via the Internet with pay-as-you-go pricing.”189 This definition hints to the cloud 
as a utility but also illustrates the marketing aspect of the cloud services and the way they are 
represented.  
 
Sometimes unfulfilled expectations of a cloud service user could lead to dissatisfaction of a 
client and if he feels wronged in some way the user might be seeking a remedy. First, by 
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communicating the problem to the service provider informally and then, if the consumer has 
not achieved the satisfactory solution and if the consumer is willing to endure, a more formal 
dispute resolution becomes an option. Cloud services are contract based services, where 
customers usually sing in by accepting “click-through” agreements, comprised of long Terms 
of Service which most of the consumers tend not to read.190 As we will see later many of terms 
in the cloud providers’ Service Agreement, tend to be in provider’s favor. Only in the moment 
of conflict escalation majority of consumers read thoroughly Terms of Service and reassess 
their legal position; they look to the terms and conditions trying to validate their understanding 
of the provider action that is contrary to contract or law. 
 
2.1. Cloud services benefits and adoption 
 
Cloud computing services advertise its advantages to achieve wider scale adoption. One of the 
main selling points is that the cloud technology allows access, mobility and flexibility to 
business and personal use, without requirements of additional infrastructure investments.191 
The European Commission’s Expert Group identified several impacts of cloud computing 
technology and divided them into three general types: non-functional, economic and 
technological.192 
 
The general or non-functional aspect193 that drives the adoption of cloud computing is explained 
in terms of: 
o elasticity  - ability to adjust resources to actual demands through horizontal and 
vertical scalability; 
o reliability - operations without disruptions; 
o the quality of service support - guaranteed in service-level agreements;  
o agility and adaptability - ability to respond in real time according to demands; 
o availability of services - providing continuous access without disruptions or 
changing of user experience. 
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Economic aspects194 that drive adoption of cloud computing are usually perceived in: 
o Cost reduction- of IT infrastructure maintenance and acquisition costs; one of 
the biggest attractions of cloud computing; also ability to adapt to user’s 
behavior that results in reducing excess capacities; 
o Pay-per-use - ability to acquire services according to actual consumption, 
without the in-house infrastructure investment of state-of-the-art technology; 
o Shorter time-to-market - cutting down the costs and delays associated with 
investments in IT infrastructure; 
o Return on investment – return on IT outsourcing in cloud outweighs return on 
investment in an in-house infrastructure; 
o Converting CAPEX to OPEX - Capital expenditure (CAPEX) is required to 
build up a local infrastructure but is unnecessary in case of outsourcing, where 
the company will spend only operational expenditure (OPEX); 
o Green effects - energy efficiency; minimizing energy use and carbon prints; 
o Hardware software and technology independence - computer services are 
purchased on per use basis, thus, businesses and consumers can reallocate their 
investments in other areas195. 
Technological aspects196 of cloud computing adoption: 
o Virtualization-essential technological characteristic allows infrastructure 
independence, flexibility and adaptability, location independence, and ease-of-
use; 
o Multi-tenancy-  the same resource may be assigned to multiple users (potentially 
at the same time); 
o security, privacy, and trust in dealing with data; 
o Data management- data is flexibly distributed across multiple resources, but the 
system needs to be aware of data location; 
o Enhancements to programming and APIs- scalability and capabilities under 
autonomic system management; 
o Metered use- of consumption of resources necessary for billing purposes; 
o Cloud tools- for development, adaptation, and usage. 
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Having in mind all these aspects that influence adoption, as well as rising technological trends 
that are connected with the development of cloud computing, such as big data analytics197 and 
Internet of things198, most of the available forecasts predict a rise in adoption of cloud 
computing services.199 According to IDC research from 2014, by the year 2016, there was an 
11% shift of IT budget away from traditional in-house IT delivery, toward various versions of 
cloud computing as a new delivery model, and by 2017, 35% of new applications will use 
cloud-enabled, continuous delivery and DevOps life cycles for faster rollout of new features 
and business innovation.200 Recent IDC projection estimates the worldwide spending on public 
cloud services will reach $122.5 billion in 2017, and it will reach $203.4 billion by 2020. 201 
Among other things, the adoption is also influenced by the ease of access to cloud services. All 
of the perceived or potential benefits of cloud services are usually advertised as easily 
accessible and available for users with a “click of a mouse.” Commoditization of cloud services 
for large-scale use requires standardized contracts, as individual negotiation for every cloud 
service would undermine the functioning and some of the fundamental characteristics of the 
cloud. 
 
 
2.2. Pricing and free cloud 
 
One of the more prominent features of the cloud services, which also has a direct effect on the 
legal position of the users is the pricing of the services with certain distinctions are being made 
between free and paid services. Advertised “free” services include in their Terms of Service 
most favorable terms for the provider, with the wide exclusion of any liability of provider.202 
Like in most tech industries, the source of fast growth and expansion could be correlated with 
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the effects of Moore’s law, Kryder’s law and several other laws describing a decrease in price 
through time per unit of production (or increase in the rate of production per time units). 
Moore's law 203 is an observation that, over the history of computing hardware, the number of 
transistors on integrated circuits doubles approximately every 18 months. Therefore, the prices 
of the circuits (or the price of processors) constantly decrease. Kryder’s law204, similarly, 
explains the decline in prices per storage unit. Hence, more and more memory is available to 
us for the same price, either buying bigger hard drives or getting bigger storage space online 
or in the “cloud.” Butter's law205 illustrates that the amount of data coming out of an optical 
fiber is doubling every nine months. Nielsen's law206 claims that the bandwidth available to 
users increases by 50% annually. Similar laws describe other building blocks of Internet and 
digital economy. The consequences of this rate of production are that we have a highly 
competitive market of services, with low barriers to entry that constantly puts pressure to lower 
the cost of services or to offer more and more of free services. 
Constant lowering of prices, as described above, allowed the development of business models 
around free services or free offers. Chris Anderson claims that this is a natural consequence of 
speed and growth of production in the digital economy, where resources are abundant (as 
opposed to the physical world) and where the speed of distribution is instant, and costs of 
distribution are minimal to nothing.207  
Hoofnagle and Whittington, however, claim that “free” is mostly used as an enticement to get 
consumers to try a product without realizing its costs.208 They argue that conceiving the 
transactions as free can be detrimental to consumers and competition because there are often 
hidden charges in these exchanges in the form of providing personal information. According 
to them: 
“The service provider may expect to earn revenues from the personal information collected about 
consumers who devote their attention to advertising and other services, such as games, from third 
parties. The more time the consumer spends using the service and revealing information, the more 
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the service can adjust the product to reveal more information about the consumer and tailor its 
advertising of products to that consumer’s personal information”.209 
Hoofnagle and Whittington are also proposing consideration of free services from transaction 
cost economics’ point of view, which hardly leaves them the qualification “free.”210  
De la Iglesia and Gayo divide these online business models into the following categories: 
advertising, freemium, work exchange and mass collaboration.211 They explain that the 
advertising model is based on the building of an audience or better to say in internet terms, a 
community, to which advertisers will want to offer their products or services; in Freemium 
model (combination of words free and premium) premium users pay and subsidize the use of 
everybody; work exchange allows free services in return for some work by users; mass 
collaboration exists because the cost is nearly nothing. 
 
Figure 1 - Table of Web 2.0 business models. 
Model Cost Who pays Why 
Freemium 0 Premium users Better features 
Advertising 0 Advertisers The attention of the 
community to its products or 
services. 
Work exchange  0 Service provider or sponsor Getting value from users 
Mass Collaboration  
 
0 Donators 
Volunteers 
 
Altruism 
Self-promotion 
Interest 
Source: Iglesia & Gayo (2009) p. 95 212 
 
Some of the most prominent free web services consider personal information gathering 
essential for revenues. The value of personal information is also confirmed by market 
valuations of such companies and their proprietary networks. At the same time, researchers are 
trying to answer what is the value of personal data per individual user. The methods vary from 
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measuring the value of privacy213 to a willingness to pay if personal data could be bought from 
the social network214. The Spiekermann study suggests that the more a user is using a social 
network, the more he/she is willing to pay for personal information.215 
Similarly, free “apps” 216 as an extension of a cloud service, are widely available on “app 
markets” for various smartphones and their platforms. Many of them, to work properly, 
demand internet connection (usually to display ads). In certain cases, we have interesting 
interaction between free and premium (sometimes paying) users in the new free web-based 
games. For example, players of free game FarmVille217 can earn virtual currency by completing 
tasks or selling crops, but also, users can use real money to gain these currencies (Farm Coins 
and Farm Cash in FarmVille or Farm Bucks in FarmVille 2218). However, is the legal treatment 
of users who earned virtual currency the same as treatment of users who purchased virtual 
currency with real money? 
Having in mind previously mentioned research on the value of personal data219 and the 
relationship between invested time/effort in using a service and value it represents for the user, 
we could also easily imagine situations where users get in disputes over free cloud services. 
Consider a user finding one day that he/she cannot access to his/her (one of the popular) free 
email account.220 
How much time and effort invested in that service would be lost together with all established 
communication and contacts, because of an alleged violation of Terms of Service? Would one 
pay to have this situation resolved? If so, how much? Would one be willing to file a lawsuit in 
the court (usually Californian) specified within standardized Terms of Service? What would 
be the cost of such action? Alternatively, consider already numerous examples of Facebook 
locking accounts after reports of violation of Facebook Community Standards, especially over 
some controversial topics.221 Certain artist creates and promotes provocative artwork that could 
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be deemed inappropriate by Facebook administrators. How about a dispute over wrongly 
assessed test or assignment on one of the free Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs), 
provided by educational platforms like Coursera222, which offer free education globally and 
where users are obtaining valuable certificates without paying for the course or enrollment. 
However, would one be able to have access to justice when all disputes are to be resolved 
before federal or state court in Santa Clara, California?  
Before we discuss access to justice, we need to examine common traits of cloud service 
contracts to see if there are elements of unfair distribution in rights and obligation between 
cloud service parties.  
 
 
 
3. Contracts for cloud services 
 
A contract could be defined as an agreement giving rise to obligations that are enforced or 
recognized by law.223 While the definition of a contract is not universally accepted, most of the 
scholars agree on two fundamental requirements for the formation of a contract: an offer and 
acceptance.224 Like most commercial services, cloud computing services are based upon 
contracts that give rise to legal obligations for both parties: users, and providers. Even though 
the term contract is not necessarily mentioned, and quite often elements of contracts are 
scattered in several documents with different names, they all constitute legally binding 
obligations based on offer and acceptance. If we distinguish negotiable and non-negotiable 
contracts/agreements, cloud services, especially public cloud services, predominantly fall into 
the non-negotiable category. Bradshaw et al. found that only large companies and governments 
can negotiate more favorable terms, which is corresponding to the value of their contract 
indicating that for low-value contracts there is no possibility for negotiation. 225 
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Non-negotiable agreements are a useful tool in economies of scale, for which especially public 
cloud services strive. When it comes to cloud services, these contracts are being made online, 
usually in the form of click-wrap agreements, which are the type of contracts of adhesion. 
 
 
3.1. Contracts of adhesion in cloud services 
 
Contracts of adhesion, in the more general definition, are the contracts presented by sellers to 
consumers in a take-it-or-leave-it form and containing standard clauses.226 Standards clauses 
sometimes are written in the style that is hardly understandable to an average user, which some 
legal traditions labeled as boilerplate clauses in contracts.227 Legislators in the EU intervene by 
regulating certain aspects of contracts of adhesion, especially in the consumer domain. 
Traditional reasons for the legislative intervention in consumer contracts are that companies 
harbor larger market power over individual consumers, consumers lack the sophistication to 
deal with specifics of contracts and that contracts are too complex for the individual 
consumer.228 Looking at the cloud providers’ Terms of Service and related documents all of the 
above characteristics of contracts of adhesion are easily recognizable. 
For the purposes of this research, we have gone through 322 cloud services looking at the 
Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policies (PP) that were available at the sites of cloud 
providers.229 While the main focus was on specific clauses relating to dispute resolution, we 
detected certain similarities in the forms of contracts and elements of their content. Regarding 
the type, contracts are being offered on “as is” basis, indicating that they, by their formation 
and standardized form for different users, are falling into the category of contracts of adhesion. 
Cloud service provider, as the party with a stronger bargaining/economic/market power drafts 
and offers the terms on take it or leave it the basis to the party with a weaker bargaining power. 
The majority of cloud users do not have negotiation power to alter previously set the terms by 
providers. With characteristics such as “broad network access”, meaning that the parties could 
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access service regardless of their physical location, and the “on demand” aspect illustrating 
promptness to cater real-time needs, it would not be very efficient to negotiate every individual 
contract or specific term. It is also a continuation of contracting practices for software licensing 
online and offline, with shrink-wrap agreements (offline) and click-wrap agreements. 230 
Very often the “as is” nature is clearly expressed in the Terms of Service:  
“To the maximum extent permitted by law, the Service Is Available “As Is.” YOU EXPRESSLY 
UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT: 
YOUR USE OF THE SERVICE AND THE PURCHASE AND USE OF ANY PRODUCTS ARE ALL 
AT YOUR SOLE RISK. THE SERVICE IS PROVIDED, AND PRODUCTS ARE SOLD ON AN “AS 
IS” AND “AS AVAILABLE” BASIS.”231  
 “TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, DROPBOX, AND ITS AFFILIATES, 
SUPPLIERS AND DISTRIBUTORS MAKE NO WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, 
ABOUT THE SERVICES. THE SERVICES ARE PROVIDED "AS IS." WE ALSO DISCLAIM ANY 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-
INFRINGEMENT. Some places don't allow the disclaimers in this paragraph, so they may not apply to 
you.”232 
3.2. Terms of Service and cloud services’ policies 
 
Looking at available Terms of Services of 322 cloud providers, certain regularities were easily 
detected. We have noticed that in general, we can place the majority of observed terms in one 
of the following categories: Terms of Service, Service Level Agreements, Acceptable Use 
Policies, Privacy (and/or Security) Policies. To the extent that providers deem necessary, we 
can find only one or several (possibly five or more if intellectual properties protection was 
significant enough to be mentioned in the separate document, i.e. IP policy declaring that you 
are the owner of your content233). 
3.2.1. Terms of Service  
 
Terms of Service (ToS) regulates the relationship between service provider and user. After 
indicating with whom users are stepping into a legally binding agreement, it usually specifies 
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providers prewritten terms in regards to its service. It specifies the main elements of a contract 
and lays out obligations of provider and user. Sometimes, ToS contain definitions and 
clarification of certain terms to avoid misinterpretation of the meaning. Occasionally, terms are 
quite specific on the intellectual property rights regarding users’ data.234 If it is not a subject of 
separate policy documents, Terms of Service tend to profess providers‘ commitments to 
security, with different degrees of details. 
For paid services, ToS typically contains commercial terms, i.e. details for payment of services. 
Certain services have special provisions for payment disputes, stating that if the provider 
overcharged for the service, there is a deadline for filing payment complaints. ToS also usually 
cover termination of the agreement, either by the will of a party or due to a breach. Certain 
agreements also allow for the suspension of the agreement, pending a decision on suspected 
violation or third party complaint. 
In the majority of observed ToS, we found some form of limitation of liability and/or exclusion 
of warranties to the extent possible by applicable law. Such provisions are more common to 
the United States legal system and possibly not applicable to other jurisdictions (EU Unfair 
Terms Directive would render such clauses, not binding). Nevertheless, they indicate attitudes 
of cloud providers towards liability for certain issues. Similarly, the one-sidedness of Terms of 
Service is also illustrated in the provider’s reservations for the unilateral changes of terms. 
Providers usually reserve the right to unilateral changes with a degree of differentiation in the 
notification procedure (from email notifications to publishing changes of ToS on sites) and 
allowing an opt-out for users. Some of the providers, especially storage providers, specify the 
details of data handling in the event of contract termination. 
In addition to dispute resolution clauses that will be discussed later, providers, may place 
indemnification clauses which creates an obligation for the customer to indemnify, defend and 
hold harmless provider and its associates from and against any liability arising from a claim of 
a third-party.  
They also usually specify governing law and jurisdiction in the case of a dispute. We discuss 
these aspects of ToS in section 4 in greater detail. Ordinarily, we also find a clause on 
severability indicating that in the event that competent court or tribunal finds some point Terms 
of Service unenforceable, the remaining clauses are to be enforced nonetheless, 
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For contractual disputes, (as opposed to non-contractual, e.g. in the case of damages) norms 
expressed in Terms of Service are of essential importance.  Common disputes that can be 
observed in most paid services are those related to payments. Paid services, on a monthly basis 
or metered, are being billed automatically. Some services dealing with the higher volume of 
users prescribed specific steps for initiating disputes as well as shorter deadlines to contest 
payments: 
IF YOU BELIEVE THAT YOUR CHARGES ARE INCORRECT, YOU MUST CONTACT JOYENT 
IN WRITING WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THE APPLICABLE INVOICE (“DISPUTE 
PERIOD”) TO CONTEST SUCH CHARGES TO BE ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE AN ADJUSTMENT OR 
CREDIT. TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, YOU HEREBY WAIVE ALL CLAIMS 
RELATING TO ANY AND ALL CHARGES NOT DISPUTED BY YOU DURING THE DISPUTE 
PERIOD (THIS DOES NOT AFFECT YOUR CREDIT CARD ISSUER RIGHTS).235 
In many cases that ToS incorporate clauses that could be covered in acceptable use policies, 
privacy and security policies, intellectual property policy or service level agreements. If those 
policies are portrayed in separates documents, they are being referenced to in Terms of Service, 
and vice versa ToS are referenced in those policies as general terms of the provider. 
 
3.2.2. Service level agreements 
 
Service level agreements (SLA) as a part of cloud service contracts are more technical 
documents, more likely to be found in IaaS and PaaS cloud services than in software as service 
models. Their function is to specify the expected level of service between provider and user. 
Through SLAs provider commits to and guarantees a certain level and quality of service. SLA’s 
usually state that providers do not guarantee 100% of availability of service (service uptime). 
It details availability of the service usually in percentage of uptime (ref. the service will be 
available for 99.5% of time) 
In some cases, SLA’s also includes Quality of service parameters (i.e. response time, 
throughput) but to enforce them, they need to be constantly monitored.236 Issues of monitoring 
are essential when it comes to disputes over SLA’s and quality of service. Some providers shift 
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the burden of proving SLA violations on the user.237 Providers tend to define the terms within 
SLA's carefully to avoid any confusion on the meaning of terms like the outage or the 
measurement period.  
Other than the parameters of SLA, the agreement usually contains procedures in case of a 
failure to obtain prescribed levels of service. Following the specific procedure in case, provider 
does not meet specified service levels, the user usually becomes eligible for service credits as 
a form of compensation. Often compositions just restricted to services but also capped to the 
maximum possible level of service credits. Some providers offer service credit as a monetary-
based credit that could be credited back to an eligible account.238 
The existence of the specific procedures in cases where a user complains that provider does not 
meet SLAs’ expectations indicates the likelihood of the occurrence of these disputes and the 
need to streamline procedures for a quick resolution. 
 
3.2.3. Privacy Policies  
 
A privacy policy is a legal document that contains a statement on the use and treatment of 
users’ personal data. 239 In our survey of dispute resolution clauses that will be detailed in the 
section 4, we found most of the Privacy Policies displayed on the provider’s landing page of a 
site, although the other terms like  “Privacy Statements”,240 “Privacy Notice”,241 “Data 
Privacy”242 or just simply “Privacy”243, are  also used for the same document.  
Usually, Privacy Policies give an explanation of what type of data providers collect and use, 
often expressing commitment to the privacy of users and safety of their data. The majority of 
providers in their Privacy Policies use the term “personally-identifiable information”244 or 
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“personal information”, which is more in line with privacy laws of the United States, as 
opposed to “personal data” defined in EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. If providers 
publicize personal information, they regularly give account to what information they make 
public with the consent of the user. However, this is not to be confused with the sharing of data 
with third parties, which is not always clearly explained in Privacy Policies and occasionally 
is a business strategy of providers that raises privacy concerns with users.245 
Providers often provide an explanation that they collect data, both personal and non-personal, 
through various techniques. They can rely on voluntarily offered information given by users, 
but also, they could automatically collect metadata, such as type of device used by user, 
software used to access the service, geolocation, log data and other statistics on usage, etc. 
Additionally they provide information if they use tracking technologies, like cookies,246 which 
are usually justified with the intention to optimize the service for the user’s needs. 
The difference in approach to privacy and data protection between the United States and the 
European Union allows different jurisdictions and applicable law issues. The differences in 
mandatory requirements cause additional burden for cloud providers that offer services 
globally, especially having in mind the nature of cloud services and the ease of data relocation 
between different locations and thus jurisdictions. Constantly evolving services, within a 
dynamic cloud market, occasionally challenges the purpose of use principle of the Data 
Protection Directive.247 Possible multi-stack in the chain of cloud service providers complicates 
the responsibility for processing 248 and sometimes makes unclear how personal data is shared 
between different providers in the stack,249 or where the data is stored. In practice, it became 
difficult to guarantee and enforce users’ rights, as the right to access or the right to correction 
and erasure personal data.250 The European Union and its Data Protection Directive did not 
fully harmonize legal treatment under national data protection laws of different Member States, 
adding uncertainty, to an extent, into the single market. The scope of the thesis is limited and 
does not allow aspects of data protection and privacy regulations. For our purposes, it is 
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sufficient to point to the debate on the issues of regulating data protection and privacy and to 
infer that uncertainty leads to disputes between users and providers. Recently, we are 
witnessing an increase in a number of legal battles, where users are claiming their rights before 
Data Protection Authorities and courts.251 The ways users’ claims are being handled vary 
between providers and between jurisdictions, placing users of the same services in unequal 
positions due to their circumstances. 
3.2.4. Acceptable use policies 
 
Acceptable use policy, (AUP), also called fair use policy, is a set of rules given by the provider 
which forbid certain uses of the cloud service. Cloud providers in their desire to be shielded 
from potential lawsuits, declare certain potential uses of their services incompatible with the 
company’s philosophy and intention. AUPs are written in general terms, forbidding any use of 
the service in illegal, harmful or offensive purposes.252 They often provide a non-exhaustive 
list of prohibited activities. Certain AUPs are explicit in actions that are not permitted, giving 
detailed descriptions of action or citing examples of such action.253 AUP’s are also an integral 
part of security, as it prohibits security violations or network abuse.254 For that purpose, the 
rules have to be expressed in a clear and concise language that explains what constitutes 
security violation, network abuse or other infringement. 
We consider AUPs as a general normative tool of providers, that does not necessarily have to 
be called acceptable use policy or exist within a single document. The rules on inappropriate 
use could be a part of Terms of Service, but also, they can be expressed in different documents: 
antispam policy, security policy or intellectual property policy (DMCA takedown policy).255 
The interpretation of AUPs is crucial for the enforcement of the policy. Usually, AUPs are 
mentioned as a part or reference the Terms of Service. If AUPs do not have a specific clause 
on applicable law, governing law expressed in Terms of Service will be consulted in case of 
different interpretation of legal terms and standards (especially in internal complaint 
                                                          
251Max Schrems high profile case, more at: http://europe-v-facebook.org/EN/en.html , ECJ Case C‑131/12.. 
Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 
González. 
252 See for example: https://aws.amazon.com/aup/ (last accessed November 2015) 
253 See for example: https://www.dropbox.com/terms#acceptable_use and 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards  (last accessed December 2015) 
254 See : No Security Violations part at: https://aws.amazon.com/aup/ (last accessed November 2015) 
255 See for example: https://www.zoho.com/policy.html and https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last 
accessed December 2015)  
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procedures). Occasionally acceptable use policies collide with different interpretations of 
freedom of expression or privacy laws in different jurisdictions.256 
Very commonly AUPs prescribe complaint procedures, provided that in the case of 
infringement of an AUP a third party can report the user, citing the example of the alleged 
abuse.257 The report is then internally investigated, and in the event that provider finds the user 
in breach of the AUP, they deliberate on one of the steps possible and prescribed as a 
consequence in case of violation of policy. These range from formal warnings, suspension of 
an account, termination of an account, to additional billing or even bringing legal action for 
damages caused by the violation. 
Considering this short overview of four elements of cloud contract, we can assume that there 
is a big number of potential disputes which are contract based or stemming from different 
interpretations of the contracts, and related to specific provisions of the Terms of Service. From 
a substantive law point of view, there are a number of legal issues that are invoked in a cloud 
environment, which lack consensus on the solution and uniform way of handling. Every legal 
issue is additionally complicated when we consider the international element of cloud services 
and the easiness with which data transfers from one jurisdiction to another. Still, no matter 
what is the cause for dispute, parties have the option to resort to a dispute resolution process. 
As a starting point for determining jurisdiction, and in line with party autonomy principle in 
private law, we need to investigate the choice of dispute resolution venue and procedure, 
commonly embedded in the contracts of cloud services. 
4. Dispute resolution in cloud contracts 
 
Considering the fact that the multitude of legal aspects are usually covered in the Terms of 
Service and other potentially lengthy legal documents which are offered by providers strictly 
following “AS IS” formula,  it is understandable that the majority of disputes are contract based 
and invoke interpretation and enforcement of the terms. It is usually a starting point in any 
deliberation on the dispute regarding cloud services. Even when the paragraphs of ToS are 
                                                          
256 A few examples on the Authentic name policy of Facebook and users issues with it in regard to freedom of 
expression, privacy and : http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/29/facebooks-real-names-
policy-is-legal-but-its-also-problematic-for-free-speech and http://www.wired.com/2015/06/facebook-real-
name-policy-problems/ and http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/16/technology/facebook-real-names/  
257 Examples of reporting at: https://aws.amazon.com/forms/report-abuse and 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards#  and https://www.zoho.com/ipr-complaints.html  
77 
 
being discussed in the court of law to substantiate party’s claim of unfair terms which should 
be null and void, the Terms of Service still have to be taken into account both as a starting and 
potentially crucial aspect of the dispute.  
To assess the fairness in dispute resolution for cloud services we need to take Terms of Service 
and accompanying documents as a starting point. Terms of Services represent at least the cloud 
provider’s interests. Cloud contracts are non-negotiable for the majority of clouds users, and if 
users decide to enter into legal relationships with a cloud provider, they are subjected to 
obligations and entitled to rights in accordance with the contract. In a sense, users choose if 
they want to become part of the distribution of rights and duties within the frame of the service. 
The offer of service, comprising such distribution, should be well within the bounds of the law, 
as a more general frame of rights and duties. Dispute resolutions between parties are within the 
reach of private regulation or distribution, but they are also essential to the rule of law, and in 
most legal systems constitutional safeguards are in place to guaranty access to justice or right 
to a fair trial. Under certain circumstances, parties can decide if they want to rely on states’ 
dispute resolution mechanisms or to choose private dispute resolution mechanisms. They can 
also sometimes choose among different states i.e. which court of which state has jurisdiction.258 
The validity of such choices where one party merely accepts nonnegotiable terms is debatable 
when it comes to certain categories, such as consumers.259 However, first, we need to establish 
if provider’s choices of dispute resolution place cloud consumer as a weaker party in a worse 
off position. To have proper “feel“ of providers preference of dispute resolution methods and 
jurisdictions we have analyzed a significant number of Terms of Service to come to reliable 
conclusions about their choices. 
 
4.1. Terminology in dispute resolution clauses  
 
Dispute resolution clauses are usually positioned near the end of the Terms of Service. 
Sometimes they are placed at the beginning of the text, but in those cases usually, clauses are 
short and succinct, specifying governing law and the court that has jurisdiction. Sometimes 
they are clearly titled and numbered within the ToS. The term for the group of clauses or a 
                                                          
258 See more about party autonomy  in chapter 4  
259 See more on unfair terms  in chapter 4 
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section can vary, but we find most commonly terms like “Governing law”, “Choice of law”, 
“Governing law and jurisdiction”, “Dispute resolution” or just under “General” or “Other”. 
Observing the significant number of terms of services and their dispute resolution clauses we 
noticed regularities and underlying structure that repeats itself to an extent, depending on 
providers’ style of drafting contractual causes and providers’ interests in determining specific 
jurisdictions. 
In a certain number of cases, dispute resolution clauses start with the amicable suggestion that 
provider and users should resolve their differences informally by communication and good 
faith.260 However, this request sometimes comes with the proviso of obligatory notice of a 
dispute of the complaining party, demanding that prior to initiating any formal dispute 
resolution complaining party needs to communicate the issue in written form most commonly 
30 days prior to taking any legal action the party is entitled to (we observed range from 5 to 60 
days prior).261 The requirement of notices for dispute is sometimes followed up with the new 
formal requirement for arbitration in case negotiation fails. These notices are more accustomed 
to terms of service that are opting for arbitration, as the procedure for initiating action before a 
court of law is well-established and prescribed by the applicable law. 
The dispute resolution clauses vary in their length, content, and style. Rarely, terms of service 
do not contain dispute resolution section (we found 5 of 322 ToS without dispute resolution), 
or it is expressed in a single clause: 
“This Agreement will be governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts without regard to its 
conflict of laws provisions.”262 
As we will see later, the majority of terms of service of cloud providers prefer courts over 
arbitration, which also reflects on the structure of the clauses. Terms of service that are 
specifying applicable law and single jurisdiction of the courts of one state, tend to have shorter 
dispute resolution sections: 
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York and the United States 
without regard to conflicts of laws provisions thereof and without regard to the United Nations 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods or the Uniform Computer Information Transactions 
                                                          
260 Cloud 9 ToS at: https://c9.io/site/terms-of-service  
261 For example DigitalOcean at: https://www.digitalocean.com/legal/terms/;  Slack at: http://slack.com; 
Silkroad  at: http://www.silkroad.com/; and SendGrid at: https://sendgrid.com/tos (last accessed November 
2015) 
262  Aperian ToS at: https://www.apperian.com/service-agreement/ (last accessed November 2015) 
79 
 
Act (UCITA). The exclusive jurisdiction and venue for actions related to the subject matter hereof 
shall be the New York state and United States federal courts located in New York, New York, and 
both parties irrevocably consent to such personal jurisdiction of such courts and waive all objections 
thereto.263 
The terms of services that are specifying different applicable laws for different areas or 
countries provide more detail on the contracting parties (if they are in different countries), in 
what circumstance which terms are applicable, which platforms of dispute resolution are 
applicable and in accordance with which law.264 ToS that mandate binding arbitration are the 
longest in their contents, detailing among other: nature of the arbitration, procedure for 
initiating arbitration, applicable rules and where they can be found, number of potential 
arbitrators, location and language of the proceedings, for what kind of disputes arbitration does 
not apply and which court has jurisdiction in those cases, enforceability of arbitral awards, 
clauses about bearing costs of arbitration, possibility of initiating disputes before small claim 
court, etc.265 Dispute resolution clauses that introduce binding arbitration may declare certain 
types of disputes that will be dealt with exclusively by courts. These commonly include 
intellectual property rights disputes and equitable relief disputes. Looking at the example of 
ToS of SaaS “Judicata” we can see almost all of the elements mentioned above: 
“12. ARBITRATION 
INFORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. To expedite resolution and reduce the cost of any dispute, controversy or 
claim related to this Agreement (“Dispute”), you and Judicata agree to first attempt to negotiate any Dispute 
(except those Disputes expressly excluded below) informally for at least thirty (30) days before initiating any 
arbitration or court proceeding. Such informal negotiations will commence upon written notice. Your address 
for such notices is your billing address, with an email copy to the email address you have provided to Judicata. 
Judicata’s address for such notices is Judicata, Inc., 330 Townsend Street, Suite 240, San Francisco California, 
94107; Attention: Legal. 
BINDING ARBITRATION. If you and Judicata are unable to resolve a Dispute through informal negotiations, 
all claims arising from use of the Judicata Service (except those Disputes expressly excluded below) finally 
and exclusively resolved by binding arbitration. Any election to arbitrate by one party will be final and binding 
on the other. YOU UNDERSTAND THAT IF EITHER PARTY ELECTS TO ARBITRATE, NEITHER 
PARTY WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUE IN COURT OR HAVE A JURY TRIAL. The arbitration will 
be commenced and conducted under the Commercial Arbitration Rules (the “AAA Rules”) of the American 
                                                          
263 For example CloudBees ToS at:  https://www.cloudbees.com/terms-service (last accessed November 2015) 
264 Facebook ToS at: https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms;  (last accessed November 2015) , Evernote ToS 
at: https://evernote.com/legal/tos.php (last accessed November 2015) 
265 examples of the most common structures and phrases of dispute resolution clauses are illustrated in 
Appendix 2 of the thesis 
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Arbitration Association (“AAA”) and, where appropriate, the AAA’s Supplementary Procedures for Consumer 
Related Disputes (“AAA Consumer Rules”), both of which are available at the AAA website. Your arbitration 
fees and your share of arbitrator compensation will be governed by the AAA Rules (and, where appropriate, 
limited by the AAA Consumer Rules). The arbitration may be conducted in person, through the submission of 
documents, by phone or online. The arbitrator will make a decision in writing, but need not provide a statement 
of reasons unless requested by a party. The arbitrator must follow applicable law, and any award may be 
challenged if the arbitrator fails to do so. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, you and Judicata 
may litigate in court to compel arbitration, stay proceeding pending arbitration, or to confirm, modify, vacate 
or enter judgment on the award entered by the arbitrator. 
EXCEPTIONS TO ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION. Each party retains the right to bring an 
individual action in small claims court or to seek injunctive or other equitable relief on an individual basis in 
a federal or state court in San Francisco County, California with respect to any dispute related to the actual or 
threatened infringement, misappropriation or violation of a party’s intellectual property or proprietary rights.  
WAIVER OF RIGHT TO BE A PLAINTIFF OR CLASS MEMBER IN A PURPORTED CLASS ACTION 
OR REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDING. You and Judicata agree that any arbitration will be limited to the 
Dispute between Judicata and you individually. YOU ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT YOU AND 
JUDICATA ARE EACH WAIVING THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A PLAINTIFF OR CLASS 
MEMBER IN ANY PURPORTED CLASS ACTION OR REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDING. Further, 
unless both you and Judicata otherwise agree, the arbitrator may not consolidate more than one person’s claims, 
and may not otherwise preside over any form of any class or representative proceeding. If this specific 
paragraph is held unenforceable, then the entirety of this “Dispute Resolution” Section will be deemed null 
and void. 
LOCATION OF ARBITRATION. Arbitration will take place in San Francisco County, California. You and 
Judicata agree that for any Dispute not subject to arbitration (other than claims proceeding in any small claims 
court), or where no election to arbitrate has been made, the California state and Federal courts located in San 
Francisco, California have exclusive jurisdiction, and you and Judicata agree to submit to the personal 
jurisdiction of such courts.”266 
Another characteristic feature of dispute resolution clauses in observed cloud providers’ ToS 
was a usual waiver of trial by jury and even more commonly any participation in a class action 
or group action against a provider. Class actions are not universally recognized. Therefore, 
these clauses are only applicable to certain legal systems.267 
Along the specifying applicable law, one of the more common features of the observed terms 
of services and their dispute resolution paragraphs is the exclusion of conflicts of law or choice 
of law rules of the selected applicable law. We found the explicit exclusion in 124 out of 322 
                                                          
266 Judicata -Terms and Conditions, at: https://www.judicata.com/terms  (accessed January 21, 2016). 
267 More about the topic in chapter 4 
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surveyed terms of service.268 Another very common declaration is that applicable law governs 
the agreements without regard to the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods and sometimes the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).269  
Providers, especially those who insert binding arbitration in their ToS, are aware that in certain 
jurisdictions, such clauses could be declared null and void before a domestic court. However, 
if some of the terms have been declared void, it does not necessarily render the whole contract 
void of the effect.270 We found that providers regularly place a severability clause that assures 
application of the remaining parts of the contract in case certain clauses are found to be void in 
the court of law.271 
Few providers have a particular dispute resolution for specific purposes outside of its regular 
dispute resolution section in ToS. It sometimes includes payment disputes, disputes between 
the users, intellectual property disputes, etc. US-based providers usually state its compliance 
with DMCA requirements and offer the notice and takedown procedure in case of an 
infringement of intellectual property rights through the use of provider sites’ and service.272 
Even though we have a variety of length and content of clouds’ ToS, we can extract certain 
common denominators, which are indicative of the position of the majority of providers 
towards the mechanisms of conflict resolution with its users. For this purpose, we have 
conducted the survey and focused on the essential elements found in observed terms of service. 
4.2. Dispute resolution in Terms of Services survey 
 
The dispute resolution clauses in the Terms of Service are usual but small part of cloud 
contracts. Since we are observing the narrow aspect of ToS, we decided to take a larger number 
of cloud contracts as a base for the survey and analysis.273 A greater number of surveyed Terms 
of Service offers more solid evidence to back the claim on the commonalities in the cloud 
market expressed through contract based transactions. We build on empirical data gathering 
and statistical analysis, with in-depth analysis of the clauses themselves and potential effects it 
                                                          
268 The full list of observed cloud services, with their Terms of Service Privacy Policies, and information 
extracted from the clauses, is contained in the appendix 1 of this thesis. 
269 Ref UNCCsg I UNCITA. UNCITA exclusion was found in 15 ToS. 
270 TREITEL., supra note 223.  
271 See for example Acronis: http://www.acronis.com/en-eu/  or see Okta:  https://www.okta.com/terms/  
272 See for example http://www.sumtotalsystems.com/legal/  (last accessed November 2015) 
273 as opposed to smaller number of providers’ terms of service which would be analyzed in-depth for all the 
aspects of contract in relation to applicable laws and parties positions 
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will have on the parties’ position. Here, we focus mostly on what is written in the Terms of 
Service and not the corrective measures in the positive law (i.e., in the case of unfair terms for 
consumers), which will be the subject of the next chapters. 
For our survey, we have analyzed 322 of available Terms of Service and Privacy Policies from 
different cloud services. The cloud market, in the broadest sense, hosts a variety of services, 274 
which are difficult to represent properly through the observed sample. We chose to focus on 
the market shares of providers and their services, expressed through the popularity of a cloud 
service among users. Due to a limitation in time and resources for the thesis, and our 
willingness to observe a bigger number of providers we chose to rely on external assessments 
on the popularity of the services. We started with an assessment of “The Cloud Times”: the 
portal writing about topics that are cloud market specific and targeted at clouds users and 
providers.275 The Cloud Times compiles annually a list of the best 100 cloud providers based 
on Cloud Times’ algorithm that calculates social media performance of selected companies.276 
This list of 2015 performance is enlarged with the cloud services from the “BVP Cloudscape” 
which lists 300 most promising cloud companies according to the BVP Cloud Index.277 “BVP 
Cloudscape” categorizes and groups cloud services along three axes of functional buyers, 
horizontal solutions, and industry-specific solutions.278 For our goals, we needed a significant 
number of representative cloud services from IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS markets. The methodology 
of these two lists are not relevant for the purpose of our survey, as we needed a list or a pool 
of cloud providers arranged by a parameter related to their popularity among cloud users, and 
results of their research are not relevant to our topic, so we will not elaborate their findings. 
Just to be on a safe side, we also added (the services that were already not on the list) Terms of 
Service and Privacy Policies of cloud services that were under observation of “Cloud legal 
project” carried out by Queen Mary University of London, School of Law.279 In the most recent 
survey, Dimitra Kamarinou et al. in 2015 published the paper” Privacy in the Clouds: an 
                                                          
274 See the part on the definition of cloud services at section 2 of this chapter. 
275 the portal is available at: http://cloudtimes.org/ ; info about the contributors: http://cloudtimes.org/about-
us/ and http://cloudtimes.org/guest-authors/ (last accessed November 2015) 
276 The list contains in total 109 cloud service available at:  http://cloudtimes.org/top100/ (last accessed 
November 2015) 
277 BVP Cloudscape of June 3, 2014 is available at: https://www.bvp.com/blog/bvp-cloudscape-top-300-
private-cloud-companies-0 (last accessed November 2015). “BVP” that’s short of “Bessemer Venture 
Partners”, is a privately held company that holds a significant portfolio of technology startups. About BVP at: 
https://www.bvp.com/about and their BVP Cloud Index: http://www.bvp.com/cloud-computing/comps  
278 https://www.bvp.com/blog/bvp-cloudscape-top-300-private-cloud-companies-0 (last accessed November 
2015). The company actually listed 295 cloud services but from marketing and convenience purposes they 
called the list the top 300. 
279 Cloud Legal Project at: http://www.cloudlegal.ccls.qmul.ac.uk/  
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Empirical Study of the Terms of Service and Privacy Policies of 20 Cloud Service Providers”, 
280 which has focused on in-depth analysis of ToS of 20 providers. Selection of providers was 
made on numbers of cloud users based on available data.281 We then cross-referenced these 
three lists: cloud times’ 109 cloud service in addition to 295 listed services on “BVP top 300 
listing” and 20 cloud providers on Kamarinou et al. study based on a number of the users. A 
number of services overlapped on the three lists, which lowered the final number for the survey. 
Additionally, we decided to treat only cloud services that offered Terms of Services on their 
site or were readily available by simple search and to exclude those who lacked the documents. 
A number of services only have Privacy Policies displayed on their sites, and even those in 
most cases do not contain dispute resolution clauses. It does not mean that these services do 
not have Terms of Service, but merely that they are not accessible for consideration unless user 
contacts provider (with the question on ToS), demands a demo or signs-up in some other way 
(i.e. user registration prior to click-through agreements). We ultimately arrived at the list of 
322 cloud services and analyzed their Terms of Service and Privacy Policies. The full table of 
all observed cloud services that illustrates the selection of dispute resolution methods of each 
provider is available as an Appendix A of the thesis. After initial analysis on commonalities 
and setting up the frame for observing ToS, we quantified the results of the survey, and we 
came to the following results which indicates several important aspects of choices in dispute 
resolution methods for cloud services. Table 1 illustrates preferences of cloud providers that 
are part of their terms of service. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
280 Dimitra Kamarinou, Christopher Millard & W. Kuan Hon, Privacy in the Clouds: An Empirical Study of the 
Terms of Service and Privacy Policies of 20 Cloud Service Providers,  (2015). 
281 Id.p. 1  
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Location of 
dis.res./choice of 
jurisdiction in 
the ToS of 322 
cloud service 
Jurisdict
ions in 
ToS 
Exclusive 
choice of 
single 
jurisdiction 
of all the 
ToS  that 
include that 
jurisdiction 
Choice of 
courts as 
exclusive 
dis.res. 
method in 
the ToS  
 
Small 
Claim 
Court 
(optional 
with 
Arbitrati
on) 
Arbitra
tion 
AAA 
Rules 
Arbitrat
ion 
JAMS 
Rules 
Arbitrat
ion ICC, 
LCAI  
and 
other 
United States  267 179  204 8 48 23 11  
 California  169 148 117 5 25 19 7 
 San 
Francisco 
County 
71 56 42 3  11 14 5 
 Santa Clara 
County 
50 35 40 1 6 4 2 
 New York 26 24 21  2  3 
 Massachuset
ts  
17 16  16  1  1 
 Washington 12 12  10 1 2   
 Delaware 6 6  6     
United Kingdom 
(London mostly) 
21 6   14  2  6 
Germany 7 1  7     
Singapore 9 0  5  1  3 
Israel 4 4  4     
Other (France, 
Netherlands, 
Hong Kong, 
Canada, Spain, 
Switzerland, 
Brazil, Norway, 
Austria, Australia, 
Ireland, Mexico) 
69 12  48    8 
Total 322 ToS  377 202  282  8 51 23 28 
Table 1. Survey of the 322 cloud provider. See more in Appendix A 
Five out of 322 analyzed terms of service and privacy policies did not have any dispute 
resolution clause or applicable law/governing law clause, either in ToS or PP. Nine providers 
contained dispute resolution provisions only in the privacy policies, which arguably refers only 
to the disputes related to privacy and data protection. Three providers have displayed terms of 
service on their site but no privacy policies as a separate or distinguished part of cloud contract. 
In the survey, particularly in ToS, we focused on the four aspects of terms of service: location 
of the dispute resolution, exclusive choice of single jurisdiction for dispute resolution, 
exclusive choice of courts and mandatory or possible arbitration. These four aspects are the 
basis for follow-up analysis of the fairness in the choices in dispute resolution clauses of cloud 
providers. 
 
85 
 
4.2.1. Location for a dispute resolution 
 
The first aspect illustrates preference of cloud providers for certain jurisdictions or specific 
locations (states, counties, areas, cities, etc.). We emphasize this, having in mind the global 
reach of cloud services (potentially global cloud market) and easiness of cross-border cloud 
transactions, where selected jurisdictions are of consequences to the effective protection of 
users’ rights. We wanted to see how globally spread were most popular cloud services and how 
it relates to their choices of jurisdictions in case of dispute. As we see in Table 1, the United 
States are the most common choice for dispute resolution venue among the surveyed ToS, 
which is as expected as most of the cloud providers are incorporated in the United States. Of 
322 cloud providers, 267 have included the United States as the location where dispute 
resolution will take place. However, even within the United States, we notice the concentration 
of the jurisdictions in certain states, most prominently California with 169 terms of service 
citing the state, counties or cities in California as the venue of the dispute resolution. The most 
preferred counties are the counties of San Francisco with 71 ToS and Santa Clara with 50 ToS, 
as these counties together with the wider area of the Northern California also hosts some of the 
most prominent cloud services based in so-called “Silicon Valley”. 
Even though the more than half of total number of surveyed terms of service opted for dispute 
resolution in California, we found cloud providers also concentrated in a few other jurisdictions 
in the United States, such as states of New York (26 ToS), Massachusetts (17 ToS), Washington 
(12 ToS) and Delaware (6 ToS). 
Outside the United States, which is obviously preferred choice among surveyed cloud 
providers, we find a variety of different jurisdictions in different countries, in close connection 
with the place of their establishments or corporate seat. With 21 surveyed terms of service, the 
United Kingdom and their courts are entrusted with possible disputes, using only for outside 
the United States, mostly for EU and EMEA area.282 
All the findings of our data gathering resemble the results from our initial survey in 2013 
conducted on a smaller sample. 
                                                          
282 EMEA stands for Europe, Middle East and Asia 
86 
 
Cloud providers - total 40 Applicable law(in contract)  Jurisdiction ( contract) 
21 US-California California courts  
8 US-Others US courts 
7 UK and Wales UK and Wales 
5 EU (without the UK) Member state 
1 Swiss, Canada  Swiss, Canadian 
2 Brazil Brazil 
8 Mandatory Arbitration AAA rules  
4 Possible Arbitration  AAA (+ 1 other) 
Table 2.  Initial smaller sample survey from 2013 published in the paper:” Online Dispute Resolution and Cloud Computing 
Services.”283 
Both surveys, display the similar concentration of choices in jurisdiction over dispute 
resolution, regardless of the selection of court or arbitration as an appropriate tribunal. Certain 
jurisdictions intend to provide resolution of disputes with users coming from a significant 
number of foreign jurisdictions, and the number of domestic users within these selected 
jurisdictions are significantly disproportionate to the number of the users that would consider 
these jurisdictions as foreign or at least not local. If we determined jurisdiction strictly by click-
through terms of service of cloud providers, the majority of the cloud users would be exposed 
to a foreign jurisdiction in the case of a dispute. Since this puts consumers in a worse position, 
many legislators decided to intervene to balance positions of parties. Chapter 4 and 5 discusses 
fairness and legislative response to these terms. 
 
                                                          
283 D Martic, Online Dispute Resolution for Cloud Computing Services, Vol-1105 in CEUR-WS.ORG (2014), 
http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1105/paper2.pdf (last visited Jan 30, 2014). We have examined contracts offered by 40 
popular cloud providers (that offer more than 60 cloud services). Surveyed cloud services: Google Cloud(Drive, 
Docs, Gmail…),Apple Icloud, Evernote, Dropbox, Box, Amazon, Skydrive (Microsoft),Microsoft Azure, 
SoundCloud, Spotify, Mendeley, CloudON, Zoho, SAP, MicrosoftOffice365,  Salesforce, GoogleAppEngine, 
Coursera, Fuzbox, GoGrid, Rackspace, Joyent, Enomaly, Appistry,  Engineyard, ThinkGrid, Opsource, HP cloud,  
Lunacloud, Nephoscale, Adrive, Mozy/Decho, Softlayer, Symantec, PayPal, Intycascade, Flipboard, Netflix, EDX, 
Prezi,Trustmarque, Servicemesh 
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4.2.2. Exclusive choice of a single jurisdiction for dispute resolution 
 
The terms of service that offer more than one jurisdiction, usually in the location of registered 
branch or office, are more accessible to the users seeking remedies than those cloud services 
that insist on a single jurisdiction in the case of a dispute. Having in mind a global reach of 
cloud service and potentially low price for the service (pay per use), some companies possibly 
could have opted for single jurisdiction as a strategy to dissuade dissatisfied users from filing 
a lawsuit or initiating a formal dispute.284 It is also a reasonable choice for companies looking 
to cut down on legal expenses. Whatever the case may be, exclusive jurisdictions of a certain 
state or a county are in the majority of observed terms, accounting for 202 of 322 ToS or 62.7% 
of terms of service that opted for a single jurisdiction.  We note in the survey that 148 or 45.96% 
of all terms of services in case of a formal dispute cite California as the exclusive jurisdiction. 
Another evidence for a concentration of jurisdictions, with even greater emphasis on 
exclusiveness.  
However, we can also notice that it is not the same case with the terms of services that opted 
exclusively for non-US jurisdictions. If we recall the fact that providers, the parties that dictate 
the terms, can opt for numerous jurisdictions, it is interesting to observe that non-US providers 
less frequently opt for exclusive jurisdiction of (presumably) their domestic legal systems. In 
the case of US-based providers, it is in 179 of 276 ToS, which accounts for 67% of providers 
opting for exclusive US jurisdiction. On the other hand, we see that only 23 exclusive 
jurisdictions in 110 ToS, which is 20.9% of non-US based providers (UK, Germany, Singapore, 
Israel and Other in table 1) which are selecting their domestic or preferred jurisdiction outside 
of the United States. In one example a provider is choosing arbitration in California according 
to American Arbitration Association Rules, but in case that the binding arbitration agreement 
is not applicable, Estonian courts in the city of Harju have exclusive jurisdiction.285 If the 
provider opted for arbitration as a primary dispute resolution method, naming the exclusive 
venue where arbitration will be held was considered the exclusive choice of jurisdiction. 
However, if provider opted for arbitration without specifying the location (even if he specify 
                                                          
284 Google initially had English courts in 2011 but they now refer to exclusively Santa Clara California. Millard, 
supra note 20., ANTOINE MASSON & MARY J. SHARIFF, LEGAL STRATEGIES: HOW CORPORATIONS USE LAW TO IMPROVE 
PERFORMANCE LEGAL STRATEGIES: HOW CORPORATIONS USE LAW TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE (Antoine Masson & Mary J. 
Shariff eds., 2010). 
285 Pipedrive ToS at: https://www.pipedrive.com/en/terms-of-service ; 
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the rules), we did not consider it exclusive, as multiple jurisdictions are possible with the same 
rules of arbitration. 
Without going further into the reasons behind the choices, we simply record the fact that the 
concentration among selection of jurisdictions is taking place in cloud service markets. The 
consequences of such choices on fairness and not the rationale of the dictating party is relevant 
from a third-party point of view. 
 
4.2.3. Courts as exclusive method  
 
The third and fourth aspect are to illustrate the preference in adjudicative methods for dispute 
resolution. We focus on adjudicative methods as they are ultimate means to resolve the disputes 
when consensual methods as mediation or negotiation that result in effective resolution of the 
dispute and parties choose to escalate a conflict.286 We wanted to see how many of cloud 
providers opted for courts as exclusive and somewhat traditional method of adjudicative 
dispute resolution as opposed to alternative dispute resolution methods as arbitration, with all 
the consequences that such choice carries for the parties, especially having in mind accessibility 
costs and time of such exclusive forum for service of a global reach. Selection of court as a 
method does not necessarily imply a single jurisdiction. It is possible, and occasionally we find 
terms of service that name different possible jurisdictions but are exclusive of specific court or 
courts within a particular jurisdiction are selected in case of dispute. We considered (albeit in 
a small number of instances) terms of service that specified applicable law without mentioning 
court as the venue where disputes are going to be handled, as equal to the terms of service that 
are quite specific to the selection of the tribunals, and we will add them together. The logic 
behind this inclusion is that all legal systems consider courts as primary dispute resolution 
mechanism, especially in commercial and consumer matters. Any derogation from this 
principle are specified in law and is considered as an exemption to the rule that allows for 
different methods of dispute resolution. We also find within different ToS, that providers 
sometimes choose courts in one jurisdiction, but for specific jurisdiction or users, they prefer 
arbitration (most commonly for the users who are United States’ residents).287 Possible options 
                                                          
286 We discuss more about this in chapter 5.  
287 See more at:  https://evernote.com/legal/tos.php ( last accessed  November 2015) 
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for exclusive method or combination with ADR puts different users in different legal positions 
over the same services, and it has ramification on issues of access to justice. 
Looking at our sample of terms of service we document the general preference for courts as an 
exclusive dispute resolution methods in 282 cases of 377 possible jurisdictions, which is 
74.8%. This preference is distributed almost equally in all jurisdictions, where it is 76.4% (204 
of 267) in the US and 70.9% (78 of 110) in non-US jurisdictions. These findings indicate that 
regardless of the possible benefits of alternative dispute resolution methods, courts remain to 
be the most significant dispute resolution bodies. 
4.2.4. Arbitration in the ToS 
 
For the same reasons as courts, the information on how many providers opted for arbitration is 
of importance, as well as under what circumstances they adhere to ADR. Circumstances 
expressed through the choice of arbitration rules make a significant difference from party’s 
point of view. Therefore, it is essential to distinguish different kinds of arbitration rules and 
providers selection based on them.  For illustration, we also grouped selection of arbitration in 
three categories: two most referenced rules of arbitration and one category for all others. We 
also included here, albeit in a small number of observed terms, whenever small claims court is 
specified as an alternative to binding arbitration.  
Cloud providers can choose exclusive binding arbitration or to offer it as a possibility and as a 
complement to a choice of the court which doesn’t make it binding for a user. They can choose 
to have arbitration in a single location or to allow multiple venues in case of a dispute for 
practical purposes. Even when the provider insists on binding arbitration, in the vast majority 
of terms of service provider specifies the court which will have jurisdiction in case arbitration 
agreement is found to be unenforceable. Providers sometimes specify alongside the binding 
arbitration agreement that a certain court will have jurisdiction over specific disputes (for 
example intellectual property disputes). 
Arbitrations as an alternative dispute resolution methods have been more developed and used 
in common-law countries than in civil law communities. Hence, it is only natural that the 
majority of binding and nonbinding arbitration in dispute resolution clauses were placed in 
terms of service specifying US jurisdictions. Only 20 of 102 terms are proposing or imposing 
arbitration outside the United States. It is also a relatively small number in relation to a total 
number of jurisdictions observed (377). On the other hand, we found 82 possible or mandatory 
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arbitrations that could take place in various jurisdictions the United States. Unsurprisingly, 
most commonly in California and San Francisco County (29 in total).  
In a small number of terms of services (8), and all of them indicating jurisdiction of United 
States, cloud providers offered the possibility to wage a dispute before Small Claims Court, in 
addition to the binding arbitration agreement. Although such legal action could be possible in 
certain jurisdictions even without explicit clause in terms of service, we only enumerated where 
it was expressed clearly to illustrate that in certain cases where provider chooses binding 
arbitration they still leave an option to users who may find it more practical or fair, as opposed 
to those ToS that insist on arbitration exclusively. 
The arbitration rules that were specified most often (51 times) are rules of American Arbitration 
Association (AAA), usually including the AAA's Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-
Related Disputes. The rules of American Arbitration Association are discussed further in 
Chapter 5. In some cases, the provider does not indicate the specific venue where arbitration 
will take place but only specifies the rules. In these cases, the location of the dispute could be 
appropriated to users or could be subject to a post-dispute agreement. Another notable choice 
in 23 ToS is JAMS arbitrations, formerly known as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation 
Services, Inc., which is a United States-based organization providing ADR services, including 
mediation and arbitration. Both, AAA rules and JAMS rules face criticism on fairness when 
they are imposed on consumers through click-through pre-dispute agreements. We will discuss 
this in Chapter 5. 
In some cases, providers with a more international presence in the markets offer arbitration by 
International Chamber of Commerce rules or LCAI rules. However, these are more appropriate 
for business-to-business commercial disputes as opposed to the consumer related disputes. 
Of all surveyed jurisdictions in terms of services, arbitration is a possibility in only 27% of 
cases. We can claim then that providers are not that eager to offer users additional and 
supposedly more flexible venues for dispute resolution even for low-value disputes (contractual 
disputes over low-cost services) where it is perceived to be the most practical. 
4.3. Dispute resolution in Privacy Policies 
 
Privacy policies are usually separated from the terms of service and represented in a different 
document although they are both integral part of cloud contracts. Privacy policies often 
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reference terms of service as an applicable general document that regulates the relationship 
between parties. That being said, it is not uncommon to see that privacy policies provide 
different procedures in certain situations, due to the regulatory requirements or the providers’ 
attitudes towards privacy and data protection. Cloud providers determine their privacy policies 
in congruence with their business processes and interests. In the cases where the providers 
extend cloud offers to other jurisdictions, facilitating cross-border exports and imports of data, 
it is expected to see the appropriation of privacy policies to the exposure of peremptory norms 
of different jurisdictions where compliance is required. 
Dispute resolution clauses are not a necessary element of privacy policies. In case that the 
privacy policies do not reference specific dispute resolution, the mechanisms established in 
terms of services are applicable unless there is a mandatory administrative or judicial body that 
has exclusive jurisdiction based on relevant and enforceable law. In the case of cloud services, 
one of the most prominent pieces of legislation that have a significant influence on the industry 
is the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46 (EU DPD).288 The Directive 95/46 establishes the 
jurisdiction of supervising authorities in article 28 and, notwithstanding supervisory 
authorities, the jurisdiction of the Member States’ courts in Article 22 to provide a judicial 
remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed by the applicable national law. Since data 
protection has the human rights perspective and the public law perspective regulators did not 
allow parties’ autonomy in the contractual relations to exclude the jurisdiction of these public 
bodies. However, within the Safe Harbor regulatory and Privacy Shield framework, which are 
intended to facilitate cross-border data transport while guaranteeing standards set in data 
protection directive, it is possible to designate dispute resolution form of choice in case of data 
protection related disputes.  
Cloud providers, especially those based outside the EU Member States, relied heavily on the 
Safe Harbor agreement (between EU Commission and the United States as it is most often the 
case), to facilitate legal transport of data from the EU. Accordingly, they profess their 
adherence to the Safe Harbor agreement’s “adequacy” standards and additionally designate 
dispute resolution applicable in the case of a relevant dispute. In our survey, we found that out 
of 322 cloud providers 185 have adhered to Safe Harbor program that they advertise on their 
sites and within their privacy policies.  In some cases, PPs do not provide information on the 
                                                          
288 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
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dispute resolution program for Safe Harbor, but information is publicly available at the 
https://safeharbor.export.gov/list.aspx.  
Most of the 185 providers that opted for safe harbor designated specific dispute resolution 
providers for data protection disputes.289 Eighty-two of those have signed up with TRUSTe, the 
trustmarks company that offers privacy and data protection certification and an accompanying 
online dispute resolution program.290 Another 25 privacy policies list “BBB EU Safe Harbor 
Dispute Resolution Program” which is in dispute resolution program offered by Better 
Business Bureau based in the United States.291 The American Arbitration Association (AAA) 
features in 15 PP as dispute resolution provider, 9 of which specifies International Center for 
Dispute Resolution of AAA (ICDR of AAA) as their choice, while the others name AAA 
without additional details. The Judicial Arbitration Mediation Service’s (JAMS) program for 
Safe Harbor is also listed in 14 privacy policies. We also have 2 cases of the Direct Marketing 
Association named as dispute resolution provider.  
Cloud providers that haven’t opted for one of the above-mentioned dispute settlement schemes 
have selected the EU Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) and Swiss Federal Data Protection 
and Information Commissioner (FDPIC) as the institutions that are (already) entrusted with 
complaint handling.292  
Safe Harbor is not the only reason to specify dispute resolution scheme for privacy issues. To 
obtain the trust of the users, many providers accept third-party private certification schemes 
regarding privacy and data protection. Almost all of them having some form monitoring 
program that also includes a dispute resolution mechanism in case of user complaints.293 
TRUSTEe is most preferred third-party certification among observed cloud providers which 
also offers a cloud-specific certification program.294 We have not found this certification 
displayed in cloud websites but rather the general TRUSTEe certification. However, most of 
the TRUSTEe programs include dispute resolution program for complaint handling. 
                                                          
289 Table in Appendix 1, last column indicates dispute resolution in privacy policies or of observed cloud 
providers.  
290 See more at:  https://www.truste.com/ (last accessed December 2015) 
291 See more at:  https://www.bbb.org/council/eusafeharbor/bbb-eu-safe-harbor-dispute-resolution-program 
(last accessed December 2015) 
292 For example see Microsoft information at http://safeharbor.export.gov/list.aspx  
293 Paolo Balboni, TRUSTMARKS IN E-COMMERCE - THE VALUE OF WEB SEALS AND THE LIABILITY OF THEIR PROVIDERS SPRINGER 
(2009). 
294 About TRUSTEe cloud certification program see  more at: 
https://www.truste.com/window.php?url=https://download.truste.com/TVarsTf=9KDUTVJ8-531 a 
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Most of these programs offer nonappearance spaced dispute resolution in the form of online 
dispute resolution through an online platform or written based arbitration or mediation. The 
intention is to facilitate quicker, cheaper and more accessible dispute resolution.295 The cost of 
these programs, however, are not so obvious and are dependent on the type and duration of the 
disputes.  
4.3.1. Privacy Shield as a new framework 
 
At the time of conducting our survey, after some deliberation, in October 2015 the European 
Court of Justice declared invalid the EU Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision that allowed 
transfer of personal data to U.S. under an adequate level of protection of the data.296 The 
overturn of Safe Harbour brought uncertainty for cloud providers and governments sought new 
solutions to allow legal transfer of personal data outside of the EU. Following the reasoning of 
the Court’s decision, the European Commission and the U.S. Government initiated negotiations 
about a new framework, and they reached a new agreement in February 2016.297 The European 
Commission finally adopted the decision on Privacy Shield framework on 12 July 2016, and it 
went into effect the same day, while the President of the U.S. signed an Executive Order 
entitled "Enhancing Public Safety" which states that U.S. privacy protections will not be 
extended beyond US citizens or residents.298 
In Chapter 7 we discuss in greater details the changes Privacy Shield framework brought to 
dispute resolution. However, due to changes to Privacy Policies of a certain number of cloud 
providers we have conducted a new survey of the policies and compared with the previous 
findings. In Appendix A you will find a single table with updated input including changes 
Privacy Shield (PS) caused. Up to April 14, 2017, out of 322 observed cloud services’ PP, 112 
has introduced Privacy Shield terms based on self-certified process. For dispute resolution that 
entails designating independent dispute resolution entity or DPA to handle cases for potential 
claims against infringement of Privacy Shield Principles.  We can notice a hesitant or slower 
process of adopting PS, where out of 187 providers previously enlisted Safe Harbour 
                                                          
295 See JAMS at: http://www.jamsadr.com/  
296 Case C‑362/14, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2015. Maximillian Schrems v Data 
Protection Commissioner. Request for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62014CJ0362  
297 See more on press release available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-
transfers/eu-us-privacy-shield/index_en.htm  
298 See more at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/eu-us-privacy-
shield/index_en.htm  
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arrangments, 83 did not yet adopt the Privacy Shield.  On the other hand of the remaining , 12 
providers that were not under Safe Harbour are now Privacy Shield certified.  Although 
informative, these numbers do not indicate serious change of attitude of provider towards 
privacy policies. They rather seem to adapt to new requirements for the sake of compliance. 
However, the new requirements have brought some changes that could have direct effects on 
access to justice, or access to recourse (as forumalted in the framework). Not all mechanisms 
under new framework have become operational and we did not find any relevant report on 
disputes until the date of writing this.299 The adequcacy of Prviacy Shield may also be subject 
of Court’s assesment in following years. 300We discuss in greater details Privacy Framework 
and its implication in Chapter 7.  
 
4.4. Dispute resolution in SLA’s and AUPs 
 
Service-Level Agreements and Acceptable Use Policies rarely contain dispute resolution 
clauses. If they are represented in different documents, they reference the general terms of 
service and hence, dispute resolution designated within them. 
One of the characteristics of the SLAs, as technical documents specifying expected quality of 
service, are the clauses prescribing remediation in case the set uptime of service has not been 
reached (, or some other technical aspects of the service have failed). Service-level agreements 
are usually limited in remedies since the procedures are only focused on the issues of quality 
of service (and its lack of) and capped in the possible remediation by maximum credit that 
could be awarded in case of established breach of SLAs targets.301 However, if remediation and 
service credits awarded are not satisfactory, the complaining party can initiate a formal dispute 
resolution process in accordance with the general Terms of Service and the applicable law. 
One of the issues for remediability is the quantification or the measurement of the availability 
or uptime. Depending on how the measurement is expressed, which parameters were taken into 
account and what circumstances are counted (i.e. if regular maintenance is counted as 
                                                          
299 See certain info on Privacy Shield practice where IAPP writer Sam Pfeifle reports that there are no reports of 
complaints yet. Available at https://iapp.org/news/a/hows-privacy-shield-doing-well-no-ones-complaining/  
300 See more news reports at: https://iapp.org/news/a/libe-committee-declares-privacy-shield-inadequate-by-
narrow-margin/  and https://iapp.org/news/a/why-the-privacy-shield-may-survive-for-now-2/ and 
https://iapp.org/news/a/the-trump-effect-on-privacy-shield-theres-a-great-deal-thats-unknown/  
301 See for example http://www.iron.io/sla/  
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downtime) and depending on the interpretation of the same, the guarantees of provider (of a 
high percentage of uptime) are ineffective.302Lack of standards in the market leaves a large 
margin of possible interpretations, especially in the cross-border service scenarios. However, 
the cloud industry and its potential standardization could push for alternative dispute resolution 
models appropriate for SLA disputes. At the time, we have not recorded mentioning of 
adjudicative ADR in the SLAs. 
Acceptable use policies, in addition to prohibiting certain behaviors and providing norms for 
users, could also specify complaints procedure in case of breach of policies. Wordpress (cloud 
hosting service) invites third parties to report a blog that is hosted on their servers if they 
contain abusive content.303 These procedures are usually focused on solving conflicts between 
users or to prevent users from infringing third parties’ rights. DMCA notice and takedown 
procedure falls in this category.304 Any breach or abuse of prescribed standards of behavior or 
”community standards” coupled with a complaint procedure could be also considered dispute 
resolution in a broader sense.305 However, these complaint handling practices are not 
appropriate for the disputes of the users with providers themselves, because of the impartiality  
(being a judge in own case) and fairness issues.  
 
5. Access to justice and fairness in cloud contracts  
 
In this chapter so far we focused only on what we observed in the cloud service contracts and 
what are the perceived positions of the parties based on these prewritten service agreements. 
We will discuss in the next chapter the legal framework for dispute resolution, and how 
sometimes applicable and binding law overrides dispute resolution terms which it finds unfair 
or unsuitable for certain categories. Just looking at contracts prima facie allow us to draw some 
conclusions on the fairness of access to justice mechanism within cloud domain. 
                                                          
302 European Commission, Standards terms and performance criteria in service level agreements for cloud 
computing services, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union 2015, A study prepared for the 
European Commission DG Communications Networks, Content & Technology by: Hans Graux and Jos 
Dumortier of  time.lex CVBA and Patricia Ypma, Jasmine Simpson, Peter McNally, and Marc de Vries of Spark 
Ltd, p. 30 
303 See more at:  https://en.support.wordpress.com/report-blogs/  
304 See for example copyright dispute policy in Sumologic’s ToS at: https://www.sumologic.com/terms-
conditions/  
305 Facebook community standards at: https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards   
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Based on the results of the survey and considering ToS drafting regularities, we can conclude 
that the cloud providers are better off compared to users, primarily due to the fact that they are 
dictating the terms of cloud contracts. This conclusion stems from expected effects of imposed 
provider’s choices in terms of service. If we go back to the theoretical framework set up in 
Chapter 2, where we proposed the four key concepts to assess fairness based on party’s 
expectation prior to the dispute, we can see clearly the points where usual terms service 
agreements can lead to unequal parties’ position.  Our framework for assessment echoes Neil 
Andrews’ principles of civil procedure306 , and they comprise the:   
1. Access to a dispute resolution body, 
2. Fairness of the process,  
3. Efficiency of the process 
4. Effectiveness of the outcomes 
We considered the first criterion as essential for the access to justice and the right to fair trial. 
Without effective access, discussions on the remaining criteria are rather meaningless.  
Cappelletti et al. also emphasize the access to dispute resolution as a starting point of access to 
justice.307 Access to dispute resolution, and in the previous sense the access to justice, are 
largely determined by the dispute resolution clauses in the cloud service agreements. If we 
consider only cloud contracts, we can see a concentration of access points in a limited number 
of jurisdictions, according to providers’ preferences. The survey was conducted on the number 
of popular cloud services, whose popularity stretches far beyond national borders. As a global 
service, facilitating cross-border transactions, the majority of users, both businesses, and 
consumers are engaging in a legal relationship with the foreign elements. 
 Clouds service providers dictate the terms of the relationship and usually, when it comes to 
dispute resolution, impose favorable terms on their behalf. Such terms include the preferred 
location of the dispute resolution, usually the city/county/state where the provider is based and 
preferred choice of courts or ADR as binding dispute resolution method. Both of those choices 
regulate the users’ ability to initiate formal dispute resolution process. Selection of exclusive 
jurisdiction and exclusive dispute resolution body (either arbitration or court proceeding) 
diminishes accessibility for the users who are not domiciled in the selected jurisdiction. Very 
few providers have selected the user’s location as the venue for dispute. Some cloud businesses 
                                                          
306 ANDREWS, supra note. 72 
307 CAPPELLETTI, supra note. 37 p. 2 
97 
 
accept the user’s location under binding arbitration scheme for dispute resolution.308 A number 
of providers, especially those that opt for arbitration under the American Arbitration 
Association rules, offer a possibility of nonappearance, submission or telephone based dispute 
resolution.309 This is certainly a step in the direction of providing more access to dispute 
resolutions. However, this should not be an exclusive option, as it would hinder fundamental 
rights in a case that a party demands to a fair hearing before an independent tribunal.310 
Mandatory nonappearance dispute resolution would stand against the second criterion of 
procedural fairness. Therefore, to safeguard basic tenets of procedural fairness, enshrined in 
the right to a fair trial, easily accessible non-appearance dispute resolution should be viewed 
as an additional tool and not replacement.311 
While some providers offer flexibility in the selection of dispute resolution methods or provide 
several jurisdictions where the user can turn to the most appropriate one, the question of 
fairness of imposing the terms without negotiation is still lingering. Going back to the Rawlsian 
reasoning behind the “veil of ignorance”, it is unlikely that the choice of the group of 
individuals, unaware of its position, would correspond to the choices of a smaller group or 
minority that are placed in preferable position compared to the majority. Such reasoning would 
be contrary to “maximin” logic, which would mandate minimization of risk for the majority.312  
The issue of accessibility is effectively the issue of barriers (physical, linguistic and cultural) 
which then translates into issues of practicality and costs of initiating and waging a dispute in 
a distant venue. This criterion stands separated from the efficiency of the process, meaning the 
costs and speed of process itself without taking into account the costs of accessing the dispute 
resolution. The criterion of efficiency should be considered under the presumption that there is 
overall equal access to the dispute settlement body. Efficiency is focused on the expenditure of 
resources (costs, time) of selected processes.313 Since we are dealing with expectations and 
fairness of choices made based on these expectations, we can observe the efficiency criterion 
                                                          
308 See for example Netflix ToS at: https://help.netflix.com/legal/termsofuse?locale=en-GB; 
309 See for example Snapchat ToS at: https://www.snapchat.com/terms or Doximity ToS at: 
https://www.doximity.com/physicians/privacy  
310 The right to a fair hearing before the independent tribunal of law is recognized in many legal systems as the 
integral part of right to fair trial of Art 6.of the European Convention of Human Rights. The European Court of 
Human Rights has developed extensive jurisprudence on the right to a fair hearing. 
311 More about it in chapter 4  
312 See chapter 2, p.  
313 More about it in chapter 4, Council of Europe’s body- The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 
(CEPEJ) has developed evaluation schemes that could be considered for the criterion of efficiency. See more 
at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp  
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by comparing the typical characteristics and costs of the processes. This would mean that 
ordinarily arbitration will be considered more efficient than court proceedings; certain 
arbitration rules could be regarded as more efficient than others based on the deadlines and 
required costs of arbitration; certain jurisdictions could be regarded as more efficient than 
others considering the average length of a proceeding and the average costs of a procedure. For 
example, we consider waging trial of the comparable value of dispute, to be on average more 
costly in the US common-law system than in one of the EU Member State’s civil law system.314 
Therefore, imposing the jurisdiction and method with higher average costs for waging a dispute 
(and/longer time expenditure) would be unfair (and inaccessible) to users who are unable or 
unwilling to sustain these costs, especially considering the possibility of a more efficient 
dispute resolution. Again, maximin logic would offer different outcomes.  
If courts are expensive, then we could turn to alternative dispute resolution. ToS that opted for 
arbitration would thus offer a more fair method. However, even though ADRs are thought to 
be cheaper, accessible and efficient dispute resolution method, they did not show satisfactory 
results in the Safe Harbor framework, and we are yet to see the effects of Privacy Shield. In an 
appearance before the LIBE committee on inquiry about “Electronic mass surveillance of EU 
citizens”, Chris Connolly noted that: ”Many of the selected dispute resolution providers are 
inaccessible to ordinary consumers.”315 He explained that an arbitrator with the AAA charges 
between $120 and $1,200 per hour (with a four-hour minimum charge) and JAMS costs $350 
to $800 per hour (plus a $1,000 filing fee for international disputes), which renders these two 
popular dispute resolution services too expensive for ordinary consumers.316 Comparing the 
fees for arbitration with the value of cloud service (not including free services) illustrates the 
potential barrier for consumers in access to justice even with readily available dispute 
resolution providers. Also, several weaknesses were detected, which led to the conclusion that 
dispute resolution providers who have been self-selected by members are completely 
inappropriate to deal with a dispute relating to national security.317 
Procedural fairness of selected disputes resolutions in the cloud terms of services is also 
assessed on the basis of expectation. The expectation of procedural fairness in arbitration is 
                                                          
314 David L. McKnight and Paul J. Hinton, NERA Economic Consulting International Comparisons of Litigation 
Costs  U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, June 2013. 
315 Chris Connolly, EU/US Safe Harbor – Effectiveness of the Framework in relation to National Security 
Surveillance Galexia 2013. p.5. 
316 Id. 
317 Id. p.7.  
99 
 
lower compared to court proceedings, as the processes are less formal and with less stringent 
rules.318 Even in ToS arbitration is sometimes explained as less formal dispute resolution, with 
procedures that are simpler and more limited than rules applicable in court, and that review is 
also limited.319 It is considerably more complicated to compare procedural fairness between 
courts proceeding in different jurisdictions or to give value judgment on the fairness of various 
arbitration rules. Therefore, we propose the rebuttable presumption that the procedural fairness 
of the different dispute resolution bodies of the same type is equal. The practice called “forum 
shopping” indicates that procedural fairness of every system is not the same (even though it 
mostly concerns substantial law).320 It is difficult, though, to prove that a party has intentionally 
selected a forum for strategic purposes and not for convenience sake. In the survey, we came 
along ToS, that resembles forum shopping, but we do not have sufficient evidence to claim 
knowledge of the provider’s intent.321 Still, we are basing our assessment on expectations, and 
expectations of procedural fairness are also supported by various regulatory safeguards of 
fairness, such as principles of impartiality of judges and judicial independence, that are 
enshrined in constitutions and civil codes. Therefore, if any of the legal safeguards exist in the 
applicable law, we presume equal procedural fairness towards parties within the same type of 
dispute resolution.  
The effectiveness of the outcomes of the dispute resolution over cloud services is widely 
dependent on existing legal framework. Both national and international legal instrument set the 
frame in which dispute resolution bodies provide access to justice. The law establishes the 
functioning of the courts and the enforcement of judicial decisions. Issues may come up in the 
enforcement of the foreign court decisions, which depending on the legal system lowers the 
effectiveness of foreign tribunals. For those terms of service that opted for arbitration, 
international enforcement is usually based on the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as the "New York Arbitration 
Convention" from 1953. On the other hand, if applicable law does not allow for 
ADRs/jurisdiction stipulated in cloud contract than dispute resolution set in the ToS is 
                                                          
318 Even though the basics of the process and guarantees of fairness are covered in the various national 
Arbitration regulations. US based arbitration providers are in compliance with The Federal Arbitration Act 
(Pub.L. 68–401, 43 Stat. 883, enacted February 12, 1925, codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) 
319 For example Cloud 9’s ToS at: https://c9.io/site/terms-of-service  
320 Azar, Deborah. On selecting jurisdiction in Internet defamation cases. Common Law Review (Prague, Czech 
Republic); Bell, Avi. Libel Tourism: International Forum Shopping for Defamation Claims. Jerusalem Center for 
Public Affairs. ISBN 978-965-218-070-4. 
321 Pipedrive ToS at: https://www.pipedrive.com/en/terms-of-service  
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ineffective. The finality and effectiveness of dispute resolutions set in the ToS need to be 
assessed by examining the positive law, which we will address in the following chapter.  
To conclude when we combine our criteria with the findings from our survey of ToS and PP 
we come to following conclusions based on parties's expectations: 
 Access to dispute resolution is biased towards providers because of the tendency of 
exclusivity and concentration of dispute resolution in jurisdictions and selection of 
institutions more suitable to providers; 
 There is a presumption of procedural fairness in the same types of dispute resolution 
methods; arbitration provides less procedural fairness guarantees the than court 
proceedings, which places users in a worse position when providers select the rules; 
“forum shopping” is an indicator of the unfair position of the weaker party/user.  
 Most selected dispute resolution providers within observed ToS seem to be too 
costly/inefficient in relation to reasonable value of disputes estimated with cloud 
subscriptions 
 the effectiveness of the dispute resolution specified in ToS depends on regulatory 
interventions and limitations of party’s autonomy 
Regulatory interventions and legal framework for dispute resolution over cloud services will 
be examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 – Jurisdiction over Cloud Service 
Disputes 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
The Internet poses certain challenges to legislation. The trans-jurisdictional character of the 
Internet has become the focal point of many modern legal issues and is of vital importance 
when we speak about online services. Legal applications based on geographical locations are 
of little help in cases of services where the location of the processing of data is difficult to 
determine, or the venue itself is irrelevant for the execution of the service. The emergence and 
growth of online business-to-consumer commerce have compelled the rethinking of not only 
the traditional conception of consumers, which is that they are weak parties in transactions, but 
also the conception of international transactions in general. Because of the general ambiguity 
of legal structures to deal with electronic commerce, it has been proven to be particularly 
challenging to justify mechanisms for dispute resolution in such cases. We have seen in the 
previous chapter that in the majority of cases cloud service providers impose dispute resolution 
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body (public or private) that will have the authority to handle disputes if a case occurs. The 
validity of these choices, however, needs to be examined in comparison with imperative legal 
norms of national and international regulations of jurisdictions in private law disputes.  
The last decade and a half we have seen the beginnings of cyberspace litigation and growth of 
various internet connected disputes.322 Though other forms of resolution should be developed 
to complement litigation, litigation remains the guarantor of final justice. Access to a judge in 
the course of the ADR, for example, may be helpful to solve an unexpected problem and 
facilitate a smooth and fruitful process. It is paramount in the first place to provide a complete 
structure for litigation in light of which other mechanisms will be successfully devised. It is 
vital to establish a waterproof framework for jurisdiction in litigation, to also set the boundaries 
to the negotiating in the “shadows of the law.”323 There are three issues at hand that should be 
discussed from the private international laws field: adjudicative jurisdiction, choice of law, and 
enforcement. Though separate and unique, these are also interdependent and often involve 
similar considerations. For the purposes of this thesis, we will mostly focus on the rules for 
determining the jurisdiction, as this would be a starting point of a formal dispute resolution, 
but we will also address other issues as they are relevant for the questions of access to justice 
and fairness in disputes resolution. When litigation is called upon, the decision regarding which 
court shall have the jurisdiction to make a judgment is the first significant issue encountered. 
If the wrong court makes a ruling, procedural injustice could be cited as a reason for refusing 
enforcement.  
In the previous chapter we have established the general context of cloud service disputes, where 
we have a provider, ordinarily based in one jurisdiction offering service to international 
customers, imposing the terms and conditions, usually on a pay-per-use basis or subscription 
basis which could be perceived as a low-value transaction. The business models324 of cloud 
companies that scale up the service to fit the global market and service a significant number of 
low or non-directly-paying customers did not compel regulators to reassess significantly 
existing framework for international commerce.325 The extent to which the international legal 
framework supports enforcement of rights of all parties to such transactions remains to be the 
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question that occupies legal scholars.326 To establish if the rules governing disputes resolution, 
mostly those determining jurisdictions, allow access to justice to the users of such services, we 
need to assess the private international legal framework given the context of cloud services. 
Nominally guaranteed access to court and rights to redress, in general, seem ineffective or 
inappropriate if the costs and obstacles which a user has to overcome are hugely 
disproportionate to the costs of service.327 We could group these costs as the costs dependent 
on the location of dispute resolution and costs dependent on the type of procedure.  
The first group of costs are linked to the physical location of the dispute resolution body, which 
induces costs of access (traveling related costs, costs related to language barriers), and it is a 
significant factor when potential party ponders on initiating formal dispute procedure.  
Especially if we consider disputes where parties need to travel internationally to seek redress. 
Similarly, procedural rules of the institution have effects on accessibility, procedural fairness, 
efficiency and effectiveness of dispute resolution. Different types of procedures and its 
particular characteristics, from less formal mediation and arbitration to more formal judicial 
processes, also vary in costs which additionally burden the parties. For that reason, it is essential 
first to determine who has the authority to resolve the disputes as it directly relates to the 
expenses dependent on location and the costs dependent on the procedure. Given that, access 
to justice is directly correlated to the rules on determining the jurisdiction of dispute resolution 
authority.  
 
1.1. Adjudicative jurisdiction in private international law 
   
Adjudicative jurisdiction is explained as a state’s authority to subject persons or things to the 
process of its courts or administrative tribunals.328 The process involves one’s selecting one 
court out of many before bringing a case to court and courts using discretionary power to decide 
                                                          
326 See for example Giuditta Cordero-Moss, GIUDITTA CORDERO-MOSS-BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, 
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ТОМ 18;ТОМ 937 (2011). 
327 CAPPELLETTI, supra note.37 
328  See Restatement (3rd) of Foreign Relations 402 (1986). 
104 
 
whether they can handle the case before taking it. It is sometimes considered to be the gateway 
to the success of litigation. 
Even though the World Wide Web is not a physical entity, the existing legal precedent for 
adjudicative jurisdiction is defined and limited by a complex system of borders on the local, 
state, national, and international level.329 Adjudicative jurisdiction has traditionally been built 
upon territorial connections, with courts being vested with power over acts within their 
administrative territory. In traditional international commerce, territorial connections are 
identifiable because the players and action were easily detectable in the visible world. This is 
hardly the case for electronic commerce that happens in virtual space and whose actors could 
be indifferent to geographic location.330 People’s location is becoming less and less relevant to 
the activities and transactions in the electronic commerce of today.  
The framework for the objective allocation of adjudicative jurisdiction has never existed.331 
Considering the new face of commerce, some lawyers have called for a new jurisdictional 
system to accommodate electronic commerce.332 As territorial connecting factors have not been 
satisfying in the light of electronic commerce, the notion of pushing for a new connecting 
factor(s) emerged.333 However, this idea has not received much support. In principle, electronic 
commerce still belongs to the known world of traditional international trade. International 
commercial interests and incentives have not changed entirely due to new technologies. 
Although electronic commerce can accomplish entire transactions online, many Internet-based 
businesses also used additional, traditional communication means. While systems of 
communication always change, the prudent policy of technological neutrality in regulation 
suggests a careful approach to the development of specific laws.334 Based on traditional legal 
theory, online commerce does not necessitate a separate system of law to deal with the 
problems given rise to by the Internet.335  
                                                          
329 C.N. Davis, Personal Jurisdiction in Online Expression Cases: Rejecting Minimum Contacts in Favor of 
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Jurisdiction has historically depended upon control held over a certain person or object. Late 
in the 19th century, for example, an American citizen or company was only subject to the 
jurisdiction of the courts that presided over fora in which the citizen or business had a physical 
presence.336 However, principles concerning jurisdiction must always be developed to meet 
new demands. With the rapid increase of international trade in the second part of 20th century, 
in large part, a reaction to developments in communication, new principles developed. 
Today, with ever-accessible communication and cloud-based businesses, it is hard to determine 
the relevant location of specific action, actor or data and to establish a relevant connection 
between transactions and the forum states. The challenge for judiciary and academia is to 
establish such connections in a resounding manner. 
We distinguish in rem and personal jurisdiction. An in rem jurisdiction revolves around the 
exercise of control over property found within the forum state.337  In rem jurisdiction is based 
on the location of the certain property. Thus, it is important to tackle the difficult tasks of first 
determining what should be regarded as property in electronic commerce and then locating that 
property. In the physical world, goods or real estate would easily be identified, but in electronic 
domain things become dubious. However, as participants in e-commerce are not always known 
in consumer transactions, it is impossible or takes efforts to ascertain the location of the relevant 
property if it exists.338 If we consider layers of different cloud service providers on which cloud 
services are sometimes offered, it further complicates the question of property rights over 
tangible (servers- IaaS) and intangible (intellectual) property (virtual machines and software– 
PaaS, SaaS).  
There are ways to resolve these issues. For example, in the case of domain disputes, the address 
of domain can serve as property, and the location of the related server can be regarded as the 
relevant environment for in rem jurisdiction.339 Under the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act, in rem jurisdiction may exist in disputes regarding forfeiture and cancellation 
of domain names or in cases that involve transferring a name to its rightful owner.340 From time 
to time domain name registrants misrepresent themselves or are using names in bad faith. 
However, it is now only theoretically possible to sue a domain name itself (in rem) rather than 
                                                          
336 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1877).  
337 T R Lee, In rem jurisdiction in cyberspace, 75 WASHINGT. LAW REV. 97–145 (2000). 
338 ZHAO, supra note 322. p. 94 
339 Id. 
340 Id. 
106 
 
suing a person or corporation (in personam jurisdiction), and the reality is that in rem 
proceedings are adjusted under the International Shoe standard.341  
As opposed to in rem, personal jurisdiction or so-called in personam jurisdiction refers to the 
power of a court or similar tribunal over an individual or property.342 As plaintiffs choose a 
court in which to file a lawsuit, the personal jurisdiction doctrine acts as a constitutional 
standard that limits a court’s power by protecting an individual’s interest in not being subject 
to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, 
ties, or relations.343 
In cases where the defendant is frequently outside the jurisdiction of the state where the damage 
occurred, the applicability of personal jurisdiction becomes especially important. Two types of 
personal jurisdiction are recognized: general and specific jurisdiction. 
1.1.1. General Jurisdiction 
 
General jurisdiction is based on continuous and systematic or substantial connections between 
the person and the court.344 When general jurisdiction is asserted over a defendant, the court 
has jurisdiction in any lawsuit, even one which has no relation to the forum state. Generally, if 
an office is established carrying out business in a forum state, general jurisdiction can be 
inferred, but the quality and quantity of the business’ commercial interactions with residents 
shall determine whether it qualifies as continuous and systematic, subjecting the participants 
in electronic commerce to the state’s general jurisdiction.345 
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Considering the nature of cloud services, the assertion of general jurisdiction is not popular.346 
There are not many cases, and more importantly, no general jurisdiction has thus far been 
asserted purely based on contacts through the Internet in the case of electronic commerce. 
 
1.1.2. Specific Jurisdiction 
 
Specific jurisdiction is based on the relationship of a specific action and the forum state.347 
Once business occurs in the certain area, such jurisdiction is easy to determine, as each state 
possesses exclusive jurisdiction within its territory. However, as interstate business and travel 
increased during the Industrial Revolution, territorialism proved insufficient for asserting 
jurisdiction.348 Thus, the court extended jurisdiction for persons outside the certain territory, as 
in the United States’ case International Shoe v. Washington which laid the foundation for the 
modern theory of personal jurisdiction in the US.349 To assert specific jurisdiction, long-arm 
statute350, and due process requirement conditions, which heighten scrutiny of assertions of 
judicial jurisdiction over foreign entities, must be met. 351 The long-arm statute concerns are 
going out-of-state and bringing a nonresident defendant into the state to defend a lawsuit.352 
For that reason, the court must determine whether the forum state’s long-arm statute applies to 
the defendants.  
The theoretical overview of jurisdiction so far has been addressed from US legal tradition and 
theory. Most popular Cloud services, as we have seen in Chapter 3, have registered seat or at 
least have a steady connection with the United States, which gives jurisdictional grounds to the 
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US courts. However, the nature of the service and its characteristics allows access to users from 
different countries which entails consideration of private international rules of those countries 
that could have imperative or exclusive jurisdictional grounds is certain scenarios. 
 
1.2. Jurisdiction in the age of cloud computing 
  
The shift to cloud computing, like any other major technological upheaval, has not been—and 
will not be—entirely free of legal obstacles. Providers and users have rapidly adopted cloud 
computing models which are a transition spurred on by the efficiencies noted in the previous 
chapter.353 These benefits have not come without a price, however. Extensive legal disputes 
have already arisen out of cloud-based interactions in substantive areas ranging from personal 
privacy to copyright infringement, antitrust, and a myriad more. Before these issues can be 
adequately adjudicated, however, courts must address the fundamental question dealt with by 
this chapter: jurisdiction. Jurisdiction and choice of law although seem separated, in the matters 
of online services, as we are aware that they tend to become tangled issues. However, for the 
scope of our research we are mainly interested in jurisdictional rules. 
Besides the issues of inequality of bargaining power which compromises party autonomy in 
cloud contracts, we also have the general issues of e-commerce in relation to private 
international law. The private international law relies on connections, and while it is difficult 
to determine the connection of the consumer or SMEs with cloud service under certain location, 
it is much easier to establish a connection with provider’s location, usually a place of residence 
of the provider of service. Consequently, we could again end up with inequality but this time 
in relation to the most connections of service has with the system of rules or applicable law.354 
We also have issues of declining jurisdiction, that are more accustomed to common law 
tradition under the doctrine of forum non convenience. Additionally, many countries reserve 
the right to use public policy and overriding mandatory rules of the forum to protect the 
fundamental social, economic and political order of the forum or a friendly third country from 
being violated by the application of foreign law.355 
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The courts of a forum where the case has been presented will first check to see if there is a 
specific choice of court agreement in line with the principles of party autonomy and freedom 
of contract. As it was demonstrated in the previous chapter, the majority of observed cloud 
services’ Terms of Service have a dispute resolution clause which designates selected court or 
arbitration in case of a dispute. In most jurisdictions, the court will examine ex officio the 
validity of such clauses for establishing the jurisdiction of the court in the dispute at hand. To 
establish jurisdiction, the clauses need to be in compliance with applicable law, national and 
relevant international rules on the prorogation of jurisdiction. Therefore, we will start to give 
an overview of the selected national rules on jurisdiction and the requirements needed for it. 
National regulations treat differently parties’ choice of court agreements, so we need to assess 
default national and international rules in case there is no such choice of court agreements or 
that they have been declared null and void.  
 
2. National regulation of jurisdiction for online disputes 
 
The question of ascertaining jurisdiction in online cross-border disputes is also the question of 
governance. Initial intriguing ideas that online interactions lie outside of the scope of the 
traditional law, due to virtual nature of cyberspace and ease of cross-border communication, 
and that they require Internet specific regulation356 were soon abandoned with the growth of e-
commerce, which spurred states’ interest. A more somber approach mandated, whenever 
possible, the use of already established technology neutral norms to regulate interactions 
occurring on the Internet.357 Online is wherever possible equated with off-line transactions 
represented in a catchy policy one-liner: “What hold off-line, holds online”.358 In the case of 
online services, the states apply their existing regulation of international services, developed 
over the years of international trade, with occasional appropriation or expansion of existing 
rules to the particularities of Internet dealings. In common-law countries, new precedents 
occurred, where civil law countries, sometimes more slowly, adapted the regulatory framework 
by amending the existing legislation. In procedural law, the rules on asserting court jurisdiction 
were particularly under stress in online scenarios. The questions of states’ regulating 
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jurisdictions independently are still being debated with opposing argument that more 
harmonized approach of international regulation of jurisdiction would be more suitable.359 In 
certain cases, as we will see on a European level, it led to significant steps to allowing access 
to justice in cross-border dispute scenarios. The case may very be that it is easier to harmonize 
regulation of jurisdiction on the regional level than on a global, but lack of international 
regulation effectively leaves parties to international online disputes to fall back to national 
private international law or conflicts of laws rules of relevant states. Without going too much 
into specific detail, we will give a brief overview of selected national rules on asserting 
jurisdiction in online-related disputes.  
 
2.1. Jurisdiction rules in the US applicable to online disputes 
 
Given the current concentration of the most popular cloud services companies within certain 
jurisdictions in the United States, especially within the State of California, we should start by 
giving the brief general overview of the rules on which United States courts base their 
jurisdiction in the disputes before them. Without going into specific particularities of many 
different state regulations in the United States, we aim to provide general brushstrokes of the 
rules applicable to the majority of the cases.  
Facing the cases regarding the activities on the internet, a significant number of legal 
precedents was built upon the rules and principles of common-law tradition which have been 
largely upheld by US courts. The common-law tradition in regard to asserting jurisdiction, both 
in the US and in the UK, could be described as discretion-based.360 It differs from civil-law 
rule-based approach as it gives courts the possibility to decide on jurisdiction issues, on a case 
by case basis, with a level of discretion but abiding by the principles of fairness and justice in 
their decisions. The discretion has also led to the notion of denying jurisdiction if deemed 
unappropriated by the court, which is commonly known as forum non conveniens.361  
                                                          
359 See  more in following sections of this Chapter  
360 TANG, supra note. P 354.  
361 See more on Peter S. Gillies, Forum Non Conveniens in the Context of International Commercial Arbitration,  
SSRN ELECTRON. J. (2008); Christopher A. Whytock, THE EVOLVING FORUM SHOPPING SYSTEM (2011); Edwin Peel, 
FORUM SHOPPING IN THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL AREA - INTRODUCTORY REPORT; Ronald A. Brand, CHALLENGES TO FORUM NON 
CONVENIENS (2013). 
111 
 
Differing from European rule-based approach, US courts built precedents in early phases of 
development of e-commerce. The cases which dealt with online transaction established tests 
for obtaining jurisdictional grounds aware of potential consequences in ascertaining 
jurisdictions in cases over websites located outside the United States. The applied traditional 
test of minimum contacts established in International shoe jurisdiction demanded that: a) the 
nonresident defendant must perform some act or consummate some transaction with the forum; 
(b) the claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's activities related 
to the forum; (c) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.362  
Rules of general jurisdictions would require substantial, continuous and systematic contact 
between the defendant and the forum which is a rigorous demand and high threshold that is not 
reliant on mere online contacts but the significant presence in the forum.363 Evolving online 
services also meant dealing with considerably more complicated questions in asserting 
jurisdiction. If a cloud service provider has a strong connection to the certain forum in the 
United States, that would equate to the significant physical commercial presence, general 
jurisdiction could be invoked.364 Regular contacts through the website or conducting the 
transaction online, would not be sufficient for general jurisdiction grounds, nor would use of 
servers be enough.365 The nature and functionality of the servers are not significant enough for 
establishing a significant presence in the forum. The possibility of server load balancing, 
hardware virtualization and rapid data migration between storages fortifies the argument that 
servers are the weak link to be considered under general jurisdiction. 
If general jurisdiction is inadequate in most of the case regarding disputes with cloud service 
providers, we turn to specific jurisdiction rules that emphasize forum related activities of 
defendants rather than permanent connections. Precedents building jurisprudence on specific 
jurisdiction offered us several tests for asserting jurisdiction over Internet-related disputes.366  
One of the most cited cases, Zippo Manufacturing Co v Zippo Dot Com, established the 
“sliding-scale” test.367 After citing the requirements for exercising specific personal jurisdiction 
                                                          
362 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
363 Perkins v Benguet Consolidâtes Mining Co 342 US 437 ( 1952 ) ;Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia SA 466 
US 408, 414 – 6 ( 1984 ) ; Millennium Enterprises v Millennium Music 33 F Supp 2d 907, 909 (D Or, 1999 ). 
364 Shrader v Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1241 – 2, 1243 (CA10 (Okla), 2011 ) . 
365 TANG, supra note. 354  Tang p. 85.see also Rhodes, supra note 346 . 
366 Some of the earlier cases argued for “sustained contact test” that the constant accessibility of the internet 
by the large population of a given state is a “sustained contact” especially compared to television or radio but 
this logic of passive advertising was criticized and replaced by more appropriate tests.  See more in Inset 
System v Instruction Set 937 F Supp 161 (D Conn, 1996) .  
367 Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D.Pa. 1997) 
112 
 
over a non‐resident, the presiding court concluded that “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction 
can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of 
commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.”368 The court devises “the scale” 
according to the websites’ activities:  
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If 
the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and 
repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite 
end are situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is 
accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make information 
available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise personal jurisdiction. The middle 
ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host 
computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity 
and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.369 
The innovative aspect of the Zippo’s scale inspired many subsequent cases, however, it 
gradually loses its significance with the progressive development of online services. 
Considering cloud computing services and their characteristics as described in Chapter 3, 
hardly any cloud service could be described as passive in the sense of Zippo case. Almost all 
cloud services could be put in the end of the specter to those that “involve the knowing and 
repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet” or at least to the “interactive 
websites” where users have a strong level of interactivity. It should be noted that although it 
provides interesting tool Zippo case does not replace traditional personal jurisdiction 
determination rules. 
In Calder case, actress Shirley Jones brought an action in a California court against the National 
Enquirer’s Iain Calder and John South for an allegedly libelous article they wrote and edited in 
Florida.370  The article was published in the National Enquirer and distributed throughout 
California and the United States.  In deciding to uphold California’s personal jurisdiction over 
Calder and South, the Supreme Court concluded that “the fact that the actions causing the 
effects in California were performed outside the State [should] not prevent the State from 
asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of those effects.”371 Although some 
scholars view Calder’s “effects test” favorably and encourage its use when determining 
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personal jurisdiction in Internet cases,372 more believe the standard should be modified.373 Many 
authors offer a variety of solutions to perceived problems with the test.  For example, one 
author claims Calder’s “express aiming” or “purposefully directed” requirement “prevents the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction in cases where Internet‐based activities represent the modern 
functional equivalent of actual physical presence in a forum.”374 
The “subjective availment” test permits the court to exert specific jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant if the defendant has deliberately targeted the forum in question. Unlike the 
“sliding-scale” test, which is also based on the purpose of the defendant, the “subjective 
targeting” test focuses more on the subjective purpose of the business instead of the objective 
purpose shown by the website. The approach of the court in Winfield Collection v McCauley375 
has been followed by a number of subsequent cases concerning auction sales through an 
intermediate virtual market.376 This test is helpful for cases where an e-business does not have 
a website of its own but engages in business activities through the website of a third party- 
cloud service provider. It is not appropriate to determine in every case the business’s purpose 
by examining the nature and quality of the website, which is managed and run by the cloud 
service. However, the real subjective position is hard to prove, and the inner intention of the 
parties usually has to be indicated by its external appearance. The factors considered are prior 
negotiations and potential future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the 
parties’ actual course of dealing. It has also been noticed from the existent case law that the 
test standard for the “subjective availment” is high since the seller could be deemed to have 
not purposefully availed himself to the jurisdiction of the more active buyer’s residence (who 
actively sought seller).377 
The US courts rely most on “subjective or purposeful availment” test when asserting 
jurisdiction over non-residents, which is arguably the very likely scenario given the global 
                                                          
372 See for example 4 Anderson Bailey, Purposefully Directed: Foreign Judgments and the Calder Effects Test 
for Specific Jurisdiction, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 671, 689 (2007) 
373 Teresa J. Cassidy, Civil Procedure‐Effects of the "Effects Test": Problems of Personal Jurisdiction and the 
Internet;Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2008), 9 WYO. L. REV. 575, 597 
(2009); Andrew F. Halaby, Making Sense of “Express Aiming” After Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 
37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 625 (2005); Matthew L. Perdoni, Revising the Analysis of Personal Jurisdiction to 
Accommodate Internet‐ Based Personal Contacts, 14 U. D.C. L. REV. 159, 187‐88 (2011); 
374 Matthew L. Perdoni, Revising the Analysis of Personal Jurisdiction to Accommodate Internet‐Based Personal 
Contacts, 14 U. D.C. L. REV. 159, 187 (2011).  
375 Winfield Collection v McCauley 105 F Supp 2d 746, 750 (ED Mich, 2000 ) . 
376 Metcalf v Lawson 802 A 2d 1221 (NH 2002); Karstetter v Voss 184 S W 3d 396 (Tex Ct App, 2006 ) ; 
United Cutlery Co v NFZ (n 59); Boschetto v Hansing WL 1980383 (ND Cal, 2006 ) affd 539 F Supp 3d 
1011 (CA(9) Cal, 2008); 
377 TANG, supra note. 354 p. 93. 
114 
 
market cloud company could service. However, the effectiveness of this test is arguable since 
it can hardly be applied to assess whether a consumer purposefully avails himself to the 
company’s residence where a business aims to sue a consumer.378 Although it is presumable 
that the general principles can guarantee a fair and reasonable result, these tests can hardly 
provide a certain and predicted result to protect the consumer as the weaker party as they were 
not devised with consumer specific mindset, which is also different approach from the EU 
consumer protective legislation. 
  
2.2. Jurisdiction for online disputes in the United Kingdom  
 
As an EU member state, United Kingdom had to harmonize civil law provisions and 
accordingly set the rules on asserting jurisdiction in accordance with Brussels Convention and 
subsequent Brussels I Regulation which will be discussed further in the chapter. In English 
common law, an English court has jurisdiction in claims in personam where the defendant is 
present in England, where the defendant submits to the jurisdiction, or where the court could 
exercise its power to give permission for the process to be served on the defendant out of the 
jurisdiction under the Civil Procedure Rules.379 The grounds for the English court to serve out 
of the jurisdiction in respect of contracts are indicated in the Practice Direction B to Part 6 of 
the Civil Procedure Rules and a claim form may be served out of the jurisdiction with the 
permission of the court if: (1) the contract was made within the jurisdiction; (2) the contract 
was made by or through an agent trading or residing in the jurisdiction; (3) the contract is 
governed by English law; (4) there is a choice of forum agreement choosing this jurisdiction; 
or (5) the breach of contract was committed within the jurisdiction.380  The English legal system 
remains traditional and hesitant to innovation specific to new technologies and availability of 
Internet services when it comes to the civil procedure rules up to the recent developments and 
reforms, which we will mention later.   
As it is seen in our survey a number of terms of service indicates to the English courts as the 
dispute resolution body to handle disputes between parties, and if such agreement exists and 
it’s in line with the Civil Procedure Rules, the courts do upheld such clauses. However there is 
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379 The Civil Procedure Rules 6.37 of the UK. 
380 Id. para 3.1(6) (a-d) and para 3.1(7), para 3.1(8) 
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a question of suitability of these agreements for consumer contracts, especially in the contracts 
of adhesion where consumers do not negotiate.  
 
Common law jurisdiction is based on discretion. It means the court may not take jurisdiction 
simply because a jurisdiction basis is met. The court will exercise discretion to consider 
whether or not taking jurisdiction is “appropriate” or could achieve the ends of justice.381 
The justice test which puts forward forum convenience doctrine in English law was set in 
Connelly v RTZ, in which Lord Goff of Chievely stated that: 
The question, however, remains whether the plaintiff can establish that substantial justice will not in the 
particular circumstances of the case be done if the plaintiff has to proceed in the appropriate forum where 
no financial assistance is available,382 
Yet it is sometimes difficult to establish if the plaintiff is filing suit in  English court because 
of its advantages or because of requirements of justice. On the other hand, the consumer might 
wish to claim that due to his weak financial power or other reasons, requiring him to have 
litigation abroad denies his access to justice which breaches Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).383 However, the effect of Article 6 of the ECHR in 
English jurisdiction is marginal and controversial, and the English courts usually refuse to use 
Article 6 of the ECHR as a new ground  outside the current justice consideration test.384 
 
2.3. Civil law rule based jurisdiction in Germany 
 
Just as UK, Germany as an EU member state is obligated by the relevant provisions of the 
European Union, which in itself is a large body of legal rules and procedures. Germany and its 
legal system, however, will serve to better illustrate the civil law culture and rule-based 
jurisdictional grounds. The German legal system is difficult to navigate but representative to 
the extent of many continental legal systems. The German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) is 
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382 Connelly v RTZ [ 1998 ] AC 854 . 873 
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the relevant statute in all matters regarding civil procedure. Jurisdictional questions are 
regulated in paragraph 12ff ZPO, whereas the most important provision for Internet jurisdiction 
is para. 32 ZPO.385 The statutes do not offer a provision directly regulating international 
jurisdiction, but the courts have always used para. 32 ZPO by analogy to determine questions 
of international jurisdiction. According to the paragraph 32 of ZPO, a German court is 
competent to hear a case about claims arising out of unlawful if the unlawful act has been 
committed in its district. 
In Germany, the choice of court rules and relevant private international law rules are part of 
the Introductory Act to the German Civil Code which prescribes legal rules applicable to 
international disputes.386 However, there are not many multijurisdictional Internet-related cases 
that could observe and draw concrete conclusions on German approach to jurisdiction. One 
case had a significant impact, though. The New York Times Decision case of the federal 
Supreme Court influenced a new standard in the interpretation of paragraph 32 in the context 
of jurisdiction in personality rights infringements.387 In this case, German courts asserted the 
jurisdiction even though the article was published in New York. The District Court argued that 
mere accessibility of a website is insufficient to establish jurisdiction in Germany and the 
article should be intended to be accessed in the place in question. The federal Supreme Court 
rejected that opinion and argued that the mere accessibility of websites is sufficient to establish 
a place of commission of the unlawful act.388 
In the following section will speak more about European rules on jurisdictions required by 
European Regulation which is directly applicable to all EU Member States, including Germany 
and the United Kingdom. 
 
 
3. International regulation of jurisdiction  
 
We discussed cloud computing characteristics which allow cloud-based services to be offered 
globally or at least provide services in different jurisdictions. We have seen in Chapter 3 the 
majority of the cloud contracts contain a choice of jurisdiction in the case of disputes. Whether 
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the selected jurisdiction will apply to specific case depends on compliance with applicable 
norms. Thus, when it comes to cloud services disputes, we also have to consider international 
regulation, private international law instruments which regulate jurisdiction and conflict of 
laws in civil disputes. At this point, we will provide an overview of the most relevant 
international instruments with a certain inclination towards European regulation and its 
applicability to cloud disputes.  
 
 
 
3.1. The EU regulation of jurisdiction 
 
The EU regulation of jurisdiction and choice of law was gradually developed over time 
following the progression and enlargement of the European Union. European countries took 
the initial step with signing Brussels Convention. 
3.1.1. The Brussels Convention and the Lugano Convention  
 
At the time European Economic Community was composed of six Member States, the Brussels 
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(Brussels Convention), which had been signed in 1968 and entered into effect in 1973, aimed 
at regulating jurisdiction as well as recognition and enforcement within the Community. The 
Convention was drafted and signed on the grounds of the Art. 220 of the Treaty establishing 
European Economic Community (EEC), which also meant that every new member joining 
EEC, would have to adhere to the Brussels Convention. However, Brussels convention at the 
very beginning did not focus on consumers or consumers’ protection per se.389 Initially, it 
provided grounds for jurisdiction in cases of contracts for the sale of goods by installment and 
loans. The scope of protection to consumers was extended by the Court of Justice ruling in 
Bertrand v Ott, Where it was clarified that the Convention was to be applied to consumers 
which were to be protected because of their “weakness in comparison with sellers”.390 The 
Bertrand ruling reasoning and protection of consumers influenced 1978’s amendment to the 
Convention with the accession of UK, Ireland, and Denmark to the European Communities. 
Nevertheless, the Convention was regarded highly fruitful and valuable and served as a basis 
for the Lugano Convention with similar or identical provisions that are taken out of the older 
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Brussels Convention that withstood the test of time. The Lugano Convention, which came into 
effect in 1988 and was effective with the Member States of European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), meaning that the rules of the Brussels Convention have been extended to the members 
of EFTA.391 The significant difference was that the European Court of Justice had jurisdiction 
over the Brussels convention and not over the Lugano Convention. 
 
The Brussels Convention was a double convention. It dealt both with the liberalization of 
recognition of judgments and jurisdictional distribution among Members States’ courts. The 
broad scope of the Brussels Convention limited national judiciaries in deciding cases with an 
international element. The Brussels Convention had been replaced with Brussels I Regulation 
(44/2001) but remained in effect due to the specific relationship between the EU and Denmark 
(which placed reserves on Brussels I Regulation). 
 
The Brussels Convention while confirming the principles of party autonomy also introduced 
significant safeguards for consumers, furthering academic and legislative efforts in securing 
the access to justice in situations of unequal bargaining and economic power. 
 
In the Art 14 the Brussels Convention clearly sets the terms in favor of consumer protection 
giving consumers the freedom to choose a more favorable forum to bring its proceedings:  
 
“A consumer may bring proceedings against the other party to a contract either in the courts of the Contracting 
State in which that party is domiciled or in the courts of the Contracting State in which he is himself domiciled. 
Proceedings may be brought against a consumer by the other party to the contract only in the courts of the 
Contracting State in which the consumer is domiciled.” 
 
The Brussels Convention development was clearly in line with “second wave” of access to 
justice movement where the diffuse and fragmented interest of group like consumers were 
given more favorable treatment as a “weaker party”.392  
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3.1.2. The Brussels I Regulation  
 
Brussels I Regulation (44/2001) is a continuation of Brussels Convention. 393 It is also a double 
regulation of jurisdiction as well as recognition and enforcement, and in most parts, it is 
verbatim of the Convention’s terms. Although Denmark initially excluded itself from the 
Regulation, which meant that the Brussels Convection was still applicable in relevant cases, 
with the latest European Commission efforts to amend the Regulation, appropriately named the 
“Brussels I Regulation recast”394, Denmark fully adhered to the Regulation which now is 
applicable to all 28 Member States of the EU.395 
 
The Brussels I Regulation recast (the recast) is the latest regulation that took an additional step 
towards unburdened circulation and recognition of court decisions in the EU. It addressed some 
of the issues European courts faced, extended the scope of its application in particular areas 
and abolished perceived barriers for the enforcement of the decisions. Although it’s a 
significant expansion introduced by a new regulation (replacing Council Regulation (EC) No 
44/2001), having the same scope of application, it kept colloquial name Brussels I Regulation, 
which we will use here respectively making specific reference to the recast and original 
Brussels I Regulation where the  significant change has taken place. 
 
The Brussels I Regulation (the Regulation) set broad jurisdiction grounds for civil and 
commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal, but is explicit in Art 1. that it 
will not be applied in cases of the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property 
arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession, bankruptcy, proceedings 
relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, 
compositions and analogous proceedings, social security and arbitration.396 It sets the rules for 
general jurisdiction for persons domiciled in a Member State which shall, whatever their 
nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.397 This rule is in line with the doctrine 
                                                          
393 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters; available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32001R0044  ( last visited March 20,2016). 
394 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(recast), OJ EU 2012, L 351/1. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:351:0001:0032:EN (accessed April 01, 2016). 
395 See more at https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_brussels_i_regulation_recast-350-en.do  
396 Art 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 and Art 1 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 
397 Art 2 (1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 and Art 4 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 
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actor sequitur forum rei - a general principle that defendant should be sued in the place of his 
domicile.  
 
After setting general jurisdiction in personam, Brussels I Regulation introduces a good deal of 
grounds for the special jurisdiction where persons domiciled in a Member State may be sued in 
the courts of another Member State. For contractual disputes, is possible to be sued in another’s 
Member state in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question.398 The 
place of performance of the obligation in the case of the sale of goods, shall be the place in a 
Member State where the goods were delivered or should have been delivered, and in the case 
of the provision of services, the place in a Member State where, under the contract, the services 
were provided or should have been provided. 399 While services are not excluded from the scope 
of the recast, they are problematic as they are excluded from Rome I Regulation, which deals 
with applicable law. It is important also to mention that the courts for the place where the 
branch, agency or other establishment is situated will have jurisdiction with regards to a dispute 
arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment.400 
 
The Regulation also specifies jurisdictional rules matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, 
civil claim for damages or restitution which is based on an act giving rise to criminal 
proceedings, civil claim for the recovery, based on ownership, of a cultural object, operations 
of a branch, dispute brought against a settlor, trustee or beneficiary of a trust created by the 
operation of a statute, or by a written instrument, or created orally and evidenced in writing, a 
dispute concerning the payment of remuneration claimed in respect of the salvage of a cargo 
or freight,  in certain cases of arrest.401 Article 8 allows jurisdiction of another Member state in 
some cases of multiple defendants, proceedings of the third party which also involves 
defendant, counter-claims and certain contract disputes connected to the immovable 
property.402 The last one is not to be confused with proceedings which have as their object rights 
in rem in immovable property for which Member States are granted exclusive jurisdiction 
where the property is situated.403 
 
                                                          
398 Art 7 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 
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The Brussels I Regulation pay particular attention to setting special jurisdiction in matters of 
insurance, consumer contracts, and contracts of employment. The consumer is defined as a 
person who can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession.When a consumer enters 
into a contract with a party who is not domiciled in a Member State but has a branch, agency 
or another establishment in one of the Member States, that party shall, in disputes arising out 
of the operations of the branch, agency or establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that 
Member State.404 The jurisdiction over consumer contracts has been expanded with the Brussels 
I Regulation recast. Similarly to the Brussels Convention, Article 16 of previous (original) 
Brussels I Regulation indicated that a consumer might bring proceedings against the other party 
to a contract either in the courts of the Member State in which that party is domiciled or in the 
courts for the place where the consumer is domiciled.405 Seemingly, the wording of this article 
does not include third country parties (outside of the EU), without branch, agency or another 
establishment in one of the Member States. Brussels I Regulation recast has expanded its scope: 
“A consumer may bring proceedings against the other party to a contract either in the courts of the Member 
State in which that party is domiciled or, regardless of the domicile of the other party, in the courts for the 
place where the consumer is domiciled.”406 
Of course, even under the old Regulation, which granted branch and agency some treatment as 
the domiciled party of a Member State, it was possible to subject third countries’ parties to 
special jurisdiction terms for consumer contracts. To add to that, even under previous 
Regulation the Member States, including for example Belgium, Denmark, France, Hungary, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain, already allowed consumers to sue professionals 
from third states at home in accordance with their national rules of jurisdiction.407  However, 
the formulation of the recast Regulation places EU domiciled consumer in a stronger “weak” 
position in cross-border consumer contracts. To be clear, it applies only to consumers that have 
domicile in a Member state of the EU.408  On the other hand, all the above-mentioned 
regulations and conventions, allow consumers to be sued only in the court of the consumer’s 
domicile.  
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Brussels I Regulation protects consumers by allowing them a choice between the court of 
consumer domicile and the court where business is domiciled. However, not all businesses that 
enter into legal relationships with consumers are under the scope of this regulation. Art 17 (c) 
is limiting jurisdiction over consumer contracts where: 
… the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues commercial or professional activities in the 
Member State of the consumer’s domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that Member State or 
to several States including that Member State and the contract falls within the scope of such activities. 
 
While it’s casting a wide net since it’s applicable to all contracts other than contracts for the 
sale of goods on instalment credit terms (in Art 17 (a)) and contracts for a loan repayable by 
instalments, or for any other form of credit, made to finance the sale of goods (in Art 17 (b)), 
it is at the same time limiting contracts with alternative conditions that leaves the room to 
different interpretations. The business has to pursue either commercial or professional activities 
in the consumer’s domicile, or it has to direct commercial or professional activities to the 
consumer’s domicile or the states including the consumer’s domicile. 
 
The Regulation confirms the autonomy of the parties to a contract but places a significant 
restraint on mentioned insurance, consumer or employment contracts, where only limited 
autonomy to determine the courts having jurisdiction is allowed and subjected to the exclusive 
grounds of jurisdiction laid down in the Regulation. We will speak more about party autonomy 
in the following section. 
 
Article 25(2) of the Brussels I Regulation is the only instance that explicitly acknowledges 
agreements made via electronic means, stating that “any communication by electronic means 
which provides a durable record of the agreement shall be equivalent to writing.”409 It implies 
that a contract stored in a computer as a secured word document (i.e. a read-only document or 
document with entry password), or concluded by email or a click-wrap agreement falls within 
the scope of Article 23(2) of the Brussels I Regulation.410 
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3.1.3. Cloud services under Brussels I Regulation 
 
If we consider cloud services in a business-to-business type of relationship, then Brussels I 
Regulation is following the lines of the traditional doctrine of actor sequitur forum rei, where 
the court of defendant’s domicile has jurisdiction. However, the scope of Brussels I Regulation 
is limited to parties who are domiciled in the EU Member States, and if cloud service based 
outside of the European Union does not have branch, agency or other establishment, it falls out 
of the Regulation’s regime of the EU-wide recognition and enforcement. Such scenarios default 
back to private international rules of individual states. Brussels I Regulation  reinforces party 
autonomy except in certain cases where it limits jurisdiction (i.e. exclusive jurisdiction 
regarding mobile property), and if choice of courts agreements fulfills the form of validity of 
being a written form, which includes electronic durable record, it is considered as such clause 
represents valid consent of the parties to a certain jurisdiction. Hence, a significant number of 
cloud services that have a branch in one of the Member States of the EU have a valid choice of 
court agreement indicating jurisdiction of that state’s court in the case of a dispute. The 
Regulation does not offer any protection for small and medium enterprises. 
For cloud services, conditions set out in Article 17 (c) regarding consumer contracts should be 
of special interests. Depending on the interpretation of these terms, the cloud services fall or 
do not fall under the scope of the Brussels I regulation when it comes to consumer contracts. 
The first alternative of pursuing commercial activities in the consumer’s domicile sounds more 
applicable to traditional forms of customer relations and business management of off-line 
service providers. To pursue commercial activity could be interpreted narrowly, in the sense of 
performing transactions meaning providing paid services, or broadly, encompassing all 
activities engaging consumers even though these services are perceived to be free for 
consumers. It is debatable if the commercial activity is oriented to users of, for example, social 
network service that is free but profits of selling user-related data to third parties, or the 
commercial activities is oriented to the third parties as customers of accumulated data. Zhang 
Sophia Tang makes the argument that if we focus on the latter alternative of “directing 
activities” as more appropriate to the e-commerce, we should then interpret “pursuing activity” 
narrowly.411 It is still unclear does pursuing mean physical presence in the domicile, or should 
we look into plans and intentions of business. Also, it is worth to note that the pursuing should 
be done in the Member States of the consumer’s domicile as opposed to directing such activities 
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which can be done in one or more Member States.  This observation goes in line with the 
argument of a narrow interpretation of pursuing. Arguably, it is possible that this because of 
ambiguous intentions of online services where it is hard to establish that they are pursuing 
specific consumers of a specific member state, the legislators set alternative in the form of 
“directing” commercial activities to the consumer domicile of one or more Member States. 
There are a number of ways that “directing activity” could be interpreted in the context of cloud 
services. Mere accessibility of a service could not be interpreted as directing activity or sending 
an offer of the service. The Council and the Commission confirmed that the mere fact that an 
internet site is accessible is not sufficient for Article 15 (Art 17 of the recast) to be applicable.412 
Users being able to access service does not mean that the service has been directed its activity 
to the same users. Some discussions have been around separating active (interactive) and 
passive websites, but problem even if we could make such a distinction remains the same.413 
One of the ideas that sprung about was to mark profitability as a pointer of directing activity, 
meaning if a service makes a profit out of the jurisdiction it should be considered reasonable 
to fall under that jurisdiction.414 We do not find this approach particularly appropriate to cloud 
services when we consider alternative monetization of the services, especially free services that 
collect and resell aggregate user data to third parties. Since the service is not making a profit 
directly from the users of the service, they would be effectively deprived of protective rules 
regarding jurisdiction.  
Another approach proposes that the service itself indicates the connection with certain country 
or jurisdiction.415 The connection could be made for example based on domain names of 
websites and language of communication, or some under indicator that would undoubtedly 
establish a connection with a certain jurisdiction or a country. However, relying just on them, 
said indicators would not be enough. We couldn’t solely rely on providers’ appearance of a 
connection, as it is too easy to manipulate the connecting factors. Providers are sometimes 
choosing domain names irrelevant to the country and providing a single international language 
of service does not mean the exclusion of all other users whose native language is not 
corresponding to the language of a service.  
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In traditional commerce and private international law, the location of performance would be a 
much more reliable connection. Needless to say, the location of activity of cloud service is 
quite dubious sometimes. While it is possible, and sometimes not without effort, to identify 
servers used to deliver cloud services, the activity of the servers could be dispersed due to 
resource pooling and rapid elasticity of cloud computing. Especially in scenarios involving 
public cloud, the location of the data which is being migrated between several servers for load 
balancing purposes is hard to pinpoint or the location could include several servers in several 
different jurisdictions for a given service over short periods of time. In certain cases, location 
and jurisdiction of servers are being specified in terms and conditions. Certain cloud users insist 
on keeping the data within a specified jurisdiction due to regulatory requirements, or they could 
simply prefer and have trust in particular legal systems. Such cases could justify performance 
or activity as a connector to jurisdiction, but then again it would be superfluous since it is 
already user’s choice of jurisdiction, and jurisdictional grounds would be firmly established by 
party autonomy. Dan Jerker B. Svantesson suggests that in general if the performance takes 
place online, the place of performance is not appropriate as a connecting factor.416 The thought 
especially resonates with cloud services. Unless the location of the activity where data is stored 
and processed is not specified, the location of performance in the traditional sense of private 
international law and Brussels I Regulation should not be primary connection to the jurisdiction 
in the case of a dispute.  
One more widely used approach in finding an appropriate connection with jurisdiction is ring-
fencing. The ring-fencing is based on the idea that the business should clarify and limit its 
commercial activities to desired locations. It would be sufficient to clarify the activities directed 
at certain jurisdictions and the consumer protective provisions of Brussels I Regulation could 
be avoided if business desires to do so.417 In a way, it is a declaration of business’ intent. One 
way to ring fence is a written statement preferably in terms and conditions. However, the 
statement doesn’t completely alleviate the responsibility from providers. In fact, certain cloud 
providers are stating in their terms of service exclusivity of their service to certain countries 
and jurisdictions while on the other hand, the service itself remains accessible to everyone 
under the same conditions as for consumers from the specified jurisdiction.418 Another way to 
ring fence is via geo-localization technologies, which block access from certain locations based 
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on IP addresses and allow service providers control which limits exposure to undesired 
jurisdictions, and thus direct activity to the desired. The third way of ring-fencing would be to 
require potential users to disclose their personal information and then based on received 
information to proceed or restrict service. This method relies on data provided by the user, 
which can be manipulated or misleading as well. Restricting the service to users coming from 
certain geographic areas would potentially incentivize users to provide false data. Not one 
single method has proven to be effective by itself in practice, and scholars like Tang are 
advising hybrid approach: ring-fencing by looking into several aspects of the business, country-
specific indicators and where possible activity.419 
As we have seen and established in the survey in Chapter 3, the majority of cloud contracts 
contain dispute resolution clauses with a choice of court or choice of arbitration agreements. 
The validity of this clauses regarding consumer contracts will be also assessed through the lens 
of Unfair Terms Directive in Chapter 5.  
 
3.1.4. European Small Claims Procedure  
 
Speaking of cloud service disputes as most commonly low-value disputes with cross-border 
elements, we are looking into appropriateness and applicability of different regulatory 
instruments looking from the context of cloud services. The regulation establishing the 
European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP) ostensibly represent such an instrument.420 It was 
intended to be the pan-European solution for lower value disputes with exclusively cross-
border elements and significantly lower formality of processes. To a certain extent, this 
regulation was a consequence of EU guaranteed a free moment of persons, goods, and services 
which resulted in increased cross-border cases. European Small Claim Procedure together with 
European Enforcement Order421 and European Order for Payment422 were proposals for co-
operation in civil matters with cross-border implications to ensure proper functioning of the 
internal market. 
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ESCP is envisioned to be the exclusively cross-border procedure for claims under €2000, for 
all civil and commercial matters with a wide range of possible disputes. The limits of €2000 
claim is a result of a compromise between countries of higher and lower standards of living in 
the European Union with the upcoming lifting the threshold to €5000 in July 2017. Another 
element sine qua non -cross-border disputes is defined as the case “…in which at least one of 
the parties is domiciled or habitually resident in a Member State other than the Member State 
of the court or tribunal seized”423 There’s always possibility the dispute will not be cross-border 
until the enforcement phase, but in that case the European Order or Payment (EOP) would be 
helpful.424  If EOP is not applicable, the rules of enforcements of judgments under of Brussels 
I regulation will be applicable. 
Certain states have placed reserves on the regulation: Denmark is excluded; in Ireland it is 
applicable only to certain consumer cases; Spain allows process without legal representation 
under €900 and above it is obligatory.  The procedure does not require mandatory legal 
representation425 and the rules for oral hearings have been relaxed in the sense that where 
they’re needed, they could be handled through video conferencing.426 Form for commencing 
the claim has been standardized, and needed assistance could be provided for filing it.427  The 
form itself (called Form A) instructs applicants on the rules of Brussels I Regulation, as 
applicable. ESCP is governed by the procedural law of the Member States in which procedure 
is conducted.428  Article 5 provides rules for the conduct of the procedure: 
1. The European Small Claims Procedure shall be a written procedure. The court or tribunal shall hold an oral 
hearing if it considers this to be necessary or if a party so requests. The court or tribunal may refuse such a 
request if it considers that with regard to the circumstances of the case, an oral hearing is obviously not 
necessary for the fair conduct of the proceedings. The reasons for refusal shall be given in writing. The refusal 
may not be contested separately. 
… 
3.  The defendant shall submit his response within 30 days of service of the claim form and answer form, by 
filling in Part II of standard answer Form C, accompanied, where appropriate, by any relevant supporting 
                                                          
423 Id. Art 3.  
424 PABLO CORTÉS, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR CONSUMERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010). p.100. 
425 Art 10 of Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
establishing a European small claims procedure  
426 Id. Art 8 
427 Id. Art 4  
428 Id. Art 19  
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documents, and returning it to the court or tribunal, or in any other appropriate way not using the answer 
form. 
4. Within 14 days of receipt of the response from the defendant, the court or tribunal shall dispatch a copy 
thereof, together with any relevant supporting documents to the claimant. 
… 
According to article 16 unsuccessful party bears the cost of the proceedings, however the court 
will not award the costs to the successful party to the extent that they were unnecessarily 
incurred or are disproportionate to the claim. The appeal on the decision is possible but 
dependent on the procedural laws of the Member State whose court heard the matter. At the 
moment there hasn’t been a complete study on the usefulness of the ESCP however its positive 
influence on harmonization of procedural rules are already visible (for example single Form 
A). Use of new technologies will probably be necessary in order to keep the system efficient 
and effective.429 
Looking at the European Small Claims Procedure, we notice a significant improvement in 
solving low-value cross-border cases within the space of European internal market. It has 
certain limitations: at the moment is not fully online, claimants occasionally need assistance, 
limited to defendants who are residents of the EU. Having in mind Brussels I Regulation, 
particularly the possibility to treat a branch, an agency or other establishment as a resident of 
the Member State and the expansion of consumer protection scope to non-European 
defendants, it certainly stands possible to use of European small claim procedure for the cases 
of cloud service disputes. To argue which dispute resolution is more appropriate for cloud 
disputes we will compare the characteristics of ESCP (especially IT supported procedure) and 
private dispute resolutions in the following chapters.  
3.1.5. Jurisdiction and EU data protection regulation 
 
So far, we have been dealing with the context of disputes between cloud service providers and 
users primarily as the transactional relationship between two parties covered by contracts 
(terms of service). However, when we speak about cloud services, we must not neglect an array 
of mandatory public law provisions guaranteeing fundamental human rights of consumers 
(given that consumers as natural persons are entitled to such guarantees) and their interaction 
with norms of private international law. The right to privacy is a fundamental human right 
                                                          
429 Cortes, Pablo 2010. Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union (Routledge Research 
in Information Technology and E-Commerce Law). Routledge. 
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enshrined in the Article 8 the European Convention on Human Rights and the Article 7 of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. For the purposes of the cloud service dispute context we 
will focus mainly on data protection aspects in the privacy of cloud consumers (although the 
right to privacy encompasses more than just data protection, and data protection covers more 
than just privacy) and its jurisdictional aspect. Directive 95/46/EC also called Data Protection 
Directive (DPD) has set jurisdictional grounds that could be invoked in a wide array of disputes 
between different actors as disputants. It establishes grounds for data subjects as defined in Art. 
2 of DPD430 to initiate civil litigation against data controller and processors, but also allows 
jurisdiction in administrative litigation against decisions of Data Protection Authorities.   
The EU Member States fostering civil law tradition distinguish public law from private law 
provisions, while common law countries do not insist on such differences. Consequently, civil 
law Member States differentiate between remedies in civil procedures and remedies in 
administrative procedures. Article 22 of the Data Protection Directive is recognizing such a 
distinction by allowing judicial recourse without prejudice to any administrative remedy.431 
With the administrative remedies, the actions are being taken before administrative bodies, 
such as national data protection authorities, although these are not subject of this thesis and 
will not be further discussed, but they are important to have in mind and to have a clear 
distinction between administrative or judicial procedures.432 Recent high profile case Google 
vs. Spain implicated jurisdiction which was the dispute involving administrative remedies 
because Spanish DPA was presumably acting in the exercise of the public authority.433 
Our interests primarily lie in cloud computing disputes between users and providers, as data 
subjects, controllers and processors respectively, and not in administrative procedure before 
Data Protection Authority (DPA) or remedies against DPA’s decisions. In fact, judicial process 
and the administrative process could be parallel and independent to each other, without rules 
                                                          
430 According to the Art 2. DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, data subject is an identifiable person is one who can be identified , directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity; 
431 Article 22 DPD states:” Without prejudice to any administrative remedy for which provision may be made, 
inter alia before the supervisory authority referred to in Article 28, prior to referral to the judicial authority, 
Member States shall provide for the right of every person to a judicial remedy for any breach of the rights 
guaranteed him by the national law applicable to the processing in question.” 
432 See more in Maja Brkan, Data Protection and European Private International Law,  SSRN ELECTRON. J. (2015). 
433 CJEU case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja 
González (2014) 
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of lis alibi pendens, which would mandate the staying of the proceedings.  However, question 
remains, when and how these disputes invoke rules on jurisdiction as regulated by Brussels I 
and what is their relationship with Data Protection Directive and recently adopted General Data 
Protection Regulation which will come into force in May 2018.434 
Firstly we need to clarify if does Brussels I Regulation apply at all to the disputes regarding 
data protection. As we have clarified before Regulation 1215/2012, strictly covers civil and 
commercial matters, which implies that and administrative matter does not fall under Brussels 
I Recast. This was confirmed by multiple rulings of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union.435  
How and if we apply Brussels I Regulation depends on who are the parties to the dispute. If a 
party is a data subject, defined by Art 8 of DPD, as “identified or identifiable natural person”, 
depending on the type of dispute and facts, he/she could call upon jurisdiction rules of Recast 
as a consumer or a trader. Data subject could for example sue for breach of contract, non-
performance, damages, seek an injunction, be involved in collective action if it is available, 
etc.  We are focused on contractual disputes only, therefore we narrow the scope when we 
discuss the interplay between DPD and Brussels I Regulation. On the other hand, data 
protection regulations as public laws surpass any contractual exclusions of mandatory 
requirements and data protection standards and hence are not subject to free negotiation 
between parties.436 Maja Brkan invites for reconsideration of DP rules for the special 
jurisdictional forum, which would counter-balance the negotiation misbalance and protect data 
subject as a weaker party to negation.437 
If data subject is at the same time a consumer then protective rules of Brussels I Regulation 
will be applicable, and data subject could choose between the court of his domicile and the 
court in place of the business’ establishment. Of course requirements of a professional who has 
directed its activities to the Member State of consumer domicile applies as confirmed by the 
case law of CJEU.438 
                                                          
434 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 
435 See for example Sonntag [1993] ECR I-1963, paragraph 20; Case C-292/05, Lechouritou and Others [2007] 
ECR I-1519, para 31; Case C-420/07, Apostolides [2009] ECR I-3571, para 43; Case C-154/11, Mahamdia, [2012] 
ECR I- [2012] ECR I-0000, para 34. More on it Maja Brkan Id.  
436 Id. 
437 Id.p.18  
438 See CJEU Case C-585/08, Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, [2010] ECR I-12527, para 93 
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As we will see in the next chapter when we discuss Unfair Terms Directive, contractual clauses 
that subject consumers to exclusive jurisdictions could be considered non-binding if they were 
not negotiated and they cause a significant imbalance in parties rights and obligations to the 
detriment of the consumer.439 
The data subject could use cloud services for both private and professional use, which in turn 
excludes consumer protection jurisdiction unless it was evidently marginal professional use 
and had a negligible role in relation to the contract.440 
If professional use are part of data subject use of cloud, the general rule of Brussels I Regulation 
will apply, and the court of defendant’s domicile will have the jurisdiction, but again this will 
be applied only if the defendant has a domicile in the EU. If cloud user/data subject wants to 
file a suit against, for example, US based cloud provider, he cannot do it under the Brussels 
Regulation but should consult his national private international law rules. If we remember the 
surveyed cloud contracts, a significant number of cloud providers are not established in the 
EU, and which makes access to courts more difficult or practically inaccessible at all.  
 
 
3.2. Choice of court agreements - the Hague Convention  
 
We focus primarily on consumers as a weaker party to the contractual disputes. However, we 
must not forget that even a professional could be a weaker party when placed in negotiation 
position against an economically more powerful party. Therefore we could argue the extension 
(limited or full) of the fair legal framework in consumer disputes with cloud providers to the 
microenterprises as weakest in negotiation power among the small and medium businesses. 
Although they are ordinarily not able to influence a lot of changes in predispute agreements, 
they are considered commercial side and as such treated and entitled to same rights and 
obligation as every other business. Notable exceptions could be found in specific sectorial 
regulation where additional protection has been put in place.441 We have seen in Chapter 3 the 
same provider favorable terms for businesses as well as consumers. Therefore a brief overview 
                                                          
439 Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts  
440 See CJEU Case C-464/01, Gruber, [2005] ECR I-439, para 39. 
441 Financial Ombudsman Service insight briefing: micro-enterprises and financial services a review of 
complaints, (2015). 
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of relevant international instrument that regulates the choice of court in the agreements are in 
order. 
The issue of choice of court agreement is one, but important, an aspect in the regime of 
jurisdiction. Currently at the international level, a multilateral treaty – the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (hereafter called “Choice of Court Convention”) – 
governs this issue. The Choice of Court Convention is part of the draft Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (hereafter called “the 
Draft Jurisdiction Convention”).442 The Draft Jurisdiction Convention was considered to be an 
ambitious project. It was comprehensive but too controversial; thus, after years of debate, the 
Hague Conference proposed that the Draft Jurisdiction Convention be scaled down to address 
the only choice of court agreements between businesses, leaving many of the broader 
jurisdictional and enforcement provisions out of the discussion.443 On 30 June 2005, all of the 
Member States approved it as the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.444 
The Choice of Court Convention has parallel functional similar to the New York Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) (“New York 
Convention”). The difference lies in the characteristic forum or the nature of a choice of court 
agreement and an arbitration agreement. When parties choose a public forum, they will usually 
include a choice of court agreement. When parties prefer a private forum, an arbitration 
agreement may be concluded. The Choice of Court Convention is a more modern and up-to-
date international instrument than the New York Convention in the sense that the Choice of 
Court Convention recognizes the validity of an electronic choice of court agreement. 
The Choice of Court Convention lays down uniform rules for the enforcement of international 
choice of court clauses. Aiming to “promote international trade and investment through 
enhanced judicial cooperation,” the Convention applies solely to “international cases of 
exclusive choice of court agreements concluded in civil or commercial matters”.445 That is, it 
applies only to business-to-business (B2B) transactions.  It excludes application to consumer 
                                                          
442 Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, available at: https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=78 (last 
access April 1, 2016) 
443 Dogauchi and Hartley, the Hague conference on private international law, preliminary draft convention on 
exclusive choice of court agreements draft 6 . (2004) 
444 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Private International Law - Civil Procedure - Hague , 
available at: https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98 (accessed March 22, 2016). 
445 Art 1 (1) of Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of 30 June 2005. Hague. available at: 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98 (accessed March 22, 2016) 
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agreements. However, it does not indicate whether it also excludes a wide range of small and 
micro businesses or nonprofit organizations. Article 2(2) further excludes its application to the 
carriage of passengers and goods, claims for personal injury brought by or on behalf of national 
persons and other matters. Moreover, Article 10 makes clear that a ruling on a matter excluded 
under Article 2(2) shall not be recognized and enforced under this Convention.  
The general scope of the Choice of Court Convention outlined in Article 1 reflects its 
applicability to the digital age, as the “international” feature of the Convention strongly 
supports global cross-border electronic transactions. In addition, recognition and application of 
choice of court clauses concluded electronically can also be found in another two articles of 
the Choice of Court Convention. As Article 3(c) expressly states, an exclusive choice of court 
agreement must be concluded or documented “in writing; or by any other means of 
communication, which renders information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent 
reference”. The wording of this provision was inspired by Article 6(1) of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Electronic Commerce from 1996. The terminology “by any other means of 
communication” should be deemed to include any electronic means, although this article could 
be made clearer by providing that “any communication by electronic means which provides a 
durable record of the agreement shall be equivalent to ‘writing’” as was stated in original 
Brussels I Regulation.446 The consideration of electronic communications is also implied in 
Article 13 of the Choice of Court Convention. For example, Article 13(1)(b) provides that “the 
party seeking recognition or applying for enforcement shall produce the exclusive choice of 
court agreement, a certified copy thereof, or other evidence of its existence”. The wording “or 
other evidence of its existence” was included mainly for agreements concluded electronically. 
While Hague Convention was drafted having in mind international commerce between big and 
medium companies, in excluding consumers and offering no protection the weaker parties as 
small and micro businesses from its scope makes the convention less relevant from the point 
of view of high-volume low-value cloud service transactions. 
3.2.1. Exclusive choice of court agreements 
 
The definition of “exclusive choice of court agreements” in the Choice of Court Convention, 
laid down in Article 3, provides that:  
                                                          
446 Article 23(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (“Brussels I Regulation”), OJ L 012, 
16.01.2001, p. 1, available at europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/ en/oj/dat/2001/l_012/l_01220010116en00010023.pdf  
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a) Exclusive choice of court means an agreement concluded by two or more parties that meets the 
requirements of paragraph c) and designates, for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may 
arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting State or one or more 
specific courts of one Contracting State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts; 
b) a choice if court agreement which designates the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific 
courts of one Contracting State shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided 
otherwise; 
c) an exclusive choice of court agreement must be concluded or documented  
i)  in writing; or  
ii) by any other means of communication which renders information accessible so as to be usable for 
subsequent reference; 
d) an exclusive choice of court agreement that forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement 
independent of the other terms of the contract. The validity of the exclusive choice of court agreement cannot 
be contested solely on the ground that the contract is not valid. 
This article provides that the Choice of Court Convention only apply to the choice of court 
agreements in favor of the Contracting States, which can apply to both past and future disputes. 
It contains five requirements: first, the agreement between two or more parties must exist; 
second, the form requirement must be satisfied; third, the agreement must designate courts of 
one state or one or more specific courts in one state excluding all other courts; fourth, the 
designated court or courts must be in a Contracting State; and finally, the designated courts 
must be connected to a particular legal relationship.447 
The validity of the choice of court agreement is to be determined by the law of the state of 
designated courts, which is problematic having in mind that it can be strategically used and 
abused by an economically stronger party. Such party, most probable provider, could use its 
repeat experience to identify most favorable the applicable law to impose on the weaker party 
in terms of service. As we will see in the following section, legislators have made significant 
efforts to counterbalance this inequality in a bargaining position. 
 
 
                                                          
447 Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report on Convention of 30 June 2005 
on Choice of Court Agreements, p.38 , available at: https://assets.hcch.net/upload/expl37e.pdf  
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What we have discussed in this chapter relates to the question of the international legal 
framework relevant to dispute resolution over cloud services. For the access to justice and our 
framework, the issue of jurisdiction is of special importance. Rules that regulated court’s 
jurisdiction in international dispute can have a significant influence whether the conflict will 
be formally disputed or not. In our theoretical framework jurisdiction is the primary feature of 
availability of dispute resolution body, in the sense of having a right to initiate the formal 
process. On the other hand, jurisdiction inadvertently has the effect on accessibility. Even on 
national effect rules governing jurisdiction determine a specific court competent to deal with 
the issue that, unless placed in ideal physical position between the parties, favor one party to a 
certain extent. This disadvantage can be that much significant when it comes to international 
disputes and especially low-value disputes. The physical traits of courts become obstacles in a 
way to access to justice. These obstacles were one of the leading reasons for the introduction 
of alternative dispute resolutions whose flexibility in accessibility and procedure could amend 
some of the issues.  We will see in following chapters how the courts also fare in comparison 
with other dispute resolution bodies when it comes to procedural fairness, efficiency, and 
effectiveness.  
Now that we have seen general rules on establishing court jurisdiction in international disputes 
that are applicable to cloud services, we need to examine the rules and effects of regulations 
that circumvent the access to courts, either mandatory or voluntary by the parties.  We will 
discuss now the international legal framework of alternative dispute resolution with a strong 
emphasis on the regulations within the EU. 
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Chapter 5 - Alternative Dispute Resolution for 
Cloud Disputes 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, we introduce alternative dispute resolution with the aim of depicting possible 
ways to solve conflicts in cloud service markets. We have seen in the survey that the significant 
number of cloud terms of services indicates some form of an alternative dispute resolution 
(from now on ADR) as a preferred and/or exclusive method for solving disputes with their 
customers. Looking at our data, we could say that ADR’s are still the exception rather than the 
general choice for most cloud providers mechanisms. Still, it is important to address substantial 
aspects of ADRs and compare them to the courts in the established framework to draw 
conclusions on the suitability of the different dispute resolution mechanisms for cloud service 
disputes.  
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Within the mentioned variety, however, we will not treat equally all forms as this would not fit 
in the framework of our research which mostly focuses on adjudicative methods of alternative 
dispute resolution. Some forms of alternative dispute resolution that can also be described as 
bargaining methods could be better observed as complementary methods rather than 
competitive to the mechanisms like arbitration and litigation, therefore are not suitable for 
baseline comparison of the framework. However, they play a major role in dispute system 
design, and we need to address them for their function and their relationship with primary 
subjects of our research. We will give an overview and distinction between most common 
bargaining mechanisms (negotiation, mediation) and adjudicative mechanisms (arbitration, 
mock trial, and early neutral evaluation). In the following section, we will introduce ADRs and 
their more essential forms. The third part of the chapter goes into relevant regulation that shapes 
ADRs pertinent for our context. In the fourth part, we explore how alternative dispute 
resolution and specifically arbitration have been applied to consumer disputes and what is their 
place in access to justice. We will also present the data gathered on ADR providers who are 
offering dispute resolution to the consumer in the EU through the official site of the EU.  All 
of the above will allow us to we draw an inference to the possible use of available ADRs on 
the cloud service dispute.  
 
2. Definition and types of ADR  
 
Alternative Dispute Resolution is a general name of the group (latin genus proximum) 
encompassing various out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms. Being a general catch-all 
notion, the specific mark of ADRs or its diferentia specifica is an avoidance of formal/judicial 
resolution of conflicts. While a broad concept, the lax definition allows all out-of-court 
mechanisms to be regarded as ADR, regardless of enormous differences in procedure, form, 
function, and outcomes.   
Although used for a long time, the phrase “alternative dispute resolution” itself is not entirely 
backed by the academia. In last two decades, we are witnessing the push for changing the use 
of term “alternative” to “appropriate” dispute resolution, while acronym remains the same. The 
reason for such a change would lie in disassociating with the notion of ADRs as an alternative 
to the judicial system, but rather to see them as complementary and added value mechanism ( 
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‘alternative to what?’ they ask) since they became very common and in some categories more 
likely to be used than formal trials.448  
In Chapter 2 we have previously mentioned the development of alternative dispute resolution 
within the context of “third wave” of access to justice movement. The story of the alternative 
dispute resolution goes much further in the history. The origins of different forms of ADR can 
be traced back to the ancient Greece, but the emergence of lex mercatoria in the medieval 
Europe has catalyzed its growth.449 “Merchant law” or lex mercatoria grew from customary 
rules established by traveling merchants looking to avoid jurisdictions and laws of local courts 
in their trade routes.450 From the mechanism of dispute resolution for traveling merchants, it 
branched further to solving diplomatic conflicts, and it found use in political and social unrests 
as well.451 Commercial ADRs have grown in recognition over time and became part of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration.452 Permanent Court of Arbitration, arose from the Hague 
conference in 1898, predates the International Court of Justice (and also shares the same 
address), which indicates the historical importance of ADR mechanisms in the domain of 
international law. In the US, the American Arbitration Association established in 1926, beside 
commercial ADR, provided labour-management dispute resolution.453 However, a significant 
rise of ADR and more common use will be seen only in second half of the 20th century. 
A spurt of ADRs in its variety came about in 1970’s under the influence of theories in the fields 
of sociology, political science, and psychology of previous decades,454 which encouraged 
alternative forms of dispute resolution within the judicial system (court-annexed ADRs) or 
outside of judiciary.455 Theories of integrative and problem-solving negotiation, as in works of 
Fisher and Ury,456 will lead to the development of the practice of mediation, and then later to 
more hybrid forms mediation-arbitration, arbitration-mediation, summary jury, and 
                                                          
448 Jeffrey Scott Wolfe, Across the Ripple of Time: the Future of Alternative ( or, is it “appropriate?”) Dispute 
Resolution, 36 TULSA LAW J. 785–812 (2001).Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ALTERNATIVE AND APPROPRIATE DISPUTE 
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minitrials.457 With the globalization and free market expansion, ADRs have become a 
significant tool in international trade primarily seen as private and an efficient means to an end. 
The long tradition of ADR has encompassed a variety of methods, and we will provide in 
following section overview of the most distinct forms and their characteristics.  
We would like to point out here that we are observing alternative dispute resolution methods 
as competitive and comparative methods to formal trials in order to provide a value judgment 
on which method is preferable given a certain context. We have modalities of the alternative 
dispute resolution methods as court-adjacent or court-annexed methods, where they 
supplement existing structures to reduce existing backlog of cases, the decrease inflow of new 
cases, especially small claims, and in general to improve the efficiency and satisfaction of 
parties appearing before the court. In this complementary form, ADRs become part of the 
process before judicial instance depending on jurisdiction. Hence, we choose to group and 
place these the dispute resolution methods (usually mediation) under the category of courts (to 
which they are adjacent). Similarly, the same methods that could be complementary or annex 
to another form of adjudicative methods-arbitration which will be considered under the same 
category (the form can also distinguish itself in the titles like med-arb or neg-med-arb).  
It is difficult to observe and get concrete data on how many of actual conflicts turn to disputes 
that again undergo all the steps in the available resolution process. Parties usually weigh 
different agreements are being criticized aspects and expected outcomes before engaging in the 
process. Stipanovitch suggests that court trial is and always was an exceptional event with very 
limited aims.458 Marc Galanter quips that for the vast majority of users of the court system, the 
name of the game is “liti-gotiation”—a process of negotiation, adjustment, and accommodation 
that is carried on against the backdrop of the series of events leading up to trial and, in very 
rare cases, beyond.459 Statistically, no matter what the number of trials, the fact is that the vast 
majority of matters never reach the courtroom—having been negotiated or resolved in some 
other fashion short of trial, or even the onset of litigation.460 It would be beyond the scope of 
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contentious and litigious society, 4 UCLA LAW REV. 1–60 (1983). 
460 Stipanowich, supra note 458.  
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our research to go into every possibility and modality of previous steps. Therefore we will 
restrict our focus only to the final phases of the dispute path when other methods did not bear 
fruits. Adjudicative methods and expected outcomes of the same, in fact, shape the bargaining 
methods. Hence the availability of “justice” is essential to the negotiating positions. If the 
certain adjudicative method is preferable and available, it could also influence the choices of 
parties in previous negotiating stages. If no alternatives are available, the dearth of choice 
shapes the positions as well. Hornle points that although useful, bargaining methods of ADR 
(negotiation and mediation) are not comparable to adjudicative forms and serve more as a filter 
of cases to these forms of adjudication in the broader sense (by which she means state courts 
and arbitration).461 Nevertheless, those methods serve the function of dispute resolution and 
avoidance, so we will briefly describe two most important bargaining methods negotiation and 
mediation and then arbitration as a relevant adjudicative method.  
 
2.1. Negotiation  
 
Negotiation is not usually perceived as a manifest method of a dispute resolution among the 
general public. It is rather seen as a common, everyday activity and part of communication in 
life and business. In academia, negotiation is a broad notion and shared the field of studies 
between different disciplines, but we focus mostly on dispute resolution and legal aspects of 
negotiation. Black’s law dictionary define negotiation as a consensual bargaining process in 
which the parties attempt to agree on a disputed or potentially disputed matter that usually 
involves complete autonomy for the parties involved, without the intervention of third 
parties.462 Barron’s Law dictionary explains negotiation as a method of dispute resolution 
where either the parties themselves or the representatives of each party attempt to settle conflict 
without resort to the courts.463 
 
Traditionally negotiation has been viewed through a strategy of positional bargaining where 
parties, having in mind their positions compromise and make concessions until they reach an 
agreement. Ordinarily, parties entering negotiations adopt positions, but frequently become 
committed and sometimes entrenched to them. The strategy of positional bargaining has been 
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criticized that frames negotiation as an adversarial, zero-sum exercise.464 Such strategy of 
positional bargaining (also sometimes called distribution negotiation) implies that one party 
will gain at the expense of the other resulting in “win-lose” outcome. In their seminal work, 
“Getting to Yes,” Fischer, Ury, and Patton propose alternative approach/strategy which they 
called the principled negotiation.465 In the principled negotiation, parties do not focus on 
positions but underlying interests. By focusing on interests, parties are prodded to look at 
different aspects, various positions and innovative solutions that could satisfy those interests.466 
Fisher, Ury, and Patton propose several principles as guidelines for handling negotiation:467 
 Separate the People from the Problem 
 Focus on Interests, Not Positions 
 Invent Options for Mutual Gain 
 Use Objective Criteria 
The principled negotiation (also called integrative, merit-based, or interest-based negotiation) 
approaches conflict as though the parties have a shared problem for which resolution they need 
to collaborate. It encourages taking opponent’s point of view of a problem to devise creative 
solution having in mind opponents interests. Both approaches assume negotiation in good faith. 
The parties that participate in negotiation without the desire to resolve the conflicts, for 
whatever purpose, are negotiating in bad faith.468  
The positional bargaining and its potential win-lose outcome are inherent to the adversarial 
adjudicative systems with the difference that it is third party or adjudicator who decides on the 
final outcome. The parties, unable to compromise themselves through negotiation, rely on 
third-party to take a decision on the strength of the argument of their positions. On the other 
hand, collaborative approach of interest-based negotiation (principled negotiation) attempts to 
give objective perspective to the parties with the help of several strategies proposed by Ury and 
Fischer. Most prominent of those are defining BATNA (Best Alternative to Negotiated 
Agreement), WATNA (Worst Alternative to Negotiated Agreement). Analysis and 
differentiation between those two in turn help parties identify the ZOPA (Zone of Possible 
Agreement). Negotiation characterizes a strong control of the parties on the outcomes of 
negotiation and flexibility style and form of communication. It could range from highly formal 
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written exchange to verbal exchanges during a short meeting. From its diversity of possible 
ways to negotiate, it is rather straightforward to indicate that negotiation in general as a form 
of ADR is the most direct, efficient and effective dispute resolution method. However, the 
effectiveness and the efficiency, and hence success of negotiation depends on the willingness 
of the parties to agree. 
 
The final agreement is to be found within the boundaries of the zone of possible agreements 
(ZOPA). Even with the concepts and strategies suggested by Ury and Fischer, sometimes 
participants are not able to reach agreement on their own (due to possible lack of sharing of 
information, lack of creativity or poor analysis of the situation and interests) and they are in 
need of assistance of a third party. The professional third parties willing to participate in dispute 
negotiation but not to adjudicate are mediators and conciliators. Conciliation is a process where 
parties reach an amicable agreement with the help conciliator. However, the parties themselves 
are more active in the resolution of the dispute.469 The role of a conciliator is similar to the one 
of mediator; the difference lies in the primary role of conciliator to restore or repair broken 
relationship either personal or in business. The mediator is oriented more towards resolving the 
dispute at hand with a greater emphasis on neutrality towards parties.470 
 
2.2. Mediation 
 
Mediation is defined as a method of settling disputes outside of a court setting by the 
involvement of a neutral third party known as a mediator to act as a link between the parties.471 
Mediation is especially useful in situations where parties are not able or to take steps necessary 
to reach an agreement by themselves, but there is still a possibility of the agreement which 
would satisfy parties to an extent (even maybe not meeting their entire expectations). Mediators 
serve as a neutral link and facilitator in communication, unattached to the parties or issues, and 
potential guide to a resolution when parties hit an impasse in their positions. Mediation is 
usually structured as an interactive and dynamic process designed to help parties advance in 
solving their issues. However, being party-centred it is a voluntary process (except in some 
mediations where the participation is mandatory by law to a degree) as it depends on party’s 
willingness to participate and give inputs. Mediators use a host of techniques, mostly to open 
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and improve dialogue, and to guide the dialogue to the common ground and the away from 
entrenching in the positions excluding compromise. Some of the benefits of mediation 
recognized by academia and practitioners are: 
 Costs - although mediators charge fees they are considerably smaller compared to 
lawyer’s fees in other forms of dispute resolution such as arbitration and litigation472 
 Time - mediation is perceived to be faster in handling cases compared to adjudicative 
forms because of its flexibility and party-oriented process as opposed to more formal 
processes.473 
 Confidentiality - is a hallmark of mediation. Mediators and parties are only privy to the 
process. It is ethical and legal obligation of a mediator to keep confidential what he/she 
learned in the process. In many cases mediators do not take notes or if they do they 
destroy them by the end.474 
 Control - parties are in control of the process, and they can stop at will, most of the 
time. The control builds trust between the parties and allows for more mutually 
agreeable and enforceable solutions.475 
We already mentioned few domains where mediation (as a form of ADR) established itself as 
particularly useful: international relations, commercial disputes, financial disputes, workplace 
and labor disputes… One domain where it has gained much support in recent decades is family 
disputes. The sensitivity in cases involving children (custody in cases of separation) and also 
in emotionally charged disputes between spouses (divorce, prenuptial agreements, alimony, 
etc.), emphasizes the importance of confidentiality and professionalism of mediators. Family 
mediation (which can be stated for mediation in general) is oriented towards prevention of 
escalation and conflict aversion. The principles and strategies of Ury, Fischer, and Patton, serve 
well in organizing and structuring the process with underlying interests of the parties in the 
minds of mediators. 
In comparison with formalized authoritative court proceedings, mediation offers flexible, self-
determined approach in which all aspects of the conflict may be considered.476 We recognize 
                                                          
472 KLAUS J. HOPT & FELIX STEFFEK, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND REGULATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE MEDIATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND REGULATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2013). p.99.  
473 Id. 
474 Edward Brunet, REEVALUATING COMPLEX MEDIATION GENERALIZATIONS (2011). 
475 HOPT AND STEFFEK, supra note 472. 
476 FELIX STEFFEK, MEDIATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN INTRODUCTION (2012), https://e-
justice.europa.eu/fileDownload.do?id=b3e6a432-440d-4105-b9d5-29a8be95408f. 
144 
 
three different types of mediation in relation to court proceedings: private mediation 
(independently of court), court-annexed mediation (initiated by the court but without 
involvement), and judicial mediation (judges or court officials involved but not necessarily 
leading the process). The latter two forms of mediation are viable choices for dispute 
resolution, but as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter we need to assess mediation as a 
competitive form to judicial proceedings, thus we will mostly comment on the private 
mediation. 
Felix Steffek and Klaus Hopt in collaboration with significant number of researchers in the 
field distilled from the variety of definitions of mediation the four essential elements (or core 
definition): (1) dispute resolution procedure, (2) voluntary nature, (3) systematic promotion of 
communication between the parties and (4) resolution for which the parties bear responsibility 
and where there is no decision-making power on the part of the intermediary.477 They also cite 
important elements (although not part of the core definition) of neutrality and confidentiality, 
but also make a remark that in some jurisdiction instead of neutrality reference is made to 
independence or impartiality, and in some confidentiality is not expressly stated.478 
Clear delineation between the methods of negotiation and mediation is difficult to do, largely 
because the actors share the same skill-sets in communication and common goals. The most 
significant difference is the role of the third party. But also not every dispute is suitable for 
mediation. Suitability of the conflict for mediation could be determined by assessing factors as 
nature of the conflict, possibility of a consensual solution, reasonable and desired 
success/outcome, methods already tried to solve the conflict, probable costs of different 
procedures to solve the conflict, probable duration of different procedures to solve the conflict 
including the consideration of a failure of the procedure tried, importance of an on-going 
relationship with the conflict party/parties, importance of control over the conflict solution, 
extent to which communication problems have contributed to the conflict, desire to solve 
further problems in connection with the conflict.479 Suitability to resolve disputes when there 
is a substantial power imbalance between the parties is certainly of importance in our context 
and will be addressed later.  
The structure of mediation is dependent on the type of mediation, and most regulations allow 
flexible approach where parties and mediators can devise their steps in the process. We can 
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mark some general points in the already flexible structure. The beginning of mediation depends 
on the type; if it is private mediation it commences on the will of one party based on agreed 
clause to mediate; if it is court-annexed or judicial mediation, it starts with court’s 
recommendation or imperative legal norm to attempt mediation before judicial proceedings. 
This phase is followed by appointment or selection of a mediator. The procedure of mediation 
varies depending on the style of mediator but in general should have several phases: opening 
phase - gathering information and in affirming commitment to mediate; exploratory phase - 
parties and mediator investigate positions and underlying interests of the parties; negotiation 
phase - mediator and parties trying to come up with solution; concluding phase - settlement in 
case of success or termination of mediation.480  
Mediation is different from arbitration in one essential aspect: adjudicatory or decision-making 
power of the third party in concluding phase. The success/effectiveness of mediation largely 
depends on the will of the parties, and in cases where this voluntary element is lacking, 
sometimes the only solution is the legally binding decision of an independent party. 
 
2.3. Arbitration 
 
Arbitration is out-of-court dispute resolution mechanism where parties agree to bring disputes 
before one or several arbitrators (third parties) who will decide on the issue. Depending on the 
relevant regulation and agreement of the parties it could be binding on the nonbinding decision 
(which would be the more advisory role of arbitrator or expert consultation). As with other 
dispute resolution methods, it comes in many forms and versions. We are primarily interested 
in private arbitration as opposed to court-annexed or court-ordered arbitration; we want to focus 
our attention on contractual arbitration only. Of course, arbitration can be used in the vast 
variety of possible disputes, where it is not strictly forbidden by the law to arbitrate the conflicts 
(arbitrability), but we are concerned with arbitration that could come out as a consequence of 
a possible breach of terms of service in cloud service contracts. We have seen in Chapter 3 that 
a pertinent number of cloud providers based in the US relies on some form of arbitration to 
resolve issues with its customers.  
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Historically, called by different names, arbitration existed and followed the development of the 
society in general.481 It existed before state-run courts have been established to settle disputes 
and once judicial systems were in place, it has continued its practice in parallel, growing on 
specific needs and specializing in them. In modern times where the shape of arbitration as an 
out-of-court method has been fully accepted, it was bundled with others in the same notion of 
alternative dispute resolution.  
As with other dispute resolution mechanism, it shares certain common characteristics, and it is 
hard to determine what is typical characteristic for all arbitration processes. However, having 
in mind that the parties select it (sometimes design) and in some form usually regulated by state 
and/or private institution, we can comment on the most common structure in the majority of 
processes. The first question that arises is if the potential dispute could be a subject to 
arbitration. The arbitrability of the dispute depends on applicable law and could be regulated 
differently in a different jurisdiction.482 Arbitration is perceived as suitable for handling private 
conflicts that do not concern third parties or infringe their rights.483 Whatever matter society 
considers to be of a greater public importance could be excluded as a subject matter of 
arbitration. For example, matters pertaining to family law, status or criminal law are generally 
excluded. Also in many jurisdictions state intervenes or restricts arbitration in order to protect 
weaker parties, e.g. consumers. However, when it comes to consumers, we are witnessing a 
significant difference between the approaches the United States and the EU. The applicable 
law determines the arbitrability of the subject matter.  
Another important element in the condition for arbitration is the existence of arbitration 
agreement. These agreements come in many shapes, but ordinarily, they are in written form 
and usually part of the main contract in the shape of the arbitration clause. Arbitration clauses 
can be more or less detailed, ranging from simple statement that arbitration will be method for 
resolution of disputes the more detailed clause or even whole contract with specific elements 
providing the applicable law, place of arbitration, procedure for selection or arbitrators, subject 
matter of disputes, limitations, waivers, severability of the rest of the contract in case of the 
clause being declared void and null, etc. Observing terms of service cloud providers, allowed 
us to see all of these variations and some of this clauses are showcased in Annex B.  
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We can also divide arbitration agreements into so-called pre-disputes agreements and post- 
dispute agreements. Pre-dispute arbitration agreements are usually the part of the general 
contractor in our case terms of service which is predefined and offered to customers as a 
contract of adhesion. Pre-dispute agreements are typically criticized on the grounds of lack of 
choice for customers, lack of consent and inability to negotiate on the elements of the 
agreement. 484 We will address the issue of fairness in pre-dispute agreements when we get to 
the EU Unfair Terms Directive. Post-dispute agreements, on the other hand, are not perceived 
as problematic; usually, they are the result of negotiation and consent on appropriate dispute 
resolution methods which underlines interest of both parties to delegate the issue to such a 
venue.  
If there is a valid arbitration agreement for the dispute that occurs between the parties, assuming 
that conflict is arbitrable, one of the parties can initiate arbitration before an arbitral institution 
and its arbitrators. Depending on the agreement, which could indicate rules for selection of 
arbitrators and their number, adjudicators are appointed. We could have one or more arbitrators 
in the panel which is convened and also sometimes called arbitration tribunal or arbitral 
tribunal. Pertinent rules determine the selection of the chairman (if there is a chairman) how to 
proceed with processing the claim. The parties in principle are free to determine the number of 
arbitrators and their composition. There certain differences in depending on the type of 
arbitration.  
We can differentiate arbitral tribunals in two types of proceedings: ad hoc arbitration where 
parties appoint adjudicators without the involvement of the institution, and institutional 
arbitration where institutions themselves supervise and/or restrict potential appointees in 
compliance with their institutional rules.485 In case there is a disagreement on appointees, 
parties can rely on procedural law and courts of the place of the arbitration to resolve any 
differences over the appointments when it comes to ad hoc arbitration, or they rely on rules of 
the institution if they have chosen specific institutional arbitration. Ad hoc arbitrations usually 
have one to three appointed adjudicator for a specific case, and their role as arbitrators ends 
with the finality of the case. Institutional arbitrations, especially those dealing with large 
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commercial cases with an international element, have long-established practices and many 
times have specialized panels which increase the trust in the institutions. Better-known global 
arbitrational institutions are International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris,486 the 
American Arbitration Association487 (and its International Centre for Dispute Resolution -
ICDR for international arbitration), the London Court of International Arbitration,488 the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce489, the Singapore International 
Arbitration Center490, etc. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (or 
ICSID) is the best-known arbitration institution created by the Washington Convention in 1965 
to settle disputes between states and foreign investors. 
Ad hoc arbitrations allow more party autonomy in determining procedural rules that guide the 
process.491 Institutional arbitration has pre-determined rules of procedure with more or less 
possibility of customizing those rules for the purposes of a specific case.492 The procedural laws 
which apply in the seat of the arbitration in combination with the agreed ad hoc or institutional 
rules determine procedural rights and duties of the parties and the tribunal. 
Most national laws regulating arbitration guarantee minimum procedural justice in the sense of 
duty of the tribunal to be impartial towards parties and to allow both sides to be heard equally.493 
However, when it comes to appealing the decision of the tribunal, it depends on the institution 
and applicable law. Most countries grant the supervisory role to the courts, allowing parties to 
appeal on the grounds of arbitrability, breach of norms of public order, fraud or some other 
significant breaches of the applicable law.494  
The final result of arbitration is an adjudicatory decision on the merits called arbitral award or 
arbitration award. The award is analogous in effect to court judgments in commercial matters. 
In case a losing party does not comply with the arbitral award and voluntarily pays, the award 
has to be enforced through a court in the jurisdiction where other party resides or has assets. 
When it comes to international commercial arbitration, the most important international tool is 
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards from 1958, 
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also known as the New York Convention. Signed by 156 countries, it allows international 
arbitration awards to be enforceable in most of the countries in the world. It emphasizes the 
significance of international cooperation and regulation for the success of arbitration and 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in general. 
 
2.4. Online dispute resolution 
 
To say that an online dispute resolution is a form of alternative dispute resolution is 
oversimplification and debatable statement.495 We chose to put the term here for clarification 
and reference in following discussions. We do not have universally acceptable and uncontested 
definition of online dispute resolution (hereinafter: ODR), but then again we can operate with 
several different definitions depending on an approach that is being taken.  This is precisely 
because ODR as a field is a meeting point between several different disciplines, ranging from 
technical fields of computer science like software engineering, artificial intelligence and legal 
knowledge systems to legal and social studies of conflict resolution, dispute avoidance, and 
management.  
Defining ODR usually means focusing on a specific aspect. If we focus on out-of-court dispute 
resolution, then we can say that ODR is a part of the larger field of ADR, or more commonly 
to see it as an extension of ADR.  Then again, if we focus on the “online” part, we define ODR 
through the use of online technologies and focus on the application of such technology in 
dispute resolution regardless whether it’s strictly out-of-court, court-annexed or an integral part 
of the judicial system. ODR has become a common term that includes any use of information 
communication technologies in dispute resolution. Katsh and Rifkin coined the term “fourth 
party” for the technology that facilitates the dispute resolution.496 The term has, even more, 
standing with the developments in artificial intelligence which enables software to play a 
significant role in dispute resolution.497  
Recently adopted UNCITRAL’s Technical Notes offer a definition of ODR in section 5 as, a 
“mechanism for resolving disputes through the use of electronic communications and other 
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information and communication technology.”498 This definition emphasizes role of technology 
and is neutral towards out-of-court aspect.  Nevertheless, ODR has not gotten that far from 
ADR, and its forms are still largely comparable with traditional offline ADR.  
 
Figure 1. ODR basic typology by Marta Poblet499 
 
Among the ODR methods that are considered authentic, blind-bidding and some form of 
automated or assisted negotiation are usually mentioned. Blind-bidding is a form of settlement 
through an auction, where party bids for appropriate amounts for settlement, either precisely 
or more usually in a certain range, while at the same time unaware of the same bid from 
opposing party.500 When both parties blindly overlap in their offers or come to a certain close 
range, the software declares the issue settled. This mechanism is especially useful when there 
is a need for quick monetary settlements.  
Assisted negotiation is the method where technology guides the parties in certain phases of 
their negotiation.501 The “assistant” could streamline the negotiation and guide the conversation 
to specific points which are presumably in service of a potential settlement. Currently, many 
online platforms that offer a form of dispute resolution or complaint handling incorporate some 
form of assisted negotiation as well.  
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Since its early days in mid-nineties, ODR has become a vibrant scholarly field with many 
prominent scholars researching the role of new technologies on the principles and practices of 
alternative dispute resolution. 502 We will discuss more on the role and development of ODR 
in Chapter 7.  
 
 
3. International regulation of alternative dispute resolutions  
 
We have briefly presented three main methods in alternative dispute resolution domain and 
touched upon ODR. In order to assess whether they would be a useful tool in solving disputes 
in cloud service market, we need to examine legal framework that supports ADR methods and 
how it deals with disputes with a cross-border element. The negotiation is not regulated as a 
method of dispute resolution, but rather it is subsumed under the regulation of contract law 
since the potential outcome of negotiation could be legally binding agreement. All the issues 
fall under the domain of contracts and applicable law to the contracts which have to be 
consulted. Although we will not go into issues of contracts and their enforcement, negotiation 
will be discussed when it is necessary for relation to mediation and arbitration. They could be 
observed more as stones we need to step on to reach the same goal. Sometimes a stone can be 
skipped, and sometimes it is more prudent to tread on each step carefully, so we do not fall. 
Negotiation is the first stepping stone. It is the most informal way, and many terms of services 
instruct users to contact cloud providers directly before initiating any formal complaint. 
Sometimes it is a legal requirement and condition to following formal procedure. Being most 
informal as a dispute resolution, it does not (and probably should not) require regulatory 
intervention on party autonomy which is protected by contract law. Hence, we will be 
discussing mostly regulation of mediation and arbitration, which occasional referencing 
negation as appropriate.  
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3.1. EU Regulation of ADR 
 
The approach of legislators can vary depending on how they perceive ADR’s role in relation 
to access to justice. The EU stance has oscillated over time from a light touch, skeptical of 
ADRs as an alternative to litigation, to considering significant support to out-of-court binding 
resolutions, and back again. In the “Consumer Access to Justice Green Paper” from 1993, the 
EU Commission took cautious approach considering useful roles of mediators and ombudsman 
but suspected the guarantees of independence of arbitrators.503 According to the Green Paper 
adjudicatory role is best vested in the judiciary of the rule-of-law states.504 In ADR 
Communication from 1998, Commission suggests principles that could indicate the 
Commission’s support to the involvement of the third parties, similar to the likes of binding 
consumer arbitration.505 But later in 2001, the ADR recommendation supports consensual 
resolution of consumer disputes.506 At the time E-Commerce Directive in its Article 17 arranges 
that the Member States shall ensure in the event of disagreement between an information 
society service provider and the recipient of the service, that their legislation does not hamper 
the use of out-of-court schemes, available under national law, for dispute settlement, including 
appropriate electronic means.507 Shortly after, Green Paper on alternative dispute resolution in 
civil and commercial law (2002 ADR Green Paper) proposes pan-EU ADR mechanism.508 
After adopting European Code of Conduct for Mediators in 2004, the Commission pushed for 
the EU Mediation Directive. 
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3.1.1. EU Mediation Directive 
 
The Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Aspects 
of Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters (from hereon: Mediation Directive) provides a 
framework for cross-border mediation. The Mediation Directive dates from 21 May 2008, has 
been implemented in the European Member States’ law (except Denmark) from 20 May 2011. 
The extent and the precise nature of the Articles of the Mediation Directive reflected the 
different regulatory approaches of the Member States and the fact that mediation as a dispute 
resolution mechanism was still in the process of development.509 Some Articles contain 
concrete and hard rules for the Member States to transpose into their national laws, such as Art. 
6 on the enforceability of settlement agreements developed in mediation or Art. 7 on 
confidentiality.510 
Other Articles are formulated rather softly and express rather a desire than clear rules to 
implement, such as Art. 4 on ensuring the quality of mediation and Art. 5 on the relationship 
between court proceedings and mediation. 511 Then again, some issues are not directly dealt 
with by the regulatory part of the Directive at all, for example, the liability of mediators. 
3.1.1.1. Scope  
 
The application of the Mediation Directive is narrow in several aspects. It starts with the 
definition of mediation which could be interpreted restrictively to some forms of mediation. 
The Art. 3(a) determines the scope:  
“Mediation means a structured process, however, named or referred to, whereby two or more 
parties to a dispute attempt by themselves, on a voluntary basis, to reach an agreement on the 
settlement of their dispute with the assistance of a mediator.”  
Art. 3(b) includes judicial mediation:  
“It includes mediation conducted by a judge who is not responsible for any judicial proceedings 
concerning the dispute in question. It excludes attempts made by the court or the judge seized 
to settle a dispute in the course of judicial proceedings concerning the dispute in question.”  
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The Directive only applies to civil and commercial matters and excludes rights and obligations 
which are not at the parties’ disposal under the relevant applicable law.512 More relevant for 
our context, the Directive only applies to cross-border disputes as defined in Art. 2: a dispute 
in which at least one of the parties is domiciled or habitually resident in a Member State other 
than that of any other party on the date on which (a) the parties agree to use mediation after the 
dispute has arisen; (b) mediation is ordered by a court; (c) an obligation to use mediation arises 
under national law; or (d) for the purposes of Article 5 an invitation by a court to use mediation 
or attend an information session is made to the parties. While it only applies to cross-border 
disputes, the Directive does not restrict the Member States to enact laws that cover cross-border 
as well as purely national mediations, and a single set of rules for national and international 
mediations would be desirable, as it would foster the understanding and practice of mediation 
and avoids arbitrarily different regulation.513 
 
3.1.1.2. Courts and mediation  
 
The relationship between court proceedings and mediation is dealt with in Art. 5 of the 
Mediation Directive where it allows courts to invite the parties to use mediation in order to 
settle the dispute or to attend an information session on the use of mediation. The Directive 
gives priority to party autonomy and the principle of voluntariness. However, the Directive 
expressly does not intervene in the Member States willingness to make mediation compulsory 
if desired, or from developing other incentives to use mediation and imposing sanctions for not 
using mediation. In any case, such measures could not prevent the parties from exercising their 
right of access to the judicial protection.  
 
3.1.1.3. Enforcement of mediation settlements 
 
According to the research, agreements resulting from mediation have a higher chance of 
performance compared with court decisions.514 Mediation agreements to settle the dispute are 
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based on party autonomy instead of an authoritative third party ruling which indicates that 
parties only agree if they want the solution, hence the higher satisfaction. Mediation settlements 
are rather considerate and are prone to taking into account financial difficulties of the parties.515 
Nonetheless, the parties desire to create an enforceable agreement. This might be the case if 
the obligations agreed on are far in the future or if the parties have specific financial or 
emotional security needs.516 According to Art. 6 Mediation Directive the Member States must 
ensure that a written agreement resulting from mediation can be made enforceable with the 
consent of the parties. However, the Directive necessitates that the content of the agreements 
are not to be contrary to the law and to be enforceable under the applicable law of the Member 
State where the request is made.517 It gives some option to the Member States on the selection 
of the competent institution (court or other competent authority) and appropriate form 
(decision, judgment or another authentic instrument, but the general rules on cross-border and 
national enforcement apply. Therefore, if a mediation agreement leads to a settlement in a 
court, it will be enforceable under the national law and Art. 59 of Brussels I (Regulation 
1215/2012) and if a settlement is fixed as an authentic instrument, it is enforceable under the 
national rules for such instruments and respectively Art. 58 Brussels I Recast. 
 
3.1.1.4. Confidentiality  
 
The willingness of the parties to disclose information which then forms the basis for a proposal 
favorable to all involved in the conflict is key to the success of mediation.518 The discussion 
between the mediator and single party in privacy is used as an opportunity to convey sensitive 
information which the mediator may use to develop solution scenarios.519 Confidentiality rules, 
either mandatory by law or merely contractual, intend to ensure the trust of the parties and to 
avoid reluctance to disclose information out of fear that the information might be used against 
them in subsequent court or arbitration proceedings.520 According to Art. 7(1) Mediation 
Directive the Member States must ensure preservation of confidentiality by the mediators or 
the parties involved and to guarantee that persons involved in the administration of the process 
(legal counsel, experts, translators, etc.) will not be compelled to give evidence in judicial 
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proceedings or arbitration regarding information arising out of or in connection with mediation. 
If the parties agree otherwise, it will not apply (also where public policy so requires or where 
disclosure is necessary in order to implement or enforce the mediation settlement). 
Nonetheless, the Member States are allowed to enact stricter measures to protect the 
confidentiality of mediation.521  
The Mediation Directive rectified a number of issues that perplexed mediation as a cross-border 
dispute resolution, and we highlighted few, but its effect on the use of mediation or ADR in 
general in commercial and consumer disputes was modest and necessitated additional 
legislation. The key (and also general) the problem is that it relies on the willingness of the 
parties and if a single party refuses to cooperate the effort becomes ineffective, and without 
proper incentives parties within legal systems that have not been accustomed to using 
mediation did not respond to it with massive success.522 This is of particular importance when 
there is a significant negotiation power discrepancy, and the Directive does not offer any 
solutions for those cases. Another issue is the Directive does not require Member States to 
introduce mediations schemes where did not exist, therefore parties from the certain Member 
States would not enjoy the same privilege of equal access to mediation in case of need even if 
there is a sufficient willingness to participate from both sides. 
 
3.1.2. EU ADR Directive 
 
While the Mediation Directive focused on a single form of dispute resolution, after some 
deliberation, the EU Commission attempted to harmonize alternative dispute resolution 
methods for consumer protection in all Member States by establishing certain standards and 
requirements without prejudice to Directive 2008/52/EC. In 2013 European Parliament voted 
in favor of the Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 may 
2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes (Directive on consumer ADR).  
3.1.2.1. Scope 
 
The purpose of the EU ADR Directive is clearly stated in the first article: achievement of a 
high level of consumer protection ensuring that consumers can, on a voluntary basis, submit 
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complaints against traders to entities offering independent, impartial, transparent, effective, fast 
and fair alternative dispute resolution procedures.523 The Directive is without prejudice to 
national legislations making participation in ADR procedures mandatory, provided that such 
legislation does not prevent the parties from exercising their right of access to the judicial 
system.524 
The scope of application, defined in Article 2, are procedures for the out-of-court resolution of 
domestic and cross-border disputes concerning contractual obligations stemming from sales 
contracts or service contracts between a trader established in the Union and a consumer resident 
in the Union through the intervention of an ADR entity which proposes or imposes a solution 
or brings the parties together with the aim of facilitating an amicable solution. 525  
The Directive’s scope excludes a number of possible disputes related to work relationship with 
trader, procedures before consumer complaint-handling systems operated by the trader, non-
economic services of general interest, disputes between traders, direct negotiation between the 
consumer and the trader, attempts made by a judge to settle a dispute in the course of a judicial 
proceeding concerning that dispute, procedures initiated by a trader against a consumer, health 
services, public providers of further or higher education.526 
 
3.1.2.1. Access to ADR and procedures 
 
The ADR Directive places obligation on Member States to facilitate consumers’ access to ADR 
bodies and imposes requirements for ADR providers: to maintain an up-to-date website which 
provides the parties with easy access to information concerning the ADR procedure, and which 
enables consumers to submit a complaint and the requisite supporting documents online; to 
give information on an durable medium (paper) and to enable consumers to submit the 
complaints off-line; enable the exchange of information between the parties via electronic 
means or, if applicable, by post; accept both domestic and cross-border disputes, including 
disputes covered by ODR Regulation ( see further in 3.1.2.3.).527  
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Directive leaves to the Member States to permit or forbid to ADR bodies to introduce procedure 
rules to refuse to deal with disputes in the cases where : (a) the consumer did not attempt to 
contact the trader concerned in order to discuss his complaint and seek, as a first step, to resolve 
the matter directly with the trader; (b) the dispute is frivolous or vexatious; (c) the dispute is 
being or has previously been considered by another ADR entity or by a court; (d) the value of 
the claim falls below or above a pre-specified monetary threshold; (e) the consumer has not 
submitted the complaint to the ADR entity within a pre-specified time limit, which shall not be 
set at less than one year from the date upon which the consumer submitted the complaint to the 
trader; (f) dealing with such a type of dispute would otherwise seriously impair the effective 
operation of the ADR entity.528 In paragraph 4 of Art 5, it is stated that if an ADR entity is 
unable to consider a complaint that has been submitted to it, a Member State shall not be 
required to ensure that the consumer can submit his complaint to another ADR entity.  
 
3.1.2.2. Principles  
 
Articles 6 to 10 of the Directive on consumer ADR establishing guarantee principles which 
should harmonize practices alternative dispute resolution on the single market. These principles 
are expertise, independence, impartiality, transparency, effectiveness, fairness, liberty, and 
legality.  
Expertise, independence, impartiality rules established in the article 6, guarantee that the parties 
will possess necessary knowledge skills in general and standing law and that they are 
independent of parties and appointed for sufficient duration to their positions. Their 
remuneration should not be dependent on the outcome of the case. Along with giving general 
requirements of expertise, independence, impartiality, in breach of Article 6, the Member 
States shall ensure that there is a procedure in place to remedy the issues. Since the ADR 
directive is trying to harmonize existing practice in the Member States, the EU Commission 
needed to ensure impartiality and independence of long-established sectorial ADR bodies and 
their remuneration schemes. Paragraph 4 states: 
“Where the natural persons in charge of ADR are employed or remunerated exclusively 
by a professional organization or a business association of which the trader is a member, 
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Member States shall ensure that, in addition to the general requirements set out in 
paragraphs 1 and 5, they have a separate and dedicated budget at their disposal which 
is sufficient to fulfil their tasks.  
This paragraph shall not apply where the natural persons concerned form part of a 
collegial body composed of an equal number of representatives of the professional 
organisation or business association by which they are employed or remunerated and 
of consumer organisations.” 
The question of financing of ADR bodies has been the focus of academia with specific 
emphasis in the researcher on the potential bias of ADR entities could have to traders hoping a 
significant number of cases to them. 529 
Transparency principle ensures availability of the most relevant information (contact address, 
the language in use, fees, nature of the procedure, competences of ADR bodies, average 
duration, grounds for refusal, etc.), either on the website of the ADR entities or durable medium 
per request.530 
Under the principle of effectiveness, Member States are required to ensure easy online and off-
line access to ADR bodies, access to the procedure without necessary legal representation, that 
the ADR procedure is free of charge or available at a nominal fee for consumers, and that 
requirement of the quick notification of the complaint. 531 
In the Art. 7, the outcome of the ADR procedure, but not the enforcement, is to be available in 
a period of 90 calendar days from the date on which the ADR entity has received the complete 
complaint file. However, In the case of highly complex disputes, the ADR entity in charge 
may, at its own discretion, extend the 90 calendar days’ time period. The parties shall be 
informed of any extension of that period and of the expected length of time that will be needed 
for the conclusion of the dispute.532 
The principle of procedural fairness is represented in the Article 9 of the Directive. Member 
States guarantee the right of the parties to express their point of view (lat. audiatur et altera 
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pars).533 The parties should also be informed of the outcome of the procedure in written form. 
In ADR procedures with solution proposal as an outcome the parties have the possibility of 
withdrawing from the procedure at any stage if they are dissatisfied with the performance or 
the operation of the procedure, but in case national rules allow mandatory participation this 
will be applicable only to consumers.534 
The liberty principle in Art.10, in a similar fashion to Unfair Terms Directive, confirms that 
Member States shall guarantee that an agreement between a consumer and an on an ADR 
procedure is not binding on the consumer if it was concluded before the dispute happened and 
if it has the effect of depriving the consumer of his right to bring an action before the courts for 
the settlement of the dispute.535 The legality principle expressed in Art 11. ensures that rules of 
ADR Directive and Mediation Directive in the case of conflict of law do not result in the 
consumer being deprived of the protection afforded to him by the provisions that cannot be 
derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law of his residence.536 
 
3.1.2.3. Relationship with EU ODR Regulation 
  
The Directive on consumer ADR and the EU ODR Regulation have been introduced at the 
same time as a package intended to improve consumer protection and redress. The EU ODR 
Regulation introduced single pan-European online dispute resolution portal, where consumers 
can file complaints in a simplified manner.537 The EU ODR website provides free case 
management tool for ADR providers that lack technical expertise or practice in handling cases 
online. We will discuss more phenomena of ODR and the regulation in the following chapter. 
Here we would like to point the complementary role of the two regulations. While ADR 
Directive was intended to harmonize and to bring the same level of standards existing ADR 
entities and to ensure that the Member States provide alternative dispute resolution in the first 
place, the EU ODR Regulation was meant to provide single entry point for consumer 
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complaints on a single market, both domestic and international, which can link existing 
network of ADRs in all Member States (that fulfill requirements of the ADR Directive). The 
Recital 18 of the Regulation clarifies intent to make single entry point which should allow 
consumers and traders to submit complaints by filling in an electronic complaint form available 
in all the official languages of the institutions of the Union and to attach relevant documents 
and it should transmit complaints to an ADR entity competent to deal with the dispute 
concerned. 538  
The two pieces of legislation are interconnected. The EU Regulation on Consumer ODR relies 
on the definitions in the Art 4 of Directive on consumer ADR, which indicates the intent of 
unambiguous interpretation between two acts in the ADR practice. The ODR website is meant 
to provide relevant data on ADR entities, which has been indicated as a requirement in the 
ADR Directive, but also to provide statistical data on the use of ADR by consumers on the 
European level, having in mind the entry point of a dispute - EU ODR platform. On the other 
hand, ODR regulation has a bit wider scope since it allows disputes of traders against 
consumers (under certain conditions), and at the same time, narrower scope since it only applies 
to cases related to online sales and services’ contractual disputes. 
Both, the Directive and the Regulation do not provide a lot of assistance when it comes to 
enforcement, indicating that when it comes to enforcement of arbitral awards (when one party 
does not comply) we need to revert to New York’s convention (the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards from 1958) or the Mediation 
Directive when it comes to outcomes of mediation and cross-referencing applicable Brussels I 
Regulation rules.  
In general, both regulations rely on a willingness to participate by the parties based on post-
dispute agreements, which by itself can render accessible pan-European single-entry point and 
available infrastructure (ADR network) ineffective considering the potential number of cases 
omitted on the facts that one party does not agree to the procedure. 
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3.1.3. EU ODR Regulation 
 
While the online dispute resolution in is the full title of the Regulation No 524/2013, we cannot 
find a definition of ODR itself. ODR as a domain is a bit more difficult to define, and it is still 
debated the issue in academia.539 What we can infer from the stated purposed of the Regulation 
in Art 1, is that under ODR falls out-of-court resolution of disputes between consumers and 
traders online. If that it all, only a method of out-of-court than the discussion would be over 
soon. However, as we will see in Chapter 6, the use of technology allowed new and innovative 
forms of ODR that evolve of the traditional concept of ADR. Also, trends and demand for ODR 
in the courts show that maybe lines between ODR and e-courts will be blurred.540  
Nevertheless, the purpose of Regulation is through the achievement of a high level of consumer 
protection, to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market, and in particular of 
its digital dimension by providing a European ODR platform (‘ODR platform’) facilitating the 
independent, impartial, transparent, effective, fast and fair out-of-court resolution of disputes 
between consumers and traders online.541 We can notice here the focus on the EU and the 
improving the functioning of internal market which is also explained in Recital 4 where it states 
that the uneven availability, quality, and awareness of simple, efficient, fast and low-cost means 
of resolving disputes arising from the sale of goods or provision of services across the Union 
constitutes a barrier within the internal market which undermines consumers’ and traders’ 
confidence in shopping and selling across borders.542 
The scope of the regulation is similar to the ADR Directive. In fact, it invokes the intervention 
of an ADR entity listed in accordance with Article 20(2) of Directive 2013/11/EU. However, 
it is focused only on contractual disputes that arise out of online sales and services.543 To be 
able to deal with the e-commerce disputes and to impede the fragmentation of the internal 
market EU establishes a platform that will be a single pan-EU entry point for potential 
disputants. 
The ODR platform has been built to provide following functions in accordance with Art 5 of 
Regulation: (a) to provide an electronic complaint form which can be filled in by the 
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complainant party; (b) to inform the respondent party about the complaint; (c) to identify the 
competent ADR entity or entities and transmit the complaint to the ADR entity, which the 
parties have agreed to use; (d) to offer an electronic case management tool free of charge, which 
enables the parties and the ADR entity to conduct the dispute resolution procedure online 
through the ODR platform; (e) to provide the parties and ADR entity with the translation of 
information which is necessary for the resolution of the dispute and is exchanged through the 
ODR platform; (f) to provide an electronic form by means of which ADR entities shall transmit 
the information; (g) to provide a feedback system which allows the parties to express their 
views on the functioning of the ODR platform and on the ADR entity which has handled their 
dispute; (h) to make publicly available the following: (i) general information on ADR as a 
means of out-of-court dispute resolution; (ii) information on ADR entities listed in accordance 
with ADR Directive which are competent to deal with specified disputes; (iii) an online guide 
about how to submit complaints through the ODR platform; (iv) information, including contact 
details, on ODR contact points designated by the Member States; (v) statistical data on the 
outcome of the disputes which were transmitted to ADR entities through the ODR platform. 
Another important aspect is unifying and streamlining the complaint procedure with user-
friendly and easily accessible the complaint form on EU ODR site. Certain information are 
conditional, and if the complaint form has not been fully completed, the complainant party 
shall be informed that the complaint cannot be processed further unless the missing information 
is provided.544 
Upon receipt of a fully completed complaint form, the ODR platform shall, in an easily 
understandable way and without delay, transmit to the respondent party:545 
a) information that the parties have to agree on an ADR entity in order for the complaint 
to be transmitted to it, and that, if no agreement is reached by the parties or no 
competent ADR entity is identified, the complaint will not be processed further; 
b) information about the ADR entity or entities which are competent to deal with the 
complaint, if any are referred to in the electronic complaint form or are identified by 
the ODR platform on the basis of the information provided in that form; 
c) in the event that the respondent party is a trader, an invitation to state within 10 calendar 
days:  
                                                          
544 Art 9 of Regulation on consumer ODR 
545 id 
164 
 
— Whether the trader commits to, or is obliged to use, a specific ADR entity to 
resolve disputes with consumers, and 
 — Unless the trader is obliged to use a specific ADR entity, whether the trader 
is willing to use any ADR entity or entities from those referred to in point (b) 
If the parties fail to agree within 30 calendar days after submission of the complaint form on 
an ADR entity, or the ADR entity refuses to deal with the dispute, the complaint will not be 
processed further, and complainant party will receive information on other means of redress.546 
An ADR entity which accepted to handle the dispute has to conclude the ADR procedure within 
the deadline set in ADR Directive (90 days), and it will not require the physical presence of the 
parties or their representatives unless its procedural rules provide for that possibility and the 
parties agree.547 On the other hand, ADR entity is not required to conduct the ADR procedure 
through the ODR platform even though case management tool is available freely. 
Finally, it is important to notice that according to article 14, traders established within the EU 
engaging in online sales or service contracts, and online marketplaces established within the 
Union shall provide on their websites an electronic link to the ODR platform.548 This is a 
potential problematic requirement. On one hand e-commerce business has a mandatory 
requirement to place a visible link to ODR site, or to communicate it in the offer through an 
email, or in where applicable in the general terms and conditions of online sales and service 
contracts. On the other hand, the participation in the ADR procedure is not mandatory unless 
under some sector-specific or national regulation. This could be a possible source of confusion 
for the consumers looking for redress and coming across the link on the site or in general terms 
of service, just to find out later, that the trader is not willing at all to be involved in the process. 
Potentially it could undermine the trust in the EU ODR site. As it is the mandatory link is no 
more than an advertisement of sorts. 
 
3.1.4. Unfair Terms Directive 
 
The application of the Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts is quite broader than the 
regulation of dispute resolution, and its primarily deals with rights and duties of consumers in 
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contracts where there is a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations between 
consumers on the one hand and sellers or suppliers on the other hand.549 It directly goes to the 
subject matter of consumer protection in the EU. We want to emphasize the connection and 
treatment of consumers and the protection they receive when it comes to the selection of dispute 
resolution methods and entities.  
To be considered fair, contract terms need to be written in an intelligible language and in “good 
faith.” Possible ambiguities in interpretation will be interpreted in favour of consumers.550  
Unfair term has been defined in Art. 3, where it states that contractual term which has not been 
individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, 
it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, 
to the detriment of the consumer.  
It expands on that definition with a clarification:  
“A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it has been 
drafted in advance, and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the 
substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract.  
The fact that certain aspects of a term or one specific term have been individually 
negotiated shall not exclude the application of this Article to the rest of a contract if an 
overall assessment of the contract indicates that it is nevertheless a pre-formulated 
standard contract.”551 
The Directive obliges the Member States to set up regulation where the unfair terms, as defined 
in Art 3, will not be binding for consumers while allowing for possible co 
This article covers a vast majority of today’s online contracting by click-through agreements 
which appear as predefined terms of service. As it is seen in Chapter 3, the majority of cloud 
providers offer contracts of adhesion for the services where they already predefined terms and 
conditions. Even if all terms have not been predefined and there is room for negotiation with 
cloud consumer, dispute resolution clauses are usually not negotiable. Still, many providers are 
aware of mentioned mandatory consumer protection norms and are declaring severability of 
the rest of the contract in case of dispute resolution clauses was found to be null or void. 
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Finally, in the Annex of the Directive, we can find a non-exhaustive list of the terms which 
may be regarded as unfair. In this exemplary list of unfair terms, we find terms which require 
from consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, 
unduly restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, 
according to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract exclusive 
arbitration.552  
A significant number of cloud providers’ terms regarding arbitration, surveyed in Chapter 3 
most likely would be considered unfair in contracting with EU domiciled consumers. The 
significant imbalance would be clear if we would compare average fees that ADRs charge in 
the EU and of those predetermined in terms of service.553 Fees’ differences are even higher if 
we take into account costs of possible professional representation. Certainly, if the process in 
front of imposed ADR would deprive EU domiciled consumers of the rights guaranteed, in 
accordance with consumer protection laws in the EU, the terms would not be considered 
binding in the courts of the EU Member States.554 If we couple all that with potential costs of 
travel and language barriers if they exist (accessibility) compared with preferred 
jurisdiction/ADR of the provider (which suits them most) than the significant imbalance is 
obvious for the reasons of practicality alone. Given the value of the dispute, if predefined terms 
would be enforced it in effect would have a detrimental effect to access to justice.  
 
3.2. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards  
  
When we speak of international regulation of alternative dispute resolutions rarely can we start 
the discussion without invoking the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as the New York Convention, adopted by the diplomatic 
conference of United Nations in 1958. It is a cornerstone of a modern international commercial 
arbitration primarily because it allows international arbitration to serve its function render the 
decisions enforceable. Being a voluntary ADR, without the simplified enforcements 
mechanism which allows for binding decisions to be implemented in jurisdictions of signatory 
states, commercial arbitration be ineffective, if not pointless. 
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Being drafted and adopted in 1958, some of the languages reflected the agreement technologies 
of the time. The most consequential aspect is a requirement of written arbitration agreement 
where it is clarified that it also include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration 
agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.555 The 
application of the Art II is dubious when it comes to the arbitration agreement that has been 
concluded by means electronic communication or stored in ICT mediums.  
The main significance of the Convention undoubtedly is in relaxation of the rules for 
enforcement of arbitral awards. Under the Convention, an arbitration award issued in any other 
state can generally be freely enforced in any other contracting state, only subject to certain, 
limited grounds for objection defined in Art V: 
 a party to the arbitration agreement was, under the law applicable to him, under some 
incapacity, or the arbitration agreement was not valid under its governing law; 
 a party was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the 
arbitration proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present its case; 
 the award deals with an issue not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the 
submission to arbitration, or contains matters beyond the scope of the arbitration 
(subject to the proviso that an award which contains decisions on such matters may be 
enforced to the extent that it contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration 
which can be separated from those matters not so submitted); 
 the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the 
parties or, failing such agreement, with the law of the place where the hearing took 
place (the "lex loci arbitri"); 
 the award has not yet become binding upon the parties or has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority, either in the country where the arbitration took 
place or pursuant to the law of the arbitration agreement; 
 the subject matter of the award was not capable of resolution by arbitration; or 
 Enforcement would be contrary to "public policy". 
In addition to some countries apply for possible reservations to the convention where they 
restrict arbitration awards only to awards issued in a Convention member state or only enforce 
arbitration awards that are related to commercial transactions, or they allow enforcement of 
awards from the non-contracting state but require reciprocity treatment. Following work of the 
                                                          
555 Art II of Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
168 
 
United Nations on harmonization and unification international commercial arbitration closely 
followed the language and the rules set in New York Convention. 
 
3.3. UNCITRAL Model Laws  
 
Shortly after the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
the United Nations General Assembly established in the December 1966 permanent 
commission that will carry out its work in annual sessions switching between two locations: 
Vienna and New York City. The commission was called The United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The mission, among others, was to promote the 
harmonization and unification of international trade law by …”preparing or promoting the 
adoption of new international conventions, model laws, and uniform laws …”556 In addition to 
annual sessions, UNCITRAL is organized in intergovernmental working groups that are in 
charge of dealing with specific topics. Their work can also be supported by nongovernmental 
organizations and states were not members of UNCITRAL who are were willing to contribute 
but do not have voting rights.557  
The outcomes of the Commission’s work are usually not binding (except for Conventions 
which are brought before UN General Assembly for a vote), and it is up to states to accept them 
and implement them into their national legislations. The work of UNCITRAL is oriented to 
promoting participation and building consensus to be able to propose model laws to be 
acceptable and implemented by the signatories. Nonetheless, in practice, the spirit of consensus 
is not easy to reach especially when we have long-established commercial practices based on 
different legal systems, whose interests are taking care by representative governments in the 
work of the Commission. 
Without going into details of the work of the Commission, having in mind its significant 
influence on national legislations, including the EU Member States, we want to give a brief 
overview of selected model laws related to ADRs.  
 
                                                          
556 UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW., THE UNCITRAL GUIDE : BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED 
NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW. (2007). 
557 Id. 
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3.3.1. UNCITRAL Model Law on International conciliation 
 
UNCITRAL adopted, the Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation on 24 June 
2002. The Model Law provides uniform rules in respect of the conciliation process, with the 
primary goal to encourage the use of conciliation and ensure greater predictability and certainty 
in its use. Given the nature of UNCITRAL and slow adoption of Member States, until 2017 the 
legislations based on or influenced by the Model Law have been adopted in 16 States in a total 
of 28 jurisdictions.558 
The use of the term conciliation, as opposed to somewhat more specific term mediation, has 
been clarified in the first article: ““conciliation” means a process, whether referred to by the 
expression conciliation, mediation or an expression of similar import, whereby parties request 
a third person or persons (“the conciliator”) to assist them in their attempt to reach an amicable 
settlement of their dispute arising out of or relating to a contractual or other legal relationship. 
The conciliator does not have the authority to impose upon the parties a solution to the dispute. 
(Art 1)”.559 
The conciliation is international only if parties have their places of business in different States 
(a) or if the place of the State in which the parties have their places of business is different from 
either the State where substantial part of obligation is performed or the State with which the 
subject matter of the dispute is most closely connected (b).560 
With the purpose of clarifying and avoiding uncertainty resulting from an absence of statutory 
provisions, the Model Law addresses procedural aspects of conciliation, including appointment 
of conciliators (Art. 5), commencement and termination of conciliation (Art. 4 and Art. 11), 
conduct of the conciliation (Art. 6), communication between the conciliator and other parties 
(Art. 7), confidentiality (Art. 9), admissibility of evidence in other proceedings (Art. 11) as 
well as some post-conciliation issues, such as the conciliator acting as arbitrator and 
enforceability of settlement agreements(Art. 14). 
Being adopted in a relatively small number of the States, the Model Law on International 
Commercial Conciliation has not been as influential, especially having in mind binding nature 
and effect of EU Mediation Directive, which covered the EU Member States’ national 
                                                          
558 Information on adopted national legislation available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2002Model_conciliation_status.html  
559 the article 1(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (2002) 
560 the article 1(5) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (2002) 
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legislation. Then again, the principles and solutions in the Model Law have been parts of many 
legislation prior to its formal adoption. It serves a more significant function in the Member 
States that lacked regulatory frame for conciliation and mediation.  However, the principles 
and proposal remain relevant, and UNCITRAL Working Group II has continued its work on 
proposing an instrument on enforcement of international commercial settlement agreements 
resulted from conciliation.561 This work is direct continuation whose relevance will be more 
apparent in the near future.  
 
3.3.2. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration  
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration was adopted by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on 21 June 1985, at the 
end of the eighteenth session of the Commission, but got amended in 2006 to be in line with 
evolving practice in international trade and technological developments.562 The intended goal 
was harmonization and unification of international commercial arbitration to further the trust 
in international trade. According to UNCITRAL Secretariat explanatory note, the form of a 
model law was chosen as the vehicle for harmonization and modernization in view of the 
flexibility it gives to States in preparing new arbitration laws.563 The agreement on Model law 
reflects a worldwide consensus on the basic principles and significant issues of international 
arbitration practice, regardless of few countries that implemented the model with some 
reservations (US, China) and few countries that did not model its national laws in the image of 
it (France, Italy, Portugal, Sweden etc.).  
When we observe its global reach, it is clear that Model Law constituted a strong basis for the 
intended harmonization and improvement of national laws since it covers (and therefore 
influenced) all stages of the arbitral process from the arbitration agreement to the recognition 
and enforcement of the arbitral award.564 
                                                          
561 Current work of United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group II available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html 
562 The original 1985 version of the provision on the form of the arbitration agreement (article 7) was modelled 
on the language used in article 2 of New York Convention of 1958, which did not include electronic 
communication and agreements or signatures as part of the written agreement. 
563 Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration as amended in 2006, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-
86998_Ebook.pdf p. 23 
564 Id.  
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 The model law applies to the international commercial arbitration but gives wide interpretation 
to “commercial” and it is “international” if parties have their places of business in different 
States (a) or place of arbitration or substantial part of the obligation is outside of the State where 
parties have business (b) or if they agree that subject matter is international (c).565  
The Model Law also proposes norms on extent of court intervention (art.5), arbitration 
agreement(art. 7-9), composition of arbitral tribunal (art. 10-15), competence of arbitral 
tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction(art. 16), interim measures and preliminary orders (art. 17), 
conduct of arbitral proceedings (art. 18-27), making of award and termination of 
proceedings(art. 28-33), recourse against award (art. 34).  
The “original” Model Law from 1985 follows the New York Convention in requiring the 
written form of the arbitration agreement, but with the amendments of 2006 it recognizes a 
record of the “contents” of the agreement “in any form” as equivalent to traditional “writing.”  
If parties fail to reach agreement on a number of arbitrators, they will be three by default.566 
When there are three arbitrators, each party will appoint one, and they will appoint third, but 
in the case of arbitration with a sole arbitrator, if the parties are unable to agree on the arbitrator, 
he shall be appointed, upon request of a party, by the court or other authority.567 
When it comes to procedural guarantees Article 18 safeguards the principles that the parties 
shall be treated with equality and given a full opportunity of presenting their case. Hearings 
and written proceeding are subject to parties’ agreements, but Article 24 (1) mandates that, 
unless the parties have agreed that no oral hearings be held for the presentation of evidence or 
for oral argument, the arbitral tribunal shall hold such hearings at an appropriate stage of the 
proceedings, if so requested by a party. It is also interesting to note that the arbitral proceedings 
may be continued in the absence of a party, provided that due notice has been given, which is 
also applicable to the failure of the respondent to communicate its statement of defense.568  
The enforcement relies on the New York Convention with proposed inclusion arbitral awards 
based on arbitration agreements in forms equivalent to traditional writing. In addition to that, 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group II is working on an 
                                                          
565 Art 1 of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as amended in 2006. In the footnote to 
article 1 (1) calls for “a wide interpretation” and offers an illustrative and open-ended list of relationships that 
might be described as commercial in nature, “whether contractual or not”. 
566 Article 10 of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as amended in 2006 
567 Article 10 (3) 
568 Article 25 of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as amended in 2006. 
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instrument on enforcement of international commercial settlement agreements in connection 
with conciliation and arbitration. 569 
 
4. Alternative Dispute Resolution and Access to Justice 
 
Describing the development of access to justice as a movement, Mauro Cappelletti elaborated 
on the “third wave” of a broader conception of access to justice, where he clarifies that “this 
approach recognizes the need to relate and that the civil process to the type of dispute.” 570 
Although disputes have collective as well as individual repercussions, the parties who tend to 
be involved in certain kinds of disputes should be taken into consideration.571 In other words, 
the context of the dispute has to be considered when we ponder on appropriate dispute 
resolution mechanisms. Without an appropriate understanding of the context, the parties and 
the neutral could end up taking inappropriate steps towards the solution.572 From the regulatory 
perspective, the context and the protection of the underlying interest of the parties in regulating 
dispute resolution, also known as normative individualism, does not mean that individuals 
should be deprived of the assumptions of their positions and disadvantages. 573 In fact, the 
“second wave” of access to justice recognized diffused interests of the parties, where 
individually they wouldn’t be able to properly protect them considering the power of these 
disadvantaged parties. Among others, this is the case with consumers and regulation in regard 
to consumer protection. In the developments during the last several decades, after being 
recognized as a group that needed protection that brought about the substantial body of law, 
policy makers and the regulators also considered what would be appropriate dispute resolution 
mechanisms that could provide the most effective consumer protection. In the following 
section, we will discuss dispute resolution for consumers and their characteristics and outcomes 
based on prior empirical researchers, and we will also analyze recent data gathered on about 
dispute resolutions for consumers in the EU. This will give an essential picture of the usefulness 
of ADRs for consumer access to justice.  
                                                          
569 Current work of United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group II available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html  
570 CAPPELLETTI, supra note.37  p.52.  
571 Id. 
572 MICHAEL L. MOFFITT, ROBERT C. BORDONE & PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL., THE HANDBOOK OF 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2005). 
573 Steffek, supra note 25. 
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While primarily we are talking here about consumers, but we shouldn’t neglect another group 
of parties that could be lacking proper access to justice in the context of cloud disputes- the 
micro enterprises. For the purposes of the thesis, we defined micro enterprises as enterprises 
that employ up to 10 employees. Micro enterprises represent a substantial number of cloud 
costumers, but without significant clout, they are usually not given’s ability to negotiate the 
terms of service.574  Given that a significant number of micro enterprises have a limited budget, 
compared to larger size companies, they are placed in a comparable situation when it comes to 
dispute resolution options and when they have to do a cost-benefit analysis of potential formal 
escalation of the international commercial dispute. Mentioned UNCITRAL Model Laws or 
relevant national regulations on dispute resolutions do not provide specific treatment of micro 
enterprises in the relations to their economic positions. Consumers, on the other hand, are 
placed in considerable better position in a certain number of protections of their weaker 
positions are in place. For instance, Brussels I Regulation permits consumers to sue in the court 
of their domicile.  Immaculada Barral argues that EU’s excessively narrow definition of the 
concept of "consumer" in the context of new ecommerce is not useful in the context of 
“clickwrap” agreements and other new contracting types.575 Barral claims that the concept of 
"consumer" should be inclusive to all parties that are weaker because they are not experts and 
are unequipped to deal with these agreements.576 Considering their similar economic positions 
in the relations to large and medium-sized companies, but significant difference in legal 
protection, we can assume that lack of access to justice for consumers in our context can be 
implied for micro enterprises as well. Therefore we will primarily focus on consumers’ access 
to justice and alternative dispute resolutions. 
 
4.1.Consumers and Alternative Dispute Resolution  
 
Consumers in the cloud market are an imprecise term. Cloud service providers sometimes used 
interchangeably the terms users and consumers.577 As cloud service providers potentially offer 
their services globally and that the consumer can be interpreted differently in different 
                                                          
574 Hon, Millard, and Walden, supra note 21. See more in Chapter 3.  
575 Immaculada Barral, Consumers and New Technologies: Information Requirements in E-Commerce and New 
Contracting Practices in the Internet, 27 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 609 (2009). 
576 Id. 
577 SCRUGGS, TRAPPLER, AND PHILPOTT, supra note 484. C. N. Höfer & G. Karagiannis, Cloud computing services: 
Taxonomy and comparison, 2 J. INTERNET SERV. APPL. 81–94 (2011). 
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jurisdictions, we will stick with the legal consumer definition that is used in ADR Directive. In 
the article 4 it is stated that “consumer” means any natural person who, in commercial practice 
is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft or profession; “trader” is 
defined as any natural persons, or any legal person, who is acting, including through any person 
acting in his name or on his behalf, for purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or 
profession.578 
When we spoke about EU regulation of ADR, we mentioned the gradual development of 
policies towards consumer alternative dispute resolution, where the attitudes of policymakers 
were shifting between “soft” ADR as consumer’s voluntary complement to existing judicial 
system and ADR as an out-of-court dispute resolutions that could replace court in certain 
disputes. Eventually, policymakers decided to rely on a voluntary approach, which is evident 
from the scope of ADR Directive but also to set standards and harmonize existing national 
legislations on ADR.579 The effects of voluntary aspects of consumer alternative dispute 
resolution will be assessed in the years to come, we can compare at least initial results with 
alternative approaches that can be found in the other legal systems, most notably in the United 
States.  
It is also important to remember that we can observe different dispute resolution methods in 
relation to each other. In the field of dispute system design there is a general recommendation 
that the design should be focused on prevention as a basic level, then if the conflict is escalated 
it should be dealt with on a negotiation level, followed up with mediation in case it is needed, 
and finally if everything else fails adjudicative methods of litigation or arbitration should be at 
the top.580 The lower levels serve as a filter, and only a small number of more complicated cases 
end up in the upper levels. The following figure by Ilse Hakvoort illustrates the relationship:581 
                                                          
578 Art 4 of DIRECTIVE 2013/11/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 21 May 2013 on 
alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and 
Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR) 
579 Directive on consumer ADR 
580 Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design, 14 HARVARD NEGOT. 
LAW REV. (2009),; Louis F. Del Duca, Colin Rule & Vikki Rogers, DESIGNING A GLOBAL CONSUMER ONLINE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION (ODR) SYSTEM FOR CROSS-BORDER SMALL VALUE - HIGH VOLUME CLAIMS - OAS DEVELOPMENTS (2010); Amy J. 
Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14 HARVARD NEGOT. LAW REV. (2009),; 
Sheila Purcell, Dispute System Design: A Comparative Study of India, Israel, and California,  SSRN ELECTRON. J. 
(2013),; Orna Rabinovich-einy & Ethan Katsh, Lessons from Online Dispute Resolution for Dispute Systems 
Design,  51–71. 
581 Ilse Hakvoort, The conflict pyramid: a holistic approach to structuring conflict resolution in schools, 7 J. PEACE 
EDUC. 157–169 (2010). 
175 
 
 
 
Arbitration and litigation stand at the top of the conflict pyramid, and they serve as a final 
dispute resolution methods when voluntary and bargaining methods do not produce the desired 
outcome. Hence, their availability or accessibility, as well as binding effect play an essential 
role in access to justice. We have discussed access to justice from the aspect of access to courts 
and jurisdiction in the previous chapter, and now we will observe arbitration and its 
consequence for consumers.  
4.2.Consumer Arbitration in the US 
 
Consumer decision in the United States is specifically interesting from the aspect of access to 
justice and fairness due to the ongoing debate over the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. 
On the one side of the debate, we have proponents of arbitration, claiming it’s a business-
friendly and consumer-friendly dispute resolution method as it is cheaper and faster, which in 
turn incentivizes parties to abstain from courts.582 Critics on the other side are pointing to the 
                                                          
582 Thomas J. Stripanowich, American Justice at a Crossroads: Remarks of Thomas J. Stipanowich, 11 PEPPERDINE 
DISPUT. RESOLUT. LAW J. (2010). Arbitration/Litigation Interface: The European Debate, NORTHWEST. J. INT. LAW BUS. 
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numerous issues of consumer arbitration: repeat player effect that causes bias, unintelligible 
clauses, waiver of class actions, etc.583  
While the post-dispute arbitration clauses are generally not considered to be problematic since 
they are an expression of the free will and consent of the parties, they are not being debated or 
questioned. Pre-dispute arbitration clauses are being criticized and considered unfair since they 
are being imposed by the party who dictates the terms of the contract, i.e. the business, and 
generally they are in favor of that party when it comes to certain aspects of arbitration.584  We 
have already discussed imposed arbitration terms in cloud contracts and how they would 
probably be considered not binding by the law in the EU Member States, but in the United 
States their fairness is not being questioned only on the grounds of imposing the terms that 
cause significant imbalance, but rather on impeding access to the courts. 
The United States historically had been liberal towards arbitration, whether they enforce 
arbitration agreements which were valid under Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) from 1925.585 
On the criticism that arbitration agreements were forcing unaware consumers to arbitration, 
proponents respond that there is a possibility to declare these terms unconscionable if 
conditions are met, and hence would not be enforced.586 Unconscionability was invoked in 
many states courts that considered dubious clauses like class action waiver detrimental to 
consumers, until the seminal decision of United States Supreme Court in the case of AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion which interpreted that FAA pre-empted state laws that prohibit 
contracts from disallowing class actions.587 Consequently, significant number of companies 
changed their terms of the service to include a waiver of class actions and impose consumer 
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arbitration.588 As it was obvious from conducted survey on cloud terms of service, many clauses 
forward dispute resolution to American Arbitration Association (AAA) or JAMS, two of the 
most prominent American institutional arbitrations. However, some reports indicate that actual 
consumer arbitration is minuscule compared to the rest of the workloads.589 In the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau’s study of arbitration, 1,241 cases were filed before the AAA from 
2010 to 2012 concerning credit cards, checking accounts and payday loans, which is quite low 
number considering the number of credit card holders and users of financial services.590 Even 
more interesting for low-value claims is the statistic that out of 326 AAA cases where a debt 
was not disputed, but some other reason of complaint was filed, only 23 times consumers 
pursued claims for $1,000 or less in arbitration.591 In the highly publicized series of the New 
York Times on the issue of arbitration, journalists reported that from gathered data from 2010 
to 2014, there were only 505 arbitration cases where a consumer brought a dispute for no more 
than $2,500.592 
We have also seen attempts to presents arbitration clauses as consumer friendly by apparently 
allowing the consumer choice to opt out, go for small claims, or to choose the non-appearance 
arbitration.593 In our survey, some providers offered to pay all arbitration costs up to a certain 
amount, but some scholars describe these as incentives and an elaborate way to bypass the 
unconscionability test.594  
                                                          
588 Todd Seaman, Drowning in the Wake of Concepcion: How to Protect Small Claims Plaintiffs Bound by 
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 73 OHIO STATE LAW J. FURTHERMORE (2012),; Christopher R. Drahozal, FAA 
Preemption after Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J. EMPLOY. LABOR LAW (2014); Charles Gibbs, Consumer Class Actions 
after AT&amp;T v. Concepcion: Why the Federal Arbitration Act Should Not Be Used to Deny Effective Relief to 
Small-Value Claimants, 2012 UNIV. ILL. LAW REV. 1345–1381 (2012). 
589 Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting Procedurally 
Difficult Claims, 42 SOUTHWEST. LAW REV. 87–129 (2012), http://www.swlaw.edu/pdfs/lr/42_1sternlight.pdf (last 
visited Feb 8, 2017); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class 
Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse, 67 LAW CONTEMP. PROBL. (2004). 
590 CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY RESULTS: SECTION 1028(A) STUDY RESULTS 
TO DATE (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf 
(last visited Feb 8, 2017). 
591 Id. 
592 JESSICA SILVER-GREENBERG & ROBERT GEBELOFF, ARBITRATION EVERYWHERE, STACKING THE DECK OF JUSTICE (2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-
justice.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=a-lede-package-region&region=top-
news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0. 
593 RAMONA L. LAMPLEY, IS ARBITRATION UNDER ATTACK?: EXPLORING THE RECENT JUDICIAL SKEPTICISM OF THE CLASS 
ARBITRATION WAIVER AND INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE UNSETTLED LEGAL LANDSCAPE (2008), 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=ramona_lampley. 
594 David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA LAW REV. 605–
667 (2010), http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/57-3-1.pdf (last visited Feb 8, 2017).Myriam Gilles, Opting Out 
of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. LAW REV. 373–430 397 
(2005), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/104/3/Gilles.pdf. 
178 
 
 
4.2.1. Empirical research on the use of ADR  
 
Characterizing dispute resolution methods could be done in different ways. Usually, legal 
scholars use the descriptive method to describe dispute resolution processes, based on their 
interpretation of regulations and possible effects that it will have on the parties. The growth of 
legal empirical research in last decades gave us another data-based insight, which will be useful 
in terms of discussing efficiency but also in relation to how actual values of the dispute compare 
to the volume. Gathering data on various alternative dispute resolution methods in different 
jurisdictions is a too strenuous task for single thesis, so we have to rely on empirical research 
available in literature with specific focus on low-cost disputes that can be found in mediation 
and arbitration. Some of the elements we are observing our availability (accessibility) in 
voluntary procedures, the number of cases, duration of processes, average costs, satisfaction 
with the outcomes. 
 
4.2.1.1. Mediation 
 
Any generalizations based on gathered data available from different legal cultures are difficult 
and  subject to different interpretations. The data should serve as pieces of the mosaic that are 
put together considering a specific context or to answer a specific query. In the field of 
mediation, substantial research has been done in 2013 on principles and regulation in 
comparative perspectives under the editorial guide by Klaus J. Hopt and Felix Steffek.595 Their 
extensive research has been backed by empirical data gathered from the most important 
jurisdictions around the world. A statistical comparison of practices in different jurisdictions 
gives an uneven picture of mediation in different legal cultures.596  
4.2.1.1.1. Acceptance 
 
When it comes to taking out disputes to mediation legal cultures of Japan and China are much 
more prone to use of mediation, with the numbers of acceptance are quite high.597 On the other 
side of the spectrum acceptance, the countries like Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, Switzerland and 
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in some areas in France, showed very slow acceptance of mediation in proportion to 
adjudicatory proceedings.598 However, a significant number of countries seems to be in a 
transition phase, or in the exploratory phase, moving from court-oriented dispute resolutions 
to alternative options.599 Although this is a slow-moving trend that is measured in decades, the 
trend is still strong, and there are no reports of opposite direction.600  The number of mediated 
cases depends on the domain were mediators are employed, and the developments and the 
needs of the specific markets.601  
4.2.1.1.2. Duration 
 
The assessment of comparable durations in mediation is related to the legal framework and 
organizational infrastructures as well as commitments of the parties involved. Steffek and Hopt 
distinguish two types of data related to duration: the time spent from the decision to use 
meditation until the end of the procedure, and the number and duration of individual mediation 
sessions.602 Studies in mediation from the Netherlands provides insights in both aspects, where 
relevant associations gave reports on the longer observed time-frames. One study for the 
periods between 1998 and 2005, found the average duration 2.5 months (10 weeks).603 Another 
study for the period between 2005 and 2008 found the similar average of 69 days (2.5 months) 
with an average of 4.7 contact hours with mediator and 3.5 meetings.604 The third study for the 
period from 1993 to 2002 report is an average of 3.5 months (14 weeks)605  Swiss mediation 
Association reported similar time frames for 2008 with the terms of all procedures were 
concluded within 3 months, and only a few percentages took more than 6 months.606 In the 
United States, mediation before Citizen Dispute Settlement Centers for smallest cases typically 
do not last longer than two hours.607 
One of the Dutch studies also observed duration of court-annexed mediation and concluded 
that it ended up in bit longer averaged duration of 3 months and average direct contact of seven 
hours.608 In 2006 report for Montréal, Canada, the duration of court-annexed mediation was 
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607 Id.  Ch 25, p. 1263 
608 Id.  Mediation Monitor Study 2005-2008 
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average seven months due to structural/judicial issues.609 Steffek and Hopt observed that 
regulations which prescribe deadlines for mediation are rare, except in cases like Florida 
(deadline of 45 days).610 
 
4.2.1.1.3. Costs  
 
Hourly rates demanded by mediators certainly vary depending on the living standards of the 
countries of their practice. The Italian Ministry of Justice reported for the period of 2011 to 
2012, and average mediation fee in the range of 1000, which is based on the average value of 
all cases mediated in that period (€118,299).611 
The Netherlands’ mediation Associations report the fees from €80-€300, with an average of 
€140 for the year 2010.612 In the Dutch study, mentioned before, commercial mediations in the 
period between a 1988 and 2005, in average charged €2.925 per party.613 English mediators in 
2012 charged our daily fees of 1517 pounds (and 4279 pounds for an experienced mediator).614 
Switzerland reported 169 CHF as an average hourly mediator rate in 2008.615 We can notice 
obvious correlation between living standards in certain developed countries and hourly rates of 
mediators. Steffek and Hopt concluded that mediation in generally falls lower in the costs and 
duration compared to litigation as an alternative.616 However, they also note that attractiveness 
of mediation in regards to costs and time spent considerably varies due to a significant 
difference in litigation costs and time in different countries.617 
In one study on cross-border disputes in the European Union from 2010, results displayed that 
on average going to mediation before going to court, saves time and costs compared to going 
directly to the court first.618 
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4.2.1.1.4. Success rates 
 
If we define conclusion of settlements or similar agreements between the parties as a successful 
termination, the high success rates of mediation were reported around the globe. Here are 
illustrative numbers gathered by Steffek and Hopt (multiple percentages are for different 
mediation schemes):619 
o Success rates of mediation in general: China 95%; France 80%;  Hungary 87%, 66 and 
67%; Italy 48% and 76%; Netherlands 65% and 87%; Portugal 48%, 35%, 50 to 70% 
and 70%; Japan 60%; Russia 80%; Spain 70.5%; Switzerland 70.4%; 
o the success rate of private mediation: France 75% ;Italy 80%; Netherlands 76%; 
o success rate of court-annexed mediation: Bulgaria 76% and 70%; England 69%, 80%, 
62% and 50%; Netherlands 59%, 78%, 60% and 45%; New Zealand 90%; Portugal 
25%; Spain 77%; 
o success rate of judicial mediation: Canada 80%; Germany 69%, 80% and 80%; Norway 
70- 80%; 
o the success rate of mandatory mediation: Canada 80%; England 48%; France 50%; 
New Zealand 73%; 
High success numbers or effectiveness of mediation cannot be disregarded when we discuss 
the role of mediation either as an alternative or the part of the judicial system. Although these 
numbers portrayed the use of mediation in general and in specific domains, the potential for 
the use of mediation in low-value cross-border disputes and consumer disputes are evident. 
Now let’s take a look at consumer arbitration as an adjudicative form of alternative dispute 
resolution for consumers. 
 
4.2.1.2. Studies on consumer arbitration in the US 
 
Considering the history of consumer protection in the United States,620 and the role of 
arbitration in it, especially in the recent years after the Concepcion decision,621 it is not difficult 
to understand why the most extensive research on consumer arbitration having conducted in 
                                                          
619 HOPT AND STEFFEK, supra note 472. p. 103-104 
620 Consumer protection through legal precedents as opposed to legislative approach of the EU. Nancy A. 
Welsh & David B. Lipsky, Moving the Ball Forward in Consumer and Employment Dispute Resolution: What Can 
Planning, Talking, Listening and Breaking Bread Together Accomplish, 19 DISPUT. RESOLUT. MAG. (2012). 
621 US Supreme Court,  AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) 
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the United States. Most of the researches have been conducted with specific inquiries and aims. 
Lisa Bingham has devoted a series of articles on empirical research of employment arbitration 
and repeat-player effects that produce biases in favor of big parties.622 Ernst&Young conducted 
research in consumer arbitration in the sector of financial services and reported that consumers 
are not losing a disproportionate amount of cases compared to litigation.623 Californian Dispute 
Resolution Institution even came to a different conclusion that the success of consumers and 
employees were higher in arbitration citing the pending outcome of 215 from 303 cases 
(71%).624 
Recently, the focus of the research is on the role of arbitration in consumer protection, and 
specifically on the consequences of consumer arbitration with regards to waivers of class 
actions. Three relevant studies give insight into the applicability of arbitration to small-value 
consumer disputes: 
1. The Searle Civil Justice Institute in the so-called Searle Report reviewed 301 cases 
before American Arbitration Association in 2007.625 From that number 240 were 
consumer complaints, and in 128 of these (53%), consumers were successful.626 The 
average duration of 240 cases was around seven months, but in cases that consumers 
forfeited the hearings and allowed decision based on documents along average time 
would be reduced to four months.627 
2. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s arbitration study (CFPB Study) reviewed 
1,847 matters involving financial services companies between January 1, 2010, and 
December 31, 2012.628 Of that number consumers brought 1,234 of cases, businesses 
initiated 438, and 175 were coded as joint filings, and CFPB confirmed that 246 cases 
                                                          
622 Bingham, supra note.162 Bingham, supra note 529 ; Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose - Let’s Find Out: A Public 
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624 Cal. Disp. Resol. Inst., Consumer And Employment Arbitration In California 5 (2004) 
625 SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (2009), 
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SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE (2015), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Johnston-CFPB-Arbitration.pdf (last 
visited Feb 8, 2017). 
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settled (23%), 362 may have settled (34%), and 111 were probably withdrawn (11%).629 
Combining debt related complaints and others, CFPB concluded the consumers won 
only 32 out of 158 times (20%). The average duration of the documents-only precedents 
were about six months, and where telephonic hearings took place, it was about five 
months.630 The arbitrators’ fees averaged about $206, with a paid median of $125, but 
CFPB also noted sometimes costs were reimbursed.631 AAA required consumers to pay 
additional administrative fees in 54 of 326 awarded matters (17%) when it came to 
attempting to collect a debt.632 
3. David Horton and Andrea Cann Chandrasekher conducted their empirical research in 
2015 on a sample of 4,839 arbitrations.633 From that total number 1,446 disputes were 
withdrawn (30%), 1,407 ended up with the award (29%), 1,825 settled (38%), 150 
terminated on administrative grounds (3%), and 11 were dismissed on the merits (less 
than 1%).634 At the time of the study consumer’s fees have been capped $125 for causes 
of action seeking $10,000 and $375 for those between $10,001 and $75,000.635 In their 
sample of 1,407, 491 received an award of $1 or more (35%).636 The average duration 
of an awarded case was 243 days and median time of total cases was about 6.86 months 
(or 206 days).637 
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After the abovementioned studies, there were some changes in AAA’s Costs of Arbitration 
(including AAA Administrative Fees) which is illustrated in the following table.638
 
Table No 1:  AAA‘s Costs of Arbitration in the January 2017.  
Similarly, JAMS fees for consumer arbitration are a lump sum of $250, while business’ fee 
varies.639 
The scholars have been praising consumer arbitration compared to litigation when it comes to 
costs and duration, but also critical to the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements and waivers 
from class actions, which they claim are detrimental to consumers.640The most recent research 
show that even perceived advantages in costs to litigation, are not to be taken as certain.641 
Also, the same research indicates the outcomes of consumer rotations have shifted to repeat 
player’s favor after the Concepcion decision.642 At the time being, the EU legislators and 
national laws of Member States have decidedly forbidden practices of pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements that could have detrimental effects to consumers.643 Still, with the gathered data 
and empirical research, we have valuable insights into the practicability of consumer arbitration 
when it comes to low-value disputes. 
                                                          
638 Costs of Arbitration amended and effective on January 1, 2016 available at: 
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CAROLINA J. INT. LAW COMMER. REGUL. (2002); Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Creditor Claims in 
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4.2.1.3. Consumer Alternative Dispute Resolution in the EU 
 
In the period following the Recommendation on the principles applicable to the bodies 
responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes644 of 1998, and the Commission 
Recommendation on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the consensual 
resolution of consumer ADR,645 of 2001, the EU Commission have undertaken several studies 
to assess the consumer access to redress, coverage of ADR schemes in the Single market and 
level of compliance with ADR bodies with the recommendations. 
Prior to the proposal of ADR directive, the Commission considered reports of relevant 
institutions on access to justice and consumer protection in cross-border low-value cases in the 
European Union Member States, concluding that the judicial courts are not practical or cost-
efficient for consumers or businesses.646 The conclusion came about as a result of several 
reports and researchers ordered by the Commission to address the level of access to redress for 
consumers in cross-border cases.  
Study conducted by European Commission for Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) showed 
significant increase in average length of proceedings in civil cases on European level from 
2004 to 2008 and that the duration of court proceedings vary in different jurisdictions (to reach 
the decision in the first instance in average it needed 928 days in Italy, 925 days in Portugal 
and 408 days in Bulgaria, etc.). 647  
At the same time research on consumer perception for cross-border trade showed that only 2% 
of consumers who had a problem brought their complaint to the court in 2010,648 and 25% of 
                                                          
644 Commission Recommendation (EC) 98/257/EC on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for the 
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disputes (Directive on consumer ADR) and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
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647 European judicial systems Edition 2010 (data 2008): Efficiency and quality of justice, European Commission 
for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), p.159 
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consumers would not go to court for less than €1000.649 Another study reports that nearly half 
of EU consumers (48%) will not go to court for damages under 200 Euro, and 8% would never 
go to court, regardless of the monetary value of their claim.650 Additional research on traders’ 
perception showed that 54% of businesses would prefer to solve disputes through ADR rather 
than court.651 
The progress in development ADR schemes that could address those issues has been steady 
from the Commission’s Recommendation in 1998, where by 2009 more than 750 consumer 
ADR schemes existed in the EU.652 The schemes and practices in the ADR domain were highly 
diverse being established either by industry or in cooperation between the public sector, 
industry, and consumer organizations or directly by public authorities.653  According to the 
“Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union” by CIVIC 
Consulting (CIVIC ADR study) their funding may be private (e.g. by industry), public or a 
combination of both and in most Member States, the geographical coverage of ADR can be 
national rather than decentralised at regional or local level.654  
CIVIC reports on the functioning of sector-specific and multi-sectoral ADR schemes in the 
Member States but the vast majority of ADR procedures are based on the willingness of the 
parties to engage in the process.655 For as much as 64% of ADR schemes the adherence by the 
industry is not mandatory, and when participation to the ADR procedure is voluntary, the 
possibility for consumers to solve disputes depends on the willingness of the business to engage 
in ADR.656  Types and forms of ADR procedures and decisions vary, and they may be taken 
collegially (e.g. by boards) or by individuals (e.g. by a mediator or ombudsman) but then the 
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nature of their decisions also may vary considerably (e.g. non-binding recommendations, 
decisions binding on the trader or on both parties, agreement of the parties).657 
Study on “Cross-Border Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union” by DG FOR 
INTERNAL POLICIES, found that the main problems with cross-border ADR overlap with 
problems at the national level, but they are aggravated by specifics of cross-border situations, 
such as language barriers and the physical absence of the consumer from the trader’s country.658 
In addition, ADR schemes, as a rule, do not accept complaints against traders in the other 
Member States, mainly due to a lack of ADR schemes’ jurisdiction, knowledge of applicable 
law, and/or enforceability of final decisions.659 
 
However, all this research illustrates the state of ADR before Directive on consumer ADR and 
ODR Regulation. EU ODR platform has been fully operational since January 2016, and all 
ADR providers that are willing to comply with the requirements can be registered on the site, 
which in turn serves as a portal that forwards online complaint it receives.660 The part of the 
process that goes through ODR site is universal, with a click and fill an online form that is then 
forwarded to the trader, with a proposal for ADR provider.661 If trader accepts the parties and 
the complaint are forwarded to ADR provider. 
 
Not to belittle the significance of all consumer complaints, but for our research, we are mostly 
interested in cross-border consumer cloud service disputes. For that purposes, we have 
conducted our own survey of dispute resolution bodies whose information are listed on ODR 
platform in order to examine characteristics  of ADR bodies that would handle cloud service 
disputes. 
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4.2.1.4. Survey on dispute resolution entities in the EU 
 
There are two types of data relevant to our research on the EU ODR site. The statistic on a 
number of complaints and more importantly for our research the data on available ADR bodies 
with characteristics required by ADR Directive. 
At the time of writing this thesis, the EU ODR platform has been functioning for a year, and 
just recently it published the first batch of data with basic information on a number of 
complaints per country, the percentage of domestic vs. cross-border cases and top ten most 
complained about sectors.662 Although such dirt of data is not the source out of which we could 
draw concrete and precise conclusions, it is still a starting point considering the year of 
functioning of the platform and the time spent from the enactment of the new regulations. In 
the Art 21. of the ODR Regulation, it is stated that the Commission shall report to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the functioning of the ODR platform on a yearly basis and for 
the first time one year after the ODR platform has become operational.663  While the final report 
is in the making, the data published on the site is straightforward:  
 the total number of complaints is 26,283 which is represented in the following 
illustration with the numbers of complaints per country of both trader and consumer. 
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Illustration No1: Number of complaints by country on January 31, 2017 
 out the total number, 61.58% are national and 38.42% are cross-border ( which can be 
translated to 17,766 domestic and 11,083 cross-border complaints) 
 top ten most complained about sectors are: 
o Clothing (including tailor-made goods) and footwear – 5.64%  (3012)  
o Airlines – 4.06% (2170) 
o Information and communication technology (ICT) goods - 3.95% (2113) 
o Mobile telephone services – 2.73% (1457) 
o Electronic goods (non-ICT/recreational) – 2.57% (1371) 
o Furnishings - 1.99% (1064) 
o Leisure goods (sports equipment, musical instruments, etc) - 1.87% (1000) 
o Spares and accessories for vehicles and other means of personal transport – 
1.41% (754) 
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o Internet services – 1.31% (698) 
o Large domestic household appliances (including vacuum cleaners and 
microwaves) – 1.04% (556) 
 
 
Illustration No 2: Percentage of national and cross-border complaints and top 10 most complained about sectors 
 
The total number of 26,283 complaints speaks volumes. However, if we consider that it is a 
total number of complaints gathered through the platform for the entire Single market, 
including all consumer sectors and previously functioning ADR providers (whose reputation 
could be well established), then the numbers are not that impressive. ODR Regulation requires 
of all traders established in the EU who are selling goods and services online to place a link on 
a visible place in their respective site and to inform consumers about possible ADR scheme of 
choice.664 The numbers are representative only on complaints received through the site 
(although there is no explanation) but considering the rising trend of use of ADR in the EU (for 
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21 large ADR schemes in the EU  for  2007 - 297,147, for  2008 - 372,136, and for 2009- 
408,599)665 those numbers are not showing wide acceptance of the EU level.   
For cloud services, it is likely that the number of complaints is low, although we cannot tell 
exact number or that there were valid complaints at all. We believe (although without 
confirmation, hence with reserve) that cloud services probably do not fall under any of the 
categories that are listed in top 10 most complained about. Internet services that are listed in 
top 10 are listed in information on ADR providers under the general category of “Postal 
services and electronic communications”. Therefore it is probably the case of disputes with a 
local provider of Internet services (ISP). Still, we cannot exclude the inclusion of cloud services 
or that ISP does not offer cloud services in the bundle. If they do include them the total number 
of these complaints is again very low – 698. Similarly, ICT goods probably do not include ICT 
services, since ICT goods are usually defined differently,666 but we make that statement with 
reservation too. Another problem we observed is the distinction between cross-border and 
domestic dispute in regard to top 10 complained sectors. We do not know how many if any at 
all foreign ISPs have been complained about. Or if cross-border mobile telephone service 
included some form of cloud service as well. To draw any conclusion on available data would 
be rightfully critiqued. It only remains to make a general observation on low numbers of 
complaints, even if we do not know how many of those complaints have been turned into 
mediated or arbitrated dispute. All this information speaks more on the functioning of ODR 
site and its usefulness, and not on the usefulness of individual ADR schemes.  
The other data set of interest is the data on available ADR providers. The ADR providers who 
are capable and willing of integrating into ODR platform and fulfill the requirement of ADR 
Directive and are listed on the site. 667 
In the following table No2, we had extracted data from the information on the site and displayed 
information on relevant aspects for ADR providers in regards to consumer cloud service 
disputes. The total number of ADR enlisted is 258. It is about a third of the figure of 750 in the 
CIVIC report of 2009 (which did not distinguish consumer from commercial ADRs).  
 
                                                          
665 Id.June 2011. p. 27 
666 See for example OECD’s ICT sector – Service industries (ISIC Rev. 4) Presentation available at: 
https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/events/geneva08/Session3_Spiezia_classifications.pdf  
667 List of available ADRs per country at : https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/odr/main/?event=main.adr.show  
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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ENTITIES FOR CONSUMERS AVAILABLE THROUGH 
EU ODR PLATFORM 
TOTAL No.258 
The entity is competent for 
disputes initiated by 
 
C2B 258  
B2C 15  
Both (C2B and B2C) 15  
    
Conduct of the procedure 
 
in writing 256  
orally 126  
in writing, orally 124  
    
The physical presence 
of the parties and/or of their 
representative 
Not required 
 
173 
 
 
Required 85  
    
Fees No fees have to be paid by the consumer 199  
Fees have to be paid by the consumer 59 Variable        23 
Fixed             36 
Fees have to be paid by the trader 111 Variable        58 
Fixed             53 
No fees have to be paid by the trader 147  
    
Outcome of the procedure 
This entity might reach more than one type of outcome. 
It might be binding upon agreement by one or both 
parties, or non-binding 14 
 
It might be binding on consumers and traders , or non-
binding 8 
 
Binding upon agreement 39  
The procedure is non-binding. 174  
Binding on consumers 24  
Binding on consumers and traders 24  
Binding on traders 23  
Binding on traders or non-binding 3  
    
The entity is competent for 
disputes in the following 
sectors 
Internet services 57  
Electricity 44  
Other communication services 39  
Other (includes both goods and services) 45  
    
Average length of the 
procedure  
From 1 to and including 30 days (1 month) 
30  
From 31 to and including 60 days (2 months) 
83  
From 61 to and including 90 days (3 months) 
123  
More than 90 days 
22  
 
Table No2: alternative dispute resolution entities for consumers available through EU ODR platform 
Since all those providers are listed on EU ODR site, the data illustrates that not all of 
mechanisms could be rightfully called online capable or online functional (very few reported 
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previously to be fully online668), especially those 85 that require physical presence. Only 
selected few ADRs are competent of dispute of traders against consumers, which is a matter of 
national law. Two ADR conduct procedures only orally. 
The requirements for regulated and appropriate fees for consumers are evident since in 199 
ADR procedures consumers don’t have to pay and in 59 cases they pay symbolic or low 
amounts (usually less then AAA or JAMS fees).  Traders are required to pay more often with 
different fees variation, but especially when it comes to fixed amounts again, it is considerably 
more favorable in comparison with the American counterparts.669  
Only 24 ADR scheme provide binding outcomes for consumers (and respectively traders), 
which indicate arbitration or some form of out-of-court adjudication. Even those schemes are 
based on the willingness of the consumer to initiate the proceeding (not entirely comparable to 
pre-dispute agreements in ToS). Such outcome is different from those that are binding on 
consumer upon agreement, which indicates agreement on a binding settlement. However, 
evidently dominant forms are the ADRs which result in non-binding outcomes (174).  
Like fees, the average length is influenced by the Directive requirement of up to 90 days (with 
possible exception). Few exceed the limit, and a significant number (102) produce resolution 
up to 60 days. These number confirms the presumption of fast resolution.  And it is not the 
adjudicatory forms that require extra time to handle disputes even though methods like 
mediation are less riddled with the formal or procedural requirement. At the next table, it is 
shown that out of 24 of binding arbitrations only 1 requires more than 90 days.  
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669 See AAA and JAMS fees in previous section 4.2.1.3. Consumer Alternative Dispute Resolution in the EU 
  
Binding on 
trades 
Binding 
on 
consumer
s and 
trades 
Binding 
upon 
agreement 
Electricity 
Internet 
services 
Other 
(includes 
both goods 
and services) 
Other 
communi
cation 
services 
 Country 
Austria - - - 1 3 1 1 
Bulgaria - - 1 2 1 - 2 
Belgium - 1 - 1 2 2 1 
Cyprus - 1 - 1 1 - 1 
Czech Republic - 3 - 1 1 2 1 
Denmark - - - 1 2 1 1 
Finland - - - 1 1 1 1 
Estonia - - - 1 1 - 1 
France - - - 2 2 2 1 
Germany  3 - 8 - 2 2 2 
Greece - - - 2 2 2 2 
Hungary  1 - - - - - - 
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(F) – Fixed fee; (V) – Variable fee; (F&V) – Fixed and Variable fee. 
Table No 3: Data on selected ADR’s competences, procedure conduct, physical requirements, fees and duration 
Ireland - - - 8 1 - - 
Italy - 2 - - 14 4 4 
Latvia 2 - 1 1 1 2 1 
Lithuania - 4 - 2 1 1 1 
Luxembourg - - - 1 1 1 1 
Malta - - 2 1 - - - 
Netherlands - 3 - 1 1 1 1 
Portugal  1 2 10 10 9 10 9 
Slovakia - - 5 2 2 2 2 
Slovenia - 3 - 3 3 3 3 
Sweden  2 - - 1 1 1 1 
United Kingdom 14 5 12 1 5 7 2 
         
The entity is 
competent for 
disputes 
initiated by 
C2B 23 24 39 44 57 45 39 
B2C 0 4 2 1 4 3 2 
Both (C2B and 
B2C) 
0 4 2 1 4 3 2 
         
Conduct of the 
procedure 
 
in writing 22 24 39 43 56 44 39 
orally 23 17 28 33 31 31 25 
in writing, orally 
possible 
12 17 28 32 30 30 25 
         
The physical 
presence 
of the parties 
and/or of their 
representative 
Not required 
 
13 15 26 22 31 27 23 
Required 10 9 13 22 26 18 16 
         
Fees 
  
No fees have to be 
paid by trader 
8 9 17 28 29 21 24 
No fees have to be 
paid by consumer 
21 14 29 33 39 34 30 
No fees have to be 
paid by consumer 
and trader 
7 8 16 27 27 20 22 
No fees have to be 
paid by consumer 
but have to be paid 
by trader 
14 
13(F
) 
6 
3(F) 
13 
3(F) 
6 
1(F) 
12 
3(F) 
14 
6(F) 
8 
1 (F) 
1(V) 3(V) 10(V) 5(V) 9(V) 8(V) 7(V) 
Fees have to be paid 
by consumer but not 
by trader 
1 
1(F) 
1 
0(F) 
1 
1(F) 
1 
1(F) 
2 
1(F) 
1 
1(F) 
2 
1 (F) 
0(V) 1(V) 0(V) 0(V) 1(V) 0(V) 1(V) 
Fees have to be paid 
by consumer and by 
trader 
1 
0(F) 
9 
3(F) 
9 
4(F) 
10 
2(F) 
16 
2(F) 
10 
1(F) 
7 
1(F) 
1(V) 4(V) 4(V) 8(V) 13(V) 9(V) 6(V) 
0(F
&V) 
2(F
&V) 
1(F&
V) 
0(F
&V) 
1(F&
V) 
0(F
&V) 
0(F
&V) 
Fees have to be paid 
by the consumer 
2 10 10 11 18 11 9 
Fees have to be paid 
by the trader 
15 15 22 16 28 24 15 
         
Average 
length of the 
procedure  
From 1 to and 
including 30 days (1 
month) 
6 6 10 8 10 7 6 
From 31 to and 
including 60 days (2 
months) 
4 4 12 11 17 12 12 
From 61 to and 
including 90 days (3 
months) 
12 13 14 25 29 26 21 
More than 90 days 1 1 3 0 1 0 0 
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In the table No3, we have cross-referenced data for selected categories to illustrate data on 
ADRs with binding outcomes, and ADRs who deal with four categories of dispute under which 
cloud disputes can be placed (internet service, other communication services, other goods and 
services) and one category for utility service disputes to display relevant info on ADRs because 
cloud service are occasionally compared with utilities, and NIST report indicated that US 
federal agencies would want cloud provider to operate more like utility services.670 Of those 
displayed, notable are 3 out of 10 binding arbitrations in Portugal for disputes in electricity.   
There are 15 out of 24 binding arbitrations (for both) where physical presence is not required, 
which indicate proper online or written correspondence arbitration. Physical presence required 
in the disputes with providers of internet services (26), other communication services (16), 
other services (18) or electricity (22) would most likely render inappropriate ADR scheme for 
cloud service disputes, even if they were categorized in these sectors.  
Looking at ADR providers data, we can conclude that in the variety of available options for 
consumer disputes, not all disputants’ needs for appropriate ADR provider will be met. It is 
uncertain but probable that many of the listed schemes (few are certainly capable, for example, 
Italian Risolvi Online671, or Verein Internet Ombudsmann672) would be not able and willing to 
deal with dispute that could fit our context even if we would categorize cloud service under 
internet services, especially if the technical expertise is required and not much room for 
negotiation left. The primary reason we are leaning towards adjudicatory forms, as explained 
in the dispute resolution pyramid,673 is if we lack adjudicatory form then voluntary bargaining 
methods will not be as effective. Looking at the data there are not many adjudicatory methods 
available through EU ODR site, not all of them have binding outcomes to one or both parties, 
not all of them are possible without the physical presence of the parties, not all of them are 
capable of conduction correspondence or online procedure. In addition, those that are capable 
and functioning are probably oriented to domestic consumers due to language barriers (for 
example Portuguese Coimbra District Arbitration Centre for Consumer Disputes).674 It is 
                                                          
670 http://www.networkcomputing.com/cloud-infrastructure/treating-cloud-utility/2013935982  NIST report 
available at: https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2014/10/nists-cloud-computing-roadmap-details-
research-requirements-and-action  
671 RisolviOnline.com - Camera Arbitrale di Milano, available at: risolvionline@mi.camcom.it  
672 Verein Internet Ombudsmann - nur für im Internet abgeschlossene Verträge,  Association «médiateur sur 
l'internet» - seulement pour les contrats conclus sur l'internet at:  http://www.ombudsmann.at  
673 Hakvoort, supra note 581. 
674 Directorate General, Cross-Border Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union, .June 2011 ; Centro 
de Arbitragem de Conflitos de Consumo do Distrito de Coimbra available at: 
http://www.centrodearbitragemdecoimbra.com  
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possible that some or all of the mentioned issues influenced a small number of disputes reported 
for cross-border transactions. 
Now that we have a clearer picture of the state of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
that are applicable to online disputes, we can assess if the current international legal framework 
of both traditional judicial systems and alternative dispute bodies allow for appropriate balance 
between access, fairness, efficiency and effectiveness of dispute resolution over cloud services. 
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Chapter 6 - Access to Justice in Cloud Service Disputes  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Everything that we have been dealing with so far has led us to this point where we need to 
compare and assess the level of fairness in access to justice over cloud service disputes. We 
are going to make the comparison based on our conceptual framework established in Chapter 
2. From the beginning, we have to emphasize that this is not a comparison between equal 
entities, but between entities with different characteristics. In some aspects, they are used as 
compatible in a dispute system design for specific purposes. In Chapter 2 we have defined our 
framework through a set of shared characteristics for all the entities. The comparison will also 
be made based on reasonable expectations of the effects of the international legal framework 
on the dispute within our context. 
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To assess the mechanism for dispute resolution, it is necessary to put it into the context of the 
parties, disputed matter, and the general circumstances. In our context of cloud service disputes, 
we often have a provider of a service based in one jurisdiction, and consumer (or 
microenterprise) domiciled in another jurisdiction; service provider has most likely imposed 
terms of service on consumer during an online sign up for the service; the dispute is contractual 
(related to the cloud contract) involving a computing service with possibly technical aspect; 
provider has bigger or total control over the service; a dispute about the service that is 
presumably in the range between 0 (free) and 200 EUR (more likely 100 or less); the travel 
cost to the jurisdiction alone would probably outweigh the worth of the paid service (not 
necessarily the value for the party);  
We have described the regulatory framework for cross-border dispute resolution in chapters 4 
and 5 and explored existing empirical research and currently available data on ADR schemes 
in the EU and the United States. To answer the main research question whether the current 
dispute resolution mechanisms provide adequate means to resolve disputes within our context, 
we need to compare different dispute resolution mechanism relative to that context. We address 
the following sub-question:  
 To what extent the dispute resolution mechanisms under current international legal 
framework are adequate for cloud service disputes to ensure access to justice and 
fairness?   
 
When we put the context against the dispute resolution schemes that are available under the 
current international legal framework, we are checking if the said legal framework arranges the 
appropriate or fair distribution between parties in relation to key concepts: access, fairness, 
efficiency, and effectiveness. According to Rawls inequalities are to be arranged to benefit 
worse off (weaker) party. Ideally both sides would be equally beneficial in the access to justice 
that is nominally guaranteed, but in reality, a number of factors weaken the position of one 
party. We are going to comment on inequalities by looking at different variables within our 
core concepts, with the guidelines of operational definitions proposed in Chapter 2 and 
presented in the following table: 
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 Framework: 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
Rawlsian 
fairness in 
access to 
justice 
  
Or  
  
Access to 
justice as 
fairness 
  
  Key 
concepts 
/indicators 
 
Variables  How different dispute resolution mechanisms 
compare in following operational definitions 
 
Access  Availability of dispute 
resolution body 
 
 
 Accessibility to dispute 
resolution body 
 Jurisdiction/competence allow or make 
available dispute resolution entity? 
 
 
 Do travel costs, language, professional 
help impede in access to the body? 
Procedural 
fairness 
 Independence and 
impartiality  
 
 
 Equality of arms 
 
 
 Rules on costs of DR 
 Are there guarantees for transparency 
and fairness in selection/appointment 
procedure? 
 
 Are there guarantees that each party has 
the reasonable possibility to present its 
case? 
 Who bears the costs of proceedings and 
in what manner? 
Efficiency  Duration of processes  
 
 
 Costs  
 Average time needed for completion of 
process 
 
 Average costs of the proceeding 
Effectiveness  Success Rate 
 
 Enforcement of outcome 
  
 Is the voluntary compliance with 
outcome necessary? 
 
 How many steps needed for the 
enforcement? 
 
 
 
Key variables we need to explore based on following operationalized questions: 
1. Do jurisdictional rules or competence rules allow or make available use of a dispute 
resolution mechanism in regards to clouds dispute context? 
2. Do travel costs, language, and need of professional help, impede the access to DR 
relative to the low value of the dispute.  
3. Are there procedural guarantees in place for transparency and fairness in 
selection/appointment procedure of adjudicators/neutrals? 
4. Are there procedural guarantees in place to ensure equality of arms in presenting the 
case? 
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5. How the cost of dispute resolutions are attributed and is it adequate in cloud dispute 
context? 
6. Could average time of proceedings before DR be described as fast relative to others 
forms of DR? 
7. Are the average costs of the proceeding before DR, measured by average institution 
fees per case, high compared to others forms of DR? 
8. Is the voluntary compliance necessary for the success of the dispute resolution? 
9. How many legal actions are needed for the enforcement? 
  
For the comparison, it is only appropriate that the starting point is the courts in a judicial 
system, as they are essential elements of the organization of societies and they are a basic pillar 
of access to justice. We will divide this Chapter according to variables and then discuss 
different dispute resolution mechanisms in relation to courts and each other. We start with a 
most important element of access to justice, the access. 
 
2. Access 
 
Access is the most important element of access to justice. Without access, the remaining 
concepts do not matter. Thus, we place emphasis on access when we discuss access to justice. 
We have divided access into two separate variables: availability of dispute resolution (which 
includes both jurisdictional rules, the possibility of voluntary alternatives and available 
competences of those entities) and accessibility which translates into overcoming different 
barriers. The first variable is closely connected to regulation and rights, while the second is 
connected to physical effects of regulatory frame and need for assistance. We start with the 
first one that has direct regulatory implications: 
 Do jurisdictional rules or competence rules allow or make available use of a dispute 
resolution mechanism in regards to clouds dispute context? 
 
2.1. Access to courts in cloud disputes 
 
Availability of the courts to solve the dispute are to be observed through the rules of 
jurisdiction. We have discussed jurisdiction rules for cross-border cloud services in Chapter 4 
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where we analyzed possible jurisdictional issues that could impede or make difficult access to 
justice.  However, access to the court is also the basic human right of every natural person on 
the planet. It is the essential element of the rights to a fair trial. As such, it is enshrined and 
guaranteed by the most important conventions on human rights. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in its art 10 proclaims that everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair 
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal; in article 8 it provides for the right 
to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental 
rights granted by the constitution or by law. The Universal declarations framing certainly 
influenced a great deal of international and national provisions, dealing with equal rights to a 
fair trial. At the European level, access to justice guarantees fall under the article 6 (the right 
to a fair trial) and the article 13 (the right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), and in the article 47 (both right to a fair trial and right to an effective 
remedy) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Entitlement of the access 
to court does not automatically mean effective or practical.  This is where European Court of 
Human Rights played an important role in interpreting the article 6. In the decision Bellet v. 
France, the Court has confirmed that the right of access to a court must be “practical and 
effective” where individuals must “have a clear, practical opportunity to challenge an act that 
is an interference with his rights.”675 Practical and effective nature of the right may be impeded 
by the prohibitive costs of the proceedings,676 or the issues relating to time limits,677 or by the 
existence of some procedural limitations.678  
The right of access to the courts is not an absolute right and can be subjected to limitations. 
The limitations must not restrict or reduce the access to the individual in such a way or to such 
an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired.679 
While it is rare for civil law countries, common-law countries’ courts have the option of 
declining jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine forum non conveniens. However, jurisprudence 
and interpretation of the doctrine vary between common-law countries. In Australia, a court 
                                                          
675 CASE OF BELLET v. FRANCE (Application no. 23805/94) of December 4 1994. Par. 38 and par 36. 
676 CASE OF KREUZ v. POLAND (Application no. 28249/95) 38-45; CASE OF PODBIELSKI AND PPU POLPURE v. 
POLAND (Application no. 39199/98) pra. 65-66 
677 CASE OF MELNYK v. UKRAINE (Application no. 23436/03) par. 26 
678 CASE OF PÉREZ DE RADA CAVANILLES v. SPAIN (116/1997/900/1112) par 49; CASE OF MIRAGALL ESCOLANO 
AND OTHERS v. SPAIN (Applications nos. 38366/97, 38688/97, 40777/98, 40843/98, 41015/98, 41400/98, 
41446/98, 41484/98, 41487/98 and 41509/98) par 39 
679 Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2013 - Guide on Article 6 of the Convention – Right to a 
fair trial (civil limb) p. 14  
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could decline jurisdiction if the court is a clearly inappropriate forum, while in most common-
law countries, relative to the claim, jurisdiction can be denied if there is another more 
appropriate forum.680 However, in both interpretations of forum non conveniens, the courts 
indicate that there is another appropriate court. If that another court would also decline 
jurisdiction, then we could say that proper lack of access to court has been established.681  
Another common reason for declining jurisdiction for both common-law and civil-law 
countries is the doctrine lis alibi pendens which means that another court has initiated a 
proceeding in the same matter between same parties and for that reason access to the court is 
declined. However, in this case, it is evident that the party already has access to some other 
court (though maybe not most appropriate for the party). Hence we do not consider it reason 
for limiting access to courts.  
There is a difference between the right of access to court and availability of dispute resolution 
mechanism based on the dispute agreement. The right of access as a part of the right to fair trial 
is a constitutional right in most countries, and it is also guaranteed by international conventions, 
which means that in a worst-case scenario, even if met with obstacles of procedural nature, a 
party should not be deprived of access to a court. More commonly, the rules on asserting 
jurisdiction which regulates access to courts in connection to the subject matter of disputes and 
the parties, determine which court a party has access. To answer the initial question in relation 
to courts: do jurisdictional rules allow or make available use of a dispute resolution mechanism 
in regards to clouds dispute context - the answer is yes, the applicable rules guarantee the 
access. 
This guarantee is a significant difference compared to other forms of dispute resolution which 
rely on the agreement (either pre-dispute or post-dispute) to be able to initiate the dispute. As 
we will see in section 1.2.2., the power relation between parties influence the outcomes of the 
agreements and thus influence the availability of ADR or even restrict access to court under 
certain circumstances. Still, the access to courts remains a residual guarantee and the backbone 
of the rule of law.  
The right of access is guaranteed, but the access to the court which is inappropriate for one 
party due to various factors, are a separate issue and result of jurisdictional rules.  Chapter 4 is 
                                                          
680Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, supra note 416. p.8.  
681 Although in those cases also probably the court of higher instance would decide on which court has more 
connection to the dispute and which is more appropriate. It would delay justice for sure. 
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devoted to jurisdictional rules that are relevant for cloud service disputes, and we have seen 
under which conditions we apply Brussels I Regulation or national laws for consumers, or the 
influence of Hague Convention on the choice of court agreement for commercial disputes. Still, 
in some form right, of access is guaranteed (even though by same laws could be ineffective) in 
most of the jurisdictions, and given enough resources it is attainable. The same cannot be said 
for alternative dispute resolution, nor that it exists the right to access ADR. In some specific 
sectors regulations mandate the use of ADR but do not exclude consumers' access to courts in 
the EU entirely, or we mostly have recommendations in regulatory or policy documents to use 
ADR in appropriate settings. The cloud context would seemingly be an appropriate setting for 
ADR due to its global availability, and ADR’s flexibility should be a strong asset that would 
drive the use of it. Currently, as presented in our survey in Chapter 3, this is not the case, since 
it is not represented in the majority of cloud contracts. Let us see what factors could have 
influenced such outcome.  
 
2.2. Availability of alternative dispute resolution body 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, jurisdictional rules, given the circumstances of the disputes, 
especially when it comes to cross-border transactions, tend to favor either plaintiff 
(complainant) or defendants. The rules that give authority to specific dispute resolution body 
to handle disputes, while relying on intrinsically fair principles, at the outcome could have 
results were the jurisdiction (or the competence which is a better term for ADRs) diminishes 
the possibility of initiating the dispute resolution process. For alternative dispute resolutions, 
we underline the distinction between binding adjudicatory schemes (arbitration) and voluntary 
(consensual) bargaining schemes (negotiation, mediation/conciliation). 
Here we have two questions that need to be answered in the beginning phase of the process. 
1. Do jurisdictional (competence) rules allow the dispute to be handled in designated ADR 
entity? 
2. If they allow but are made not mandatory, are the parties going to accept the authority 
of the ADR body and commit to it? 
Jurisdictional rules, in general, allow the dispute to be handled by an ADR entity if the 
submission is based on the agreement between the parties, conditional to unrestricted consent 
and certain regulatory requirements. However, to avail itself of the procedural guarantees and 
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principles established in regulations, the parties and subject matter of the dispute have to fall 
within the scope of the pertinent regulations.  
When it comes to the EU, if the circumstances of the dispute do not fall within the scope of the 
ADR Directive and the ODR Regulation, the residual national and international regulations 
still apply (if covered by their scope). Since the ADR Directive harmonizes procedural 
guarantees, principles and practices of ADRs in the EU, and ODR Regulation provides single 
entry points, we have chosen to focus on them as they are applicable to the whole Single market 
and set in favor of consumers as weaker parties. Indeed, they were our main reference point for 
the discussion on access to justice for consumers on the EU level. Therefore for the availability 
of the ADRs that are held to the standards of these regulations (which are also relevant for other 
key concepts/indicators) we need to examine if our context fits into their scope of application.  
2.2.1. Restrictive scope of EU regulations 
 
The scope of EU regulations is restrictive in several aspects relative to the cloud service dispute 
context. 
2.2.1.1. Disputants 
 
Both the scopes of ADR Directive and ODR Regulation are equally restrictive about the 
disputant parties. They are both only applicable to a dispute between a consumer resident in 
the European Union and a trader established in the Union.682 This is very restrictive considering 
the global availability of cloud services and how many consumers that are domiciled in the EU 
are able to use the services which are established outside of the EU (presumably in the US). 
The same goes in the other direction, many consumers domiciled outside of the EU would not 
be able formally to avail themselves of access to the ADR entities that comply with the 
regulation by invoking it, even if the business established in the EU are willing to. According 
to Art 4 of the ADR Directive a trader is established: (a) if the trader is a natural person, where 
he has his place of business, or (b) if the trader is a company or other legal person or association 
of natural or legal persons, where it has its statutory seat, central administration or place of 
business, including a branch, agency or any other establishment.683 Of course, if the (out of 
scope) trader is willing to accept out-of-court entity to settle the dispute and consumer 
                                                          
682 Art 2 of ADR Directive, Art 2 of ODR Regulation 
683 Art 4 of ADR Directive, also it is referenced to in Art 4 (2) of ODR Regulation 
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(nonresident)  is willing as well, then it would not be that strenuous to find available ADR body 
in the EU and probably even among those enlisted on ODR site. Only, in that case, it would 
not have to comply with requirements and principles set in ADR and ODR regulations. That 
means the guarantees are not in place and hence the international legal framework is not 
appropriate for the disputants that fall outside of the scope. Consequently, the potentially high 
number of disputes that are within our context (mostly for traders established outside of EU) 
would be left out of high standards and principles of the framework. 
 
2.2.1.2. Out-of-court entities  
 
The ADR Directive is not applicable to procedures before dispute resolution entities where the 
natural persons in charge of dispute resolution are employed or remunerated exclusively by the 
individual trader, (unless national law of Member States allows it); and procedures before 
consumer complaint-handling systems operated by the trader.684 That leaves out any in-house 
complaint systems even if it would be subjected to independent supervision or audit, or if it 
provides substantive guarantees for its independence or impartiality. Also, it leaves out 
numerous complaint handling systems that describe themselves as ODR.685 It is up to the 
Member States to allow for the application of the Directive in the first case but it is not 
mandatory for all states and does not set the standard, so it cannot be taken as allowed or set. 
A Member State could just as easily enact higher standards for all requirements and principles 
under its national law.  
This does not, in turn, exclude trustmark schemes since they are not being remunerated 
exclusively by a single trader. They are financed by the system of annual fees and membership 
from the adhering members/traders, or if they are financed based on the procedure initiated 
they are still not reliant on the trader as single source of income but they are being financed 
under general adherence to their respective programs, which also includes remuneration for 
compliance checks etc. Still, we have not yet observed that Trustmark schemes like TRUSTe 
are enlisted on the ODR site, even if they provide fully online dispute resolution.  
In addition, the scope of ADR Directive does not include attempts made by a judge to settle a 
dispute in the course of a judicial proceeding concerning that dispute.686 It is not clear if it 
                                                          
684 Art 4 (a) and (b) of ADR Directive 
685 More on it in the later in chapter 7 
686 Art 4  (f) of ADR Directive 
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includes any attempt before judicial proceedings where a judge advises parties to adhere to 
mediation or assisted negotiation, or it is strictly restrictive to judicial role in mediation and 
negation. If we go strictly by the wording of the article, then all court-annexed ADR are out of 
scope. This paragraph excludes a number of national initiatives to expedite the proceedings 
before civil courts and small claim courts by introducing online and off-line annexed ADR 
schemes, which run independently or under the supervision of court staff.687   
2.2.1.3. Subject matter 
 
Both ADR Directive and ODR Regulation are clear that the subject matter of the respective 
regulation are disputes that concern contractual obligations stemming from sales or service 
contracts.688 However, ODR Regulation diverges in one important aspect: “…disputes 
concerning contractual obligations stemming from online sales or service…” ODR Regulation 
is primarily oriented to online sales and services, which includes cloud services as a 
subcategory of online services.  However, looking at the text of the EU ODR and ADR 
regulations we get an impression that the legislator had primarily focused on buyer-seller 
disputes of products on the internal market and chose to neglect the quite common free online 
service which are mostly cloud based. 
2.2.1.3.1. Free services 
 
Nominally, the legislator addresses services, however, the idea that EU has not been fully 
considering redress for free online services is best illustrated in the definition of a service. If 
we look at the definition of a service contract for ADR Directive (ODR Regulation also refers 
to it for the definition) it clearly says in Art 4:  
“Service contract means any contract other than a sales contract under which the trader 
supplies or undertakes to supply a service to the consumer and the consumer pays or 
undertakes to pay the price thereof.”689 
Click-through sign-up for free service are usually a form of a service contract. This definition 
excludes the use of EU ODR platform for disputes over contracts for free services, where 
                                                          
687 See HiiL TREND REPORT IV ODR and the Courts: The promise of 100% access to justice? Online Dispute 
Resolution 2016  
688 Art 2 of ADR Directive and Art 2 of ODR Regulation 
689 Art 4 of DIRECTIVE 2013/11/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 21 May 2013 on 
alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and 
Directive 2009/22/EC  
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economic gains are not coming from consumers paying for the service, but from other possible 
income models as described in Chapter 3. On the EU ODR site, while submitting a complaint, 
it is required to fill one of the fields by entering the amount spent on good or service. The 
requirement is set in Annex to the ODR Regulation, where it is specified what kind of 
information is to be provided when submitting a complaint. Under (9) it is required to enter 
information on the price of the good or service purchased.690 It is obviously considered relevant 
to have information on the amount of money that was spent for the good or service, as it is 
relevant for the complaint handling (communication to trader), type of dispute and choice of  
ADR provider among others, but also for the parties’ consideration whether it is worthwhile to 
settle dispute in proposed manner (if not mandatory). However defining a service contract by 
counter payment, excludes many of the online services from the scope.  
We could also question the possible interpretation of this definition on free trial periods of the 
services; a free trial is not as committing to payment or undertaking to pay for a service, as the 
commitment to payment is conditional and pending approval upon trial period. In the highly 
competitive markets for certain internet services, a free trial period is highly expectable. On 
the other hand, liability limitations are common and justifiable in the probation periods for the 
service, since the main goal of the trial period is to test the quality to establish whether quality 
standards satisfy the user. If users’ requirements and standards on providers’ contractual 
obligations are not met, the outcome should be the cancellation of the main service contract. 
However, there are possible situations leading to disputes, where users that canceled the service 
upon trial period are being charged as though the service contract has been concluded. The 
issues of unjustified enrichment and whether such scenario constitutes service contract or if it 
is a contractual dispute in the first place would possibly have to be interpreted beforehand in 
the court or another tribunal.  
Similarly, to keep the customer loyalty, service providers are often providing other free services 
that may not be directly connected to the one that has been paid. Such subsidized service is 
usually based on separate click-through contract, which according to ADR Directive is not a 
service contract. Additionally, we also have situations where the cloud service is free, but 
certain extensions or add-ins are to be paid if desired. If users run into an unrelated issue with 
a basic service provider, while they only paid for this third-party add-in software, it is uncertain 
if it falls under the scope since the basic service is intermediary for the paid service, but the 
                                                          
690 Annex to the Regulation on consumer ODR 
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paid one is not directly disputed. If the cloud provider limits liability or guarantees for any third 
party application and if they are not being paid to (at least directly) by users are they under the 
scope of the Directive?  Again, strictly looking at the wording of the scope of regulations, those 
situations would be excluded from the scope.  
Time could also be an issue since we could have services that were used to be paid, but then 
became free services, or if a user of paid premium version of service, switches to free version. 
Should it be considered a new contract because the important element has changed (price and 
terms for payment) or a continuation of previous by the annex to the contract since all other 
elements have remained the same? When users switch back to free or basic version, usually it 
has to be specific step indicating the intention for the transition. Otherwise, service is being 
charged as in a previous period (automatically billing as in the prior period of monthly or yearly 
subscriptions for premium users).691 For this step, users need to find the appropriate option on 
the site and undergo new click-through giving of consent, which indicates a new agreement. 
Whether it should be considered an entirely new contract for free service or annex to the 
existing contract, it should have legal effects from the date of giving a renewed consent for it. 
Therefore, it would be most likely considered a free service for the purposes of the Directive if 
the dispute arises after the date of switching to a basic account. However, if the dispute would 
be for overcharging or charging the previously canceled paid service then it could still be 
considered a paid consumer service (for the previous period), and it would fall under the scope 
of the regulations.  
Needless to say, the wording of the Directive excludes the use of most popular cloud-based 
social network sites from its scope. Social network sites, like Facebook, have a significant 
number of complaints involving compliance with acceptable use policies and terms of 
service.692 Even though Facebook algorithms are used for detection of AUP violations, they 
employ a significant number of people to check or verify the work of algorithm based on 
complaints.693 Access to the free services like Facebook has become valuable to many users, 
arguably more valuable than the price they are (not) paying for it, and if given option, some of 
the blocked users from Facebook, would probably contest such decision in the external and 
                                                          
691 See for example ToS of Spotify at: https://www.spotify.com/int/legal/end-user-agreement/   and Dropbox 
at: https://www.dropbox.com/privacy#terms  
692 See for example http://www.theverge.com/2014/9/2/6083647/facebook-s-report-abuse-button-has-
become-a-tool-of-global-oppression and https://www.change.org/p/facebook-encourage-facebook-to-review-
their-report-abuse-process and https://www.rt.com/uk/359144-facebook-lawsuit-nude-photo/  
693 See https://mic.com/articles/153072/facebook-harassment-abuse-algorithm#.XB2tC3B1j  
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appropriate forum. Certain social network sites or cloud services could be excluded from the 
scope due to their nature, regardless of the price (or lack thereof). LinkedIn, for example, is 
advertised as a social network for building professional networks of its users. Thus it would be 
hardly considered as consumer service that is outside of natural person’s trade, business, craft 
or profession as defined in Art 4 of ADR Directive.  
Many products (other than cloud services) come bundled with additional free online service 
that otherwise would have to be paid for. It could come in the form of free subscription for a 
cloud service that comes with a smartphone that has been bought, a toy that has interactive web 
game based on it, or software (a platform) that is bundled with basic free third party 
applications. To add to complexity many home appliances that are being marketed under the 
term of “internet of things” are enabled to connect to third party applications, and many of 
those are free as well. The market for smartphones alone is significant enough and relies on 
many free web-based services that in turn proliferates use of free services, and many of those 
are used for interaction with other internet enabled products. Free services have become a vital 
part of the cloud market, and without further explanations, we do not know the reason for 
excluding them from the scope of the ADR Directive and ODR Regulation. We could speculate 
that the Commission did not consider the disputes over free services relevant since their value 
has not been expressed through price (which could also complicate determination of the value 
of the claim) and consumers of those services are less committed without payments. Hence the 
redress for them is less relevant.  Maybe, it was intended to avoid large volumes of frivolous 
claims stemming from irrational demands from users of free services. Maybe it was sought to 
avoid the complexity of some issues, like the ones we mention above, and to stick with simple 
low-value cases that could be handled more easily by ADR providers. Then again most of these 
arguments are sidestepped if we consider that there are no thresholds for the paid service to 
allow redress, and there is no significant difference between free service and service that has 
been paid for in lowest, symbolic amounts (for example 1 EUR or 0.1 EUR to confirm the 
validity of credit card in some service).694  In the free services, the value of service is not 
expressed through the price paid for the service and access to redress should not be conditioned 
to it either. If a consumer has attached significant value to the service, especially with the 
prolonged use of it (for example consider the use of popular free e-mail client), he should be 
able to have access to external redress if he considers being wronged by the provider (most 
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commonly blocked access by provider). However, said redress is not covered by the scope of 
consumer regulations on ADR and ODR in the EU.   
 
2.2.2. Effectiveness of post-dispute agreements on ADR 
 
If the dispute at hand falls under the scope of ADR Directive and ODR Regulation, that does 
not mean certain availability of the ADRs. The use of alternative dispute resolutions in most 
cases is not compulsory. In certain cases, the use of ADR is required by pertinent regulation or 
conditional to adherence to the specific sectoral scheme. In the EU, there is a certain variety 
when it comes to mandatory ADR.  Adherence to the ADR scheme by traders could be required 
by law (e.g. concerning consumer protection in specific sectors) to offer or guarantee the 
availability of ADR, but it is not made mandatory for the consumer whose right to access to 
courts is also guaranteed. Such ADR schemes are set up and overseen by public authorities.695 
We also have mandatory ADR schemes set up by professional or trade association and who 
make adherence to ADR a condition for membership.696 However, the majority of ADR 
schemes, in general, are on a voluntary basis. CIVIC study reported in the questionnaire on 
adherence by the industry to ADR schemes that out of 164 members of various industries, 19% 
declare mandatory participation.697  It indicates that the majority of traders either decides on a 
case by case basis whether they are going to participate in the ADR procedure or it could be 
adopted trader’s policy, and they are willing to accept it even if it is not a mandatory procedure.  
In any case, the decision entails some form of deliberation on the part of the trader if it is in its 
interests to take part in the procedure. Pre-dispute agreements on mandatory arbitration are 
frowned upon from the standpoint of fairness in the EU, and probably would not be considered 
binding on consumers; nevertheless, that does not mean that it would be binding for traders if 
they would choose to submit themselves to ADR scheme. Therefore we could have trader’s 
policy on the use of ADR either in the form of pre-dispute agreements or post-dispute 
agreement either for binding or non-binding outcomes of ADR, and we also have the case-by-
case decision of trader to participate in available ADR in post-dispute scenarios.  
                                                          
695 For example in consumer financial services sector, see for example Financial Ombudsman Service in the UK: 
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/  but also Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier in 
Luxembourg, Pensions Ombudsman in Ireland, and the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority in Germany. 
696 See for example Banking Ombudsman in Poland, Commission Paritaire de Médiation de la Vente Directe in 
France and the Netherlands Foundation for Consumer Complaints Boards. 
697 Report, supra note. 655 p. 35.  
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While the pre-dispute agreement is already determining the availability of the ADR to the 
consumer for potential redress purposes, the post-dispute agreement allows traders to assess 
the legal standing in a given case, assess the possible options, effects and outcomes of proposed 
ADR methods and compare it with alternatives. The parties are in effect negotiating on the 
acceptance of an ADR scheme which is either suggested by the one of the party or by the ODR 
platform (based on the input of claimant). No matter if they take a positional or principled 
approach to negotiation, the power relationship between the parties plays an important role. 
The power imbalance is one of the main critique points of the work of Fisher and Ury, where 
the theory assumes rough equality in power between the parties.698 Fisher addressed issues of 
power imbalance, and proposed strategies which point to establishing a strong BATNA, but 
even those strategies recognize the overpowering effect of the stronger party.699 
In our context, there is an obvious power imbalance, observable in imposed terms of service 
and non-negotiable terms. If negotiation relied solely on the power of the parties in their 
relationship and party autonomy, the outcomes would prevail in favor of providers, which we 
can testify by observing the typical “as is” terms of services.700 Without regulatory intervention, 
the weaker party-consumer would not be able to consider significant alternatives to negotiated 
agreements or BATNA’s. The regulatory intervention potentially creates incentives to reassess 
negotiation position. Given that EU consumer regulation would allow consumers to choose the 
court of their domicile, which could be inconvenient for providers, they would have to consider 
the effects of such choice on their positions. Such incentive is viable only if the consumer 
would be willing to pursue redress before the court. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
a significant percentage of consumers (48%) would not be willing to go to court for the 
damages under 200 Euros.701 Cloud services for consumer mostly fit into price range from free 
to 200 Euros.  The cost of disputes, as we will demonstrate soon, differs from state to state, but 
could be even more expensive when there is a cross-border element to the dispute. These factors 
influence negotiation positions and BATNA’s, and if legislative intervention does not provide 
additional incentive for providers to adhere voluntarily to ADR scheme, the weaker parties will 
                                                          
698 W McCarthy, The role of power and principle in getting to yes,  NEGOT. J. (1985).Katja Funken, THE PROS AND 
CONS OF GETTING TO YES Shortcomings and Limitations of Principled Bargaining in Negotiation and Mediation, 
. 
699 ROGER FISHER, Negotiating Power, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 149–166 (1983). 
700 See survey on ToS in chapter 3 
701 European Commission (2011). Consultation paper on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution as a means 
to resolve disputes related to commercial transactions and practices in the European Union, para. 1; CSES 
2009, p. 10 
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be facing inferior negotiation position that leads to lack of redress and hence lack of access to 
justice.  
Amy Schmitz claims that although some companies use pre-dispute arbitration to escape 
liability and sidestep legal regulation, “insistence on post-dispute arbitration agreements is 
impractical because parties rarely agree to arbitrate after relationships have soured.”702 
The ODR Regulation, with proclaimed intention to provide low cost and speedy dispute 
resolution, is nonetheless reliant on the willingness of parties to participate. In article 9 it is 
clearly stated that, after exchanging communications, if parties fail to agree within 30 calendar 
days after submission of the complaint form on an ADR entity, or the ADR entity refuses to 
deal with the dispute, the complaint shall not be processed further.703 The only obligation of the 
cloud provider established in the EU is to provide a link to the ODR platform. There could be 
a perplexing issue of consistency here since there is no obligation of the provider, which in a 
way advertises its acceptance and support for EU ODR platform by placing a link to it that it 
will follow through and respond to invite by ODR platform. In other words, the web service 
could advertise its willingness to resolve disputes through ODR mechanisms, but when it 
comes to it, the business will make case-by-case decision to be or not be the part of the ODR 
process. This is a general problem of EU ODR Regulation - lack of proper mechanism to ensure 
the acceptance of the processes.704 In highly competitive markets where different services 
providers offer similar services, those who are willing to participate in ODR and go a step 
further and offer such option for consumers in pre-dispute agreement, are exposed to a 
multitude of potential claims compared to those who abstain.  
We have to remind that ADR Directive and ODR regulation are primarily intended to be 
consumer protection tools that only apply to disputes between consumers and traders who are 
residents of the European Union. Paid and free consumer web services are also most commonly 
cloud computing services, where its biggest providers are residents of the United States. It is 
common that Software-as-a-service (SaaS) model is based on PaaS or IaaS of a different 
provider (possibly based outside EU). The functioning of SaaS is sometimes dependent on 
SLAs of its provider. Interdependence of layers of service could be exampled through 
disruptions that influence other services. For instance, disruption of services of IaaS (like 
                                                          
702 Schmitz, supra note 554. p. 101.  
703 Art 9 (8) of ODR Regulation 
704 Dusko Martic, Redress for free internet services under the scope of the EU and UNCITRAL’s ODR regulations, 
1 REV. DEMOCR. DIGIT. E GOV. ELETRÔNICO 360–376 (2014). 
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Amazon Web Services) could potentially lead to disruption of a European SaaS. Consumers of 
SaaS being in a contractual relationship with only European provider could seek redress for 
this disruption. This would put SaaS provider in a difficult situation to be part of the dispute 
resolution process where it, in fact, is not responsible for the lack of the service.705 So unless 
there are an adequate redress and remuneration from its own provider, SaaS would not easily 
accept beforehand to be part of the process where the majority of its users could seek redress 
and it is understandable why would provider hesitate to submit to an adjudicatory form of 
dispute resolution on a permanent basis, rather on per case basis, or if at all.  
It is possible that the EU’s ODR platform could be appropriate for EU-based cloud providers, 
competing with more renowned US-based providers, by offering more redress options and 
building trust with users through ODR.706 Looking at the survey in Chapter 3, cloud service 
companies are not devoted at the moment to cross-border ODR mechanisms outside of their 
established practices. If interested cloud service based outside of EU would probably consider 
the use of ODR mechanisms independently of EU ODR Regulation.   
 
2.3. Accessibility of dispute resolution bodies 
 
Another important aspect of access to justice is the accessibility of dispute resolution bodies 
from the point of view of travel costs, language, and need of professional help. Looking at the 
different dispute resolution bodies, we need to answer respectively if travel costs, language, 
and need of professional help, impede the access to DR relative to the low value of the dispute 
in our context? It is also important to remark that not all forms of dispute resolution are equally 
physically available. The number of courts, arbitrations, or even arbitrators and mediators are 
limited and differ from country to country. The number of courts in the country should serve a 
purpose of allowing a maximum number of people access to the court. In the 2016 CEPEJ 
study on European judicial systems, the average number of first instance courts was 2 per 100 
000 inhabitants of all of the observed countries members of Council of Europe (median1,4; 
minimum 0,1; maximum 13,2) and the average number was 21 judges per 100.000 
inhabitants.707 It is obviously not comparable to the significantly lower number of total 750 
                                                          
705 Id. 
706 For more on building trust through ODR see Noam Ebner, ODR and Interpersonal Trust,  203–236 (2012). 
707 European judicial systems Efficiency and quality of justice CEPEJ STUDIES No. 23,  2016 (data from 2014) 
p.90 and p. 167. The number includes all types of first instant courts and judges 
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ADR bodies in the EU out of which 258 are registered with the ODR platform, nor should it 
be an interchangeable category.708 Still, it is illustrative of their capacities in case of a higher 
volume of dispute inflow.  
2.3.1. Travel costs 
 
We have already pointed to the aspects of potential cloud service disputes that given their cross-
border nature, it is quite likely that the travel costs to the jurisdiction of the party would 
outweigh the price paid for the disputed service.  This does not mean that the value of the 
dispute for the complaining party is determined only in relation to the price, but it is indicative 
of impracticability of waging disputes in these scenarios. If we consider just traveling costs 
between different states and then recall the study that consumers would not go to a court for 
the damages less of €200, then we can say that for low-value cloud service disputes, cross-
border travel could play an important role in pursuing access to justice. 
Having this in mind we need to consider how the traveling costs are distributed among the 
parties. Are they equally distributed (Rawlsian first principle) or in case they are not, are they 
distributed, so that weaker party is benefiting of such distribution (second principle)? We can 
observe the travel costs as direct effects of the rules of jurisdiction and availability of dispute 
resolution bodies.  
If the dispute resolution is pursued before the court, the distribution of travel costs will be 
determined by rules of jurisdiction. The party is physically located further away from the court 
that has jurisdiction, will most likely (but not necessarily) have higher travel expenses 
connected to the litigation, especially if presence is required or party needs to give oral 
statements before the court. If the procedure requires only written statements and does not 
require the physical presence of the parties, or it is rather an exception than the rule, as in many 
procedures before small claim courts, it also has the effect on the costs.  
The forum of the dispute and the type of the court is determined by private international law 
rules of jurisdiction which we have talked about in Chapter 4. The accepted principle is that 
defendant should be sued in the place of his domicile- actor sequitur forum rei. This doctrine 
puts complaining parties in the cross-border disputes in the less favorable position of having to 
travel to the defendant’s domicile. However, as we have seen, there are exceptions to the rules. 
                                                          
708 See Chapter 5 
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In the case of prorogation, where parties agree to the jurisdiction of courts under specific legal 
conditions and designate courts that will have jurisdiction regardless of parties’ domicile. In 
the majority of the cases of cloud service disputes, this is the case of designating provider’s 
jurisdiction in terms of services. Having more negotiating power cloud providers impose more 
favorable forum to them. On the other hand, consumer protection rules incorporated into 
Brussels I regulation, offer protection to consumers as the weaker parties in giving them a 
choice of jurisdiction between the Court of defendant’s domicile and the court of consumer’s 
domicile. The consumer would have to be domiciled in one of the Member States of the EU 
for Brussels I to apply.  Assumed selection of consumer’s local court is, of course, more 
favorable to the consumer. The special jurisdiction for consumers is limited to natural persons 
and transactions outside of their trade or profession. Cloud users that are also natural persons 
must abstain from the professional use of cloud service in order to benefit from consumer 
protection rules on jurisdiction.709 When we mention other than natural persons that use cloud 
service professionally, we think of small and medium enterprises that are also disadvantaged 
by the established rules of private international law in the case of cross-border cloud disputes, 
as they are not entitled to different treatment from big enterprises.  
To counteract traveling costs and other disadvantages of having cross-border disputes, the EU 
has introduced the Regulation on European small claims procedure, which is intended to be the 
pan-European solution for lower value disputes with exclusively cross-border elements and 
significantly lower formality of processes.710 Nevertheless, it is still a court procedure that is 
governed by the Brussels I regulation in determining of the jurisdiction. Lower procedural 
formality allows for avoidance of unnecessary travel and could be equally favorable to both 
parties. The advantages of European small claims procedure for cross-border cases still have 
to be confirmed in practice, and then to be compared to alternative forms of dispute resolution. 
To develop the full potential of European small claims procedure, the courts would have to rely 
more on information technologies to facilitate faster, cheaper and accessible procedures.711 
Alternative dispute resolutions encompass a variety of methods which have effects in lowering 
travel costs that could be incurred by parties in litigation. Bargaining methods of ADR are 
much less formal and more flexible than adjudicatory forms and largely depend on 
                                                          
709 See more in Chapter 4 
710 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a 
European small claims procedure 
711 CORTÉS, supra note 424. 
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communication. If the communication can be facilitated without travel costs, it would be 
equally beneficial desired effect for both parties. If travel costs are necessary, they depend on 
the format of ADR, and fairly arranged by parties themselves or mediator.  
Arbitration in the traditional sense requires establishing the seat of the arbitration tribunal. The 
most renowned institutional arbitrations are usually seated in commercial capitals, and if the 
dispute is brought before them, depending on the level of formality in arbitration, travel costs 
for the parties could be even higher than in litigation. Arbitration also allows flexibility where 
parties can agree on ad hoc tribunals with the seat in the mutually agreed location. The 
arrangement and possible costs dependent on parties ‘agreement, which again could be an issue 
there is a major power imbalance. Costs can be avoided with procedurally less stringent 
(correspondence only) arbitrations that don’t require physical presence. This type of arbitration 
without physical appearance could sit well with cloud service disputes since the evidence could 
be submitted in an electronic medium and oral depositions would probably be exceptional. In 
such circumstances, it would seem even more appropriate to conduct the whole proceedings 
online, and thus to avoid travel costs altogether. 
If we consider characteristics of the parties, where both disputants have equal or similar access 
to the Internet, then ODR allows most equal accessibility with lowest costs of travel and 
communication compared to other forms of dispute resolution. The digital divide should not 
be an issue since users are already using digital services. Thus presumption of availability and 
competence in using internet services would be sufficient for accessing online arbitration or 
other forms of ODR.712 Both parties have already presumed access to the Internet. Accordingly, 
the travel costs in use of ODR would be irrelevant for the process. Online formal dispute 
resolution comes closest to the ideal equality in access. If on the other hand the choice between 
different forms of dispute resolution had to be made, having in mind Rawlsian fairness and its 
propensity for weaker party, the travel costs or lack thereof in online methods of dispute 
resolution are to the greatest benefit of worse off party. It cannot be considered in isolation but 
in conjunction with other concepts. However, the perceived barrier of costs in traveling plays 
an important role in assessment and decision to pursue a formal dispute resolution. 
 
                                                          
712 M WARSCHAUER, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION: RETHINKING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (2004); P NORRIS, DIGITAL DIVIDE: 
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, INFORMATION POVERTY, AND THE INTERNET WORLDWIDE (2001). 
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2.3.2. Language and professional need 
 
We observe language from the point of view of accessibility of dispute resolution body, and 
not as a procedural guarantee based on the right to a fair trial. Linguistic rights that cover rights 
to an interpreter during trials are a separate issue connected to procedural fairness. However, 
from the point of accessibility through initiating disputes, do courts and ADRs accept 
complaints in different languages other than the official language of the institution?  
Usually, when submitting a lawsuit in the court, it has to be in one of the official languages 
recognized by the state.  For parties that do not speak the official language, professional 
assistance in the form of lawyers and interpreters are available. Employing a professional 
assistance increases overall costs and discourages low-value claims from being submitted in 
the first place.  
European small claims procedure Regulation introduces standardized form for submitting the 
claim and provides assistance in filling it if needed.713 However, the claim must be submitted 
in the language of the court, as must the response, any counterclaim, the description of 
supporting documents, essential documents.714  
Similarly, most of ADR bodies registered on the EU ODR platform, give information on the 
languages in which they perform the procedures. This information is required by ODR 
Regulation, and it is mandatory to be submitted to the parties in initial 
communication/negotiation phase on appropriate dispute resolution body for the disputes. In 
that sense ADR procedures have the same limitations as the court procedures were official 
languages is a potential limiting factor or barrier in case of disputes with cross-border elements 
and parties speak different languages. It is also one of the main reasons why currently European 
ADR schemes are oriented primarily towards disputes within their Member States.  
Nevertheless, the EU ODR platform allows submitting a complaint in all official languages of 
the European Union, by standardizing the fields in the form on the site in all languages, 
allowing the party to select the language it uses, and also based on the language it seeks and 
                                                          
713 Art 4 of Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
establishing a European small claims procedure   
714 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a 
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proposes appropriate ADRs.715 It also provides information and assistance in all the official 
languages of the EU. 
For the low-value consumer cases, professional assistance in the form of attorney is usually not 
required in the courts of the Member States. It has also been confirmed with European small 
claim procedure Regulation that professional assistance is not required and the judges could 
provide help and assistance to the disputant.716 European small claim procedure Regulation also 
gives judges discretionary power to refuse unnecessary procedural requests by the parties in 
they are unnecessary for the fair proceedings.717 We have a presumption of judges’ expertise 
required to assess the legal situation, and if needed the judge can provide some assistance to 
the party who did not commission attorney.  
ADR Directive and ODR Regulation, do not require professional assistance of the third parties, 
although it is intrinsic to some form of ADR, like the natural role of the mediator would be to 
consider the interest of the parties and to find an appropriate solution from a neutral standpoint. 
Still, the role of mediators should not be compared with the requirement of professional 
assistance in adjudicative forms of dispute resolution. ADR Directive and ODR Regulation 
confirm that legal representation is not required in submitting a complaint or for proceeding 
with a dispute, but without depriving parties of the right to representation. 718 The possibility of 
having a dispute resolution without necessary legal representation was one of the raison d’etre 
for the ADR and ODR consumer regulations.  
Considering our context of cloud services, if the parties do not have the necessary legal 
knowledge, the assistance of the judge or ADR third party is welcome, with the assumption 
that the legal expertise of the judge surpasses required standards for ADR neutrals. In any case, 
at least for consumer disputes, legal representation or lack thereof is not a barrier to initiate or 
proceed with the dispute. ODR platform could be seen as additional assistance in proposing 
ADR entities based on their proclaimed expertise although the platform itself does not provide 
any professional assistance other than facilitating language variety.  
 
                                                          
715 Art 5 and Art 9 of ODR Regulation 
716 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a 
European small claims procedure   
717 See Chapter 4 
718 Art 7 (b) of ADR Directive: “the parties have access to the procedure without being obliged to retain a 
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2.4. Access for the less advantaged 
 
Commonly, cloud service providers impose terms of service in their favor, which consequently 
can turn the users of service to be a less advantaged party of arrangement.  From all the possible 
ways users could be treated unfairly, we are interested only in the aspect of dispute resolution 
and how fairly the parties can access justice. While the most competent and fair dispute 
resolution bodies could be available elsewhere in comparable cases, the only thing that matters 
from users’ point of view in specific dispute is whether they have access to a suitable conflict 
resolution that matters to the dispute at hand. Therefore we focused on two variables of access: 
availability and accessibility.  We observed whether different dispute resolution bodies are 
sufficient from the point of these two variables by answering two guiding questions: 
 Do jurisdictional rules or competence rules allow or make available use of a dispute 
resolution mechanism in regards to clouds dispute context? 
 Do travel costs, language, and need of professional help, impede the access to DR 
relative to the low value of the dispute. 
Availability of the courts is guaranteed by international human rights conventions as the right 
to access the court, but the availability of ADRs depends on contractual/consensual nature of 
the mechanisms. The EU regulatory framework provides specific boundaries that shape and 
sometimes restrict the availability of ADRs. Looking strictly at adjudicatory dispute resolution 
bodies in comparison, we find that human right guarantees of access to court outweigh the 
availability of ADRs that are usually on contractual grounds. Even though the EU ADR and 
ODR framework are set to provide consumers a suitable forum for low-value disputes, the fact 
that availability mostly relies on traders good will, do not provide a sufficiently adequate tool 
that users could expect to use in case of need. Current numbers of available arbitrations that 
are in compliance with ODR Regulation are smaller in comparison with already established 
practices for consumer arbitration/adjudication in some of the EU Member States. Therefore, 
the pillars of availability remain on courts within the networks of national judicial systems and 
adjudicative ADRs have an advantage over adjudicative ODR mechanisms. If we factor in non-
adjudicatory methods, the result remains the same since the non-adjudicatory mechanisms like 
mediation and conciliation also depend on post-dispute agreement. Traditional ADRs have a 
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slight advantage due to previously established practices in the Members States and availability 
through European Consumer Center Network (ECC-NET), but this could change during time 
through higher recognition of ODR.719  
As opposed to availability based on rights of the parties to bring the dispute to the forum, the 
accessibility is a matter of the barriers to the access to a potential dispute resolution. Online 
dispute resolution mechanisms achieve almost ideal equality with overcoming travel costs for 
the parties. This would suit perfectly to Rawlsian first principle of justice, and hence have a 
strong advantage over other mechanisms. Traditional arbitration, due to limited numbers of 
institutions which are mostly focused on significant commercial areas is less benefiting to the 
worse off parties then courts. Non-adjudicatory methods have an additional advantage over 
adjudicatory due to their flexibility.  
Looking at the both elements of access in our conceptual framework of access to justice as 
fairness, we can notice the interplay between them and influence of access to other key 
concepts. Without access to the courts or availability of alternative dispute solutions remaining 
key concepts are not engaged at all. The right of access to the courts is an essential human right. 
However, although guaranteed right, jurisdictional rules of private international law affect the 
accessibility to the public bodies whose access they guarantee. The effect they produce could 
turn out to be barriers, like disproportionate travel costs to one side that render dispute 
resolution impractical. Assuming access to dispute resolution body, either mandatory or on a 
voluntary basis, we can proceed with assessing other key concepts before analyzing them from 
a fairness point of view. 
 
3. Procedural fairness 
 
If we look at the procedural rules for different dispute resolution bodies, we get an impression 
of variety and possible feeling of comparing apples and oranges when it comes to certain forms 
of dispute resolution (i.e. mediation and court procedure). Therefore, we need a common 
denominator, a common baseline that applies to all the forms of dispute resolution. The ADR 
Directive serves this purpose since its goal is to harmonize and set common standards for ADR 
entities, whether they are registered on the ODR platform or not. At that juncture of standards 
                                                          
719 More on ECC-NET available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/non-
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for ADR, we can establish if and to what extent procedural guarantees and principles of judicial 
processes satisfy those standards, or in what ways they surpassed them. It is well-known that 
judicial proceedings are well regulated by national procedural laws, and they are expected to 
have higher procedural standards compared to ADRs rules. Rules and procedures could also 
serve different functions, and while they guard basic human rights of plaintiffs in judicial 
proceedings, they could be purposely devised to allow flexibility and informality in ADR as 
alternatives to very same rules of judicial proceedings. The high formality of judicial 
proceedings and its consequences motivate potential disputants to seek alternatives. The 
question remains if such alternatives provide basic procedural fairness to be considered a form 
of access to justice. 
We will focus on three aspects of procedural fairness that are common for all dispute resolution 
bodies which involve a third party. They do not cover negotiation, as it is inter-party dispute 
resolution without the involvement of third parties. Negotiation in cloud disputes is the least 
formal form of dispute resolution and generally does not require procedure (although it is 
possible to have structured negotiation with rules). Without strict structure and procedure, the 
issues of procedural fairness are not problematic, especially if there is a similar level of 
negotiation power. If negotiation is based on voluntary participation, and if it does not yield a 
satisfying result, parties can escalate the dispute to another form.  In the case of power 
inequality in negotiation, the law could be invoked on the outcomes of unfair negotiation under 
certain conditions, but regulations do not interfere in the negotiation procedures in the disputes 
relevant for our context. Therefore, we focus on the regulated aspects of ADR which we will 
observe through following three questions:  
1. Are there procedural guarantees in place for transparency and fairness in 
selection/appointment procedure of adjudicators/neutrals? 
2. Are there procedural guarantees in place to ensure equality of arms in presenting the 
case? 
3. How the cost of dispute resolutions are attributed and is it adequate in cloud dispute 
context? 
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3.1. Transparency and fairness in appointment 
 
To guarantee procedural fairness in the appointment of entities and persons that deal with 
disputes, two aspects need to be examined: professional- the expertise of the 
adjudicator/neutral, and ethical- impartiality and independence of the adjudicator/neutral.  
 
3.1.1. Expertise of third parties 
 
In judicial systems, the expertise of judges in general aspects of law and judicial procedures 
are verified through several stages of their professional life. Beginning with the initial training 
in the law and obtaining the law degree, usually to become a judge, the candidates would have 
to undergo additional professional training and accumulate years of experience in practice 
before being appointed to the position of a judge. The process of appointment of judges to a 
permanent position (tenure) differs from state to state, and the conditions vary. In many cases, 
the selection and appointment of judges are regulated by a constitution, in order to guarantee 
separation of powers and impartiality and independence from other branches of government.720 
The appointment process itself is of paramount importance for the democracy and is being held 
to the high standards of scrutiny in regards to professional expertise in matters of law. 721 
The expertise of third parties or neutrals in alternative dispute resolution depends on the needs 
of the specific case and agreement of the parties that specific person with required expertise 
handles the dispute. The third party, whether it is a mediator, conciliator or arbitrator, or 
combination of all those, does not necessarily have to be expert in law. Their expertise could 
be a relevant or subject matter of the dispute (in the case of arbitrators) or in managing conflict 
(mediators, conciliators). Moreover, even though their position depends on the agreement of 
the parties, and they could be selected from a variety of possible neutrals, if they are handling 
disputes as a chosen profession, then it is expected to have a certain expertise relevant to their 
practice.  
Article 6 of the ADR Directive guarantees a level of expertise of persons in charge of ADR 
and requires that they “possess the necessary knowledge and skills in the field of alternative or 
                                                          
720 MICHAL BOBEK, SELECTING EUROPE’S JUDGES : A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE APPOINTMENT PROCEDURES TO THE EUROPEAN 
COURTS. 
721 Id. 
223 
 
judicial resolution of consumer disputes, as well as a general understanding of the law.”722 
Given that ADR directive covers many forms of consumer dispute resolution, the requirement 
of the necessary knowledge and skills could vary significantly in relation to the subject matter 
of the disputes and ADR methods. Necessary knowledge and skill of a mediator are not the 
same as those of an arbitrator. It does require a general understanding law, but this is an 
unspecified requirement. It would have been more specific if it had required an understanding 
of consumer law. On the other hand, it leaves room for lawyers, attorneys, former judges and 
other legal professionals that have expertise or knowledge of judicial resolutions. Still, the 
criteria for the expertise of the third parties is unspecified and significantly lower compared to 
expertise criteria of judges in any national judicial system. 
It is interesting to the point that article 6 makes reference only to the expertise of the natural 
person in charge of ADR. If we consider the use of innovative forms of ODR, where the third 
party as a natural person could be replaced by software in assisting or proposing solutions or 
even adjudicating issues, we could question the adequacy of this requirement. Potential 
software that has capabilities comparable to required skills and knowledge of natural persons 
(if not exceeding them) would not stricto sensu have to be subjected to any requirement of 
expertise. If we assume that the requirement of expertise would be then referred to a natural 
person operating such system, then the ODR system could not operate completely 
autonomously without the oversight of natural persons with the required expertise. In that case, 
we could say that natural person could be a limiting factor for the development and use of ODR 
and artificial intelligence solutions if it is to be always linked to the expertise of a natural person 
in charge. The article 6 requirement is for a natural person in charge of ADR which indicates 
that the ODR systems would be considered only a tool in the hands of designated natural 
person. As we will see later in a discussion, this solution could affect the role of technology in 
ODR as a “fourth party.”723 This requirement could be mitigated by broader interpretation of 
required necessary knowledge and skills of persons in charge, so that technical person could 
suffice, or if it would be sufficient that there is a natural person in charge to handle issues that 
ODR “tool” could not handle by itself. Otherwise, the expertise is only required of natural 
persons, and not of legal entities operating the software. A legal entity has the right to use ODR 
system without implicating natural persons in the ADR process since there is no strict definition 
                                                          
722 Article 6 of ADR Directive 
723 Arno R. Lodder, The Third Party and Beyond. An analysis of the different parties, in particular The Fifth, 
involved in online dispute resolution, 15 INF. COMMUN. TECHNOL. LAW 143–155 (2006). 
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that would imply otherwise.724 This would legally bypass requirements of expertise of ODR 
system or ADR entity, but it becomes even more problematic when we discuss requirement of 
impartiality and independence.  
 
3.1.2. Impartiality and independence 
 
Requirements of impartiality and independence are regulated together with expertise in article 
6 of ADR Directive. Again, the Directive requires the Member States to ensure that the natural 
persons in charge of ADR are independent and impartial.725 Independence and impartiality are 
additionally specified with requirements that natural persons in charge of ADR are: (1) 
appointed for a term of office of sufficient duration to ensure the independence of their actions, 
and are not liable to be relieved from their duties without just cause; (2) are not subject to any 
instructions from either party or their representatives; (3) are remunerated in a way that is not 
linked to the outcome of the procedure.726 These requirements are comparable to the tenure of 
judges in judicial systems that guarantee their positions and security from being relieved 
without just cause, their financial stability, and independence from parties and government. 727 
Additionally, the Directive requires from natural persons to disclose without delay to the ADR 
and any circumstance that may or may be seen to, affect their independence and impartiality or 
give rise to a conflict of interest with either party to the dispute they are asked to resolve.728 
ADR entities must have procedures in place to replace natural persons in charge that would 
disclose such circumstances.729 In the case of relevant disclosure, a person is replaced with 
another natural person in charge of dispute resolution process, ADR entity proposes another 
entity competent to deal with the dispute or the procedure continues with the consent of the 
parties.730 
                                                          
724 Art 4 of ADR Directive defines:  ‘ADR entity’ means any entity, however named or referred to, which is 
established on a durable basis and offers the resolution of a dispute through an ADR procedure and that is 
listed in accordance with Article 20(2) and ‘ADR procedure’ means a procedure, as referred to in Article 2, 
which complies with the requirements set out in this Directive and is carried out by an ADR entity; 
725 Art 6 of ADR Directive 
726  Art 6 of ADR Directive par. 1. (b), (c), (d)  
727 William Howard Taft, The Selection and Tenure of Judges,  (1913). BOBEK, supra note 720. 
728 Art 6 of ADR Directive par. 1 (e)  
729 Art 6 par. 2  
730 Art 6 par. 2 (a)(b)(c) 
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As with other requirements in regards to expertise, impartiality, and independence, the 
Directive makes reference only to natural persons as the ones in charge of handling the dispute 
resolution process. It is an assumption that negates current technical capabilities of certain 
ODR systems, which are expected to become even more sophisticated with the development 
of artificial intelligence, natural language processing, and legal expert systems.731 Again, as 
with expertise, ADR entities that are legal entities, according to the Directive do not have any 
specific requirement or obligation to put natural persons in charge of ADR, which means they 
could use ODR systems as replacement of natural persons to handle ADR processes. In case 
the ADR entity is a legal entity (as opposed to natural persons that act as ADR entity alone) 
chooses to employ an ODR system, there would not be necessarily a natural person in charge 
of ADR and hence requirements of impartiality, independence and expertise are inexistent. 
This opens the door for possible misuse and fraud in case proper oversight is not conducted. It 
leaves out accountability and ethical constraints from persons in charge of setting up 
autonomous of ODR systems.  
Nevertheless, we are talking about the European Union Directive, and it depends on how the 
Member States are going to implement this norm into their national legislations. If they 
transcribe it verbatim, they will leave a loophole for ADR legal entities as well.  
No matter if the mentioned lacuna will actually become abused in practice, it shows that with 
minimal requirements of professional ethical standards it is possible to find ways of misuse. 
National legal systems place significantly more effort in securing impartiality and 
independence of judges, as this represents the backbone of democratic deliberation under the 
separation of branches of government. Also, impartiality and independence of judges are the 
foundations of the right to a fair trial, and as such it has been subject to significant interpretation 
and clarification of European Court of Human Rights. The independence is referred to in 
relation to other parties and in relation to other powers (Parliament and executive).732 ECHR 
has established following criteria on assessing independence:733 
                                                          
731 Davide Carneiro et al., Online dispute resolution: An artificial intelligence perspective, 41 ARTIF. INTELL. REV. 
(2014).John Zeleznikow, Developing an Online Dispute Resolution Environment : Dialogue Tools and 
Negotiation Support Systems in a Three-Step Model,  1–52.AR Lodder & John Zeleznikow, Artificial Intelligence 
and Online Dispute Resolution,  in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE: A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 73–94 (2012), http://www.mediate.com/pdf/lodder_zeleznikow.pdf (last visited Nov 26, 
2013). LODDER AND ZELEZNIKOW, supra note 731. 
732 CASE OF BEAUMARTIN v. FRANCE (Application no. 15287/89) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG  24 November 1994 
and CASE OF SRAMEK v. AUSTRIA (Application no. 8790/79) 22 October 1984 
733 CASE OF LANGBORGER v. SWEDEN (Application no. 11179/84) 22 June 1989; CASE OF KLEYN AND OTHERS 
v. THE NETHERLANDS 6 May 2003 
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 the manner of appointment of its members and 
 the duration of their term of office; 
 the existence of guarantees against outside pressures; 
 Whether the body presents an appearance of independence. 
We recognize the similarity of the criteria with requirements of ADR Directive, with the 
distinction of long-established jurisprudence on the issues of independence that is mandatory 
for all the states signatories to European Convention on Human Rights, which leaves less space 
for interpretation. Similarly, ECHR established criteria for assessing impartiality: (1) a 
subjective test, on personal conviction and behavior of a particular judge, that is, whether the 
judge held any personal prejudice or bias in a case; (2) an objective test, that is to say by 
ascertaining whether the tribunal itself and, among other aspects, its composition, offered 
sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in respect of its impartiality.734 
Looking at the criteria developed by the European Court of human rights, especially the manner 
of appointment of its members, we emphasize the significance of transparency in appointments 
of persons in charge of dispute resolution. Even though it ADR Directive promotes 
transparency by requiring specific information to be available on the sites of ADR providers, 
it is not held to such high standards of criteria as we can witness in judicial systems based on 
the jurisprudence of ECHR or national courts and national legislations. The appointments of 
judges are not on a voluntary basis. It is a differently regulated procedure in national systems, 
but usually in accordance with “natural” judge principle were cases are being distributed 
randomly.735 Contrariwise, cases are not being distributed randomly to natural persons within 
ADR entities (unless it is part of the appointment procedure where it ADR entity appoints a 
one or more arbitrators randomly) nor the selection of ADR entities is randomly rendered, but 
usually it is controlled by the parties, and it is based on their agreement. Different institutions 
or ADR entities have different rules for appointing third parties. Established institutional 
arbitrations usually have detailed procedures for appointment of arbitrators and the role of 
institutions in their appointments and selection. There are also principles and best practices for 
the appointment of arbitrators proposed in UNICTRAL Model laws and UNCITRAL 
                                                          
734 CASE OF MICALLEF v. MALTA (Application no. 17056/06) 15 October 2009 See more on it in Echr & Cedh, 
Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights Right to a fair trial, . 
735 BOBEK, supra note 720. 
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arbitration and conciliation rules. They serve as a guide if an agreement between the parties is 
not easy to reach. 
 
3.2. Equality of arms 
 
The equality of arms principle is an essential principle of the general concept of fairness within 
the right to a fair trial. It is a fundamental principle for adversarial adjudicative proceedings. 
Equality of arms underpins the equal opportunities of the parties in proceedings by assuring 
procedural equality of the parties to present their cases.736 As a part of the right to a fair trial, it 
is enshrined in the most important international conventions dealing with basic human rights. 
Our focus for comparison is mostly in Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which in its article 6 guarantee equality of arms among the states signatories of the Convention. 
By the wording of the Convention in the said article everyone is entitled to a fair hearing by 
the tribunal. The requirement of fair hearing establishes the general principle of fairness for 
criminal, civil proceedings. Signatory States do have more room for interpretation of 
requirements of fairness in civil proceedings than for criminal proceedings.737 Equality of arms 
as an element of fairness has been defined by the European Court of Human Rights in the sense 
of maintaining a fair balance between the parties.738 Fair balance entails affording a reasonable 
opportunity to present case and evidence under the condition that it does not place a party at 
the substantial disadvantage in relation to another party.739 The Court takes the position 
principle is a general formulation and does not require strict equality between the opposing 
sides, but in its jurisprudence gives examples of failures to protect equality of arms. For our 
context, an important example of such breach of equality of arms would be in cases where a 
party that enjoyed significant advantages in control or access to relevant information swayed 
considerable influence over the court’s rulings.740  
The ADR Directive in Article 9 provides similar requirements to the principle of equality of 
arms, with the proviso of the applicability to other methods as well and not just to the 
adversarial adjudicatory proceedings. It is framed in a way that the parties “have the possibility, 
                                                          
736 Shajeda Akther, Dr Rohaida & Binti Nordin, EQUALITY OF ARMS : A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF FAIR TRIAL 
GUARANTEE DEVELOPED BY INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, . 
737 Echr and Cedh, supra note. 734 p. 34.  
738 CASE OF FELDBRUGGE v. THE NETHERLANDS (Application no. 8562/79) of 29 May 1986 
739 CASE OF DOMBO BEHEER B.V. v. THE NETHERLANDS (Application no. 14448/88) of 27 October 1993 
740 CASE OF YVON v. FRANCE (Application no. 44962/98) 24 April 2003 par 37 
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within a reasonable period of time, of expressing their point of view, of being provided by the 
ADR entity with the arguments, evidence, documents and facts put forward by the other party, 
any statements made and opinions given by experts, and of being able to comment on them.”741   
The possibility to comment on presented arguments, evidence, documents is not exactly 
guaranteed equality of arms as interpreted by ECHR since it does not deal with the important 
aspect of disadvantages of another party. Therefore, as long as the substantially disadvantaged 
party is enabled to comment on other parties and expert submissions, the fairness requirements 
will be satisfied. The article 9 does not give any additional authority or guideline to ADR entity 
for handling the issues of fairness between the parties. This could have a detrimental effect on 
the fairness of the process, especially when there is a significant imbalance of power between 
the parties where one is overly dominant and has access to all information and evidence, and 
the other party does not have full access to needed evidence. If rules of ADR procedure would 
allow so, ADR entity or person in charge of ADR could be entitled to more investigatory 
powers or to reverse a burden of proof where appropriate, but this would have to be based on 
an agreement between the parties on the rules of ADR. Given our previous discussion on the 
effectiveness of post-dispute agreements were dominant party decides on acceptance of ADR 
on a case-by-case basis, it would be hard to expect that the third party would be given 
significant investigatory authority. In situations like these, regulatory intervention on behalf of 
a weaker party would be required to guarantee fairness. Legislators of the Member States could 
further elaborate on the requirement of fairness and establish higher standards. 
 
3.3. Distribution of costs 
 
The rules on distribution of costs are relevant from the point of view of access to justice. In the 
first “wave” of access to justice, the equality before the court was guaranteed, but the costs of 
litigation were prohibitive to the poor.742 We could say that rules on distribution of costs were 
not adequate for all categories of the population to allow access to justice. Looking at our 
context and the international framework we are interested to see how the cost of dispute 
resolutions are attributed among parties and is it adequate in cloud dispute context? 
                                                          
741 Article 9 of ADR Directive 
742 CAPPELLETTI, supra note.37 
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All countries impose fees on the parties who initiate the proceedings and sometimes even on 
defendants in certain stages of the trial.743 The amount of imposed fees is regulated by statutes 
and depend on the type of courts, type of case or other factors. Hodges reports that the majority 
of countries use a tariff system, either basing the fee on a specified fixed percentage of the 
claim value or on the basis of a detailed tariff that specifies certain bands of fees or percentages 
for cases of differing values.744 Two approaches are distinguished with the court fees: one that 
requires upfront payments and another that requires payments during specific steps of the 
process.  “A large initial fee may obviously deter access to the courts, but again that depends 
on the size of the fee relative to the resources of users.”745 
Other important aspects of the distribution of costs are costs-shifting rules. Most jurisdictions 
have rules of costs shifting where the majority of countries adhere to the general costs shifting 
rule were loser pays.746 Exceptions are countries like the United States and Lithuania and in the 
EU where the rule is that each party bears its own cost.747 For our context of low-value disputes, 
it is important to mention rules on costs in the EU Small Claim Procedure. Recital 29 of the 
Regulation on European Small Claim Procedure states: 
The costs of the proceedings should be determined in accordance with national law. Having 
regard to the objectives of simplicity and cost-effectiveness, the court or tribunal should order 
that an unsuccessful party be obliged to pay only the costs of the proceedings, including for 
example any costs resulting from the fact that the other party was represented by a lawyer or 
another legal professional, or any costs arising from the service or translation of documents, 
which are proportionate to the value of the claim or which were necessarily incurred.748 
 
However, the success of the dispute is not always clear-cut win or lose scenario. Almost every 
jurisdiction has rules of costs shifting and costs of distribution based on the partial success of 
the claim or counterclaim which usually leads to proportionate amounts of bearing costs 
relative to the success of the claim of each party.749 If we compare these principles and national 
rules on cost attribution and costs shifting with the rules on fees in the ADR directive, we can 
notice a strong inclination to consumer protection in the ADR processes. In Art 8 of the ADR 
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European Small Claims Procedure [2007] OJ L 199/1. 
749 Id. p.18. 
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Directive, it is proclaimed that the procedure is free of charge or available at a nominal fee for 
consumers.750 We have seen in our survey in Chapter 5 that the significant number of the ADR 
providers, in fact, provides ADR mechanism free of charge for consumers or for a nominal fee. 
Still, it is important to the point that even those nominal fees are sometimes comparable if not 
exceeding significantly more than potential costs of cloud services relevant for our context. 
This distinction would be even more drastic compared to court fees, even under the smallest 
fees regulated by small claim procedures is in the Member States of the EU. 
 
If we consider ODR platform as part of ADR process, which also incurs certain costs of 
functioning, it is pertinent to stress that the service that platform provides is free of charge for 
both parties and not just consumers. It even offers free case management tool for online dispute 
resolution. The lack of fees for ODR platform is an additional incentive for the use of the tool 
in handling disputes. The rules for distribution of costs only paint part of the picture. In the 
following section, we will approximate the difference in actual costs for disputes before courts 
and ADRs. 
 
With all above mentioned aspects in mind, we come to the conclusion that procedural fairness, 
as observed through these three aspects, would expectedly a strong side for traditional 
litigation. In fact, procedural guarantees are sometimes so stringent that could become a 
hindrance on dispute resolution, with possible effects on duration which is necessary for every 
procedural requirement to take place equally for both sides. Equality before the law and 
guarantees of due process are well established constitutional principles in any rule of law 
society. Hence, looking strictly from procedural guarantees, when it comes to independence 
and impartiality, and equality of arms, judicially system provide most to the weaker party to 
the dispute. However, treating sides equally means that usually losing party bears the cost in 
accordance with law and its cost-shifting rules. Here, we see one aspect where ADR Directive 
and ODR Regulation are in a position to benefit more to the weaker party-consumer by mostly 
getting rid of charges for consumers or capping them to a nominal level.  Still, the overall 
assessment and expectations of procedural fairness give courts significant advantage.  
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4. Efficiency 
 
Efficiency is a broad economic term for a measure of the extent to which input is well used for 
an intended task or function (output).751 One aspect of efficiency is a measurement of 
productive efficiency where no additional output can be obtained without increasing the 
amount of inputs, and production proceeds at the lowest possible average total cost.752 Here, 
we are mostly interested in a simplification of efficiency indicators and comparison between 
different entities with those indicators. We are focusing mostly on time indicators of average 
time spent and costs, as defined in following questions: 
1. Could average time of proceedings before DR be described as faster relative to others 
forms of DR? 
2. Are the average costs of the proceeding before ADR measured by average institution 
fees per case, lower compared to others forms of DR? 
 
4.1. Average time comparison 
 
In Chapter 5 we have seen some of the research related to the average duration of ADRs, 
especially consumer arbitration the United States, where the average time spent according to 
several studies range between two and four months.753 Of course, these are general consumer 
arbitration studies without the specific context of the dispute, and they do not provide specific 
information for types of disputes that are in our focus. They serve as a general illustration of 
the time efficiency of ADR process.  For our assessment of international framework for cloud 
service disputes, it is essential to focus on European legal framework embodied in the ADR 
Directive and ODR Regulation.  
In article 8 of ADR Directive is it is required that the outcome of the ADR procedure be made 
available within a period of 90 calendar days from the date on which the ADR entity has 
received the complete complaint file, with the possible extension in case of highly complex 
disputes.754 ADR entities listed on ODR platform are required to provide information on 
average length of dispute resolution proceedings.755 In case they are not connected to ODR 
                                                          
751 P. A. (PHILIP A.) BLACK ET AL., ECONOMICS : PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2000). 
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platform but comply with ADR Directive, they are still required to provide information on 
average length of dispute resolution proceedings on the website of the ADR entity and to 
provide this information to interested parties.756 We have conducted the survey based on 
available information from the ADR entities listed on ODR platform, of both general and 
specific sector ADRs (for internet services) and found that they comply with these 
requirements. Of all 258 ADR entities, 30 of them (11.62%) finalize outcome within 30 days, 
83 (32.2%) within 60 days and 123 (47.7%) within 3 months.757 Only 22 (8.5%) surpass 
required three months. 758 Out of 57 ADR entities that capable of dealing with disputes over 
Internet services (although the meaning and capacity of this qualification we have already 
questions in the previous chapter) number show that 10 do it in up to a month, 17 up to two 
months and 29 up to three months, with only 1 reported for average duration more than 90 
days.759 If other specified conditions are met, and one of the listed ADR entities is selected for 
handling disputes between cloud providers and users, the numbers on the average length of the 
procedure show similarity with consumer arbitration in the United States.  
If we compare this data with the data available on the average duration of civil and commercial 
cases before the courts in the EU, we cannot negate certain advantages in ADR timeframes.  
Although we do not have specific data on duration of cases that are relevant to our research (as 
this is hard to obtain) we can draw general but relevant conclusions on general average times 
of different countries in the EU. Following table presents CEPEJ monitoring of the time of 
civil and commercial litigious cases between 2010 and 2014 for EU Countries with following 
average, median, minimum and maximum days at the EU level for available data on the years 
2010, 2012 and 2014 respectively: 
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758 id 
759 Id. p. 189.  
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Country 2010. 2012.  2014. 
Austria 129 135  130 
Belgium NA NA  NA 
Bulgaria NA NA  NA 
Croatia 462 457  380 
Cyprus 513 NA  NA 
Czech Republic 128 174  163 
Denmark 182 165  177 
Estonia 215 167  125 
Finland 259 325  289 
France 279 311  348 
Germany 184 183  192 
Greece 190 469  330 
Hungary 160 97  144 
Latvia 315 241  225 
Lithuania 55 88  97 
Luxemburg 200 73  103 
Malta 849 685  536 
Ireland NA NA  NA 
Italy 493 590  532 
Netherlands NA NA  132 
Poland 180 195  203 
Portugal 417 369  NA 
Romania 217 193  146 
Slovakia 364 437  524 
Slovenia 315 318  228 
Spain 289 264  318 
Sweden 187 179  157 
United Kingdom NA NA  NA 
Average  266 243  243 
Median  195 188  177 
Minimum  13 40  33 
Maximum  849 685  603 
Table No 4: Evolution of the Disposition Time of civil and commercial litigious cases between 2010 and 2014 for EU 
Countries according to CEPEJ study 2016 (2014 data)760 
 
 
This table presents average time frames for all cases including small value litigation for which 
we do not have specific data. European Small Claims Procedure Regulation proclaimed the 
goal of increasing the speed of proceedings, but without imposing specific time limitations.761 
However, there is a deadline of 30 days within which the court has to provide judgment based 
on written submissions when all other procedural conditions have been met (which also have 
guaranteed procedural deadlines), or in case court is not able to deliver a final judgment, take 
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further details and evidence or summon parties to an oral hearing within 30 days of the 
summons.762  
Small Claims Court procedure as harmonized by European regulation could be comparable in 
the time necessary for handling disputes with ADR entities if all actions and submissions by 
the parties and the court are taken without significant delays within procedural deadlines. That 
being said it would be still expected that ADR entities, given their lower formalism in 
proceedings and higher flexibility in communication, would still be able to deliver faster 
outcomes in comparable cases. In cloud service disputes communication would be presumably 
even faster, given that both parties are apt for online communication and would potentially 
prefer this way to offline.  
 
4.2. Average costs comparison 
 
We have talked about the rules on the attribution of costs. To paint a proper picture of factors 
that influence party’s decision to initiate disputes we should also assess average costs between 
courts and ADRs. The costs of ADR differs significantly relative to the type of case, by the 
claim, a number of third parties, institutional fees (especially renowned commercial 
institutions), etc. We have seen in Chapter 5 fees for consumers in the US arbitration schemes 
(200 $ for initiating disputes regardless of value under AAA). For our context of low-value 
claims in cross-border cloud service disputes, the EU’s ADR Directive and ODR Regulation 
are most relevant. ADR Directive set the standards on cost with an obvious inclination to 
consumer protection as the weaker parties in cross-border disputes. The article 8 of ADR 
Directive requires that the ADR procedure is free of charge or available at a nominal fee for 
consumers.  
In our survey on ADR entities listed on ODR platform, we found that 199 of 258 ADR entities 
that require fees to be paid the consumer, and of 59 of those require 36 have fixed nominal fees 
for consumers. Of 57 ADR entities dealing with internet service disputes, 39 do not require 
fees to be paid by the consumer.763 Traders are also exempt from fees in 147 of the total number 
of ADR and in 29 of 57 for internet service disputes.764 This shows the intent of regulator to 
                                                          
762 Id. Article 7 
763 See more in section 4.2.1.4. Survey on Dispute Resolution Entities in the EU p.187. 
764 Id. 
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incentivize voluntary adherence to ADR schemes by lowering or exempting from fees traders 
as well. The time will show if the fee incentive is sufficient to attract a larger volume with the 
cross-border law by the dispute cases. At the moment based on available data displayed in 
Chapter 5, the significant attraction has not been demonstrated. The logic “if you build it they 
will come” might not be entirely sufficient when there are other interests at play. 765 
Looking at our context, again we need to differentiate between general costs of all civil disputes 
and costs of small claims procedures. For cloud service disputes in most cases, small claim 
procedures are more relevant if all conditions are met for that to be applied. In cases where 
small claims courts that assume jurisdiction, general civil courts will impose appropriate fees 
according to their rules. The following graph shows results of the questionnaire on the amounts 
of proceeding fees in Study on the Transparency of Costs of Civil Judicial Proceedings in the 
European Union. The study includes small claim procedures, and obviously, fees in the range 
of 20-249 Euros are most prevalent.  
 
Amount in EUR |    Free |     1-19 |  20-49 |  50-99 |     100-249 | 250-349 | 350-499 | 500-749 | 750-999 | +1000  
Graph 1- Amount of proceeding fees in Study on the Transparency of Costs of Civil Judicial Proceedings in the 
European Union Source: public questionnaire 766 
 
                                                          
765 Reference “if you build it they will come”  is made to the line in movie “Field of Dreams” 
766 Study on the Transparency of Costs of Civil Judicial Proceedings in the European Union, final report, 2007. 
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The importance of small claims should be emphasized once more, as new Regulation promised 
disputes with proportionate costs under harmonized procedure.767 The research of Christopher 
Hodges and others have conducted on civil costs, in a scenario where repayment was sought 
by a consumer of €200 price paid for a product not delivered, showed that total costs in small 
claim dispute, whoever bears the final costs are not proportionate to the sum in dispute in a 
significant number of countries.768 
 
 
Graph 2- a Case study of Christopher Hodges, Stefan Vogenauer and Magdalena Tulibacka et al.  on court fees 
on small claim case where repayment was sought by a consumer of €200 price paid for a product not delivered.769 
With time, possibly the costs of small claims procedures will become proportionate to the value 
of the claims. However revoking that in our context the price of the disputed cloud service 
could be significantly lower than exemplified €200, it is hard to imagine that costs of the 
procedure, which include several procedural and administration steps, will be entirely 
                                                          
767 Recital 7 of REGULATION (EC) No 861/2007 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 
July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure states: … It should be necessary to have regard to 
the principles of simplicity, speed and proportionality when setting the costs of dealing with a claim under the 
European Small Claims Procedure. It is appropriate that details of the costs to be charged be made public, and 
that the means of setting any such costs be transparent. 
768 HODGES, VOGENAUER, AND TULIBACKA, supra note 161. p.53. 
769 Id. p.34. 
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proportionate to the value or claim of cloud service disputes. The smaller or somewhat 
proportional costs to the value of the dispute will always play an important role in deciding to 
escalate the conflict. In confirming the importance of the costs relative to party’s decision on 
initiating a proceeding in low-value claims. Hodges notes: 
In low-value claims, costs are frequently both high and disproportionate to the amount in dispute. This can 
be so irrespective of whether or not costs are controlled by a tariff. In other words, all court-based dispute 
resolution systems have an inherent level of costs that produces a threshold of cost proportionality: below the 
threshold, cases may not be worth pursuing and may either be dropped or pursued through alternative 
means.770 
 
By way of conclusion, we can say that empirical research and comparisons of average durations 
and costs of different dispute resolution bodies indicate that ADRs would have the expected 
advantage over judicial systems for the disputes related to cloud services. We can couple this 
with regulatory requirements in favor of efficiency that also makes ADRs favorable. However, 
it is evident that ODR with online communication platforms and the possibility of 
asynchronous handling of disputes would have an additional advantage over traditional offline 
ADRs. The practicality of the technology directly translates into efficiency, which makes ODR 
most appropriate for the online disputants, and hence weaker party to the dispute as well.     
 
5. Effectiveness  
 
Effectiveness is often defined as the ability to be successful and produce the intended results.771 
Hence, we observe the effectiveness of dispute resolution mechanisms by looking at their 
outcomes. The outcomes of dispute resolution mechanisms vary significantly due to the fact 
that the mechanisms by itself are different and sometimes intended or selected for different 
purposes.  
There are several methods to measure the effectiveness of the dispute resolution. All these 
methods require some form of extensive empirical research into the produced effects of the 
outcomes, satisfaction, and perception of the process and the outcome, perception of justice 
                                                          
770 Id. p.72. 
771 effectiveness Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary, , 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/effectiveness (last visited Jan 27, 2017). 
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(procedural or substantive) reached through the process, etc.772 Researching specific or several 
aspects the outcomes based on empirical data constitutes thesis by itself with proper 
methodology and far exceeds resources for our research.773 Given the variety of possible 
disputes, parties to the dispute (consumers, enterprises), international aspects of the dispute, 
complex international legal framework and potential technical aspects of the dispute, it would 
be hard to devise methodology that encompasses all of these facets and produce significant 
conclusions on the outcomes, other than general observations already established by previous 
research under different methodologies and interpretations.  
Because of the variety of dispute resolution mechanisms and respective regulations we chose 
to focus on two aspects of dispute resolution process which are essential for the effectiveness 
of all different dispute resolution mechanisms. These two aspects answer our questions from 
conceptual framework regarding effectiveness: 
 Is the voluntary compliance necessary for the success of the dispute resolution? 
 How many legal actions are needed for the enforcement? 
 
5.1. Voluntary compliance 
 
The question of voluntary compliance is to a large extent comparable with the issues of 
acceptance of dispute resolution methods in the sense that it relies on parties’ assessment of its 
interests to comply and act on it. In most cases, parties comply with the outcome of the process. 
The reason for that lies in the expectancy that in the case of incompliance, mechanisms that 
ensure enforcement will be applied, often adding additional expenses to the party.  However, 
those mechanisms are not always available.  
On the one hand, we have dispute resolution schemes with binding outcomes. Those range 
from judicial processes, binding arbitration, the binding decision of neutral third party 
following conciliation, binding settlements stemming either from mediation or negotiation. The 
defining factor for all of them is a lack of reliance on the voluntary compliance and the external 
assistance available if necessary for enforcement. In case a party refuses to comply with the 
binding outcome, pertinent regulations are in place to guaranty the enforcement of the outcome. 
                                                          
772 Gramatikov, Barendrecht, and Verdonschot, supra note 162.Bingham et al., supra note 529 .Verdonschot et 
al., supra note 162; Gramatikov, Barendrecht, and Verdonschot, supra note 77. 
773 Id. 
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In most cases, enforcement is vested in the power of states to use force or other means necessary 
for the compliance with the binding outcome. This also refers to alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms and their enforcement which by and large depend on state assistance in 
enforcement in case of incompliance. For cross-border disputes, the New York Convention is 
of paramount importance for the recognition of arbitral awards. The biding settlements usually 
include a clause that the agreement is enforceable in a court of law. Having external state 
mechanism guaranteeing the outcome renders the binding decisions and court rulings effective 
by themselves. Voluntary compliance is a more pertinent issue with non-binding dispute 
resolution mechanisms, where effectiveness relies on the good faith of parties. Reaching an 
agreement that is to the greatest extent satisfactory for both parties is one way to ensure the 
likelihood of voluntary compliance. Pleading to the underlying interests of the parties is 
essential for conducting dispute resolution and its effectiveness. 
When it comes to non-binding dispute resolution, the enforcement depends on the will of 
parties. If the participation was voluntary, not required by any regulation, the likelihood of 
successful outcome is great considering that the outcome should be agreed by the parties. The 
parties who are willing to agree to a non-binding settlement, are less likely to refuse compliance 
after the agreement.774 Of course, it is possible that a party changes its mind, but the overall 
success rate of mediation testify the likelihood of voluntary follow-through compliance. The 
main question here brings us back to the previously discussed issues when it comes to cloud 
service disputes. Will the party agree to participate in the first place? 
In Chapter 5 we have discussed general success rates of mediation that included both voluntary 
and mandatory mediation. Steffek and Hopt reported on prevailing success rate when it comes 
to mediation if we define conclusion of settlements or similar agreements between the parties 
as a successful termination (France 80%; Hungary 87%, 66 and 67%; Italy 48% and 76%; 
Netherlands 65% and 87%; Portugal 48%, 35%, 50 to 70% and 70%; Japan 60%; Russia 80%; 
Spain 70.5%; Switzerland 70.4%).775 The numbers do not show 100% success rate, but even 
with judicial proceedings, 100% of enforcement rate is difficult to accomplish for various 
reasons (death, lack of means, legal obstacles, etc.).  These numbers show the success rate of 
initiated mediation under already developed mechanisms for certain types of disputes that are 
deemed appropriate for mediation. We do not have access to data on the success rate of initiated 
mediation where there is a big negotiation power discrepancy and hence can not draw specific 
                                                          
774 ANDREWS, supra note 72. 
775 HOPT AND STEFFEK, supra note 472. 
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conclusion relative to our context based on these general findings. We can only turn to 
circumstantial indicators that are reasonably argumentative and relevant for generalized 
comparison between binding and non-binding dispute resolution mechanism within our 
context.  
For cloud service disputes as we mentioned many times, the bigger issue and main indicator 
are acceptance on non-binding dispute resolution mechanisms. The data published on EU ODR 
platform, unfortunately, do not paint an optimistic picture when it comes to acceptance or 
submission of complaints regarding cloud disputes. The survey we have conducted on cloud 
providers terms of service did not show any inclination towards non-binding mediation through 
the EU ODR platform or otherwise. Therefore, we can only conclude the lack of effectiveness 
in voluntary schemes would not be caused by a lack of willingness to comply with the 
previously mediated non-binding settlement, but due to lack of acceptance of such mechanisms 
in the first place. This then goes back to the issues of the power relationship between parties 
and their interest to participate. Luckily, there are mechanisms that do not rely on the will of 
the party to secure the successful outcome of the dispute resolution process.  
 
5.2. Enforcement 
 
Voluntary compliance with binding or nonbinding decision is always the easiest way to ensure 
a successful outcome of the dispute resolution process. We see that there are issues with 
voluntary compliance, but for the rule of law to exist, there must be an enforcement mechanism 
in place when a party refuses to comply with the binding decision. This is a traditional role of 
courts. In the case a court decision is not complied with by a party in a specified timeframe, 
the opposing party can submit a motion for judicial enforcement. In some countries, the 
enforcement is also vested in private entities with public authority, but their activities are also 
highly regulated and controlled by public bodies. For our context, we are mainly interested in 
the enforcement of decisions with a foreign element. Those can be from the point of claimant 
either domestic court decision that needs to be enforced in another country since plaintiff does 
not have any property in claimant’s jurisdiction, or foreign judgment that needs to be enforced 
against a party in his domicile by a local court.  
If within our context Brussels I Regulation is applicable, the recent changes to the Regulation 
(recast) has abolished exequatur procedure that was regulating recognition and enforcement of 
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Member State judgments. Until the changes exequatur procedure slowed enforcement by 
requiring the judgment of other Member State to be verified in local court, although in a limited 
fashion. With the recast, Brussels I Regulation in its article 53 requires only to present the 
enforcing court a copy of the judgment and a standard certificate delivered by the court which 
rendered the judgment. The new rule removes a significant barrier for enforcement of foreign 
judgments in the EU and hence allows higher access to justice. However, this is only to be 
applied if Brussels I is applicable and we have seen that in regards to our context that is not 
always the case. Even if Brussels I is invoked for consumer cases allowing the jurisdiction of 
the court where the consumer has a domicile, recent changes that broadened the scope to out 
of EU entities as well do not address the issues of enforcement over those entities.  In case 
cloud provider does not have a domicile or property in the EU territory, national rules of private 
international law for recognition of foreign judgment apply.  The rules can differ between 
different jurisdiction, and some jurisdictions do not recognize judgments from certain countries 
at all. Nonetheless, the rules for recognition usually involve a verification by the local enforcing 
court, which means additional procedure and potentially additional costs and delay. These can 
also be abolished by bilateral state agreements. These have not been sufficient for the global 
economy since the issues of enforcement in cross-border cases has motivated international 
trade to turn to alternative dispute resolutions.  
When it comes to ADR, the main significance of the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as the New York Convention, 
undoubtedly is in the relaxation of the rules for enforcement of arbitral awards. Under the 
Convention, an arbitration award issued in any other state can generally be freely enforced in 
any other contracting state, only subject to certain, limited grounds for objection defined in Art 
5. The number of signatories to Convention is high enough to make the Convection nonpareil 
instrument in international commercial arbitration. However, as we have discussed in the 
previous chapter, there are some issues, especially with the applicability of NY Convention to 
an agreement made online and online arbitration awards enforceability. The Convention is due 
for an update and until the wide acceptance of proposed changes in accompanying regulations 
is achieved, ODR and more specifically online arbitration could be handicapped by the lack of 
recognition under NY Convention.  
To conclude, observing effectiveness from these two aspects of enforcement, indicate that 
mandatory or binding dispute resolution has a clear advantage over non-binding. Even if the 
rates of non-compliance are not high, still they are high enough to make bargaining methods 
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ineffective if there are no residual binding mechanisms that would incentivize voluntary 
compliance.  On the other hand, among binding adjudicatory measures, ODR field has still to 
work out some wrinkles to be able to smoothly enforce decisions. Traditional arbitration has a 
significant tool in NY Convention applicable both in and outside of the EU. With the removal 
of exequatur in Brussels recast, enforcement of foreign judgments has been liberalized. The 
enforcement in countries outside of the EU remains within national law requirements which 
could be very diverse. Hence, traditional offline arbitration could be considered most 
internationally enforceable and effective mechanism.  
 
 
6. Access to justice and fairness for cloud services under international legal 
framework 
 
What we have discussed so far are the building blocks to answer the question: to what extent 
the dispute resolution mechanisms under current international legal framework are adequate 
for cloud service disputes to ensure access to justice and fairness?  To answer this, we need to 
know which dispute resolution mechanism under current international legal framework is the 
most adequate for cloud service disputes and does it ensure access to justice and fairness.  
When we put the context against the dispute resolution schemes that are available under the 
current international legal framework, we are checking if the legal frameworks arrange the 
appropriate or fair distribution between parties in relation to key concepts: accessibility, 
fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness. According to Rawls inequalities are to be arranged to 
benefit worse off party. Ideally both sides would be equally beneficial in the access to justice 
that is nominally guaranteed, but in reality, a number of factors influence worsening of the 
position of a party. 
We are going to make a distinction in the comparison between adjudicatory and non- 
adjudicatory methods. We are addressing adjudicatory dispute resolution mechanisms first, as 
they are the backbone of dispute resolution systems. Having in mind the dispute resolution 
pyramid scheme design, where for proper efficiency and effectiveness, as well as incentives 
for the parties, we need to position adjudicative dispute resolution on the top of the pyramid, 
meaning that we cannot rely solely on non-adjudicatory mechanisms. This is especially 
relevant in situations of vast imbalance in negotiation power. Therefore, looking from our 
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theoretical framework, we first compare the most relevant forms of adjudicatory dispute 
resolution mechanisms, under four key concepts, which translate to nine comparable variables. 
We have concluded each section with the comparison but to see it more clearly we can represent 
it in the following tables: 
Framework 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
Access to 
justice as 
fairness 
 
in  
 
cross-
border 
low-value 
cloud 
service 
dispute   
 
Adjudicatory Dispute Resolution (DR) 
Mechanisms 
Courts 
 
 
Alternative 
DR 
 
Arbitration 
(in 
compliance 
with ADR 
Directive, not 
online) 
Online DR 
 
Arbitration 
(in 
compliance 
with ODR 
Regulation)  
The most 
benefiting to 
the worse off 
party in 
cloud service 
dispute 
Accessibility Availability of dispute 
resolution body 
 
High Medium  Low Court 
Accessibility to dispute 
resolution body 
Medium Low High  
Procedural 
Fairness 
Independence and 
impartiality 
High Medium Low Court 
Equality of arms 
 
High Medium Low 
Rules on costs of DR Low Medium High 
Efficiency Duration of processes 
 
Low Medium High ODR 
Costs Low Medium High 
Effectiveness  Success Rate 
 
High Medium Low Court and 
ADR 
Enforcement of 
outcome 
 
Medium High Low 
Table No 5. Comparison between dispute resolution mechanisms within the framework of access to justice as 
fairness. Values: low, medium, and high relative to the benefit of worse off party. 
 
Looking at the table, we get clear impression that courts remain to be the mechanism of dispute 
resolution that is most benefiting to the worse off party in cloud service dispute. The availability 
of the courts is guaranteed, and so are the higher procedural standards. Currently, the 
involuntary enforcement relies heavily on courts. What it lacks in efficiency it compensates in 
consistency and remains the backbone of the rule of law. However, this also portrays 
inadequacy of alternative dispute resolution (both ADR and ODR) to fill the spot, and in 
scenarios where they could supposedly be more useful, they do not achieve its purpose. Would 
the situation be different if we would introduce non-adjudicatory mechanisms? Maybe the 
variety in the approach could be the difference? However, according to the pyramid as 
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explained in Chapter 5, with all the variety non-adjudicatory methods are effective only in 
cooperation with residual adjudicatory methods. In the following table we introduce the non-
adjudicatory forms and observe them in conjunction with adjudicatory: 
 
Framework 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
Access to 
justice as 
fairness 
 
in  
 
cross-
border 
low-value 
cloud 
service 
dispute  
 
Dispute Resolution (DR) 
Mechanisms 
Courts 
 
 
Adjudicatory 
Alternative DR 
 
Arbitration 
(in compliance 
with ADR 
Directive, not 
online) 
Non-
adjudicatory 
Alternative DR 
 
Mediation/Conci
liation 
(in compliance 
with ADR 
Directive, not 
online) 
Non-adjudicatory 
Online DR 
 
Mediation/Concili
ation 
(in compliance 
with ODR 
Regulation) 
Adjudicatory 
Online DR 
 
Arbitration 
(in compliance 
with ODR 
Regulation)  
The most 
benefiting 
to the 
worse off 
party in 
cloud 
service 
dispute 
Accessibilit
y 
Availability 
of dispute 
resolution 
body 
 
Highest  High Medium Low Lowest Court and 
online 
mediation 
Accessibility 
to dispute 
resolution 
body 
Low Lowest Medium Highest High  
Procedural 
Fairness 
Independenc
e and 
impartiality 
Highest High Medium Low Lowest Court 
Equality of 
arms 
 
Highest High Low Lowest Medium 
Rules on 
costs of DR 
Lowest Low High Highest Medium 
Efficiency Duration of 
processes 
 
Lowest Low Medium Highest High ODR 
(online 
mediation) 
Costs Lowest Low Medium Highest High 
Effectivenes
s  
Success Rate 
 
Highest High Low Lowest Medium Court and 
arbitration 
Enforcement 
of outcome 
 
High Highest Medium Low Lowest 
Table 6. Comparison between dispute resolution mechanisms within the framework of access to justice as 
fairness that includes non-adjudicatory forms of dispute resolution. Values: lowest, low, medium, high, and 
highest relative to the benefit of worse off party. 
 
We get similar results of comparison with somewhat adjusted approaches dependent on the 
acceptance of the non-adjudicatory method. Obviously, if they would be accepted, methods 
like online mediation would be an additional tool and could complement still dominant court 
system. This is also in line with the reform of certain judicial systems which plans to rely more 
on online mechanisms to filter the cases and quickly resolve smaller claims through several 
non-adjudicatory methods.776 
                                                          
776 See LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS, CIVIL COURTS STRUCTURE REVIEW: FINAL REPORT (2016), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/civil-courts-structure-review-final-report-jul-16-final-1.pdf (last visited Apr 15, 
2017). 
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Finally, to answer the question to what extent the dispute resolution mechanisms under current 
international legal framework are adequate for cloud service disputes to ensure access to justice 
and fairness, we must simply state that it depends on circumstances. It depends to what extent 
providers as the more dominant parties are willing to participate in voluntary, contractual 
dispute resolution mechanisms. 
When it comes to cloud providers who are unwilling to participate - to the extent mandatory 
primarily adjudicatory mechanisms are in place. That would be courts and traditional litigation. 
We have discussed in Chapter 4 the international legal framework for litigation, and together 
with the data presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we can say that the framework is not 
adequate. It does not allow access to justice and access to redress in the disputes that originate 
out of cloud services. Precisely, because of perceived deficiency of the courts, the EU has 
introduced ADR Directive and ODR Regulation as additional tools for tackling the issues of 
cross-border consumer disputes.  
On the other hand, if providers are willing to participate, then we could have additional 
mechanisms like online mediation or online adjudication of sorts that would be useful and more 
adequate tools, but it would still be a limited mechanism and eventually reliant on traditional 
courts. Either as an incentive for dealing in the “shadows of the law” or as enforcement. From 
what we have observed as we have seen in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, cloud providers are mostly 
not interested in participating in mentioned alternatives, or they are uninformed and yet to 
reassess their position if they find it compelling in some way. In the following chapter, we will 
look into possible legal measures that could adjust existing regulatory framework to be 
adequate for cloud service disputes.  
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Chapter 7 - Online Dispute Resolution for Cloud Service 
Disputes 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
 
We have seen in Chapter 6 to what extent current international legal framework is adequate for 
cloud service disputes. In this chapter, we will explore what needs to be done to improve the 
existing framework. Certainly, there are a number of ways to improve and adjust any of the 
forms of dispute resolution to suit cloud service disputes or any other type of disputes if the 
proper amount of focus and resources are allocated to handling the issues. Ideally, courts as an 
integral part of the judicial system should be perfectly suited to handle all disputes allowing 
full access to justice, in all its aspects. Just as any branch of government, the judiciary cannot 
reach its ideal form, and it operates within constraints and limitations. Access to justice for all 
will remain to be the goal of dispute system design. Presently, we need to focus on those issues 
where we identified insufficient access to justice in specific circumstances. For our research 
that is the context of cloud service disputes. Since cloud service disputes could be by and large 
described as low-value cross-border disputes, naturally we focus on optimizing regulations 
dealing with low-value cross-border disputes.  EU ODR and ADR regulations are exactly 
intended to deal with this kind of cases in the EU. In Chapter 6 we have compared the likely 
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outcomes of the EU regulatory framework on the cloud service disputes to see if it achieves or 
improves access to justice for cloud disputants. The comparison with traditional systems has 
shown that not only that it does not warrant the access to justice, but that in many cases it is 
comparably a lot behind courts. The judicial system, of course, remains the backbone of the 
right to a fair trial and hence access to justice. The legislative efforts to improve the system 
with adding additional tools for remedy remain ineffective because of the small number of 
perceived points that could be addressed in future legislations.  
A regulatory framework for low-value cross-border disputes already exists. The easiest and 
most prudent way to handle what we described as problematic from the point of our cloud 
service context, is to address the ADR Directive and ODR Regulation respectively, to enhance 
their effectiveness with a number of pertinent tweaks. We have already identified the points 
where ODR in particular underachieves. Naturally, this will be our roadmap in proposing steps 
to ameliorate the framework and to ensure the adequacy of ODR for cloud services. We have 
illustrated the lack of actual definition of ODR in Chapter 5 and touched upon its evolving 
relationship with new technologies. We will continue to address ODR tools having in mind 
developing technologies while at the same time have technology neutrality regulatory mindset. 
We take the stand, however, that the regulation should not prevent greater possible role of 
technology and that if fact should create proper boundaries for it to fulfill its potential and 
usefulness for it users.  
Many lessons can be drawn from the established ODR practices. ODR has been developing for 
two decades, and its history offers significant insights for the dispute resolution design.  
ICANN’s Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP procedure) is interesting 
as a single set of rules for adjudicatory ODR that is globally applicable and effective. 
Before we address the specific issues in the regulations and propose the alternatives, we will 
briefly observe the proposal for a global international framework that did not achieve its 
purpose because of the hurdles of international consensus. It is still interesting for comparison 
and as a guideline for the design of dispute system on a global or a regional level. The approach 
the UNCITRAL has taken was different as it did not seek to grow from existing ADR practices, 
but to create a framework for ODR which stands by its rules and clarifies the missing 
procedural issues on a global scale. We observe both the UNCITRALS ODR work 
and UDRP through the perspective of our framework and draw conclusions from it. It 
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reinforces our arguments for necessary changes to existing European regulatory framework to 
achieve its purpose of having effective dispute resolution tool for low-value consumer disputes.  
Another important framework that has to be addressed is recently introduced, Privacy Shield.  
Cloud services deal with data and in many ways, especially consumer-oriented services in the 
Single market, have to comply with EU data protection regulations. European Commission and 
U.S. Department of Commerce have negotiated the agreement setting up Privacy Shield 
framework that covers the transfer of personal data from the EU to the US. Privacy Shield 
guarantees redress through independent dispute resolution and binding arbitration for cases 
dealing with personal data.777    
We contrast UNCITRALs technical notes, Privacy Shield framework and UDRP rules with our 
theoretical framework and existing ODR Regulation to gain insights to answer the research 
question: what is the most appropriate legal framework for dispute resolution between cloud 
providers and users that provide access to justice and fairness?  
First, we need to give a brief overview of the history and development of ODR and why is it 
considered suitable for e-commerce.  
 
 
2. Development of Online Dispute Resolution 
 
In Chapter 5 we gave a short overview and definition of ODR as a reference point for the 
follow-up discussion on EU ODR Regulation. However, the story of online dispute resolution 
and its development is worth taking a look in itself to illustrate the potential and opportunity 
ODR represents. The growth of ODR coincided with the general use and popularity of Internet 
and especially with the occurrence of blooming e-commerce opportunities in the 90s. 778  
As we said in Chapter 5, most commonly in defining ODR technologies are used as a 
discernible factor in comparison to alternative dispute resolution. Online dispute resolution, is 
according to this school of thought, the extension of existing practices of ADR by use of 
technology, more specifically online communication tools. However, this approach 
                                                          
777 Section 2.3. - Redress mechanisms, complaint handling and enforcement of COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING 
DECISION (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield 
778 Katsh, supra note 3. 
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unintentionally dismisses the potential of technology to redefine the field itself. The use of 
technology especially the innovative aspect of technology could give birth to previously and 
unimagined forms of dispute resolution.  
ODR as a field of dispute resolution has been developing for over 20 years now, with more 
than a 150 projects. ODR has been developing through several stages that Conley Tyler has 
proposed as she documented ODR practices and ODR platforms.  In two different reports (in 
2003, 2004 but also confirmed the same phases in following reports) she described the different 
stages of development of ODR since the early nineties: 779 
i. the “hobbyist” period of the first half of the 1990s, lead on an individual basis, often 
without any institutional support; individual pioneers and enthusiasts were 
experimenting with technologies in the field of dispute resolution; 
ii.  the “experimental” phase (1996–1998) mostly consisting of projects developed by 
US academic institutions (i.e. the “Virtual Magistrate” of the Villanova University 
and the Online Ombuds Office (OOO) at the University of Massachusetts) and 
funded by the like of Hewlett Foundation and institutions such as United Nations;  
iii. The “entrepreneurial” phase (1999–2001) where a significant number of start-ups 
enter the ODR market. In early 2001, commercial sites offering ODR services had 
reached its peak in the US (i.e. SquareTrade, Cybersettle, SmartSettle, etc.) while 
experimental initiatives were launched in Europe (ECODIR, Médiateur du Net, 
etc.). However, with the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2001 many of the then 
raising ODR providers that were hopeful startups ceased  their commercial 
activities;  
iv. The current “institutional” phase (2001- until today). The new wave of the public 
support a range of official bodies including courts and other dispute resolution 
providers. EU has enacted its ODR Regulation which created pan-EU ODR 
platform. UNCITRAL has worked on their proposal for an international legal 
                                                          
779 Melissa Conley Tyler, Seventy-six and Counting: An Analysis of ODR Sites, in Proceedings of the UNECE 
Second Forum on Online Dispute Resolution, 8 (Ethan Katsh & Daewon Choi, eds., Center for Information 
Technology and Dispute Resolution, University of Massachusetts, 2003). 
www.odr.info/unece2003/pdf/Tyler.pdf and Mellissa Conley Tyler, “115 and Counting: The State of ODR 200”, 
in M. Conley Tyler, E. Katsh & D. Choi. (eds.), Proceedings of the Third Annual Forum on Online Dispute 
Resolution, Melbourne, Australia, 5-6 July 2004. Available at <www.odr.info/unforum2004/ConleyTyler.htm>. 
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framework for ODR. Several judicial reforms proclaimed interest for ODR and its 
applicability.780 
Most of the initiatives to develop online dispute resolution have been in the private sector, 
where knowledgeable entrepreneurs try to seize the opportunity by addressing the demand for 
dispute resolution over right in different cases that originated online. Among the majority of 
unsuccessful pilots and projects, few have stood out with the success that is representative of 
ODR’s potential: SquareTrade, Cybersettle, SmartSettle, Ebay, PayPal, ICANN’s UDRP, 
chargeback procedures. Here we are mostly interested in observing the legal framework that 
allows such private initiatives to thrive, although some of them even thrived despite existing 
regulations.  
We could also observe the development of ODR through the progress of technology it uses and 
the development of the “fourth party”. Marta Poblet et al. describes early development as ODR 
1.0 technology that although different boils down to three features: (i) proprietary software 
licenses, (ii) stable platforms, (iii) PC-based.781  Online communication was the crux of the 
early ODR providers, with little additional functionalities with few notable exceptions 
(SmartSettle). However, with the development of the notion of “Web 2.0” and “Semantic web”, 
new ODR initiatives have followed.782 Lodder and Zeleznikow developed a substantial model 
for dialogue tools and negotiation support system that lays the foundation for growth and 
development of artificial intelligence in ODR.783  ODR could also use technology to enhance 
some aspects of dispute resolution, for example, detection of emotions.784 On the other hand, 
Barendrecht leads the notion that the best use of technology for ODR is to allow access to 
justice to underprivileged in search of microjustice.785 With the development of new 
                                                          
780 BRIGGS, supra note 776. 
781 Marta Poblet & Pompeu Casanovas, Mediation, ODR, and the web 2.0: a case for relational justice,  in AI 
APPROACHES TO THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS. COMPLEX SYSTEMS, THE SEMANTIC WEB, ONTOLOGIES, ARGUMENTATION, 
AND DIALOGUE 205–216 (2010). p.2 
782 Ronald Leenes, Introduction: Online Dispute Resolution and Data Protection, 21 INT. REV. LAW, COMPUT. 
TECHNOL. 79–80 (2007)., Jaap Van Den Herik, Daniel V. Dimov & Jaap Van den Herik, Towards Crowdsourced 
Online Dispute Resolution,  J. INT. COMMER. LAW TECHNOL. (2012). 
783 Arno R. Lodder & John Zelznikow, Developing an Online Dispute Resolution Environment: Dialogue Tools and 
Negotiation Support Systems in a Three-Step Model, 10 HARVARD NEGOT. LAW REV. (2005).LODDER AND ZELEZNIKOW,  
731.Gerard A.W. Vreeswijk & Arno R. Lodder, GearBi: Towards an online arbitration environment based on the 
design principles simplicity, awareness, orientation, and timeliness, 13 ARTIF. INTELL. LAW 297–321 (2006). 
784 Marta Poblet & Pompeu Casanovas, Emotions in ODR, 21 INT. REV. LAW, COMPUT. TECHNOL. 145–156 (2007). 
785 Maurits Barendrecht et al., Towards Basic Justice Care for Everyone: Challenges and Promising Approaches,  
SSRN ELECTRON. J. (2012).Maurits Barendrecht, In Search of Microjustice: Five Basic Elements of a Dispute 
System,  SSRN ELECTRON. J. (2009); Maurits Barendrecht & Patricia van Nispen, Microjustice,  SSRN ELECTRON. J. 
(2008).Jobien Monster, RB Porter & Maurits Barendrecht, Dispute Resolution Practices of Legal Aid 
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technologies, we see ODR slow but steady acceptance and adaptation.786  From proprietary PC-
based stable platform software, we are now witnessing a migration to cloud-based ODR.787  
Development of negotiation systems and other advancements are allowing ODR to integrate 
into companies’ customer service and complaint handling departments, which blurs the line 
between ODR and complaint management, as well as in-house and independent ODR.788 EBay, 
using ODR on its platform for solving C2C disputes, has reportedly managed to deal with an 
enormous inflow of complaints and disputes.789 On the other hand, facing the high-volume of 
disputes over online services (like social networks) prompted ODR scholars to put additional 
emphasis on prevention of conflict.790 
The scope of our research is limited to legal frameworks, so we will not go deeper into various 
ODR initiatives. We do however need to address one success story of the self-regulatory regime 
using online communication for its administrative procedure - ICANN’s UDRP. 
 
2.1. ICANN’s UDRP 
 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (hereinafter: ICANN) is a non-
profit organization that coordinates the maintenance and procedures of several databases 
related to the namespaces of the Internet, known as Domain Name System (DNS), manages 
generic top-level domains (TLDs), and the operation of root name servers.791 From its 
establishment, ICANN ran across issues with registered domain names and trademarks. 
Trademark owners would complain that someone registered a trademark protected domain 
without the owner’s approval. The “first come, first served” policy that ICANN used in the 
registration of domains, led to a number of registrants who abused their right by registering a 
name that is a well-established trademark, in order to reserve or “cybersquat” and negotiate 
with the trademark owner to sell the rights to the domain name. ICANN commissioned World 
                                                          
Organizations in Developing Countries,  (2011).Maurits Barendrecht & Jin Ho Verdonschot, Objective Criteria: 
Facilitating Dispute Resolution by Information About Going Rates of Justice,  SSRN ELECTRON. J. (2008). 
786 MARTA POBLET, MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (Marta Poblet ed., 2011). 
787 See Modria cloud-based model at http://modria.com/ and Youstice at https://www.youstice.com/en/  
788 See for example Cognicor solution for airline industry complaints at: http://www.cognicor.com/  
789 C Rule & C Nagarajan, Leveraging the Wisdom of the Crowds: the Ebay Community Court and the Future of 
online Dispute Resolution,  ACRESOLUTION 2 4 (2010). 
790 Katsh, Ethan, and Orna Rabinovich-Einy. Digital Justice: Technology and the Internet of Disputes. Oxford 
University Press, 2017. 
791 See more at https://www.icann.org/  
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Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to help set up a response to common complaints. 
Following WIPO recommendation to establish a mandatory administrative procedure, which 
allows neutral venue in the context of often international disputes, ICANN adopted the 
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) 792 After ten years ICANN adopted 
another proposal of WIPO on eUDRP Rules, to transition into electronic-only submission of 
complaints and annexes.793  
Selected providers of resolution in accordance with UDRP are: World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO)794, The Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (ADNDRC)795, 
National Arbitration Forum (NAF)796, Czech Arbitration Court, Arbitration Center for Internet 
Disputes797 and the Arab Center for Dispute Resolution (ACDR)798 
The UDRP has not been exactly equated with arbitration, although it resembles it in many 
aspects. It is usually described as administrative adjudicatory procedures with self-enforcement 
mechanism. Committing to UDRP does not exclude judicial redress in the same matter in most 
jurisdictions. The UDRP rules, according to its article 18, require notification in case any legal 
proceeding has been initiated prior to or during an administrative proceeding in respect of a 
domain-name dispute that is the subject of the complaint, and the acting Panel shall have the 
discretion to decide whether to suspend or terminate the administrative proceeding, or to 
proceed to a decision.799 
The success of the UDRP procedure can be attributed to several aspects. One reason lies in the 
authority of the ICANN as an international nonprofit with semi-public authorities vested with 
overseeing a significant administrative work of international importance. Although criticism 
of the lack of transparency and legitimacy can be heard when ICANN’s work is brought to 
discussion, the organization has contributed to the development of the Internet and position 
itself as a pillar of its structure.800 However, we would argue the success is inherent to the 
                                                          
792 The Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues Final Report of the WIPO 
Internet Domain Name Process http://wipo2.wipo.int April 30, 1999 
793 See more on eUDRP at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/rules/eudrp/  
794 See more at: http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/;   
795 See more at: https://www.adndrc.org/mten/index.php  
796 See more at: http://www.adrforum.com/domains  
797 See more at: http://www.adr.eu/index.php 
798See more at:  http://acdr.aipmas.org/default.aspx?lang=en  
799 Article 18 (a) of The Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy - Effect of Court 
Proceedings, see more on https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-rules-2015-03-11-en/#8  
800 Pablo Cortes, AN ANALYSIS OF THE UDRP EXPERIENCE: IS IT TIME FOR REFORM? (2007).Annemarie Bridy, NOTICE AND 
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design of UDRP: limited reasons for complaints, straightforward procedure and self-
enforcement.  
 
2.1.1. The procedure  
 
The Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") have been 
amended a few times but in general kept their core traits of written based, and now exclusively 
electronically mediated procedure. The grounds for the complaint have been limited to issues 
where: 
1. the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service 
mark in which the Complainant has rights; and 
2. the registrant (domain-name holder) has no rights or legitimate interests in 
respect of the domain name that is  the subject of the complaint; and 
3. The domain name has been registered and being used in bad faith.801 
The registrar of a domain name, although not part of the process, must comply with requests 
for information by the dispute resolution provider in charge of the procedure, and ultimately to 
enforce the decision.   
After submission of complaint and response (if submitted), a Panel will be appointed of one or 
three members/adjudicator. Usually, the cases are handled by a single arbitrator appointed by 
approved dispute resolution provider, but in cases, parties express such plea, both parties can 
appoint one, and the third one will be appointed by dispute resolution body.802 A panelist has 
to be impartial and independent and shall have, before accepting the appointment, disclosed to 
the dispute resolution provider any circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubt as to the 
panelist's impartiality or independence.803 The decision of a single panelist or the panel must 
be delivered within 14 days after its appointment. 804  Upon communication from the panel, the 
concerned registrar notifies within 3 days the date of enforcement of the decision. 805  
                                                          
801 Article 3 (b) (ix) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
802 Id. Article 6. 
803 Id. Article 7.  
804 Id. Article 15.  
805 Id. Article 16, 
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Complainants pay to the dispute resolution provider an initial fixed fee, in accordance with 
their supplement rules.806 If the fees have not been payed within ten days of receiving the 
complaint, the complaint shall be deemed withdrawn and the administrative proceeding 
terminated.807 
Interestingly, from the point of equality of arms and fairness, although the claimant has to prove 
the merits of its claim, UDRP recognized in some cases that complainant does not have access 
to relevant information to back their claim and reversed the burden of proof. 808 
The legal framework of the UDRP procedure is of contractual nature. Registrants commit 
during application for domain name that he will not “infringe upon or otherwise violate the 
rights of any third party”.809 Registrants also commit to procedure conducted before one of the 
administrative-dispute-resolution service providers (UDRP).810 
ICANN’s Policy and Rules have not been based on international agreement, but as an 
overseeing semi-public organization vested with powers to directly assign domains and thus 
enforce relevant decisions with international elements. It is interesting to display similarities 
and contrasts to already discussed international regulations. The disputes that we are dealing 
with are outside of the scope of UDRP. However, from the point of our theoretical framework, 
we can notice possible similarities with some proposals for an international frameworks (like 
UNCITRAL’s work on ODR). Certain scholars have pointed to the possible appropriateness 
of the UDRP for handling a larger scope of e-commerce disputes.811 Limited competences of 
UDRP panels and a single applicable set of binding rules have simplified the procedure and 
allowed greater efficiency. If we consider the dispute within the competencies of the UDRP, 
the availability and accessibility have been on a very high level. With the introduction of 
mandatory electronic submission and communications, the access and efficiency are 
expectedly close to the highest possible levels. Although many procedural guarantees are in 
place, certain criticisms have been heard, especially of structural bias in favor of 
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Resolution Mechanisms Become the Default Method for Solving International Intellectual Property Disputes?,  
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complainants.812  The expertise of panelists is not in question, but independence and 
impartiality guarantees need to be reinforced, which has been the subject to amendments and 
changes to UDRP. The rule on the distribution of cost point to the claimant’s responsibility to 
advance the fees in order to be heard. We don’t see this as fair from the perspective of the 
economically weaker party, but it is understandable considering that most of the claimants are 
trademark owners with certain economic strength. Efficiency has been regulated and 
guaranteed by the UDRP. The self-enforcement mechanism is probably the most noteworthy 
element, where the circumstances and the design of the ICANN allowed enforcement of panels’ 
decisions through registrars, regardless of respondent’s willingness to comply. The 
enforcement could be overturned by judicial decision, but within the autonomous legal system 
that the UDRP has become, self-enforcement has become a hallmark of ICANN’s 
effectiveness. The UDRP has given a strong argument for ODR in international dispute 
resolution domain and inspired work on an international legal framework for cross-border e-
commerce disputes. The effectiveness of the UDRP seems desirable from a standpoint of 
dispute resolution system design, and fully online adjudicatory model is something to strive for 
in the cloud service dispute resolution.  
 
3. International legal framework for Online Dispute Resolution 
 
Given the established assumption in the academia of the usefulness or appropriateness of ODR 
for conflicts arising out of e-commerce, before we make a stand on the most appropriate 
framework for cloud services dispute resolution, we need to take a look at existing legal 
frameworks and see how they fare with our theoretical framework for access to justice and 
fairness in dispute resolution. We have discussed and analyzed EU ODR Regulation in Chapter 
5 and 6, so we will focus here on UNCITRAL’s work and new regulatory framework Privacy 
Shield. 
 
3.1. Online Dispute Resolution and the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law 
 
                                                          
812 Cortes, supra note 799; Bridy, supra note 799. David  A. Simon, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FAIR USE DECISIONS 
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3.1.1. Negotiation on UNCITRAL’s International framework 
 
At its forty-third session (New York, 2010), the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) agreed that a Working Group should be established to undertake 
work in the field of online dispute resolution relating to cross-border electronic commerce 
transactions.813 In the following sessions, UNCITRAL specified the mandate of Working 
Group (called Working Group III) by instructing the parties involved to work on low-value, 
high-volume cross-border electronic transactions, including B2B and B2C transactions, having 
in mind its impact on consumer protection.814  
UNCITRAL’s ambition was to provide a framework for an international online dispute 
resolution by developing the Procedural Rules for ODR primarily, but also additional 
supplementing documents: Guidelines for Neutrals, Minimum Standards for ODR Providers 
Supplementary Rules for ODR Providers, Substantive Legal Principles for Resolving Disputes 
and Cross‐border Enforcement Mechanisms.815  However, the ambition and successful outcome 
of the initiative was sidelined and eventually diluted by the fundamental disagreement in 
approaches to ADR/ODR between UNCITRAL Member States on the nature of the final stage 
of the ODR process. 
One side, a group of states, led by the United States, pushed for binding arbitration as the final 
stage of the process.816 The other side, which includes the EU Member States, Canada, and 
Japan, disagreed and proposed non-binding instrument as a final stage based on original dispute 
agreement.817 The fundamental difference lies in acceptance of pre-dispute agreements, 
whereas we discussed in Chapter 5, the EU considers pre-dispute arbitration clauses for 
consumers to be non-binding and in contravention of the Unfair Terms Directive. The US, on 
the other hand, has developed consumer arbitration practice based on pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements. Since the expected bulk of low-value, high-volume cross-border electronic 
transactions will be consumer disputes and consumer protection impact was considered 
                                                          
813  See A/CN.9/868 - Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its thirty-third 
session (New York, 29 February-4 March 2016)  
814 See more on 
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815 See A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.112 - Online dispute resolution for cross-border electronic commerce transactions: 
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816 See A/CN.9/827 - Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its thirtieth 
session (Vienna, 20-24 October 2014) 
817 Id  
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essential for Working Group deliberation, the difference in approaches led to a lack of 
consensus on a number of related issues.818  
The rift in approaches led to the development of two tracks in the draft proposals for Procedural 
Rules for ODR. The stages of ODR according to proposals would coincide when it comes to 
negotiation through ODR platform as a beginning stage, followed by facilitated settlement 
stage. As the final stage of ODR (in cases where the agreement has not been reached in the 
previous step) track I proposed binding arbitration and track II non-binding recommendation.819  
The important issues would be in identifying whether Track I or Track II would be applicable 
about the specific consumer in high-volume transactions. Consumer arbitrations with clear 
post-dispute consumer consent are not deemed problematic, and based on it we have seen 
attempts to bring closer two approaches with the “second click proposal”, wherein the third 
stage the consumer would be asked to choose (but only under track II) between a 
recommendation as a default option and arbitration (if parties agree).820  
However, at the UNCITRAL’s forty-eighth session (in Vienna, 29 June-16 July 2015), it was 
agreed that any future text should build upon the progress achieved up to that point and the 
Commission instructed the Working Group III to continue its work towards elaborating a non-
binding descriptive document reflecting elements of an ODR process, on which elements the 
Working Group had previously reached consensus, excluding the question of the nature of the 
final stage of the ODR process.821 The non-binding descriptive document was called Technical 
Notes on Online Dispute Resolution. 
 
3.1.2. UNICTRAL’s Technical Notes  
 
The Technical Notes on Online Dispute Resolution of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law that has been adopted by the General Assembly on December 13, 
2016, cannot be considered a framework for ODR. They do however reflect the work of 
UNCITRAL and the attempt of creating a consensus for an international regulatory framework 
                                                          
818 Id par 132.  
819 See A/CN.9/827 - Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its thirtieth 
session (Vienna, 20-24 October 2014) 
820 See A/CN.9/833 - Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its thirty-first 
session (New York, 9-13 February 2015) 
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Notes on a non-binding descriptive document reflecting elements and principles of an ODR process par 1.  
258 
 
for ODR in e-commerce. Technical notes are relevant in several aspects: they set a number of 
common principles and proposals for rules that could be a foundation for future legal 
instruments regulating ODR on regional or international level; they illustrate differences and 
issues in approaches to ODR from different legal backgrounds; they confirm public trust in 
ODR and its usefulness even without unison conceptual approach.  
Technical Notes are divided into eleven sections: (1) introduction, purpose of the technical 
notes, (2)  principles, (3) stages of an ODR process, (4) scope of ODR process (5) ODR 
definitions, roles and responsibilities, and communications, (6)commencement of ODR 
proceedings, (7)negotiation, (8)facilitated settlement , (9)appointment, powers and functions 
of the neutral, (10)language, (11) governance. 
In the introductory section, Working Group III reaffirms that ODR is one of the mechanisms 
which can assist the parties in resolving the disputes coming out of online cross-border 
transactions in a simple, fast, and flexible manner, without the need for a physical presence at 
a meeting or hearing.822 The proclaimed purpose of the Technical Notes is to “foster the 
development of ODR and to assist ODR administrators, ODR platforms, neutrals, and the 
parties to ODR proceedings” by reflecting approaches to ODR systems that embody principles 
of impartiality, independence, efficiency, effectiveness, due process, fairness, accountability, 
and transparency.823  
The Technical Notes are a non-binding descriptive document that is not intended to be 
exhaustive or exclusive, nor are they suitable to be used as rules for any ODR proceeding, nor 
does it promote any practice of ODR as best practice.824 The Technical Notes are however 
intended for use mainly in disputes arising from cross-border low-value sales or service 
contracts concluded using electronic communications.825 This is also confirmed in the section 
dealing with the scope of the ODR process. Additionally, it is specified that ODR process, as 
proposed under Technical Notes, may apply to disputes arising out of both a business-to-
business as well as business-to-consumer transactions.826   
                                                          
822 Par 1 of A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.140 - Online dispute resolution for cross-border electronic commerce 
transactions: Draft outcome document reflecting elements and principles of an ODR process 
823 Id  
824 Id. par 6.  
825 Id. par 5.  
826 Id. par. 22. 
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The Technical Notes offer a definition of ODR in section 5 as, a “mechanism for resolving 
disputes through the use of electronic communications and other information and 
communication technology.”827 The Notes then going further and distinguished ODR from 
ADR (especially ad hoc ADR) through technology where they confirm that  ODR process 
requires a system for generating, sending, receiving, storing, exchanging or otherwise 
processing communications (such a system is referred to as an “ODR platform”).828 
The principles that underpin any ODR process include fairness, transparency, due process, and 
accountability, but those principles are not exhaustive or entirely explained. They are rather 
exemplified with statements of desirability to disclose any relationship between the ODR 
administrator and a particular vendor (transparency) or usefulness to adopt policies dealing 
with identifying and handling conflicts of interest and  code of ethics for neutrals 
(independence, under due process), or policies governing selection and training of neutrals 
(expertise, under due process).829 The accountability principle proposes an internal 
oversight/quality assurance process which may help the ODR administrator to ensure that 
neutrals’ decisions conform to the standards it has set for itself.830 Even though the principle of 
party autonomy is not explicitly mentioned in the proposed principles, it is recommended that 
the ODR process should be based on the explicit and informed consent of the parties.831  
However, the consent recommendation does not go into details nor does it clarify in any way 
whether and how it applies to pre-dispute and post-dispute agreement scenarios.  
The Technical Notes propose three-stage process including negotiation; facilitated settlement; 
and a third (final) stage without specifying what the third stage would be. They leave to ODR 
administrator to direct parties to a third stage in accordance with applicable ODR rules.  This 
is a result of the lack of consensus on the nature of the final stage of ODR proceedings. The 
ODR process commences by claimant submission of a notice of claim through the ODR 
platform to the ODR administrator. After the ODR administrator informs the respondent on the 
claim, gives them the opportunity to respond and informs claimant about it, with their consent, 
the first stage of a technology-enabled negotiation begins. If the settlement through negotiation 
is not reached, the process may move to a second, “facilitated settlement” stage, where the 
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ODR administrator appoints a neutral.832 If that stage also does not yield result in the form of 
settlement of the dispute, the process may move to the final, third stage which may be, although 
not specifically mentioned, binding arbitration in case of parties post-dispute consent or based 
on pre-dispute agreements in cases where applicable, or non-binding recommendation or 
evaluation of the dispute.833  
One of the significant differences with EU ODR Regulation is when it comes to the rules for 
the appointment of neutrals. According to the Technical Notes, for reasons of efficiency and 
costs reduction, it is preferable that the ODR administrator appoints a neutral only when a 
neutral is required for the dispute resolution process in accordance with any applicable ODR 
rules.834 Dealing with a low-value dispute, the Notes specifically recommend that there should 
be only one neutral per dispute appointed at any time for reasons of cost efficiency.835 The 
following powers of neutral are enlisted as desirable: 
a) Subject to any applicable ODR rules the neutral be enabled to conduct the ODR 
proceedings in such a manner as he or she considers appropriate; 
b) The neutral be required to avoid unnecessary delay or expense in the conduct of the 
proceedings; 
c) The neutral be required to provide a fair and efficient process for resolving disputes; 
d) The neutral be required to remain independent, impartial and treat both parties equally 
throughout the proceedings; 
e) The neutral be required to conduct proceedings based on such communications as are 
before the neutral during the proceedings; 
f) The neutral be enabled to allow the parties to provide additional information in relation 
to the proceedings; and 
g) The neutral be enabled to extend any deadlines set out in any applicable ODR rules for 
a reasonable time. 836 
The Technical Notes, in accordance with their name also contain a number of recommendation 
relating to the technical aspects of communication through the ODR platform (retaining 
communication on the platform, having a electronic address per party etc.), which information 
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should be communicated by parties (especially for commencement of ODR process), desired 
requirement from neutrals (declaration of impartiality and disclosure of any relevant facts that 
could give rise to doubts), proposal for streamlined appointment and challenge procedures, 
language preferences,  etc.837   
The Technical Notes also profess a desire for ODR proceedings to be subject to the same due 
process standards that apply to that process in an offline context, in particular, independence, 
neutrality, and impartiality, and that guidelines or minimum requirements for the conduct of 
ODR platforms and administrators should be in place.838 
 
3.1.3. Access to justice and UNCITRAL’s Technical Notes 
 
Even though the Technical Notes are a descriptive document with the general recommendation, 
and without any formal legal status, we still can discuss some of its recommendation from the 
point of view of our context.  
Cloud services are usually cross-border and in general, could fall under the low-value high-
volume category, hence the recommended scope for ODR processes cover cloud service 
disputes both from consumer-to-business and business-to-business aspect.  In that sense, if the 
result of UNCITRAL’s work had been a legal framework for cross-border dispute resolution, 
the broader scope would have solved many issues pertaining to the distinction between 
consumer and professional use of a cloud service. As we have discussed in Chapter 6, EU ODR 
Regulation could have problems related to discerning service with mixed professional use and 
private/consumer use outside of the profession. Including B2B and B2C in the scope solves the 
issue although applicable law questions remain.  
When it comes to access, we have distinguished accessibility and availability of dispute 
resolution mechanisms. The Technical Notes are very clear on the principle of party autonomy 
in paragraph 17 where they confirm The ODR process should be based on the explicit and 
informed consent of the parties. That means we only have contractual grounds for initiation of 
ODR process. Explicit and informed consent requirement is not entirely clear on the issues of 
pre-dispute agreements. The US law considers the pre-dispute agreement on arbitration by 
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click-through terms of service as an agreement based on explicit and informed consent.839 
According to the EU Unfair Terms Directive, such agreements are not binding; they do not 
allow freedom to its users not to consent and hence do not prevent consumers from access to 
court. In our context, we have unequal negotiation power from the beginning, and both parties 
are expected to behave in their best interest. Therefore the issue of a contractual basis for ODR 
process can be considered troublesome from the fairness perspective if pre-dispute agreements 
are enforceable, or from the effectiveness of post-dispute agreements if pre-dispute agreements 
are non-binding. We have discussed both aspects in previous chapters. Even if we consider 
them entirely legal, the fairness aspect of pre-disputed agreements, from the Rawlsian 
perspective is not acceptable in our framework. The worse off party ends up in worse off 
position when it comes to availability of dispute resolution and access to redress. Relying on 
post-dispute agreements, on the other hand, is ineffective and does not fulfill the potential of 
the mechanism, as evidenced by the modest numbers aggregated by EU ODR platform in a 
large market and for supposedly high volume transactions. Therefore we could assume that the 
result for the contractually based framework for the availability of ODR, under UNCITRAL 
Technical Notes influence would yield little result within our context. Accessibility, as the 
other side of the coin of access to dispute resolution, would be optimal as was the case in our 
comparison in Chapter 6, where instant access by both parties reaches almost ideal equality. 
Such equality has priority over unequal distribution benefiting worse off party, as we have 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
The procedural fairness is not in any way guaranteed simply by the nature of the non-binding 
character of the Technical Notes. We have seen consensus professed on the principles of 
fairness, due process, transparency, and accountability. Some of those principles are elaborated 
with vague recommendations. It is of course not to be expected of the Technical Notes to go 
deep on the principles, though it could be stated that for some principles we have seen more 
consensus on how to approach selected issues during the UNCITRAL’s Working Group 
discussions. For instance, the fairness principle is scattered through several recommendations 
for fair treatment. The neutral should be required to “provide a fair and efficient process” or to 
“independent, impartial and treat both parties equally throughout the proceedings.”  In the draft 
procedural rules, we have seen undisputed articles that substantiate fairness requirements, 
especially in regards to equality of arms: 
                                                          
839 See more in Chapter 5 
263 
 
“Each party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to support its claim or defense. 
The neutral shall have the discretion to reverse such burden of proof where, in exceptional 
circumstances, the facts so require.”840 
However, without finalized consensus and for probable reasons of appropriateness for the 
Technical Notes, a number of formulations that could have support from all the Working Group 
members have been omitted from the final text.  Much of these principles are reaffirmed where 
the Technical Notes discuss the powers of neutral. We see the inclination to fairness, but 
without a significant guarantee, this remains ineffective. 
The efficiency is also professed without specific formulations. It is desired that in various 
stages the actions are taken within a reasonable time for parties, and from neutrals, it is required 
to avoid unnecessary delay or expense in the conduct of the proceedings. ODR, in general, is 
offered as a more cost-effective alternative to traditional approaches, the latter of which in 
some cases may be overly complex, costly and time-consuming in light of the nature and value 
of the dispute.841 The notes do not specify any time limitations or cost requirements. The one 
significant aspect is explicit consensus within Working Group that a single neutral should be 
appointed to handle disputes for efficiency purposes. This, of course, can be opposed to certain 
aspects of fairness, but the logic of appropriating a low-value dispute to minimum necessary 
handlers is obvious. Even though arbitration is not explicitly discussed in Technical Notes, due 
to lack of consensus on nature of final stage, this requirement of single neutral translates to a 
single neutral/adjudicator in the final stage/arbitration. 
Finally, when it comes to effectiveness, and more specifically to enforcement issues, the 
Technical Notes do not mention enforcement. The enforcement has been discussed in Working 
Group with special emphasis on private enforcement mechanism through payment 
intermediary, but given that none of the expected outcomes of the initial Working Group goals 
have been achieved, it is not surprising that enforcement issues have been neglected at the end. 
842  
With our theoretical model in mind and considering the context of cloud services disputes, we 
can conclude that the Technical Notes and the work of UNCITRAL on ODR have not provided 
                                                          
840 Draft Article 7 of A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.133 - Online dispute resolution for cross-border electronic commerce 
transactions: draft procedural rules 
841 See more in A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.140 - Online dispute resolution for cross-border electronic commerce 
transactions: Draft outcome document reflecting elements and principles of an ODR process 
842 See more in A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.124 - Online dispute resolution for cross-border electronic commerce 
transactions: overview of private enforcement mechanisms 
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desired outcomes. The non-binding descriptive nature of the Notes is insufficient to serve 
anything other than to pinpoint international consensus on certain issues in regulating dispute 
resolution for low-value high-volume disputes.  We have seen some promising aspects in the 
discussion of the Working Group, but without concrete results at the end, we can say that 
currently, the EU has the most significant international (or regional) framework for ODR with 
a concrete single EU ODR platform. Therefore we will focus on the existing international ODR 
instrument, with the intention to make it more suitable for cloud service disputes. Before that, 
we will also briefly review the Privacy Shield-legal framework for data transfers between US 
and EU, which offers dispute resolution for data protection related cases. Though at the time 
of writing this text, the dispute resolution mechanism is not functional yet, we can comment 
based on the requirements for dispute resolution bodies within the framework.  
 
3.2. Privacy Shield Framework 
 
3.2.1. Background  
 
After some deliberation, in October 2015 the European Court of Justice declared invalid the 
EU Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision that allowed transfer of personal data to the U.S. 
under an adequate level of protection of the data.843 The Decision was brought under an 
agreement with U.S. on the framework of the International Safe Harbour Privacy Principles in 
line with requirements of Article 25(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. However, since the Court 
overturned the Decision, we will not discuss Safe Harbour other than in accordance with our 
findings during the survey in Chapter 3.844 Following the Court’s decision, the European 
Commission and the U.S. Government initiated negotiations about a new framework, and they 
reached a new agreement in February 2016.845  
The Privacy Shield framework, like Safe Harbour before it, contains a number of substantive 
norms that are outside of the scope of our research. However, the redress mechanism within 
the Privacy Shield framework is connected and dependent on the adequacy of the framework 
                                                          
843 Case C‑362/14, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2015. Maximillian Schrems v Data 
Protection Commissioner. Request for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62014CJ0362  
844 See Commissioner Jourová's remarks on Safe Harbour EU Court of Justice judgment before the Committee 
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)", 26 October 2015 
845 See more on press release available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-
transfers/eu-us-privacy-shield/index_en.htm  
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to serve its purpose within the larger EU Data Protection framework. The Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party in its subsequent Opinion stated that the Privacy Shield offers major 
improvements compared to the Safe Harbour decisions, but that three major points of concern 
remain, which relate to deletion of data, a collection of massive amounts of data, and 
clarification of the new Ombudsperson mechanism.846 Related to the redress mechanism the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party also expressed some concerns that the effective 
exercise of the data subject’s right might be undermined which we will address below.847 The 
European Data Protection Supervisor published an opinion in which, besides the other issues, 
he found minor concerns regarding the complexity of the redress system and proposed bigger 
role of Ombudsperson. 848  
The European Commission adopted the decision on Privacy Shield framework on 12 July 2016, 
and it went into effect the same day, while the President of the U.S. signed an Executive Order 
entitled "Enhancing Public Safety" which states that U.S. privacy protections will not be 
extended beyond US citizens or residents.849 
 
3.2.2. Dispute Resolution under Privacy Shield 
 
Within the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield principles, under the “Recourse, Enforcement and Liability 
Principle”, participating organizations must provide recourse for individuals who are affected 
by non-compliance of other principles of the framework and offer the possibility for EU data 
subjects to submit complaints regarding non-compliance by U.S. self-certified companies and 
to have these complaints resolved, if necessary by an adjudicatory decision, providing an 
effective remedy.850 
The data subject can complain directly or through the Department of Commerce following 
referral by a DPA, and the organization must provide a response to the EU data subject within 
                                                          
846 Chapter 5 of Opinion 01/2016 on the EU – U.S. Privacy Shield draft adequacy decision, the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2016/wp238_en.pdf  
847 Id. p. 26.  
848 European Data Protection Supervisor, Privacy Shield: more robust and sustainable solution needed, 30 May 
2016 available at: https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/16-05-30_privacy_shield_en.pdf p.12 
849 See more at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/eu-us-privacy-
shield/index_en.htm  
850 See 2.1. Privacy Principles (26) in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 
pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the 
protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (notified under document C(2016) 4176) 
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a period of 45 days, which must include an assessment of the merits of the complaint and 
information as to how the organization will rectify the problem.851 If not satisfied, data subject 
can approach other recourses.  
Organizations are required to undergo self-certification, which also provides with independent 
recourse mechanism by which individuals can file complaints and initiate disputes free of 
charge.852 Self-certification requirements are somewhat more stringent than under the previous 
Safe Harbour framework. Self-certified organizations may choose independent recourse 
mechanisms in either the European Union or in the United States, which includes a choice 
between the EU DPAs or independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) established either 
in the US or EU (except for human resources data disputes).853 Selected ADRs must include 
effective enforcement mechanisms in accordance with the requirements. Independent dispute 
resolution bodies should be readily available and free of charge to individuals. Organizations 
are obliged to remedy any problems of non-compliance, and they are also subject to the 
investigatory and enforcement powers of the FTC, or any other U.S. authorized statutory 
body.854 
Independent dispute resolution bodies must inform on the Privacy Shield Principles’ dispute 
resolution with the description on how the complaint is to be filed, the timeframe and 
description of potential remedies and also to provide information on aggregate statistics 
regarding their dispute resolution services.855 Private sector dispute resolution bodies and self-
regulatory bodies must notify failures of Privacy Shield organizations to comply with their 
rulings to the governmental body with applicable jurisdiction or to the courts, where 
applicable.856 
In cases where their complaints have not been resolved by any of the dispute resolution 
mechanisms, as a “last resort” individuals may invoke binding arbitration under the Privacy 
Shield Panel.857 Before addressing the Privacy Shield Panel data subjects must: 
(1) raise the claimed violation directly with the organization and afford the organization an 
opportunity to resolve the issue within the timeframe set; 
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852 Id. see 2.3. Redress mechanisms, complaint handling and enforcement 
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(2) make use of the independent recourse mechanism under the Principles, which is at no 
cost to the individual; 
(3) Raise the issue through their Data Protection Authority to the Department of Commerce  
(DoC) and afford an opportunity to DoC to resolve the issue within set timeframe.858 
The Privacy Shield Panel (consisting of one or three arbitrators, as agreed by the parties) 
provides limited remedies since it has the authority to impose individual-specific, non-
monetary equitable relief (such as access, correction, deletion, or return of the individual's data 
in question) necessary to remedy the violation of the Principles only with respect to the 
individual.859 The binding decision of the Panel could be subject to judicial review and 
enforcement under the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act.860 The Arbitration Panel will be selected 
by the parties from the list of at least 20 arbitrators chosen by European Commission and U.S. 
Department of Commerce, based on their independence, integrity, and expertise, with the 
condition that they are admitted to law practice in the U.S. and are also experts in U.S. privacy 
law, with additional expertise in EU data protection law. 
At the time of writing the Department of Commerce and the European Commission are yet to 
agree to adopt an existing, well-established set of U.S. arbitral procedures (such as AAA or 
JAMS) to govern proceedings before the Privacy Shield Panel, in accordance with Annex II, 
with certain pre-set specifications among which are: “… 5. The location of the arbitration will 
be the United States, and the individual may choose video or telephone participation, which 
will be provided at no cost to the individual. In-person participation will not be required; 6. 
The language of the arbitration will be English unless otherwise agreed by the parties…; 9. 
Arbitrations should be completed within 90 days of the delivery of the Notice…” 861 
The arbitrator should take reasonable steps to minimize the costs or fees of the arbitrations, and 
the Department of Commerce will establish a fund where Privacy Shield organization will be 
required to pay an annual contribution, which will cover the arbitral cost, including arbitrator 
fees.862 
                                                          
858 Annex II of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the 
EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (notified under document C(2016) 4176)  available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal 
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3.2.3. Access to justice and Privacy Shield 
 
Although online dispute resolution has not been specifically mentioned in the Privacy Shield 
framework, it follows logically that the dispute resolution for the cases related to non-
compliance with the Principles will only be effective if it is conducted partially or entirely 
through online communication tools. Other forms of dispute resolution that excludes online 
communication tools entirely (even though possible) seem improbable from practical reasons, 
cost efficiency, and short deadlines. The participating organization that transfer personal data 
outside of the EU and guarantee recourse to data subject domiciled in the EU, undergo self-
certification which introduces independent dispute resolution bodies (either ADR or private 
sector developed privacy programs) that provide recourse to affected Data Subjects irrespective 
of their location.  The only way to design a dispute resolution process that could efficiently 
cover communication with a possible variety of potentially affected data subjects is to rely 
heavily on online communication tools, commonly through the specific platform of 
certification body or ADR. One of the very well established privacy shield certification 
programs, TRUSTe, facilitate consumers’ privacy complaints through an online submission 
mechanism, where it guides complainant on in addressing a specific type of complaint, but also 
requires a functional e-mail address to proceed with the complaint.863 This might hint to 
possible Digital Divide issues where data subjects who would lack competences in online 
communication would be discriminated, but it is reasonable not to expect a lot of these issues 
relative to Privacy Shield Principles. We can assume use of online communication tools for the 
majority of disputes regarding issues of compliance with Privacy Shield Principles individual 
cases and proceed with assessing the framework within our contexts of cloud service disputes. 
Our theoretical framework considers access as the significant point of access to justice and 
fairness and within it availability and accessibility of dispute resolution bodies. Given that the 
transfer of personal data outside the EU to the United States is conditional to guarantees of 
adequate level of protection in line with Directive 95/46/EC, and that the Privacy Shield 
framework is intended to facilitate legal transfer for a large number of US-based organizations, 
and many of those are cloud services providers, we consider this framework significant for 
access to justice for individuals in cases relative to data protection and privacy. Availability of 
                                                          
863 See TRUSTe dispute resolution on-site form at: https://feedback-form.truste.com/watchdog/request  
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the dispute resolution bodies is guaranteed within the framework, which allows several 
recourses for potential redress and additional binding arbitration mechanism in case previous 
bodies failed. The Framework and Annex II cite “readily available independent 
mechanism.”864The data subjects can sometimes choose between private certification 
mechanism and its dispute resolution scheme, ADR based in the US or EU, or European Data 
Protection Authorities to facilitate resolution. With the availability guaranteed, the question of 
accessibility remains. As mentioned above, the only way to achieve efficient (speedy procedure 
at no cost for data subjects) and effective dispute resolution procedure is to rely on online 
communication tools. Therefore, we speak of online dispute resolution in the broader sense of 
technology-mediated dispute resolution, and since digital divide should not be an issue within 
our contexts, online dispute resolution allows the greatest level of accessibility that comes 
closest to the ideal of equality. Even if available dispute resolution is not satisfactory in the 
prior stages, data subject can eventually invoke binding arbitration through Privacy Shield 
Panel that does not require in-person procedure and allows for video or telephone 
communication. Thus, legal guarantees of availability with online accessibility provides 
nominally strong access to dispute resolution bodies for cloud service related disputes.  
When it comes to procedural fairness, Privacy Shield framework does not provide guidelines 
for specific dispute resolution bodies on the dispute resolution procedures. It requires from 
independent bodies an annual report providing aggregate statistics regarding services reports 
that could indirectly hint on their independence since significant irregularities could be 
potentially noticed. Procedures before DPAs are regulated with administrative procedure 
norms of different national laws, and high level of procedural fairness is to be expected in 
DPAs handling of the procedure. When the complaint is brought before a DPA, the informal 
panel of DPAs established at Union level delivers advice after both parties have had a 
reasonable opportunity to comment and to provide any evidence they wish.865 Independent 
dispute resolution bodies and DPAs are vested with the investigation of complaints allowing 
them more authority to act as they see fit than in mere adversarial procedure.866 The 
organization is obliged to comply. The Privacy Shield does, however, condition approval for 
                                                          
864 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy 
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appointment in arbitrators’ pool for Privacy Shield Panel, with independence, integrity, as well 
as experience in U.S. privacy and Union data protection law.  
The distribution of cost is obviously set in favor of data subjects as the less powerful party. It 
is required that dispute resolution procedure is at no costs for the individuals. These include 
costs of the procedure only (fees for DR body) and no other expenses, such as legal 
representation. It is unclear who bears the costs of translation if it is necessary. Travel costs are 
minimized with the use of online technologies for communication. For the Privacy Shield 
Panel, it is required to set up a fund where Privacy Shield participating organizations will pay 
an annual contribution, which will cover the arbitral cost, including arbitrator fees. It is 
expressly stated that attorney's fees are not covered by these provisions.867 The arbitration will 
be in English unless both parties agree otherwise, which in practice translates that it will be 
almost always since U.S. law is applicable and arbitrators will be selected among lawyers with 
US law practice experience. Nevertheless, these norms solidify the position of data subject as 
an economically weaker party to wage a dispute resolution process. 
Since the Privacy Shield has been introduced recently (relative to the writing of this text) we 
have not seen any reports on dispute resolution under the framework, and we have yet to see 
the general reports on the framework, we have to rely on the text of the framework to assess 
the efficiency.868 It is required from the organizations and dispute resolution body to act 
promptly on received complaint. The organizations have to respond within 45 days to the 
complaints addressing the issues of the individual. As a general rule, the DPAs’ advice will be 
delivered by the panel within 60 days after receiving a complaint. If an organization fails to 
comply with a device within 25 days, the DPA panel will give the notice to submit the matter 
to the FTC or to conclude a serious breach of commitment. If DPAs refer the complaint to the 
Department of Commerce, the procedure is established where relevant contact point will liaise 
directly with the respective DPA on compliance issues and in particular update it on the status 
of complaints within a period of not more than 90 days following referral.869 Arbitrations under 
                                                          
867 Annex II to the Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016  under H. Costs 
868 See for example The International Association of Privacy Professionals blog update:  How’s Privacy Shield 
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869 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
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Privacy Shield Panel should also be completed within 90 days of the delivery of the Notice to 
the organization at issue unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.870 
Finally, the effectiveness of the Privacy Shield dispute resolution framework is related to its 
enforcement mechanisms. In the theoretical framework through which we observe dispute 
resolution mechanism, we ask the question: is the voluntary compliance necessary for the 
success of the dispute resolution? The short answer is no. The decisions of dispute resolution 
bodies following mostly investigatory procedure are by nature adjudicatory and not dependent 
on parties’ agreement. If the organization chose to self-certify and condition itself to Privacy 
Shield Principles, it also accepted to introduce an obligatory recourse mechanism with the 
threat of removal from the list of certified Privacy Shield organizations in case of non-
compliance, backed by enforcement action of Department of Commerce, the FTC or a 
competent court.871 Removal from the certified list would indicate non-compliance with 
Privacy Shield Principles and that any future transfer of personal data of EU data subject would 
be illegal. Ensuring compliance with the Principles should represent sufficient incentive in 
most cases. Additionally, in case the data subject escalates the dispute to binding arbitration by 
the Privacy Shield Panel enforcement of the arbitral decisions pursuant to U.S. law under the 
Federal Arbitration Act.872 
How many legal actions are needed to enforce the decision of independent dispute resolution 
body or advice of DPA, depends on the organization's resistance to comply with the decision 
of different competent bodies. In most cases, additional actions are not required from 
individuals. Steps related to removal of the certified organization from the list is not connected 
with any cost to the individual. For the estimated small number of cases of involuntary 
enforcement of the arbitral decision by the Privacy Shield Panel, possible legal actions before 
the competent court would be necessary for enforcement under FAA.  
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP29) acknowledges different layers of 
possible redress but express concerns that most, if not all, of the recourse mechanisms, foresee 
a procedure in the U.S., thus complicating monitoring of the procedure by the EU DPAs.873 The 
WP29 criticizes framework for not allowing to bring claims for damages in the European Union 
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as well as being “granted the right to lodge a claim before a competent EU national court.”874 
They also stress concern that, though arbitration is available, having to cover the costs of 
attorneys may prevent EU individuals from initiating arbitration proceedings.875 
Privacy related disputes also fall under our context of the cloud service disputes, which 
encompasses a larger scope of possible conflicts. Although we do not focus specifically on data 
protection disputes the contractual disputes over cloud services, self-certification for Privacy 
Shield and previous Safe Harbour framework introduces the provision of said framework into 
Privacy Policies and hence contracts with individuals as cloud users. Recent changes 
introduced in Privacy Shield were the result of perceived deficiencies and lack of access to 
redress under Safe Harbour. The value of the claims in data protection and privacy disputes are 
difficult to determine but in most cases could be characterized as low-value or small claims 
(small claims under The European Small Claims procedure is for claims of up to €2000, but 
the threshold will be increased to €5000 from July 2017) which is especially relevant in cross-
border access to justice context. With Privacy Shield framework in mind, we will discuss in 
the next section possible recommendations to make a more adequate existing legal framework 
for low value online cross-border contractual disputes to the cloud service disputes scenarios.  
 
4. Dispute resolution framework for cloud service disputes 
 
Everything that we have discussed so far led us, in one way or another, to more substantial 
conclusions on what has to be changed in order to have more appropriate dispute resolution 
framework for cloud service disputes. We have seen the development of online dispute 
resolution that coincided with the growth of e-commerce and has grown out of demand or even 
necessity for handling conflicts in the new e-commerce environment. We have seen that private 
ODR schemes, like the ones of eBay and PayPal, have achieved enormous success but also 
play an important part in maintaining the trust in a general service that these companies provide. 
The participation to these ODR mechanisms is mandatory and part of the terms of service that 
users have to accept if they want to avail themselves of those online services. It was interesting 
to the point that these companies, as champions of ODR mechanisms for private online out-of-
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court dispute settlements systems, do not readily accept ODR for disputes they are having with 
their own consumers.  
We have seen a functioning global ODR mechanism in ICANN’s UDRP, where the system 
grew out of necessity to deal with specific issues of intellectual property rights’ infringements. 
A single set of rules to deal with the limited number of issues and mandatory nature of the 
adjudicatory dispute resolution, coupled with effective enforcement mechanism made UDRP 
a success story of online arbitration.  
UNCITRAL’s effort in devising a global international legal framework for online dispute 
resolution to deal with low-value high-volume cross-border disputes has not been successful 
and resulted in non-binding descriptive documents or recommendation for ODR. Although it 
is understandably difficult to reach a consensus of many different legal cultures, we have seen 
in the work of Working Party III significant efforts and uncontested proposals that could serve 
as an inspiration for future frameworks of dispute resolutions. Principles of fairness, 
transparency, due process, and accountability within several stages of dispute resolution 
process seems to be a general recommendation for ODR. Among other things, in proposals for 
binding arbitration as a final phase of dispute resolution, we have noted the proposal for 
appointment of a single arbitrator by ODR administrator for the efficiency reasons.  
Dispute resolution under Privacy Shield framework offers several available mechanisms to file 
a complaint about infringement of principles set in the framework. As a last resort, if the dispute 
has not been settled in previous stages, the Framework introduced binding arbitration under 
single set procedural rules. This residual mechanism serves both as an additional instrument 
for data subjects and as an incentive for organizations to solve the issue through other means, 
increasing chances for access to justice.   
To answer the research question of the chapter on what is the most appropriate legal framework 
for dispute resolution between cloud providers and users that provides access to justice and 
fairness, we take into account all of the above and the results of analysis from Chapter 6. We 
should point here that there is an unsatisfactory way to correctly answer this research question 
and it goes as follows: any legal framework that achieves optimal or ideal results in the 
categories that we have observed would be suitable. So any dispute resolution that comes 
closest to its ideal forms would the most suitable one. However, we have seen in the previous 
chapter that none of the available methods comes close to ideal when it comes to cloud service 
disputes. In fact, traditional litigation still would be the appropriate method in current 
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circumstances (unless there is a providers’ good will) and we have seen that it does not provide 
access to justice in practice. Hence it is not adequate. Precisely because court system harbors 
inefficiency and other inadequacies that alternative forms of dispute resolution came to be. But 
then again neither alternative dispute resolutions (including online) do not achieve its goal in 
cloud service disputes. Specialized framework for the out-of-court handling of disputes coming 
out of e-commerce does not achieve its purpose.   
We can recall here that our primary research question of the thesis asks: (if it is not adequate) 
what legal measures can be taken to improve access to justice and fairness in this domain? 
Therefore, if we are looking to improve access to justice and fairness by legal or regulatory 
intervention, we get additional perspective on our question for the chapter. Thus we have a 
clearer query of the most appropriate legal framework for dispute resolution between cloud 
providers and users that we can improve with legal measures to become the most adequate. 
Although efficiency as a category, could be influenced by legal requirements, it does not 
depend on it nor does it guarantee the result. Hence with legal measures, we can improve access 
(availability), procedural fairness and effectiveness.  
In our analysis in Chapter 6, we found that ODR mechanisms are most accessible (within 
category access) and most efficient. Therefore, with regulatory intervention in ODR’s 
availability and effectiveness, and amending some issues in procedural fairness, it would 
position ODR as the most adequate dispute resolution mechanism for cloud service disputes. 
We could look into ways to optimize court to become more efficient, but that would require 
greater regulatory intervention with many implications to national laws and more importantly 
it would require greater technical improvements of judicial systems. At the moment the UK is 
reforming its judiciary by including online dispute resolution as the integral part for certain 
types of disputes. 876  The current proposal imagines three phases, first- evaluative and 
preventive phase, second - conciliatory phase with case management tools, and final third – 
adjudicatory with online adjudication by judges.  Similarly with pyramid of conflict resolution 
Brigg’s proposal aims to handle most of the low-value cases in first phases. It indeed sounds 
as potentially good model for cloud service disputes before judiciary, however it is important 
to stress that it is part of the strategy for reform of national judiciary which is still being debated 
and it is primarily orientated on a single state with aims of reducing backlogs of cases and 
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2017). 
275 
 
increase in judicial efficiency. While it could be commendable reform it is hardly a solution 
for cross-border disputes unless similar reforms have been successful in all or majority of the 
Members States. Until then, even with the most optimized national judicial system, we will 
have unequal access to justice for different cloud users, which is hardly in line with ideals of 
the Single market.  As opposed to courts, already functioning infrastructure of ODR platform 
could be appropriated more easily and allow ODR market players to fulfill its role. Thus, if we 
want to make as little adjustments to existing regulatory framework as possible, then we should 
look to specialized regulations for our domain – legal framework for ODR.  It comes back to 
the intuitive argument from the early days of the field that ODR is most suitable for conflicts 
that originate online.877  
Now we shall address what actual legal measures could be taken to improve the international 
regulatory framework for online dispute resolution - EU ODR  Regulation and ADR Directive 
respectively – that could be applicable to cloud service disputes in its entirety (as opposed to 
Privacy Shield). 
 
4.1. Proposals for the dispute resolution for cloud services in the EU 
 
The European Union has enacted regulations to deal with out-of-court dispute resolution for 
cross-border online sales of products and services. Since cloud services fall under this category 
the logical way to handle what we described as problematic from the point of our cloud service 
context, is to address the ADR Directive and ODR Regulation respectively, to enhance their 
overall effectiveness with a number of pertinent tweaks. These are specialized regulatory 
instruments, and it is easier and more practical to address them, than for example to enhance 
general aspects of the judicial system. European Small Claims procedure is an example of such 
enhancement, but at the moment desired efficiency or reliance on information technology in 
small claims procedure have not been achieved. On the other hand, single EU ODR platform 
has been activated and designed in a user-friendly manner with mandatory links to it on traders’ 
sites. 
To get an answer on what is the most appropriate legal framework for dispute resolution 
between cloud providers and users that provide access to justice and fairness, we start from the 
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conclusions of Chapter 6. Observing the current legal framework available for contractual 
disputes in the EU, we found out that for cloud services within our context judicial system and 
courts remain to be most adequate dispute resolution mechanism in case of a dispute between 
cloud users and providers. ADR and ODR regulations, although intended to address the issues 
of solving disputes coming out of e-commerce, have not yet proven to be effective, and by our 
analyses are more appropriate for issues of selling goods online within Single market than for 
cloud service. However, due to various reasons explained in Chapter 4, 5 and 6, even the option 
of the court as the dispute resolution method would most likely lead to abstention from the 
dispute resolution unless certain thresholds in the value of the claim had been surpassed. It is 
particularly the case if the only option is a foreign court, where additional costs and barriers 
are involved rendering dispute resolution impractical. In a situation where a party has a 
legitimate claim and will to pursue, having an option to initiate and wage a dispute, but for one 
reason or another finds obstacles to available redress that result in not having a conflict 
resolved, indicates a lack of access to justice. Building from our previous conclusions and 
through the lens of our theoretical framework we address potential proposals or guidelines for 
the legal framework for ODR/ADR. 
 
 
4.1.1. Access in the proposed ODR framework 
 
To address the access to justice issues, Mauro Cappelletti focused on access.878 In our 
theoretical framework, we focused on four concepts, observed through nine indicators, where 
access remained key concepts on which other depended. Without access, the remaining concept 
does not matter. We have observed access through availability and accessibility of dispute 
resolution.  
Accessibility of ODR, where barriers are low or non-existent, is close to ideal equality for 
parties and thus score highly in fairness, compared to traditional offline forms of dispute 
resolution. Single ODR platform equalizes not only parties to the disputes, but also access to 
various consumers in different Member States where there could be a significant difference in 
access to justice in general.    
                                                          
878 CAPPELLETTI, supra note 37. 
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By way of our definition, availability depends on jurisdiction or competences of dispute 
resolution bodies. Herein lies currently the most pertinent problem of existing regulatory 
framework for ODR. There are no mechanisms to ensure the availability of the dispute 
resolution party. Firstly, we have not observed that consumer cloud services have complied 
with the requirement to post a link to EU ODR site.879 Secondly, in most cases the participation 
to the process is voluntary, and there are no mechanisms to ensure participation of traders 
(except in cases where there is sectorial obligation to participate). Cloud providers usually 
impose on its user's non-negotiable terms of service, which indicate that they are not prone to 
renegotiation of pre-set terms, and even if they were, they would decide to participate in each 
case from a post-dispute perspective. Hence, the decision to participate would be based on 
excepted successful outcome. The effectiveness of post-dispute agreements in a situation with 
significant power disparity is dubious at least. So it would require a solid incentive to make 
cloud providers to participate or to make the participation obligatory. The latter seems sounder 
since market incentives to participate have not been effective or relevant so far. The 
requirement to place a link already exist, and in a way, it is a half-way measure that confuses 
consumers, as there is no guarantee of participation.  
From the perspective of benefiting the worse off party, and in our context that would be 
consumers, the participation to the ODR procedure should be made obligatory for service 
providers. This however, does not inevitably lead to the mandatory binding outcome of the 
proceedings. Rawlsian distribution of inequalities does not necessarily indicate distribution to 
the benefit of the worse off party exclusively on the expense of better off party (win-lose 
scenario, zero sum). If available, a distribution where worse off party would benefit and better 
off party would benefit more than in the previous scenario; it would be more in accordance 
with Rawlsian fairness. Would it be fair to force cloud providers to participate in ADR 
procedure even for disputes of lowest value or over free services? It represents significant 
intervention at the expense of principle of party autonomy. Imposing non-negotiable arbitration 
that causes significant imbalance is considered unfair for consumers. Therefore, we would 
argue that if it is possible to achieve the same or similar outcome with a measure of lesser 
disadvantage to one party, it would be more suitable.  
We propose that mandatory online arbitration under the auspices of ODR platform would be 
an option for the consumer in case a provider/trader refuses participation in ODR/ADR 
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procedure, as offered by ODR platform in the initial phase of complaint handling. It would 
serve as “residual mechanism” that would incentivize the trader (cloud provider) to participate 
in already available ODR procedures. For this residual binding online arbitration, we would 
propose that it becomes an integral part of ODR platform, with a single set of procedural rules 
(model by UNCITRAL arbitration, UNCITRAL Technical Notes, AAA consumer arbitration 
rules, or any other appropriate or appropriated rules for arbitration of low-value disputes). 
Residual online arbitration would not be free for consumers, and they would have to pay the 
fees of arbitration in accordance with cost-shifting rules for losing party (with the possible 
exception of other party’s legal representation fees). That would discourage frivolous and 
fraudulent claims. The cloud provider could challenge the fraudulent claim by inviting the 
claimant to initiate online arbitration for which he could end up paying.  The cheapest option 
for both parties would be to participate in one of ADR schemes offered by ODR platform, and 
if provider/trader accept participation, online arbitration would be off the table for the 
consumer to choose.  
Mandatory online arbitration option already exists in some frameworks that we have touched 
upon, like ICANN’s UDRP and in Privacy Shield framework. Privacy Shield would especially 
be relevant, since the designers of the Privacy Shield, have decided to address the lack of access 
to redress with providing several options for redress, and arbitration as a “last resort” under a 
single set of procedural rules.  Pablo Cortes, Cristopher Hodges at al. propose ensuring the 
effective provision of consumer ADR by making the requirement of consumer ADR mandatory 
in a number of sectors where there is a high demand for ADR and to set up an effective residual 
forum to ensure full coverage.880 Cortes ponders whether the online tribunal or the online court 
would be a better residual instrument but nevertheless, argues for any of those instruments as 
improvement over existing framework.881 We believe that EU ODR platform with a single set 
of procedural rules would be the most appropriate venue for binding arbitration in case 
trader/provider refuses to participate in offered ADR procedure.  
Another important aspect is the ADR procedure under current Regulation if the provider 
accepts the participation. Any form of dispute resolution would be appropriate with a 
successful outcome. We have seen, that according to various empirical research, high rates of 
successful outcomes when it comes to bargaining dispute resolution methods. However, from 
the incentives point of view, the fact that there is a percentage of unsuccessful outcomes that 
                                                          
880 See Conclusion in PABLO. CORTEŚ, THE NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CONSUMER DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2016). 
881 id 
279 
 
does not lead to some form of settlement, could mean that providers could “fake” participation 
without consequences. Therefore as an incentive, and also a form of enforcement, we propose 
that unsuccessful outcomes due to “bad faith" would be published on neutral’s discretion, with 
a description of the issue and neutral’s recommendation as well as party’s refusal to comply 
with the recommendation in given timeframe. This published information would be available 
on ODR site as a transparency report on individual unsuccessful cases but also as a reputation 
damaging information in cases of provider’s unjustified refusal to comply. Indirectly, this 
would resemble EU trustmark scheme. For a provider of cloud service, within our low-value 
dispute context with high-volume of transactions and large consumer base, it would require 
resources to participate even in the non-binding procedure (to avoid potential binding 
arbitration), and in addition, it would be waste of such resource if reputation damaging 
information on consumer complaint gets published in case of disregard of neutrals 
recommendations/advice/proposal. It would serve as another incentive for a “good faith” in an 
attempt to solve the conflict. 
In our analysis in Chapter 6, we found that scope of ADR Directive and ODR Regulation are 
restrictive in several ways. Without repeating, we would propose that those issues get attention 
in future amendments. It would be desirable to expand the scope on the traders/providers who 
are not established in the EU, but who orientate its activities to the EU market. Similar 
interpretations have been established in national jurisprudence, and with recent Brussels I 
Recast amendments.882  Of course, it is possible that current scope was designed to provide 
additional tools for traders established in the EU and thus grow additional trust in cross-border 
transactions within EU. However, we are observing the framework from an individual access 
to justice point of view, and with normative individualism in mind, we approach the legislative 
proposals without thinking of overall economic effects for society.  
Free services are excluded from the scope of current ADR Directive and ODR Regulation. The 
regulatory framework for disputes over cloud services, or in general for online service, would 
have to redefine the definition of service contract in a manner that the element of payment is 
not essential. We have a constant growth of free services in the cloud market and many 
indications that such trend will continue and expand. Leaving free services outside of the scope, 
could leave the door open for many arguments over what exactly was paid for and does a 
service fall under the scope or not. We have discussed the issues of free service at greater length 
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in Chapter 6, and we propose regulators to redefine the definition of service contracts which 
include services that are profited of in different manners and not directly through user’s 
payment. Accountability of providers should not be conditioned with users’ payments. 
 
4.1.2. Procedural fairness in the proposed ODR framework 
 
Procedural fairness in dispute resolution in our theoretical framework has been observed from 
3 aspects that are a common factor for all various dispute resolution methods. We have 
commented if procedural guarantees are in place for transparency and fairness in 
selection/appointment procedure of adjudicators/neutrals; procedural guarantee in place to 
ensure equality of arms in presenting the case; procedural rules for cost distribution. We have 
noted in Chapter 6 that in general there are procedural guarantees for all these aspects, although 
with significantly lesser standards for ADR and ODR, than in traditional judicial systems. This 
was to be expected since procedural fairness of courts is guaranteed by numerous procedural 
laws, constitutions, international conventions, etc. On the other front, the minimal standard for 
different ADRs has been put in place with the goal to harmonize the ADR practice across the 
EU. The less stringent procedural requirements are part of the appeal of ADR and ODR, and 
they serve their purpose allowing higher flexibility than within traditional litigation.  
Nevertheless, we found some points of criticism in current legislations. Within procedural 
guarantees of independence, impartiality and expertise, set in Article 6 of ADR Directive rests 
a specific lacuna. ODR Regulation reference ADR Directive and its requirement for ADR 
entities. ADR entities could be both natural and legal persons. However, guarantees of 
independence, impartiality, and expertise are directed only to natural persons, without 
requirements for legal persons. ADR entity that is a legal person could employ ODR 
technology without a natural person in charge of ADR to legally bypass the requirements. Even 
more so could be expected with further development of capabilities of ODR technology. 
Although we are talking about Directive that has to be implemented into national laws, small 
amendments to existing provisions could rectify the issue. For example, where appropriate in 
the text it should be stated that requirement should be extended to ADR administrator, whether 
natural or legal person.  
For residual binding online arbitration, we would propose a selection of arbitrators from a large 
pool of experts open at EU level (recall to the Rawlsian notion of equally open offices to all). 
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If parties cannot reach agreement on one or three arbitrators, ODR platform would appoint a 
random arbitrator with necessary expertise and requirements. This approach has recommended 
by UNCITRAL’s Technical Notes for low-value high-volume disputes.  
Equality of arms is covered by Article 9 of ADR Directive, It does not guarantee any balancing 
authority in cases of significant imbalance of power between the parties where one is overly 
dominant and has access to all information and evidence, and the other party does not have full 
access to needed evidence. We have seen that in Privacy Shield framework dispute resolution 
bodies are vested with essentially investigatory competences. While this would not be entirely 
appropriate for contractual dispute in general and it depends on type of dispute resolution, 
within our proposal we would accept formulation for authority of the third party in residual 
binding arbitration as displayed in one of the draft proposals for UNCITRLA’s WG III: “The 
neutral shall have the discretion to reverse such burden of proof where, in exceptional 
circumstances, the facts so require.”883 For all other ADR procedures, neutral discretion to 
assess that the provider has not complied with its recommendations could suffice in providing 
authority to the neutrals for conducting various forms of dispute resolution where one party has 
all information and evidence, and the other party does not have full access to needed evidence. 
The way costs are attributed under current regulations it is adequate for consumers in cloud 
dispute context. We would, however, propose equalization in case of binding arbitration. In 
accordance with cost-shifting rules for losing party applicable to most civil law systems, the 
fees of arbitration will be covered by the party who failed (with the possible exception of other 
party’s legal representation fees). That would discourage frivolous and fraudulent claims. This 
rule would also motivate parties to use the existing network of ADRs as already in function. 
Principles of efficiency and neutral authority to guide the process to be most efficient as 
proposed by UNCITRAL’s Technical Notes would be welcomed here as well.  
 
4.1.3. Efficiency in the proposed ODR framework 
 
Efficiency is the aspect where ADR and ODR regulations have already established appropriate 
limitations, and we have seen in our survey in Chapter 5 that disputes handled through EU 
ODR platform have been handled more efficiently compared with average costs and duration 
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of procedure in traditional offline dispute resolution mechanisms. We would recommend, as in 
the previous section on the appointment of arbitrators, that ODR platform takes a more 
significant role in the appointment of arbitrators. At least in residual binding arbitration. Hörnle 
distinguishes the referral function from transfer function of the current ODR platform.884 The 
referral function imitates search engine for ADR/ODR providers and the transfer function is 
evident from receiving and transferring the complaint/case to chosen ADR/ODR provider.885 
We propose for the efficiency of the residual phase that the functions of the platform are 
enhanced by allowing ODR platform as a “fifth party” the function to randomly select arbitrator 
(from list of qualified neutrals) in line with recommendations from Technical Notes and to 
transfer the case through an online arbitration tool adjacent to existing platform.   With residual 
binding arbitration as an incentive for negotiation, the EU ODR platform could even provide a 
single negotiation tool that could structure and filter negotiation phase before escalating to 
another phase, thus improving the overall efficiency.  
By allowing enlisting a greater number of potential arbitrators for residual arbitration, the 
competition and market itself could potentially reduce the costs of arbitration fee, especially 
having in mind the freely available online arbitration tool at their disposal. Of course, the 
criteria for selection would be predefined by the ODR platform and random selection would 
be the case only among equally qualified (maybe even equally cheap) arbitrators.  
 
4.1.4. Effectiveness in the proposed ODR framework 
 
Effectiveness in our model is largely connected to the issues of enforcement of decisions and 
settlements. We would argue that voluntary compliance should not be necessary for the dispute 
resolution, or rather that there are small incentives to push voluntary compliance. We proposed 
that unsuccessful outcomes due to “bad faith" of one party should be published on neutral’s 
discretion, with a description of the issue and neutral’s recommendation as well as party’s 
refusal to comply with the recommendation in given timeframe. This published information 
would be available on ODR site as a transparency report on individual unsuccessful cases but 
also as a reputation damaging information in cases of provider’s unjustified refusal to comply.  
It could be described and indirect enforcement, but would not require any additional step from 
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High?,  QUEEN MARY SCH. LAW LEG. STUD. RES. (2012) p.18. 
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opposing party. In a way, it would be immediate enforcement, and some satisfaction for 
complaining party to have a neutral recommendation publicly proclaimed in his favor. The 
trader/provider can choose to ignore the negative review, but if we recall that consumer was 
free to choose from the beginning how he is going to pursue the dispute, and one opted out of 
traditional litigation than one should accept the consequence of his actions. To some degree at 
least he/she had access to some justice or redress. Being a dispute of low-value that would be 
an appropriate risk when deciding to make dispute formal or not to pursue at all. Here we are 
only proposing an addition to non-binding mechanisms, while there is a significant number of 
ADR operating that issues binding decision on traders, consumers or both, as we showed in 
Chapter 5.  
On the other hand, for our proposal of residual binding arbitration, it would be desirable to 
have a straightforward legal grounds for enforcement of arbitral decision coming out of online 
arbitration (and thus solve the issue with NY Convection). Arbitral decision coming out of 
online arbitration under auspices of EU ODR platform should be directly enforceable with at 
least same or even quicker procedure when compared to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
under NY Convection.  
We have discussed in this chapter proposals for improving the existing legal framework for 
disputes coming out of cloud services. We argue that a small number of changes to the ADR 
Directive and ODR Regulation could make the most appropriate legal framework for dispute 
resolution between cloud providers and users that provide access to justice and fairness? There 
a significant number of way legislation could be appropriated and with no certainty can we say 
that one way is the ultimate solution. However, starting from the Rawlsian perspective of 
improving the position of the worse off party, and applying this logic to minor redistribution 
of rights and obligation under existing framework, that would achieve the desired outcome, we 
consider above-discussed changes sufficient. Additional requirements could overburden one 
side and achieve opposite effect. We should also remind that ODR and ADR regulations are 
but a tool for reaching a goal of access to justice and that more “heavy” instruments exist. The 
question of appropriateness is then a matter of decision based on specific circumstances.  
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion  
 
 
 
 
In today’s fast-paced ultra-connected world, living without technology seems impossible. 
Technology surrounds us, and we are immersed in the technology in our professional and social 
lives. One of the dominant ways we interact with each other today is through the Internet. The 
Internet has become a platform for the exchange of ideas and communication, but also a catalyst 
for social changes, in particular through an increase in productivity which leads to 
transformation of whole industries. We are now able to be productive irrespective of our 
geographical location or day of the time. With the constant exchange of knowledge and services 
online we are ushering a new industrial revolution. One of the technologies industries are 
increasingly relying on to become more efficient and productive are cloud services.  
Cloud services are based on cloud computing technology, which by itself is characterized by 
on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity and measured 
service. Cloud computing essentially provides infrastructure, platform or specific software as 
an on-demand, pay-as-you-use, always accessible service over the Internet.  With  the effects 
of Moore’s law, Kryder’s law and several other laws describing a decrease in price through 
time per unit of production, we could expect a constant growth of cheaply and readily available 
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services that will cost users nothing to very little. This is evident also from the number of free 
cloud services ( e-mail clients, photo-editors, streaming services, etc.) or free apps in the 
markets. To use free or low-cost service, we usually click-trough terms of service on the web-
site or accept terms and conditions for the app, which are essentially contracts of adhesion.  
These contracts are usually predetermined, non-negotiable and usually in one way or another 
in favor of its provider. The specific aspect that we are interested in are dispute resolution 
clauses, which are usually predetermined in the way that sets provider’s local jurisdiction as a 
forum in a case dispute arises. In order to determine the exact state of the issue, we have 
conducted the survey on a significant number of cloud providers’ terms of service, which 
confirmed assumptions of predetermined jurisdiction in favor of the provider which could be 
inaccessible or difficult to access by the majority of users of the service. Cloud services are 
usually globally available and not restricted to a specific jurisdiction. From our survey, we 
established that the United States are the most common choice for dispute resolution venue 
among the surveyed ToS, which was expected as most of the cloud providers are incorporated 
in the United States. Of 322 common cloud providers, 267 have included the United States as 
the location where dispute resolution will take place. However, even within the United States, 
we notice the concentration of the jurisdictions in certain states, most prominently California 
with 169 terms of service citing the state, counties or cities in California as the venue of the 
dispute resolution. The most preferred counties are the counties of San Francisco and Santa 
Clara, as these counties together with the wider area of the Northern California also hosts some 
of the most prominent cloud services based in so-called “Silicon Valley.”  Analyzing the effects 
of such dispute resolution clauses on cloud users’ access to justice, which we defined in our 
theoretical framework in Chapter 2, we concluded that it deprives access to justice to users of 
low-value cross-border services. If predefined contractual terms do not allow appropriate 
access to justice, that does not mean the there are no other more adequate means for the user to 
find redress.  
Our research has been focused on answering the following question: do the current dispute 
resolution mechanisms provide adequate means to resolve cross-border low-value disputes 
between cloud providers and users, and if not, what legal measures can be taken to improve 
access to justice and fairness in this domain?  
We have developed the theoretical framework of access to justice as fairness, by applying the 
Rawlsian approach to fairness, which he used to formulate 2 principles of justice. The second 
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principle of justice, demands distribution of inequalities to the benefit of the worse off party. 
This philosophy was unintendedly promoted through several waves of access to justice 
movement.  We have identified 4 key concepts out of principles of civil law dispute procedures 
and operationalized them through 9 observable aspects which were later used for assessment 
and comparison of different dispute resolution mechanisms, always having in mind context of 
cloud service disputes.  
In Chapter 4 we have explored jurisdictional aspects of potential cloud services disputes. We 
find that the EU domiciled users, with Brussels I (recast) Regulation have a significant tool for 
bringing the dispute to their local courts. However, as we saw in Chapter 5, even if the court 
option is available, disputants are not willing to engage in litigation if certain thresholds of 
disputed value have not been crossed. Cloud service disputes, usually fall below such threshold. 
In Chapter 5 we have analyzed the international legal framework for ADRs and ODR. The 
framework for ADR and ODR in the EU has been enacted in order to address the issues of lack 
of redress for cross-border consumers. We have gathered data from different sources to have 
stronger insights into the adequacy of existent ADRs for cloud service disputes and also we 
have gathered data from the EU ODR platform. Looking at the available data, we do not see 
that many cases over cloud services, either because the cloud providers are not interested or 
uninformed, or ODRs and ADR are not competent to handle those disputes.  In Chapter 6, we 
compare the analysis of available data and perceived characteristics of previously analyzed 
dispute resolution mechanisms to draw conclusions on the most appropriate dispute resolution 
for cloud services given the current international legal framework. With critical analysis of the 
ADR Directive and ODR Regulation, we have identified several inadequate provisions, which 
restrict the use of the EU ODR platform for the cloud services disputes, although they are 
intended to deal with disputes originating in online transactions.  Exclusion of the free services 
from the scope of regulations as well as inappropriate safeguards for independence, 
impartiality, and expertise are some of the points criticized in Chapter 6. However, one of the 
biggest obstacles to the success of ODR platform is the voluntary nature of procedures, which 
in the cloud context of imbalance in negotiation power, seems highly ineffective.  Certainly, 
with ADR Directive and ODR Regulation, the EU has increased the range of availability and 
accessibility of dispute resolution with almost guaranteed efficiency.  
To answer the question to what extent the dispute resolution mechanisms under current 
international legal framework are adequate for cloud service disputes to ensure access to justice 
and fairness, we must simply state that it depends on circumstances. It depends to what extent 
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providers as the more dominant parties are willing to participate in voluntary, contractual 
dispute resolution mechanisms.  
When it comes to cloud providers who are unwilling to participate - to the extent mandatory 
primarily adjudicatory mechanisms are in place. That would be courts and traditional litigation. 
The international legal framework for litigation is not adequate for low-value disputes such as 
those over cloud service. This conclusion is additionally confirmed by the data presented in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  The international legal framework, including the framework for 
ADR, does not provide adequate access to justice and access to redress in the disputes that 
originate out of cloud services. Precisely, because of the perceived deficiencies of the courts, 
the EU has introduced the ADR Directive and ODR Regulation as additional tools for tackling 
the issues of cross-border consumer disputes.  
On the other hand, if providers are willing to participate, then we could have additional 
mechanisms like online mediation or online adjudication of sorts that would be useful and more 
adequate tools, but they would still be limited mechanisms and eventually reliant on traditional 
courts. Either as an incentive for dealing in the “shadows of the law” or as an enforcement tool. 
From what we have observed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, cloud providers are mostly not 
interested in participating in mentioned alternatives, or they are uninformed and yet to reassess 
their position if they find it compelling in some way.  
Given what we have concluded so far, we have discussed in the final chapter proposals for 
improving the existing legal framework for disputes coming out of cloud services. We argued 
that a small number of changes to the ADR Directive and ODR Regulation could turn ODR 
into the most appropriate dispute resolution mechanism under said legal frameworks for 
dispute resolution between cloud providers and users that provide access to justice and fairness. 
Small number of changes relative to required reforms of national judicial systems if we wanted 
to rely solely on courts. The suitability of these legal frameworks in turn means suitability of 
ODR/ADR as the most appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms.   
There are significant number of ways legislation could be appropriated and with no certainty 
can we say that one way is the ultimate solution. However, starting from the Rawlsian 
perspective of improving the position of the worse off party, and applying this logic to minor 
redistribution of rights and obligation under existing framework, that would achieve the desired 
outcome, we consider following changes optimal: 
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 A single ODR platform access to justice through the upgraded version of already 
existent pan-European portal for ODR.  
 The participation to the ODR procedure should be made obligatory for service 
providers. This, however, does not inevitably lead to the mandatory binding outcome 
of the procedure, since they could refuse to comply with the recommendation of a 
neutral. 
 In the case of non-compliance with the neutral’s recommendation, the recommendation 
with the facts of the case (where applicable) should be published, and thus additional 
incentive of avoidance of negative reputation would be in place. 
 Any form of dispute resolution agreed by the parties would be appropriate. If the 
provider accepts or proposes ADR that has been approved and enlisted on ODR 
platform, consumer’s refusal would end the procedure, and the consumer is left with a 
choice of other available dispute resolution mechanisms, e.g. courts.  
 It would be desirable to expand the scope on the traders/providers who are not 
established in the EU, but who orientate their activities to the EU market. 
 We propose that mandatory online arbitration under the auspices of ODR platform 
would be an option for the consumer in case a provider/trader refuses participation in 
ADR procedure, as offered by the ODR platform in the initial phase of complaint 
handling. It would serve as “residual mechanism” that would incentivize the trader 
(cloud provider) to participate in already available ODR procedures.  
 The regulatory framework for disputes over cloud services, or in general for online 
service, would have to redefine the definition of service contract in a manner that the 
element of payment is not essential. 
 More explicit procedural guarantees for independence and impartiality of ODR 
software as a “fourth party” is needed. 
 For residual binding online arbitration, we would propose a selection of arbitrators from 
a large pool of experts open at the EU level. If parties cannot reach agreement on one 
or three arbitrators, the ODR platform would appoint a random arbitrator with necessary 
expertise and requirements. 
 We propose cost-shifting rules for the losing party as applicable in most of civil law 
systems; the fees of residual arbitration will be covered by the party who failed. 
 Arbitral decision coming out of online arbitration under auspices of EU ODR platform 
should be directly enforceable in the Members States and in accordance with NY 
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Convention. Non-compliance with neutral’s recommendation in regular ODR would be 
published on ODR platform.  
These proposals are meant to serve as guidelines in achieving more adequate or fair framework 
for dispute resolution. Additional requirements could overburden one side and achieve opposite 
effect. We should also remind that ODR and ADR regulations are but a tool for reaching a goal 
of access to justice and that more “heavy” instruments exist. The question of appropriateness 
is always to be considered under specific circumstances and with the development of new 
technologies, those circumstances will likely lead to the point where future disputants will not 
remember how to handle disputes without the use of technology.  
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Appendix A 
 
Overview of dispute resolution methods and jurisdictions in Terms of Service and 
Privacy Policies of 322 cloud services 886 
 
Cloud Services Choice of 
adjudicative 
dispute 
resolution 
in Terms of 
Service 
Location of 
dispute 
res./choice of 
jurisdiction in 
Terms of 
Service 
Choice of  
dispute 
resolution 
in Privacy 
Policies 
1. 1010Data887 Court New York SH/PS, 
TRUSTe 
2. 10gen888 Court New York AAA/ PS 
3. 37 signals.com(Basecamp)889   SH/PS, 
BBB EU 
4. 42Floors890  US  
5. Abiquo891 Court UK  
6. Acquia892 Court Middlesex 
County, 
Massachusetts 
SH/PS 
7. Acronis893 Court Massachusetts SH/ no PS 
                                                          
886 In the footnotes last access date refers to Terms of Service. All Policies have been access again and updated 
up to date of April 15, 2017 due to changes and introduction of Privacy Shield framework. SH stands for Safe 
Harbour and PS stands for Privacy Shield certification. Additional independent dispute resolution bodies where 
noted when they are designated in Privacy Policy.  
887 Service description available at: https://www.1010data.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.gooddata.com/terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at:  http://www.gooddata.com/privacy-policy (last 
accessed November,2015) 
888 Service description available at: https://www.mongodb.com/;; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.mongodb.com/legal/terms-of-use; Privacy Policy at: https://www.mongodb.com/legal/privacy-
policy; (last accessed November,2015)  
889 Service description available at: https://basecamp.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://basecamp.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://basecamp.com/privacy (last accessed 
November,2015) 
890 Service description available at: https://42floors.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://42floors.com/terms_of_service ; Privacy Policy at: https://42floors.com/privacy_policy  (last accessed 
November,2015) 
891 Service description available at: http://www.abiquo.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
anycloud.abiquo.com/tos ; Privacy Policies (PP) at: http://www.abiquo.com/privacy-policy/ (last accessed 
November,2015) 
892 Service description available at: https://www.acquia.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.acquia.com/about-us/legal/terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.acquia.com/about-
us/legal/privacy-policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
893 Service description available at: http://www.acronis.com/en-eu/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.acronis.com/en-eu/legal.html ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.acronis.com/en-
eu/company/privacy.html ; (last accessed November,2015) 
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8. Actifio894 Court Massachusetts  
9. Akamai895  Massachusetts SH/PS 
 
10. Alfresco896 Court England( law)  
11. Amazon Web Services897 Court for 
over 7500$ 
King county, 
Washington 
SH/PS, 
BBB EU 
12. American Well898 Court in Boston, 
Massachusetts 
 
13. Anaplan899 Court California SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
14. Anaqua900   SH/ no PS, 
AAA 
15. Aperian901 Court law of 
Massachusetts 
SH/ no PS 
16. Apigee902 Court Santa Clara, 
County, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
BBB EU 
17. AppDynamics903 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
AAA 
                                                          
894 Service description available at:http://www.actifio.com/#cloud-service-provider ;Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.actifio.com/terms-of-use/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.actifio.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
895Service description available at: https://www.akamai.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.akamai.com/us/en/privacy-policies/portal-terms.jsp ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.akamai.com/us/en/privacy-policies/privacy-statement.jsp   (last accessed November,2015) 
896 Service description available at: https://www.alfresco.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.alfresco.com/terms-use Privacy Policy at: https://www.alfresco.com/privacy (last accessed 
November,2015) 
897Service description available at: http://aws.amazon.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://aws.amazon.com/agreement/; Privacy Policy at: https://aws.amazon.com/privacy/?nc1=f_pr(last 
accessed November,2015) 
898 Service description available at: https://www.americanwell.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.americanwell.com/terms-of-use/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.americanwell.com/privacy-
policy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
899 Service description available at: www.anaplan.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.anaplan.com/terms-of-use/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.anaplan.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
900 Service description available at: http://www.anaqua.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.anaqua.com/legal/terms-and-conditions ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.anaqua.com/legal/privacy-policy (last accessed November,2015) 
901 Service description available at: https://www.apperian.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.apperian.com/service-agreement/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.apperian.com/apperian-
privacy-policy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
902 Service description available at: http://apigee.com/about/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://apigee.com/about/terms; Privacy Policy at: http://apigee.com/about/privacy (last accessed 
November,2015) 
903 Service description available at: http://www.appdynamics.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.appdynamics.com/terms-of-use/; Privacy Policy at: http://www.appdynamics.com/privacy-
policy/(last accessed November,2015) 
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18. Appistry904  Missouri law SH/ no PS, 
AAA 
19. Apple905 Court Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
TRUSTe, 
SH/ no PS, 
Apple 
privacy 
officer or 
EU DPA 
20. Apprenda906 Court Rensselaer 
County, New 
York 
 
21. Aprenda907 Court Rensselaer 
County, New 
York 
 
22. Apptio908  laws of 
Washington 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
23. Aria909   SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
24. ARM910    
25. Aryaka911 Court Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
 
26. Asana912 Arbitration, 
AAA 
San Francisco 
San Francisco, 
SH/ PS, 
BBB EU 
                                                          
904 Service description available at: http://www.appistry.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.appistry.com/terms-and-conditions/; Privacy Policy at: http://www.appistry.com/safe-harbor-
privacy-policy/(last accessed November,2015) 
905 Service description available at: www.apple.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/terms/site.html; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.apple.com/privacy/privacy-policy/; (last accessed November,2015) 
906 Service description available at: https://apprenda.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://apprenda.com/express-license-terms/; Privacy Policy at: https://apprenda.com/privacy-policy/; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
907Service description available at: https://apprenda.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://apprenda.com/express-license-terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://apprenda.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015)  
908 Service description available at: www.aptio.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://tbmcouncil.jiveon.com/terms-and-conditions!input.jspa?displayOnly=true and 
http://tbmcouncil.org/termsofuse.html ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.apptio.com/resources/trust/data-
privacy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
909 Service description available at: www.ariasystems.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.ariasystems.com/legal ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.ariasystems.com/privacy-policy ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
910Service description available at: http://www.arm.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.arm.com/about/terms-conditions.php; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.arm.com/about/privacy.php; (last accessed November,2015) 
911Service description available at: http://www.aryaka.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.aryaka.com/terms-and-conditions/; Privacy Policy at: http://www.aryaka.com/privacy-policy/; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
912 Service description available at: https://asana.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://asana.com/terms#terms-of-service; Privacy Policy at: https://asana.com/terms#privacy-policy (last 
accessed November,2015) 
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Small claim 
court 
California 
27. AT&T913 Arbitration 
BBB 
Court 
AAA rules for 
Data service, 
Online Texas for 
site 
 
TRUSTe 
28. Atlassian914 Arbitration, 
ICC 
Court 
Sydney, 
Amsterdam ,San 
Francisco 
San Francisco, 
California, 
SH/PS, 
TRUSTe 
29. Automattic – Wordpress915 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
Courts 
San Francisco 
County, 
California 
 
30. Avalara916 Court Washington  
31. Avature917   SH/PS 
32. BambooHR918 Court Utah SH/PS, 
TRUSTe 
33. Barracuda Networks919 Court Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
 
34. Betterlesson920 Courts Boston, 
Massachusetts 
 
                                                          
913Service description available at: https://www.att.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.att.com/legal/terms.sessionBasedWirelessDataServicesAgreement.list.html; Privacy Policy at : 
http://www.att.com/gen/privacy-policy?pid=2506  (last accessed November,2015) 
914 Service description available at: https://www.atlassian.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://www.atlassian.com/end-user-agreement ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.atlassian.com/legal/privacy-
policy (last accessed November,2015) 
915 Service description available at: https://automattic.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://en.wordpress.com/tos/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://automattic.com/privacy/ ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
916 Service description available at: www.avalara.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.avalara.com/terms-of-use/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.avalara.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
917 Service description available at: http://www.avature.net/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.avature.net/en/terms-of-use/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.avature.net/en/privacy-policy/ ; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
918 Service description available at: http://www.bamboohr.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.bamboohr.com/terms.php ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.bamboohr.com/privacy.php; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
919Service description available at: www.barracudanetworks.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.barracuda.com/legal/terms; Privacy Policy at: https://www.barracuda.com/legal/privacy; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
920 Service description available at: betterlesson.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://betterlesson.com/public/terms_of_service?from=cc_footer ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://betterlesson.com/public/privacy_policy?from=cc_footer ; (last accessed November,2015) 
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35. Bigcommerce921 Court Travis County, 
Texas 
PS 
36. Bill.com922 Court the Northern 
District of 
California 
TRUSTe 
37. Bime - Zendesk923 Court French (law)  
38. Birst924 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Santa Clara, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
39. BlueJeans925 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
Court 
San Jose, 
California 
Santa Clara, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
40. Bluelock926 Court Marion County, 
Indiana 
SH/ PS, 
BBB EU 
41. Bluenose927 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
San Francisco 
County, California 
 
42. Boundary928 Court US- Houston; 
Austria- Vienna; 
Germany-
Frankfurt ab 
Main; Belgium, 
Denmark, 
Finland, England, 
Netherlands, 
Norway, 
Sweden- English 
Courts; Portugal-
Lisbon; Spain – 
Madrid; 
EU DPA 
                                                          
921 Service description available at: https://www.bigcommerce.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.bigcommerce.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.bigcommerce.com/privacy/ (last 
accessed November,2015) 
922 Service description available at: www.bill.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://app.bill.com/TermsOfService; Privacy Policy at: http://www.bill.com/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
923 Service description available at: https://www.bimeanalytics.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policy 
at: https://www.bimeanalytics.com/terms-of-use.html (last accessed November,2015) 
924 Service description available at: https://www.birst.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.birst.com/website/commercial-terms/powered-by-birst-cloudappliance-customer-agreement/ ; 
Privacy Policy at:  https://www.birst.com/website/privacy-policy/ (last accessed November,2015) 
925 Service description available at: http://bluejeans.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://bluejeans.com/terms-of-service ; Privacy Policy at: http://bluejeans.com/privacy-policy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
926Service description available at: http://www.bluelock.com/ Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.bluelock.com/uploads/2012/09/Bluelock_MSA_v120901.pdf; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.bluelock.com/legal/privacy-policy/  (last accessed November,2015)  
927 Service description available at: http://www.bluenose.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.bluenose.com/legal/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://getsatisfaction.com/corp/privacy-policy/ (last 
accessed November,2015) 
928 https://boundary.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: http://www.bmc.com/legal/terms-of-use.html; Privacy 
Policy at: http://media.cms.bmc.com/documents/External+Privacy+Binding+Coporate+Rules+Policy+-
+Aug+04.pdf ; (last accessed November,2015) 
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Switzerland- 
Zurich; France- 
Nanterre 
43. Box929 Court In US - Santa 
Clara County, 
California; 
In UK- 
CourtEngland 
and Wales 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
44. Bright Edge930 Court San Francisco, 
San Mateo or 
Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
 
45. Brightbytes931 Courts San Francisco, 
California 
 
46. Buuteeq ( bookingSuite- 
Priceline)932 
Court Amsterdam  
47. CA Technologies933 Court Suffolk County, 
New York 
BCR, SH/ 
PS, EU 
DPAs 
48. Carecloud934 Court State of Florida, 
Miami-Dade 
County 
TRUSTe 
49. Chargify935 Court Boston SH/ PS, BBB 
EU 
50. Chartbeat936 Court New York SH/ PS, BBB 
EU 
                                                          
929 Service description available at: www.box.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.box.com/legal/termsofservice/; Privacy Policy at: https://www.box.com/legal/privacypolicy/ ; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
930 Service description available at: http://www.brightedge.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.brightedge.com/legal ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.brightedge.com/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
931 Service description available at: brightbytes.net; Terms of Service (ToS) at: http://brightbytes.net/terms/ ; 
Privacy Policy at: http://brightbytes.net/privacy-policy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
932 Service description available at: http://suite.booking.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://suite.booking.com/terms-of-service/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://suite.booking.com/privacy-policy/ (last 
accessed November,2015) 
933 Service description available at: http://www.ca.com/us/default.aspx; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.ca.com/us/legal/terms-for-cadotcom.aspx; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.ca.com/us/privacy.aspx?intcmp=footernav; (last accessed November,2015) 
934 Service description available at: http://www.carecloud.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://community.carecloud.com/terms-and-conditions ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.carecloud.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
935 Service description available at: www.chargify.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.chargify.com/terms-conditions/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.chargify.com/privacy-policy/ ; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
936 Service description available at: https://chartbeat.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://chartbeat.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://chartbeat.com/privacy/ (last accessed 
November,2015) 
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51. Circleci937 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
San Francisco, 
California 
 
52. Cirruspath938   SH/ PS, 
53. Cisco Systems939 Courts In US- State 
California; In 
Canada-Province 
of Ontario; 
EMEA-English 
Court(for Italy 
only, Italian law); 
Japan – Tokyo; 
Australia- New 
South Wales; All 
other- California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
54. Citrix Systems940 Court Florida PS 
55. Clarizen941 Court California SH/ no PS, 
JAMS 
56. Clarizen942 Court California SH/ no PS, 
JAMS 
57. Clearcare943 Court San Francisco, 
California 
 
58. Clearslide944 Court San Francisco 
County, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
                                                          
937 Service description available at: https://circleci.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://discuss.circleci.com/tos ; Privacy Policy at: https://circleci.com/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
938 Service description available at: http://www.cirruspath.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://www.cirrusinsight.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at:  https://www.cirrusinsight.com/privacy (last accessed 
November,2015) 
939 Service description available at: http://www.cisco.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.cisco.com/web/siteassets/legal/terms_condition . and https://www.webex.com/terms-of-
service.html ; Privacy Policy at: html http://www.cisco.com/web/siteassets/legal/privacy_full.html; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
940 Service description available at: http://www.citrix.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.citrix.com/about/legal/legal-notice.html; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.citrix.com/about/legal/privacy.html#safe; (last accessed November,2015) 
941 Service description available at: http://www.clarizen.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://app2.clarizen.com/clarizen/pages/service/terms_conditions.htm Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.clarizen.com/privacy-policy.html (last accessed November,2015) 
942 Service description available at: http://www.clarizen.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://app2.clarizen.com/Clarizen/Pages/Service/Terms_Conditions.htm ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.clarizen.com/privacy-policy.html (last accessed November,2015) 
943 Service description available at: http://clearcareonline.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://clearcareonline.com/master-subscription-agreement/ ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://clearcareonline.com/privacy-statement/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
944 Service description available at: https://www.clearslide.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://www.clearslide.com/legal/terms ; Privacy Policy at:  https://www.clearslide.com/legal/privacy (last 
accessed November,2015) 
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59. Clever945 Courts Santa Clara, 
California 
 
60. Clictale946 Court Tel Aviv, Israel  
61. Clio947 Court England, Wales 
and Ireland 
TRUSTe 
62. Cloud9 Analytics948 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Court 
Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
 
63. CloudBees949 Court New York  
64. Cloudera950 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
65. Cloudera951 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
66. Cloudflare952 Arbitration, 
AAA 
San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
67. Cloudius. (now scylladb)953 Court Tel-Aviv  
68. Cloudlock954 Court Massachusetts 
(law) 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
69. CloudPassage955 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
San Francisco, 
California 
 
                                                          
945 Service description available at: clever.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: https://clever.com/about/terms ; 
Privacy Policy at: https://clever.com/about/privacy-policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
946 Service description available at: https://www.clicktale.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.clicktale.com/terms-use ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.clicktale.com/privacy-policy ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
947 Service description available at: https://www.goclio.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.goclio.com/tos/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.goclio.com/privacy/ (last accessed 
November,2015) 
948 Service description available at: https://c9.io/; Terms of Service (ToS) at:; Privacy Policy at: 
https://c9.io/site/terms-of-service https://c9.io/site/privacy-policy; (last accessed November,2015) 
949 Service description available at: https://www.cloudbees.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.cloudbees.com/terms-service ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.cloudbees.com/privacy-policy ; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
950 Service description available at: cloudera.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.cloudera.com/content/www/en-us/legal/terms-and-conditions.html ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.cloudera.com/content/www/en-us/legal/privacy-policy.html ; (last accessed November,2015) 
951 Service description available at: http://www.cloudera.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.cloudera.com/content/www/en-us/legal/terms-and-conditions.html ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.cloudpassage.com/privacy-policy; (last accessed November,2015) 
952 Service description available at: www.cloudflare.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.cloudflare.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.cloudflare.com/security-policy ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
953 Service description available at: http://www.cloudius-systems.com and http://www.scylladb.com/ ; Terms 
of Service (ToS) at: http://www.scylladb.com/opensource/cla/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
954 Service description available at: www.cloudlock.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.cloudlock.com/tos/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.cloudlock.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
955 Service description available at: https://www.cloudpassage.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.cloudpassage.com/terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.cloudpassage.com/privacy-
policy; (last accessed November,2015) 
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70. CloudShare956 Court Israel  
71. Connectandsell957 Arbitration, 
AAA and if 
not JAMS 
San Francisco, 
California 
 
72. Content Raven958 Court Massachusetts  
73. Cornerstone-Evolv959 Court California (law) SH/ PS 
74. Couchbase960 Court California (law)  
75. Coupa961 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
DPAs 
76. Coursera962 Arbitration 
Court 
 
Santa Clara, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
ICDR of 
AAA 
77. Crittercism963 Court Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
SH/ no PS 
78. CrowdFlower964 Arbitration, 
AAA 
San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
79. Curalate965 Court Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania 
 
                                                          
956 Service description available at: www.cloudshare.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.cloudshare.com/node/21 ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.cloudshare.com/node/20; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
957 Service description available at: http://connectandsell.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
http://www.connectandsell.com/docs/CONNECTANDSELL-ONLINE-AGREEMENT.pdf  (last accessed 
November,2015) 
958 Service description available at: http://www.contentraven.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policy 
at: http://www.contentraven.com/terms-conditions/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
959 Service description available at: http://www.cornerstoneondemand.com/evolv; Terms of Service (ToS) and  
Privacy Policy at: https://www.cornerstoneondemand.com/privacy-policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
960 Service description available at: http://www.couchbase.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.couchbase.com/terms-of-service; Privacy Policy at: http://www.couchbase.com/privacy-policy; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
961 Service description available at: www.coupa.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://supplier.coupahost.com/terms_of_use ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.coupa.com/privacy-policy/ ; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
962 Service description available at: www.coursera.org ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.coursera.org/about/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.coursera.org/about/privacy ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
963 Service description available at: http://www.crittercism.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.crittercism.com/service-terms-and-conditions/ ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.crittercism.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
964 Service description available at: http://www.crowdflower.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.crowdflower.com/terms-and-conditions ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.crowdflower.com/privacy 
; (last accessed November,2015) 
965 Service description available at: http://www.curalate.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.curalate.com/tos/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.curalate.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
299 
 
80. Datameer966 Arbitration, 
AAA 
California SH/ no PS, 
81. Defense.net (F5.com)967 Court State of 
Washington, 
United States. 
SH/ no PS, 
JAMS 
82. Dell968 Arbitration-
consumers, 
AAA, JAMS 
Mediation-- 
commercial 
Court- 
commercial 
Travis or 
Williamson 
County, Texas 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
83. Delphix969 Court Northern District 
of California 
 
84. Deskaway970    
85. Digital Ocean971 Arbitration, 
AAA 
in the city where 
subscriber is 
being billed, NY 
law 
SH/ PS 
86. Docusign972 Court State of 
Washington(law) 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
87. Docutap973 Court Sioux Falls, 
South Dakota 
 
88. Dotcloud974 Court Berlin  
                                                          
966 Service description available at: http://www.datameer.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.datameer.com/datameer-azure-evaluation-agreement/ ; Privacy Policy at:  
http://www.datameer.com/privacy-policy/ (last accessed November,2015) 
967 Service description available at: https://f5.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: https://f5.com/about-
us/policies/terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.f5.com/pdf/customer-support/f5-safe-harbor-
policy.pdf ; (last accessed November,2015) 
968 Service description available at: http://www.dell.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/uscorp1/terms ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/uscorp1/policies-privacy; (last accessed November,2015) 
969 Service description available at: http://www.delphix.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.delphix.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Delphix-Product-License-Agreement.pdf ; Privacy 
Policy at: http://www.delphix.com/p/privacy-policy/; (last accessed November,2015) 
970 Service description available at: http://www.deskaway.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
http://www.deskaway.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.deskaway.com/privacy/ (last accessed 
November,2015) 
971 Service description available at: https://www.digitalocean.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.digitalocean.com/legal/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.digitalocean.com/legal/privacy/ ; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
972 Service description available at: www.docusing.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://www.docusign.com/company/terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.docusign.com/company/privacy-policy (last accessed November,2015) 
973 Service description available at: http://docutap.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://docutap.com/assets/uploads/content-files/DocuTAPCustomerPortalTerms_2013-05-06.pdf; Privacy 
Policy at: http://docutap.com/privacy; (last accessed November,2015) 
974 Service description available at: https://www.dotcloud.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.cloudcontrol.com/terms and https://www.dotcloud.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.dotcloud.com/privacy-policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
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Santa Clara, 
California-US 
89. DotCloud975 Court Berlin for EU; 
Santa Clara 
County, 
California for US 
 
90. Doximity976 Court 
Arbitration, 
AAA 
(optional for 
less than 
10000$) 
Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
Non-appearance 
arbitration 
 
91. Dreambox977 Arbitration,  
AAA 
King county, 
Washington 
 
92. Dropbox978 Arbitration, 
AAA-US 
Court 
Small claims 
court 
San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
JAMS 
93. Dynamic Yield979 Court Israel (law) PS 
94. Edmodo980 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ PS, BBB 
EU 
95. Egnyte981 Court Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
96. Ello982 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Burlington, 
Vermont 
 
                                                          
975 Service description available at: https://www.dotcloud.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.dotcloud.com/terms; Privacy Policy at: https://www.dotcloud.com/privacy-policy; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
976 Service description available at: www.doximity.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.doximity.com/physicians/privacy; (last accessed November,2015) 
977 Service description available at: www.dreambox.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.dreambox.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.dreambox.com/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
978 Service description available at: www.dropbox.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.dropbox.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.dropbox.com/terms#privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
979 Service description available at: https://www.dynamicyield.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.dynamicyield.com/tos/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.dynamicyield.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
980Service description available at: www.edmodo.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.edmodo.com/corporate/terms-of-service ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.edmodo.com/privacy#policy ; (last accessed November,2015)  
981 Service description available at: https://www.egnyte.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.egnyte.com/corp/terms_of_service.html; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.egnyte.com/corp/privacy_policy.html; (last accessed November,2015) 
982 Service description available at: https://ello.co/wtf/about/what-is-ello/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://ello.co/wtf/policies/terms-of-use/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://ello.co/wtf/policies/privacy-policy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
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97. EMC983 Court Middlesex 
County, 
Massachusetts 
SH/ no PS, 
DPAs 
TRUSTe 
98. Engine Yard984 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
ICDR of 
AAA 
99. Ensighten985 Arbitration, 
AAA 
 SH/ no PS 
100. Entelo986 Court San Francisco, 
California 
 
101. Erply987 Arbitration, 
AAA 
New York  
102. Eucalyptus Systems988 Court Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
BBB 
TRUSTe 
Apec 
103. Evernote989 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Courts 
San Mateo 
County, 
California; 
Brazil; 
Switzerland 
SH/ no PS, 
DPAs 
104. Exspensify990 Court the Northern 
District of 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
105. Facebook991 Courts Northern District, 
California or 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
                                                          
983 Service description available at: http://www.emc.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.emc.com/legal/legal-information.htm  Privacy Policy at: http://www.emc.com/legal/emc-
corporation-privacy-statement.htm#3; (last accessed November,2015) 
984Service description available at: www.engineyard.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.engineyard.com/policies/tos ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.engineyard.com/policies/privacy/; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
985 Service description available at: https://www.ensighten.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.ensighten.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.ensighten.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
986 Service description available at: https://www.entelo.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.entelo.com/terms-of-use/; Privacy Policy at: https://www.entelo.com/privacy/ ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
987 Service description available at: https://erply.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: https://erply.com/terms-of-
service/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://erply.com/privacy-policy/ (last accessed November,2015) 
988 Service description available at: http://www8.hp.com/us/en/cloud/helion-eucalyptus-overview.html; Terms 
of Service (ToS) at: http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hpe/legal/terms-of-use.html ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hpe/privacy/privacy.html; (last accessed November,2015) 
989 Service description available at: https://evernote.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://evernote.com/legal/tos.php; Privacy Policy at: https://evernote.com/legal/privacy.php; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
990 Service description available at: www.expensify.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.expensify.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at:https://www.expensify.com/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
991 Service description available at: https://www.facebook.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms; Privacy Policy at: https://www.facebook.com/privacy/explanation; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
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San Mateo 
County 
106. FinancialForce.com992 Arbitration, 
JAMS, 
Court of 
International 
Arbitration 
Rules 
San Francisco, 
California -US 
 
London –rest of 
the world 
SH, JAMS 
107. Fivestars993 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
Courts 
San Francisco, 
California 
San Francisco, 
California 
 
108. Flexiant994 Courts England  
109. FluidInfo995 Courts New York  
110. Flurry996 Arbitration, 
AAA, 
Court 
San Francisco, 
California 
 
SH/ no PS, 
DMA 
111. Freshbooks997 Arbitration Ontario, Canada TRUSTe 
112. Fusion IO (San Disk)998 Courts Santa Clara, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
DPAs 
113. Gainsight999 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
Court 
Santa Clara 
 
Santa Clara or 
Northern District, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
BBB EU 
                                                          
992 Service description available at: www.financialforce.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) 
at:http://www.financialforce.com/company/cloud-erp/legal/platformtermsofuse-other/ and 
http://www.financialforce.com/company/cloud-erp/legal/msa/ ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.financialforce.com/company/cloud-erp/legal/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
993 Service description available at: http://www.fivestars.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.fivestars.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.fivestars.com/privacy/ ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
994 Service description available at: https://www.flexiant.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.flexiant.com/terms-of-use/; Privacy Policy at: https://www.flexiant.com/privacy/ ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
995 Service description available at: http://fluidinfo.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://fluidinfo.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at:; (last accessed November,2015) 
996 Service description available at:  http://www.flurry.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.flurry.com/legal-privacy/terms-service/flurry-analytics-terms-service; Privacy Policy at: 
https://policies.yahoo.com/us/en/yahoo/privacy/index.htm (last accessed November,2015) 
997 Service description available at: www.freshbooks.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.freshbooks.com/policies/terms-of-service ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.freshbooks.com/policies/privacy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
998 Service description available at: http://www.fusionio.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.sandisk.com/about/legal/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.sandisk.com/about/legal/privacy 
; (last accessed November,2015) 
999 Service description available at: http://www.gainsight.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.gainsight.com/terms-service/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.gainsight.com/privacy-policy/ (last 
accessed November,2015) 
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114. Get Satisfaction1000 Arbitration, 
AAA 
San Francisco 
County, 
California 
SH, 
TRUSTe 
115. GigaSpaces1001 Courts New York  
116. Gigya1002 Court Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
SH/ PS 
117. GinzaMetrics1003   SH/ no PS, 
AAA 
118. GoGrid1004 Courts San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
BBB EU 
119. GoodData1005 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
120. Google1006 Courts Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
SH/PS, 
DPAs 
For HR 
JAMS 
121. Greenhouse1007 Court New York SH/ no PS 
122. Ground Rounds1008 Court Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
 
123. Gusto, (formerly Zenpayroll1009 Arbitration, 
AAA 
San Francisco, 
California 
 
                                                          
1000 Service description available at: https://getsatisfaction.com/corp/  ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://getsatisfaction.com/corp/terms-of-service/ ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://getsatisfaction.com/corp/privacy-policy/ (last accessed November,2015) 
1001 Service description available at: http://www.gigaspaces.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.gigaspaces.com/gigaspaces-xap-software-license-agreement-premium-edition-andor-caching-
edition  ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.gigaspaces.com/privacy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1002 Service description available at: http://www.gigya.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.gigya.com/terms-of-service/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.gigya.com/privacy-policy/; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1003 Service description available at: http://www.ginzametrics.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.ginzametrics.com/terms-of-use/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.ginzametrics.com/privacy-policy/ 
; (last accessed November,2015) 
1004 Service description available at: www.datapipe.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.datapipe.com/gogrid/legal/; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.datapipe.com/gogrid/legal/eu_safe_harbor_policy/; (last accessed November,2015) 
1005 Service description available at: http://www.gooddata.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.gooddata.com/terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.gooddata.com/privacy-policy  (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1006 Service description available at: www.google.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/; (last accessed November,2015) 
1007 Service description available at: http://www.greenhouse.io/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.greenhouse.io/privacy-policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1008 Service description available at: https://www.grandrounds.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.grandrounds.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.grandrounds.com/privacy ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1009 Service description available at: gusto.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: https://gusto.com/terms ; Privacy 
Policy at: https://gusto.com/privacy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
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124. Hc1.com1010 Court Southern District 
of Indiana, 
PS 
125. Hearsaysocial1011 Court California- US 
England- UK 
Hong Kong - HK 
SH/ PS 
126. Heroku1012 Courts Santa Clara, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
127. Hewlett-Packard1013 Courts Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
BBB 
TRUSTe 
Apec 
128. Hightail1014 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Court 
 
Northern District 
of California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
129. HIreVue1015 Arbitration, 
AAA 
New York SH/ no PS 
130. Hoopla1016 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
Courts 
San Jose, 
California 
Northern District 
, California 
SH/PS, 
BBB EU 
131. Hootsuite1017 Court British Columbia, 
Canada 
SH/ no PS 
                                                          
1010 Service description available at: www.hc1.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.hc1.com/legal/terms-use/; Privacy Policy at: https://www.hc1.com/legal/privacy-policy/; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1011 Service description available at: http://hearsaysocial.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://hearsaysocial.com/assets/2013/05/Hearsay-EULA-US-FINAL-2015.pdf and 
http://hearsaysocial.com/assets/2013/05/Hearsay-EULA-UK-2015_FINAL.pdf ; Privacy Policy at:  
http://hearsaysocial.com/privacy-policy/ (last accessed November,2015) 
1012 Service description available at: https://www.heroku.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.heroku.com/policy/tos; Privacy Policy at: https://www.heroku.com/policy/privacy; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1013 Service description available at: http://www8.hp.com/us/en/cloud/helion-eucalyptus-overview.html 
Terms of Service (ToS) at: http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hpe/legal/terms-of-use.html; ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hpe/privacy/privacy.html; (last accessed November,2015) 
1014 Service description available at: https://www.hightail.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://www.hightail.com/aboutus/legal/terms-of-service#dispute ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.hightail.com/aboutus/legal/privacy (last accessed November,2015) 
1015 Service description available at: https://www.hirevue.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.hirevue.com/service-agreement/; Privacy Policy at: http://hirevue.com/terms; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1016 Service description available at: https://www.hoopla.net/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.hoopla.net/terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.hoopla.net/privacy-policy (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1017 Service description available at: https://hootsuite.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://hootsuite.com/legal/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://hootsuite.com/legal/privacy (last accessed 
November,2015) 
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132. HortonWorks1018 Court Westchester 
County, New 
York 
 
133. Host analytics1019 Court San Mateo 
County, California 
SH/ PS, BBB 
EU 
134. HubiC1020 Commercial 
Court 
Lille, France  
135. Hubspot1021 Court Massachusetts -
US 
Dublin - EU 
New south 
Wales, Australia 
- Other 
SH/PS, 
TRUSTe 
136. Huddle1022 Court English (law) SH/ no 
PS,AAA 
137. IBM1023   SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
TRUSTe 
Apec 
138. Infusionsoft1024 arbitration 
AAA 
 SH/ PS, 
Verasafe 
dis. res. 
139. InisdeView1025 Court San Francisco 
County, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
                                                          
1018 Service description available at: http://hortonworks.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://hortonworks.com/agreements/terms-of-service/ ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://hortonworks.com/agreements/privacy-policy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1019 Service description available at: www.hostanalytics.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.hostanalytics.com/terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.hostanalytics.com/privacy-policy ; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
1020 Service description available at: https://hubic.com/en/  Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policy at: 
https://hubic.com/en/contracts/Contrat_hubiC_2014.pdf (last accessed November,2015) 
1021 Service description available at: http://www.hubspot.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://legal.hubspot.com/terms-of-service and http://www.hubspot.com/legal-stuff ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.hubspot.com/privacy-policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1022 Service description available at: https://www.huddle.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://www.huddle.com/terms-of-use/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.huddle.com/safe-harbor/ (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1023 Service description available at: http://www.ibm.com/cloud-computing/?lnk=bucl; Terms of Service (ToS) 
and Privacy Policy at: http://www.ibm.com/privacy/us/en/?lnk=flg-priv-usen?lnk=flg ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1024 Service description available at: http://www.infusionsoft.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.infusionsoft.com/legal/terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.infusionsoft.com/legal/privacy-policy and https://www.verasafe.com/dispute-submission ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1025 Service description available at: http://www.insideview.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
http://www.insideview.com/terms-use/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.insideview.com/privacy-policy/ (last 
accessed November,2015) 
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140. Insidersales.com1026 Court Utah SH/PS, 
TRUSTe 
141. Insightly1027 Court California SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
142. InsightSquared1028 Court Massachusetts 
(law) 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
143. Instagram1029 Arbitration, 
AAA 
JAMS 
Small claim 
court 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
Santa Clara, 
California 
 
144. Instructure1030 Courts Salt Lake County, 
Utah 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
145. Intact1031 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
Santa Clara, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
146. Intel1032 Courts Delaware SH/ no PS, 
DPAs 
147. Intercom1033 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
148. Iron.io1034 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ noPS, 
ICDR of 
AAA 
                                                          
1026 Service description available at: http://uk.insidesales.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
http://uk.insidesales.com/terms.php ; Privacy Policy at: http://uk.insidesales.com/privacy_policy.php (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1027 Service description available at: https://www.insightly.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://www.insightly.com/terms-of-service/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.insightly.com/privacy-policy/ 
(last accessed November,2015) 
1028 Service description available at: http://www.insightsquared.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.insightsquared.com/docs/tandc/ ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.insightsquared.com/docs/privacypolicy/ (last accessed November,2015) 
1029 Service description available at: https://www.instagram.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.instagram.com/about/legal/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.instagram.com/about/legal/privacy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1030Service description available at: www.instructure.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.instructure.com/policies/terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.instructure.com/policies/privacy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1031 Service description available at: us.intacct.com; Terms of Service (ToS) 
at:http://us.intacct.com/endusertermsandconditions/termsofservice.pdf ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://us.intacct.com/privacy_policy_website ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1032 Service description available at: https://www-ssl.intel.com/content/www/us/en/cloud-computing/intel-
cloud-based-solutions.html; Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policy at: https://www-
ssl.intel.com/content/www/us/en/legal/terms-of-use.html; (last accessed November,2015) 
1033 Service description available at: https://www.intercom.io/  ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://docs.intercom.io/terms ; Privacy Policy at: http://docs.intercom.io/privacy  (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1034 Service description available at: www.iron.io ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: http://www.iron.io/terms/ ; 
Privacy Policy at: http://www.iron.io/privacy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
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149. Jazz (formerly Resumator)1035 Court Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania 
SH/ PS, 
BBB EU 
150. Jobscience1036 Court San Francisco 
County, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
DPAs 
151. Jobvite1037 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
152. Jotta1038 Courts Oslo, Norway  
153. Joyent1039 Courts San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
DPAs 
154. Judicata1040 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Small claims 
court 
San Francisco, 
California 
 
155. Juniper1041 Courts California SH/ no PS, 
BBB EU 
156. Kaavo1042 Courts Delaware  
157. Kapost1043 Court Denver County  
158. Keynote Systems1044 Courts Santa Clara, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
DPAs 
159. Kissametrics1045 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
DMA 
                                                          
1035 Service description available at: https://jazz.co/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: https://jazz.co/terms-of-
service/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://jazz.co/privacy-policy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1036 Service description available at: http://www.jobscience.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.jobscience.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.jobscience.com/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1037 Service description available at: http://www.jobvite.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.jobvite.com/terms-and-conditions/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.jobvite.com/privacy-policy/ ; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
1038 Service description available at: https://www.jottacloud.com/;  Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.jottacloud.com/terms-and-conditions/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.jottacloud.com/privacy/ ; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
1039 Service description available at: www.joyent.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.joyent.com/about/policies/terms-of-service; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.joyent.com/about/policies/privacy-policy; (last accessed November,2015) 
1040 Service description available at: www.judicata.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.judicata.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.styleseat.com/privacy (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1041 Service description available at: http://www.juniper.net/us/en/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.juniper.net/us/en/legal-notices/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.juniper.net/us/en/privacy-policy/; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
1042 Service description available at: http://www.kaavo.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.kaavo.com/terms; Privacy Policy at : http://www.kaavo.com/privacy  (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1043 Service description available at: http://kapost.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: http://kapost.com/mtm-
terms-of-use/ ; Privacy Policy at : http://kapost.com/privacy-policy/ (last accessed November,2015) 
1044 Service description available at: http://www.keynote.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.keynote.com/legal/terms; Privacy Policy at: http://www.keynote.com/legal/privacy ;(last 
accessed November,2015) 
1045 Service description available at: https://kissmetrics.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://kissmetrics.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at:  https://kissmetrics.com/privacy and 
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160. Knewton1046 Courts New York SH/ no PS, 
BBB EU 
161. Kyriba1047 Court San Diego County, 
California. 
SH/ no PS, 
JAMS 
162. Layered Technologies1048 Courts San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
BBB EU 
163. Lever1049 Arbitration, 
AAA 
San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
PIPEDA 
164. Linkedin1050 Courts Santa Clara, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
and Irish DP 
Commission 
165. Linode.com1051 Court New Jersey SH/ no PS, 
BBB EU 
166. Lithium technologies1052 Arbitration, 
 
 
ICC 
Court 
San Francisco, 
California, New 
York, Honolulu, 
London, Geneva, 
Singapore, Hong 
Kong, or Sao 
Paulo 
US 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
167. Livedrive1053 Courts London, UK  
                                                          
http://thedma.org/resources/compliance-resources/safe-harbor-program-guide/dma-safe-harbor-program-
guide-for-european-and-swiss-consumers/ (last accessed November,2015) 
1046 Service description available at: www.knewton.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.knewton.com/resources/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.knewton.com/resources/privacy-policy/; (last accessed November,2015) 
1047 Service description available at: www.kyriba.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.kyriba.com/sites/default/files/content/online_cloud_services_agreement_-
_version_2014_03_01_-_us_corp_0.pdf ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.kyriba.com/company/safe-harbor-
privacy-policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1048 Service description available at: https://www.datapipe.com/layered_tech/; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.datapipe.com/gogrid/legal/eu_safe_harbor_policy/; (last accessed November,2015) 
1049 Service description available at: http://www.lever.co/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.lever.co/terms-of-service ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.lever.co/privacy-policy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1050 Service description available at: https://www.linkedin.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement?trk=hb_ft_userag ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacy-policy?trk=hb_ft_priv ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1051 Service description available at: www.linode.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: https://www.linode.com/tos ; 
Privacy Policy at: https://www.linode.com/privacy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1052 Service description available at: http://www.lithium.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.lithium.com/master-services-agreement ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.lithium.com/privacy (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1053 Service description available at: https://www.livedrive.com ;Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.livedrive.com/terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.livedrive.com/privacy-policy ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
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168. LiveOps1054 Court Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
169. LiveOps1055 Courts Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
170. Localytics1056 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Boston, 
Massachusetts 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
171. Loggly1057 Court San Francisco, 
California 
 
172. LogicWorks1058 Courts New York 
County 
 
173. LongJump1059 Courts Darmstadt, 
Germany 
 
174. Lookout1060 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/PS, 
JAMS for 
non-HR, 
DPAs and 
FDPIC for 
HR 
175. LuquidPlanner1061 Court King County, 
Washington 
 
176. Mailchimp1062 Court (not for 
account 
dispute) 
Fulton County, 
Georgia 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
                                                          
1054 Service description available at: http://www.liveops.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.liveops.com/terms-of-service ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.liveops.com/privacy-policy (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1055 Service description available at: http://www.liveops.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.liveops.com/terms-of-service; Privacy Policy at: http://www.liveops.com/privacy-policy; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1056 Service description available at: http://www.localytics.com/welcome/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.localytics.com/terms-of-service/; Privacy Policy at:  http://www.localytics.com/privacy-policy/ 
(last accessed November,2015) 
1057 Service description available at: www.loggly.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.loggly.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.loggly.com/privacy/ ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1058 Service description available at: http://www.logicworks.net/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.logicworks.net/legal/cloud-services-agreement; (last accessed November,2015) 
1059Service description available at: http://www.softwareag.com/special/longjump/index.html; Terms of 
Service (ToS) at: 
http://techcommunity.softwareag.com/ecosystem/communities/public/contents/common/terms/; Privacy 
Policy at: http://www.softwareag.com/corporate/privacy.asp; (last accessed November,2015) 
1060 Service description available at: https://www.lookout.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.lookout.com/legal/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.lookout.com/legal/privacy ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1061 Service description available at: http://www.liquidplanner.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
http://www.liquidplanner.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.liquidplanner.com/privacy/ (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1062 Service description available at: http://mailchimp.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://mailchimp.com/legal/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://mailchimp.com/legal/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
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177. Main street hub1063 Court Travis county, 
Texas 
 
178. Marketo1064 Courts California SH/ PS, 
ICDR of 
AAA 
179. MarkLogic1065 Court San Mateo or 
Northern District, 
California 
 
180. Masteryconnect1066 Courts Utah  
181. McAfee1067 Courts US-New York; 
Canada; Italy; 
France; Spain; 
German; Austria; 
Switzerland; 
England; 
Sweden; Finland; 
Netherlands; 
South Africa; 
Denmark; Dubai; 
Belgium; Poland; 
Ireland; 
Australia; 
Singapore; 
SH/ no PS, 
JAMS, 
JAMS 
international 
Mediation 
For HR EU 
DPAs 
182. Medallia1068 Court San Mateo 
County, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
183. MedeAnalytics1069 Court Alameda County, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
                                                          
1063 Service description available at: http://www.mainstreethub.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.mainstreethub.com/terms-of-service/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.mainstreethub.com/privacy-
policy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1064 Service description available at: http://www.marketo.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.marketo.com/trust/legal/; Privacy Policy at: http://www.marketo.com/trust/safe-harbor/; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1065 Service description available at: www.marklogic.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.marklogic.com/terms-of-use/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.marklogic.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1066 Service description available at: www.masteryconnect.com; Terms of Service (ToS)  and Privacy Policy at: 
https://app.masteryconnect.com/terms ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1067 Service description available at: http://www.mcafee.com/us/products/security-as-a-service/index.aspx; 
Terms of Service (ToS) at: http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/legal/online-service-terms-na.pdf; Privacy 
Policy at: http://www.mcafee.com/common/privacy/english/docs/mcafee-privacypolicy.pdf  (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1068 Service description available at: http://www.medallia.com/  ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.medallia.com/terms-of-use/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.medallia.com/privacy/ (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1069 Service description available at: http://medeanalytics.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://medeanalytics.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: http://medeanalytics.com/privacy-policy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
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184. Mezeo (Zimbra)1070 Courts Dallas County, 
Texas 
SH/ PS, 
JAMS 
185. Microsoft1071 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Small 
Claims court 
King County, 
Washington 
SH/PS 
186. Mindbody1072 Arbitration, 
AAA 
San Luis Obispo, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
187. Mirantis1073 Court Santa Clara, or 
North District, 
California 
 
188. Mixpanel1074 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ PS,  
BBB EU 
189. MobileIron1075 Court 
Arbitration, 
LCIA 
Arbitration, 
ICC 
Arbitration, 
AAA 
Santa Clara, 
California – US 
London (NY law) 
– EMEA 
Singapore – Asia, 
AU, New 
Zealand 
New York – 
Americas 
SH/ PS, 
JAMS 
190. Modernizing medicine1076 Court Palm Beach 
County, US 
 
191. Mojave Networks1077 Court Santa Clara, 
California 
 
                                                          
1070 Service description available at: https://www.zimbra.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://files.zimbra.com/website/docs/Zimbra-Professional-Services-Terms-and-Conditions.pdf; Privacy Policy 
at: https://www.zimbra.com/legal/privacy   (last accessed November,2015) 
1071 Service description available at: www.microsoft.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/legal/arbitration/demand.aspx; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/privacystatement/default.aspx ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1072 Service description available at: https://www.mindbodyonline.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.mindbodyonline.com/terms-of-service ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.mindbodyonline.com/privacy-policy (last accessed November,2015) 
1073 Service description available at: www.mirantis.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://software.mirantis.com/blank/terms-and-conditions/ and https://www.mirantis.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/Master-Subscription-Agreement_Online_August-2015.pdf ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.mirantis.com/company/privacy-policy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1074 Service description available at: https://mixpanel.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://mixpanel.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://mixpanel.com/privacy/ (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1075 Service description available at: https://www.mobileiron.com/en ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.mobileiron.com/en/legal ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.mobileiron.com/en/privacy-policy and 
https://www.mobileiron.com/en/legal/safe-harbor-privacy-policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1076 Service description available at: https://www.modmed.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.modmed.com/terms-of-service/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.modmed.com/privacy-policy/ ; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
1077 Service description available at: https://www.mojave.net/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.mojave.net/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.mojave.net/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
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192. Moxie softwar1078 Court Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
SH/ no Ps, 
AAA 
193. Moz1079 Court Seattle, 
Washington 
 
194. Mulesoft1080 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
195. Nasuni1081 Courts Massachusetts  
196. Navicure1082 Court Gwinnett County, 
Georgia, or in the 
U.S. District 
Court located in 
Atlanta, Georgia, 
 
197. Ncino1083 Court North Carolina.  
198. Netflix1084 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Small claim 
court 
Users ‘residence 
 
 
Brazil (law) 
Delaware (law) 
 
199. NetSuite1085 Arbitration 
ICC 
JAMS 
Courts 
San Francisco 
San Mateo, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
DPAs 
200. New Relic1086 Courts California SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
                                                          
1078 Service description available at: https://www.gomoxie.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://www.gomoxie.com/about/legal/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.gomoxie.com/about/privacy/ (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1079 Service description available at: https://moz.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policy at: 
https://moz.com/terms-privacy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1080 Service description available at: www.mulesoft.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.mulesoft.com/content/terms-service ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.mulesoft.com/privacy-
policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1081 Service description available at: http://www.nasuni.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.nasuni.com/legal/#terms_of_service; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.nasuni.com/legal/#privacy_policy; (last accessed November,2015) 
1082 Service description available at: http://www.navicure.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.billingbetter.com/terms.htm ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.navicure.com/privacy.htm; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1083 Service description available at: https://www.ncino.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.ncino.com/terms_and_conditions ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.ncino.com/privacy (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1084 Service description available at: https://www.netflix.com/;  Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://help.netflix.com/legal/termsofuse?locale=en-GB ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://help.netflix.com/legal/privacy?locale=en-GB ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1085 Service description available at: http://www.netsuite.com/portal/home.shtml; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.netsuite.com/portal/pdf/termsofservice-suitecloud.pdf  ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.netsuite.com/portal/privacy.shtml; (last accessed November,2015) 
1086 Service description available at: http://newrelic.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://newrelic.com/terms; Privacy Policy at: http://newrelic.com/privacy; (last accessed November,2015) 
313 
 
201. Newrelic1087 Court California (law) SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
202. Newvoicemedia1088 Arbitration, 
Center for 
Effective 
Dispute 
Resolution 
(ADR) 
England  
203. Nicira1089 Courts Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
DPAs 
204. Nimble1090 Arbitration, 
AAA 
California SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
205. Nimbula1091 Courts Santa Clara or 
San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
206. Nitrous1092 Court Santa Clara, 
California 
 
207. Okta1093 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no Ps, 
DPAs 
208. Onelogin1094 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
209. Onlyoffice1095    
                                                          
1087 Service description available at: www.newrelic.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: http://newrelic.com/terms 
; Privacy Policy at: http://newrelic.com/privacy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1088 Service description available at: http://www.newvoicemedia.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.newvoicemedia.com/legal and 
https://assets.digitalmarketplace.service.gov.uk/documents/92795/5205306132922368-terms-and-
conditions.pdf ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.newvoicemedia.com/privacy-policy (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1089 Service description available at: https://www.vmware.com/products/nsx/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.vmware.com/help/legal.html#sthash.34MW6cjx.dpuf  ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.vmware.com/help/privacy.html; (last accessed November,2015) 
1090 Service description available at: http://www.nimble.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.nimble.com/company/terms-of-service/  ; Privacy Policy at:  
http://www.nimble.com/company/privacy/ (last accessed November,2015) 
1091 Service description available at: http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/acquisitions/nimbula/index.html; 
Terms of Service (ToS) at: http://www.oracle.com/us/legal/terms/index.html; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.oracle.com/us/legal/privacy/services-privacy-policy/index.html; (last accessed November,2015) 
1092 Service description available at: https://www.nitrous.io/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://community.nitrous.io/docs/terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://community.nitrous.io/docs/privacy-policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1093 Service description available at: www.okta.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: https://www.okta.com/terms/ ; 
Privacy Policy at: https://www.okta.com/privacy-policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1094 Service description available at: https://www.onelogin.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.onelogin.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.onelogin.com/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1095 Service description available at: https://www.onlyoffice.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://www.onlyoffice.com/legalterms.aspx ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.onlyoffice.com/privacy.aspx  
(last accessed November,2015) 
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210. OpenStack1096 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Court 
US 
Australia-New 
South Wales 
Europe- UK 
Honk Kong 
 
211. OpSource1097 Arbitration, 
AAA 
 SH/ no 
PS,DPAs 
212. Optimezely1098 Court Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
213. Oracle1099 Courts Santa Clara or 
San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ PS 
TRUSTe 
214. Oracle cloud1100 Court San Francisco or 
Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
215. Pagerduty1101 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no PS 
216. Panda Security1102 Courts Bilbao, Spain  
217. Pantheon1103 Court Delaware SH/ PS 
                                                          
1096 Service description available at: http://www.openstack.org/; Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policy  at: 
http://c744563d32d0468a7cf1-
2fe04d8054667ffada6c4002813eccf0.r76.cf1.rackcdn.com/downloads/pdfs/RACKSPACE-%2342301-v4-
Master_Form_Cloud_Terms_of_Service_JLF_27_October_2015_-_uploaded.pdf; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1097 Service description available at: http://www.opsource.net/ and http://cloud.dimensiondata.com/saas-
solutions/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: http://cloud.dimensiondata.com/saas-
solutions/about/legal/legacy/opsource-cloud-terms  ; Privacy Policy at: http://cloud.dimensiondata.com/saas-
solutions/about/legal/privacy-policy; (last accessed November,2015) 
1098 Service description available at: https://www.optimizely.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.optimizely.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.optimizely.com/privacy/ ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1099 Service description available at: http://www.oracle.com/index.html; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.oracle.com/us/legal/terms/index.html; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.oracle.com/us/legal/privacy/services-privacy-policy/index.html; (last accessed November,2015) 
1100 Service description available at: http://www.oracle.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.oracle.com/us/legal/terms/index.html ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.oracle.com/us/legal/privacy/marketing-cloud-data-cloud-privacy-policy/index.html  (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1101 Service description available at: https://www.pagerduty.com/home-c/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.pagerduty.com/tac/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.pagerduty.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015)  
1102 Service description available at: http://www.pandasecurity.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policy 
at at: http://www.pandasecurity.com/serbia/homeusers/media/legal-notice/#e10:; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1103 Service description available at: https://pantheon.io/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://pantheon.io/pantheon-terms-service; Privacy Policy at: https://pantheon.io/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
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218. Panzura1104 Courts Northern District, 
California 
 
219. Parklet1105 Court California SH/ no PS 
220. Pentaho1106 Arbitration, 
AAA or 
JAMS 
Court 
 
 
Orange County, 
California 
SH/ PS, DPA 
and FDPIC 
221. Peoplematter1107 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Court 
Charlstone, 
South Carolina 
 
222. Ping Identity1108 Courts Colorado SH/ no PS, 
DPAs 
223. Pipedrive1109 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Court 
Santa Clara, 
California- US 
Harju court in 
Estonia- Other 
 
224. Pivotlink- Smartfocus1110 Court English Courts SH/ PS, 
225. Plex systems1111 Court Oakland County, 
Michigan 
PS 
226. Pointclickcare1112 Court Province of 
Ontario 
 
                                                          
1104 Service description available at: http://panzura.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://panzura.com/termsandconditions/ and https://www.pingidentity.com/en/legal/community.html; 
Privacy Policy at: https://www.pingidentity.com/en/legal/privacy.html;; (last accessed November,2015) 
1105 Service description available at: https://www.parklet.co/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.parklet.co/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.parklet.co/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1106 Service description available at: http://www.pentaho.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://community.pentaho.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at:  http://www.pentaho.com/privacy (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1107 Service description available at: https://www.peoplematter.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.peoplematter.com/sites/default/files/PeopleMatter-Appendix-D-Terms-and-Condidtions-v1.pdf ; 
Privacy Policy at: https://www.peoplematter.com/privacy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1108 Service description available at: https://www.pingidentity.com/en.html; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.pingidentity.com/en/legal/pingid-terms-of-service.html; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.pingidentity.com/en/legal/privacy.html; (last accessed November,2015) 
1109 Service description available at: https://www.pipedrive.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.pipedrive.com/en/terms-of-service ; Privacy Policy at:  https://www.pipedrive.com/en/privacy 
(last accessed November,2015) 
1110 Service description available at: http://www.smartfocus.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.smartfocus.com/terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at:  http://www.smartfocus.com/privacy-and-
cookies-policy (last accessed November,2015) 
1111 Service description available at: http://www.plex.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.plex.com/utility/terms-and-conditions.html; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.plex.com/utility/privacy-policy.html (last accessed November,2015) 
1112 Service description available at: http://www.pointclickcare.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.pointclickcare.com/terms-of-use/ 
http://wyqcr1hvyue2u5arp2hemjqt.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/PointClickCare_Terms_of_Use-US_v2014-1-1.pdf ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.pointclickcare.com/website-privacy-policy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
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227. Practice Fusion1113 Court San Francisco, 
California 
 
228. Preact1114 Court San Francisco 
County, 
California 
 
229. Procore1115 Court Santa Barbara 
County, 
California 
 
230. Propeller Health1116 Court State of 
Wisconsin 
PS 
231. Propertybase1117 Court Munich, 
Germany – 
EMEA 
Berkeley 
California- US 
and other 
 
232. Puppet Labs1118 Court Multnomah 
County, Oregon 
SH/ no PS, 
233. Qualys1119 Court Santa Clara, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
234. Rackspace1120 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Court 
US; 
Australia-New 
South Wales 
Europe- UK 
Hong Kong- HK 
PS 
                                                          
1113 Service description available at: http://www.practicefusion.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.practicefusion.com/pages/terms-of-use.html ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.practicefusion.com/pages/privacy-policy.html; (last accessed November,2015) 
1114 Service description available at: http://www.preact.com/  ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.preact.com/company/terms.html Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.preact.com/company/privacy.html (last accessed November,2015) 
1115 Service description available at: https://www.procore.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.procore.com/fine-print/terms.php ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.procore.com/fine-
print/privacy-policy.php (last accessed November,2015) 
1116 Service description available at: http://propellerhealth.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://my.propellerhealth.com/terms-of-service ; Privacy Policy at: http://propellerhealth.com/privacy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1117 Service description available at: https://www.propertybase.com  ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.propertybase.com/images/uploads/general-assets/Propertybase_MSA_2014-02-10.pdf ; Privacy 
Policy at:  
https://www.propertybase.com/images/uploads/general-assets/Propertybase-Privacy-Policy-2012-09-10.pdf 
(last accessed November,2015) 
1118 Service description available at: https://puppetlabs.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://puppetlabs.com/terms; Privacy Policy at: https://puppetlabs.com/privacy; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1119 Service description available at: https://www.qualys.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.qualys.com/forms/freescan/service-agreement.html ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.qualys.com/company/privacy/; (last accessed November,2015) 
1120 Service description available at: www.rackspace.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.rackspace.com/information/legal/cloud/tos; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.rackspace.com/information/legal/privacystatement/; (last accessed November,2015) 
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235. RainStor1121 Courts South District of 
New York 
SH/ no PS, 
ICDR of 
AAA 
236. Rapid 71122 Court Boston, 
Massachusetts 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
237. Ravello1123 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
DPAs 
238. Recurly1124 Court San Francisco 
County, California 
SH/ PS, 
DPAs 
239. Red Hat1125 Courts New York SH/ PS, 
DPAs 
240. Redbooth1126    
241. Replicon1127 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Court 
Calgary, Alberta, 
Canada 
 
242. RightScale1128 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Court 
California SH/ no PS 
243. Rocket Lawyer1129 Court 
Arbitration, 
JAMS 
England – UK 
San Francisco, 
California 
 
                                                          
1121 Service description available at: http://rainstor.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policy at: 
file:///C:/Users/user/Desktop/Teradata_Privacy_Policy_23OCT2015%20FINAL.pdf;; (last accessed 
November,2015) Teradata acquired RainStor in December 2014. Teradata dropped the RainStor product from 
its portfolio in January 2016 and it is no longer developed or marketed 
1122 Service description available at: http://www.rapid7.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.rapid7.com/legal.jsp ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.rapid7.com/privacy.jsp ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1123 Service description available at: https://www.ravellosystems.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.ravellosystems.com/ravello-terms-of-service ; Privacy Policy 
athttps://www.ravellosystems.com/ravello-privacy-policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1124 Service description available at: recurly.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: https://recurly.com/legal/terms ; 
Privacy Policy at: https://recurly.com/legal/privacy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1125 Service description available at: http://www.redhat.com/en; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.redhat.com/en/about/terms-use ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.redhat.com/en/about/privacy-
policy; (last accessed November,2015) 
1126 Service description available at: https://redbooth.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://redbooth.com/more-info/terms-and-fair-use ; Privacy Policy at: https://redbooth.com/more-
info/security-privacy (last accessed November,2015) 
1127 Service description available at: www.replicon.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.replicon.com/license-agreement ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.replicon.com/privacy-policy ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1128 Service description available at: http://www.rightscale.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.rightscale.com/legal/terms-of-service and http://www.rightscale.com/legal/msa ; Privacy Policy 
at: http://www.rightscale.com/legal/privacy-policy; (last accessed November,2015) 
1129 Service description available at: https://www.rocketlawyer.com/ and https://www.rocketlawyer.co.uk/ ; 
Terms of Service (ToS) at: https://www.rocketlawyer.com/terms-and-conditions.rl; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.rocketlawyer.com/privacy.rl (last accessed November,2015) 
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244. Saasu1130 Court New south wales, 
Australia 
 
245. SafeNet1131 Arbitration, 
ICC 
London- EMEA 
Baltimore, 
Maryland- US 
Hong Kong - 
APAC 
 
246. Sailthru1132   SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
Spam 
complaints 
247. Salesforce.com1133 Courts San Francisco , 
California - US 
Toronto, Ontario- 
Canada 
England Courts- 
Eu, Middle East, 
Africa- 
Tokyo - Japan 
Singapore -Asia 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
248. SAP1134 Courts Germany, 
San Francisco, 
California- US 
 
249. Sauce labs1135 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no PS 
250. Scalextrem1136 Court Florida (law) SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
251. SendGrid1137 Arbitration, 
ICC 
Colorado law SH/ no PS, 
Direct 
                                                          
1130 Service description available at: www.saasu.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.saasu.com/terms; Privacy Policy at: https://www.saasu.com/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1131 Service description available at: http://www.safenet-inc.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.safenet-inc.com/About_SafeNet/Terms___Conditions_of_Sale_-_EMEA/#sthash.YCun0ruZ.dpuf; 
Privacy Policy at: http://www.safenet-inc.com/privacy-statement/; (last accessed November,2015) 
1132 Service description available at: http://www.sailthru.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.sailthru.com/legal/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.sailthru.com/legal/#privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1133 Se rvice description available at: http://www.salesforce.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.salesforce.com/company/legal/agreements.jsp and 
http://www.sfdcstatic.com/assets/pdf/misc/salesforce_MSA.pdf; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.salesforce.com/company/privacy/; (last accessed November,2015) 
1134 Service description available at: http://go.sap.com/index.html; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.sap.com/corporate-en/about/legal/terms-of-use.html; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.sap.com/about/legal/privacy.html; (last accessed November,2015) 
1135 Service description available at: https://saucelabs.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://saucelabs.com/tos ; Privacy Policy at: https://saucelabs.com/privacy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1136 Service description available at: http://www.scalextreme.com/ https://www.citrix.com/solutions/cloud-
services/overview.html ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: https://www.citrix.com/about/legal/legal-notice.html ; 
Privacy Policy at https://www.citrix.com/about/legal/privacy.html#safe ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1137 Service description available at: sendgrid.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: https://sendgrid.com/tos; Privacy 
Policy at: https://sendgrid.com/privacy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
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Marketing 
Association 
Elected for 
dispute 
resolution 
for SH 
252. Sendthisfile1138 Court Sedgwick 
County, Kansas, 
USA 
SH/ PS, 
BBB EU 
253. Servicemax1139 Court Alameda County, 
California 
SH/ no PS 
254. Shopify1140 Court Province of 
Ontario 
SH/ PS. 
ICDR of 
AAA 
255. Silkroad1141 Court Cook County, 
Illinois 
SH/ PS 
256. Silversky (BEA systems)1142 Court UK SH/ PS 
257. Simply Measured1143 Court King County, 
Washington 
 
258. Skytap1144 Courts 
Arbitration, 
non-formal 
employee 
arbitrators 
King County, 
Washington 
SH/ PS, 
JAMS 
259. Slack.com1145 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
 SH/ PS, 
JAMS 
                                                          
1138 Service description available at: https://www.sendthisfile.com/index.jsp; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.sendthisfile.com/policy/terms-of-use.jsp ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.sendthisfile.com/policy/privacy-policy.jsp (last accessed November,2015) 
1139 Service description available at: http://servicemax.com/  ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://sf.servicemax.com/pdfs/msa.pdf ; Privacy Policy at: http://servicemax.com/privacy (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1140 Service description available at: https://www.shopify.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.shopify.com/legal/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.shopify.com/legal/privacy (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1141 Service description available at: http://www.silkroad.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.silkroad.com/documents/2015/02/saas-terms-conditions.pdf ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.silkroad.com/privacy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1142 Service description available at: http://www.baesystems.com/en/cybersecurity/home ; Terms of Service 
(ToS) at: http://www.baesystems.com/en/cybersecurity/terms-and-conditions ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.baesystems.com/en/cybersecurity/privacy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1143 Service description available at: http://simplymeasured.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://simplymeasured.com/subscription-agreement/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://simplymeasured.com/privacy/ 
; (last accessed November,2015) 
1144 Service description available at: https://www.skytap.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.skytap.com/?p=12930; Privacy Policy at: https://www.skytap.com/legal/privacy-policy/; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1145 Service description available at: https://slack.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  https://slack.com/terms-of-
service ; Privacy Policy at: https://slack.com/privacy-policy (last accessed November,2015) 
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260. SmartRecruiters1146 Court Delaware  
261. Snapchat1147 Arbitration, 
AAA or other, 
Small claim 
court 
Court 
Non-appearance 
by the choice of 
initiating party 
and selection of 
the manner 
 
Central District 
of California 
PS 
262. Snaplogic1148 Court California (law) PS. 
TRUSTe 
263. SOASTA1149 Courts San Francisco 
County and 
Northern District 
California 
 
264. Socrata1150 Court King County, 
Washington 
 
265. Spatialkey1151 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Court 
Boston  
266. Spiceworks1152 Court Travis County  
267. SpiderOak1153 Arbitration, 
AAA 
 
Court 
Kansas City, 
Missouri, USA 
and 
Chicago, Cook 
County, Illinois 
 
SH/ no PS, 
BBB EU  
                                                          
1146 Service description available at: https://www.smartrecruiters.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.smartrecruiters.com/terms-and-conditions/ ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.smartrecruiters.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1147 Service description available at: https://www.snapchat.com  Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://www.snapchat.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.snapchat.com/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015 
1148 Service description available at: www.snaplogic.com Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.snaplogic.com/footer/terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.snaplogic.com/footer/privacy-
policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1149 Service description available at: http://www.soasta.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.soasta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/soasta-contract.pdf ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.soasta.com/privacy-policy/; (last accessed November,2015) 
1150 Service description available at: https://www.socrata.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.socrata.com/terms-of-service/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.socrata.com/privacy/ (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1151 Service description available at: http://www.spatialkey.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.spatialkey.com/terms/websiteterms.cfm ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.spatialkey.com/terms/privacypolicy.cfm (last accessed November,2015) 
1152 Service description available at: http://www.spiceworks.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.spiceworks.com/terms-and-privacy/#terms ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.spiceworks.com/terms-and-privacy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1153 Service description available at: https://spideroak.com/  Terms of Service (ToS) at 
https://spideroak.com/policy/terms-of-use and https://spideroak.com/policy/service-agreement ; Privacy 
Policy at: https://spideroak.com/privacy_policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
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268. Spreadfast1154 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Court(if opt-
out of arb.) 
 
Austin, Texas 
court 
SH/ PS 
269. Sprinklr1155 Court Borough of 
Manhattan, New 
York 
FDPIC 
270. Steelwedge1156 Court Northern District, 
California 
SH/ PS 
271. Stripe1157 Court 
 
 
 
 
 
Chargeback 
Arbitration, 
LCIA 
San Francisco, 
California – US 
Singapore 
State of Victoria-
Australia 
Province of 
British Columbia, 
and to venue 
within 
Vancouver, -
Canada 
ciudad de 
México-Mexico 
 
Dublin 
SH/ no PS, 
JAMS 
For 
employees 
DPAs 
272. Styleseat1158 Court San Francisco, 
California 
 
273. SugarCRM1159 Court California SH/ PS, 
274. SugarSync1160 Arbitration, 
AAA 
 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
                                                          
1154 Service description available at: https://www.spredfast.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.spredfast.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.spredfast.com/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1155 Service description available at: https://www.sprinklr.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://developers.sprinklr.com/API_Terms_of_Use ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.sprinklr.com/privacy/ ; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
1156 Service description available at: http://www.steelwedge.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
http://www.steelwedge.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.steelwedge.com/privacy (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1157 Service description available at: https://stripe.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: https://stripe.com/terms , 
https://stripe.com/help/disputes-overview , https://stripe.com/help/dispute-types ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://stripe.com/privacy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1158 Service description available at: https://www.styleseat.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.styleseat.com/tos ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.styleseat.com/privacy (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1159 Service description available at: https://www.sugarcrm.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://www.sugarcrm.com/sugarcrm-terms-of-use ; Privacy Policy at:  https://www.sugarcrm.com/sugarcrm-
inc-privacy-policy (last accessed November,2015) 
1160 Service description available at: https://www.sugarsync.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.sugarsync.com/terms.html ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.sugarsync.com/privacy.html (last 
accessed November,2015) 
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Small claim 
court 
275. SumAll1161 Court New York TRUSTe 
276. Sumologic1162 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
 SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
277. Sumtotal1163 Court Santa Clara, 
California, or 
other in 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
Australian, 
Singapore, 
278. Symantec1164 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Courts 
California - US 
England and 
Wales for 
EMEA, 
Singapore for 
Asia 
TRUSTe. 
SH/ no PS, 
DPAs 
279. ThinkingPhones1165 Court Massachusetts  
280. Tigertext1166 Court Los Angeles 
County, 
California 
 
281. Totango1167 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
282. Toutapp1168 Court Santa Clara, 
California 
 
283. Trend Micro1169 Courts California-US, 
England and 
Wales- UK 
 
                                                          
1161 Service description available at: https://sumall.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: https://sumall.com/terms ; 
Privacy Policy at:  https://sumall.com/privacy (last accessed November,2015) 
1162 Service description available at: www.sumologic.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.sumologic.com/terms-conditions/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.sumologic.com/privacy-
statement/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1163 Service description available at: http://www.sumtotalsystems.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.sumtotalsystems.com/legal/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.sumtotalsystems.com/privacy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1164 Service description available at: https://www.symantec.com/index.jsp; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.symantec.com/about/profile/policies/legal.jsp; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.symantec.com/privacy/; (last accessed November,2015) 
1165 Service description available at: https://thinkingphones.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://thinkingphones.com/legal/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://thinkingphones.com/privacy/ ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1166 Service description available at: http://www.tigertext.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.tigertext.com/terms-use/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.tigertext.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1167 Service description available at: http://www.totango.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.totango.com/terms-of-use/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.totango.com/privacy-policy/ (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1168 Service description available at: http://www1.toutapp.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://toutapp.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://toutapp.com/privacy (last accessed November,2015) 
1169 Service description available at: http://www.trendmicro.co.uk/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.trendmicro.co.uk/about/legal-policies/legal-notice/index.html; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.trendmicro.co.uk/about/legal-policies/privacy/index.html; (last accessed November,2015) 
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Germany- 
Germany, Austria 
and Switzerland, 
France- Fr, 
Italy-IT, 
Ireland-EMEA 
New South 
Wales, Australia 
Asia Pacific 
Hong Kong- HK, 
India-India, 
Singapore-
Indonesia, 
Malaysia, 
Philippines, 
Singapore, 
Thailand 
284. Tuenti1170 Court Madrid, Spain  
285. Twilio1171 Arbitration, 
AAA 
San Francisco 
County, 
California 
SH/ PS 
286. Udacity1172 Courts San Mateo 
County, California 
 
287. Udemy1173 Courts San Francisco, 
California 
 
288. Unbounce1174    
289. Upsight1175 Arbitration, 
Court 
In parties 
residence, if not 
then San Francisco 
 
                                                          
1170 Service description available at: http://corporate.tuenti.com/en ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://corporate.tuenti.com/en/legal ; Privacy Policy at: http://corporate.tuenti.com/en/privacy ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1171 Service description available at: www.twilio.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.twilio.com/legal/tos ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.twilio.com/legal/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1172 Service description available at: www.udacity.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.udacity.com/legal/tos ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.udacity.com/legal/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1173 Service description available at: www.udemy.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.udemy.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.udemy.com/terms/privacy/ ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1174 Service description available at: http://unbounce.com /; ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://unbounce.com/terms-of-service/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://unbounce.com/privacy/ ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1175 Service description available at: http://www.upsight.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.upsight.com/pricing/terms-of-service/ ; Privacy Policy at:  
http://www.upsight.com/pricing/privacy-policy/ (last accessed November,2015) 
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290. Uservoice1176 Court San Francisco, 
County 
SH/ PS, 
BBB EU 
291. Veeva1177 Court California SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
292. Vembu Technologies1178 Courts US  
293. Veracode1179   SH/ PS, 
ICDR/AAA 
Safe Harbor 
Program 
294. Verificient1180 Courts Delaware  
295. Verizon1181 Courts New York SH/ no PS, 
AAA 
TRUSTe, 
296. VictorOps1182 Court Denver County 
and the federal 
Courtin the City 
of Denver, USA 
 
297. View the space1183 Court Manhattan, New 
York 
PS 
                                                          
1176 Service description available at: https://www.uservoice.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.uservoice.com/tos/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.uservoice.com/privacy/ (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1177 Service description available at: https://www.veeva.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.veeva.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at:  https://www.veeva.com/privacy-policy/ (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1178 Service description available at: https://www.vembu.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.vembu.com/terms-service/ and https://storegridcloud.vembu.com/tos.php; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.vembu.com/privacy-policy; (last accessed November,2015) 
1179 Service description available at: www.veracode.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.veracode.com/privacy-and-legal-policies; (last accessed November,2015) 
1180 Service description available at: www.verificient.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.verificient.com/terms-of-service ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.verificient.com/privacy-policy ; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
1181 Service description available at: http://www.verizonenterprise.com/solutions/cloud/; Terms of Service 
(ToS) at: http://www.verizonenterprise.com/terms/us/products/cloud/verizon-cloud-services-agreement-and-
schedules-112614-for-review-locked.pdf and 
https://business.verizon.com/MyBusinessAccount/one.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=gb_policy&page_id=In
ternet_buisness_tos and http://www.verizonenterprise.com/terms/emea/nl/voorwaarden/#20 and 
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/support/codesofpractice/complaints-disputes_uk.pdf and 
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/customer/spain-international-master-services-
agreement_en_es.pdf ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.verizon.com/about/privacy/; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1182 Service description available at: https://victorops.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://victorops.com/terms-of-service/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://victorops.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1183 Service description available at: https://www.vts.com/  ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.vts.com/terms ; PRIVACY POLICY at: https://www.vts.com/privacy (last accessed 
November,2015) 
325 
 
298. VMware1184 Courts Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
Courts 
299. Watchdox1185 Court San Francisco, 
California 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
300. Wave1186 Court Province of 
Ontario, 
 
TRUSTe 
301. Webroot1187 Courts Denver and 
Boulder Counties 
in Colorado, 
USA. 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
302. Websense1188 Courts San Diego, 
California - USA 
England and 
Wales- UK 
Dublin – Ireland 
PS 
303. WhatsApp1189 Court Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
 
304. Whitehat Security1190 Court Santa Clara, 
California 
SH/ no PS,  
ICDR/AAA 
U.S.-EU 
Safe Harbor 
program 
305. Workable1191 Court English  Courts  
                                                          
1184 Service description available at: http://www.vmware.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.vmware.com/help/legal.html#sthash.34MW6cjx.dpuf  ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1185 Service description available at: https://www.watchdox.com/us/; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://www.watchdox.com/en/terms-and-conditions/; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.watchdox.com/en/privacy-policy/ (last accessed November,2015)  
1186 Service description available at: www.waveapps.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://my.waveapps.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://my.waveapps.com/privacy/ ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1187 Service description available at: http://www.webroot.com/us/en/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.webroot.com/us/en/company/about/legal/; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.webroot.com/us/en/company/about/privacy/; (last accessed November,2015) 
1188 Service description available at: http://www.websense.com/content/home.aspx; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.websense.com/content/legal.aspx and http://www.websense.com/content/product-end-user-
terms-and-conditions.aspx and http://www.websense.com/content/reseller-terms-and-conditions.aspx ; 
Privacy Policy at: http://www.websense.com/content/privacy-policy.aspx; (last accessed November,2015) 
1189 Service description available at: https://www.whatsapp.com; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/#TOS ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/#Privacy ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1190 Service description available at: https://www.whitehatsec.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.whitehatsec.com/terms/25Nov2013/index.html ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.whitehatsec.com/safeharbor.html ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1191 Service description available at: https://www.workable.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.workable.com/terms Privacy Policy at: https://www.workable.com/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
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306. Workday1192 Courts Alameda, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe, 
DPAs 
APEC 
TRUSTe 
307. Wrike 1193 Court California SH/ PS, 
BBB EU 
308. Xactly1194 Court Texas SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
309. XING1195  German Law  
310. Yesware1196 Court 
If less than 
10000 
Arbitration 
Massachusetts 
 
Boston 
SH/ no PS, 
BBB EU 
311. Yodle1197 Court 
BBB 
New York (law) New York 
court 
312. Zapier1198 Court Wilmington, 
Delaware. 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe, 
313. Zendesk1199 Courts San Francisco, 
California, 
Singapore 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
314. Zenefits1200 Arbitration, 
JAMS 
Court 
San Francisco, 
California 
 
                                                          
1192 Service description available at: http://www.workday.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.workday.com/company/legal.php; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.workday.com/company/privacy.php; (last accessed November,2015) 
1193 Service description available at: https://www.wrike.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.wrike.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.wrike.com/privacy/ (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1194 Service description available at: https://www.xactlycorp.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
http://www.xactly.net/terms_and_conditions/ ; Privacy Policy at:  https://www.xactlycorp.com/privacy-policy/ 
(last accessed November,2015) 
1195 Service description available at: https://www.xing.com/  Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.xing.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.xing.com/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1196 Service description available at: http://www.yesware.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
http://www.yesware.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at:  http://www.yesware.com/privacy (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1197 Service description available at: http://www.yodle.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.yodle.com/legal/terms/general-terms ; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.yodle.com/legal/policies/privacy-policy ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1198 Service description available at: https://zapier.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: https://zapier.com/terms/ 
; Privacy Policy at: https://zapier.com/privacy/ ; (last accessed November,2015) 
1199 Service description available at: https://www.zendesk.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.zendesk.com/company/terms/; Privacy Policy at: https://www.zendesk.com/company/privacy/; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
1200 Service description available at: https://www.zenefits.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.zenefits.com/tos/ Privacy Policy at: https://www.zenefits.com/privacy/ ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
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315. Zerto1201 Court Tel Aviv-Yafo , 
Israel 
SH/ no PS 
316. Zetta1202 Courts Santa Clara 
County, 
California 
 
317. Zeus Technology1203 Courts 
Arbitration, 
ICC 
Santa Clara 
County, 
California- US 
Geneva- Non US 
SH/ no PS, 
DPAs 
318. Zimory1204 Courts Berlin-
Charlottenburg 
 
319. ZipRecruiter1205 Arbitration, 
AAA 
Online 
Courtsfor IPR 
and privacy 
California SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
320. Zoho1206 Arbitration, 
AAA 
IPR 
complaints 
California 
Online Zoho 
mediation 
SH/ no PS, 
TRUSTe 
321. Zuberance1207 Court San Mateo, 
California 
SH/ no PS 
322. Zuora1208 Courts Santa Clara, 
California 
SH/ PS, 
TRUSTe 
 
 
                                                          
1201 Service description available at: http://www.zerto.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.zerto.com/terms-of-use/ ; Privacy Policy at: : http://www.zerto.com/privacy-policy/ ; (last 
accessed November,2015) 
1202 Service description available at: http://www.zetta.net/; Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.zetta.net/legal.php;; (last accessed November,2015) 
1203 Service description available at: http://www.brocade.com/en.html; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.brocade.com/en/legal/purchase.html; Privacy Policy at: 
http://www.brocade.com/en/legal/privacy-policy.html; (last accessed November,2015) 
1204 Service description available at: http://www.zimory.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.zimory.com/en/meta/legal-info.html and http://forum.zimory.com/index.php?id=17; Privacy 
Policy at: http://www.zimory.com/en/meta/privacy-policy.html; (last accessed November,2015) 
1205 Service description available at: https://www.ziprecruiter.com/  ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.ziprecruiter.com/terms ; Privacy Policy at: https://www.ziprecruiter.com/privacy ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1206 Service description available at: www.zoho.com ; Terms of Service (ToS) at:  
https://www.zoho.com/terms.html and https://www.zoho.com/ipr-complaints.html ; Privacy Policy at: 
https://www.zoho.com/privacy.html (last accessed November,2015) 
1207 Service description available at: http://www.zuberance.com/ ; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
http://www.zuberance.com/terms/ ; Privacy Policy at: http://www.zuberance.com/privacy/ ; (last accessed 
November,2015) 
1208 Service description available at: http://www.zuora.com/; Terms of Service (ToS) at: 
https://www.zuora.com/terms-conditions/; Privacy Policy at: https://www.zuora.com/privacy-statement/; 
(last accessed November,2015) 
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Appendix B 
 
Examples of most common dispute resolution clauses  
 
 
Informal dispute resolution  
 
Examples of Cloudflare and Lookout 
Available at: www.cloudflare.com and https://www.lookout.com/ 
ToS at: https://www.cloudflare.com/terms and https://www.lookout.com/legal/terms 
Cloudflare: 
 
In the case of any disputes under this Agreement, the parties shall first attempt in good faith to resolve 
their dispute informally, or by means of commercial mediation, without the necessity of a formal 
proceeding. 
 
Lookout:  
 
Please Contact Us First: Our goal is for you to be happy and satisfied. If you have a dispute with 
Lookout, you agree to contact us and attempt to resolve the dispute with us, informally. 
Exclusive jurisdiction of providers domicile court 
 
Examples of Zapier and Preact 
Available at: https://zapier.com/ and http://www.preact.com/  
ToS at: https://zapier.com/terms/ and http://www.preact.com/company/terms.html  
Zapier: 
 
These Terms of Service will be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of 
Delaware, without reference to its conflict of laws principles. All disputes arising out of or relating to 
these Terms of Service will be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction 
located in Wilmington, Delaware, and each party irrevocably consents to such personal jurisdiction and 
waives all objections to this venue. 
 
Preact:  
 
19. Governing Law. 
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These Terms and each Order Form shall be governed by the laws of the State of California, without 
reference to its conflict of laws rules. The exclusive jurisdiction and venue for all disputes hereunder shall 
be the state and federal courts located in San Francisco County, California, and each party hereby 
irrevocably consents to the jurisdiction of such courts. Application of the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act are 
excluded from these Terms. All proceedings shall be conducted in English. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, Preact reserves the right to seek injunctive relief against you to enforce these Terms in any 
venue and court of competent jurisdiction. 
Multiple jurisdictions in ToS 
(exclusive court jurisdiction in case of dispute) 
 
Example of Box 
Available at: https://www.box.com  
ToS at: https://www.box.com/legal/termsofservice/ and  https://www.box.com/legal/termsofservice/GB/  
For US residents: 
 
17. CONTRACTING PARTY; GOVERNING LAW; LOCATION FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES 
 
You are contracting with Box, Inc. with an address at 4440 El Camino Real Los Altos, CA 94022 USA. 
The laws of the State of California, U.S.A. govern the interpretation of these Terms and apply to claims 
for breach of these Terms, regardless of conflict of laws principles. The parties specifically exclude from 
application to these Terms the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods and the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act. All other claims, including claims 
regarding consumer protection laws, unfair competition laws, and in tort, will, only to the extent required 
by applicable law, be subject to the laws of your state of residence in the United States, or, if you live 
outside the United States, the laws of the country in which you reside. You and we irrevocably consent to 
the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of the state or federal courts for Santa Clara County, California, 
USA, for all disputes arising out of or relating to these Terms. Box may assign this contract to another 
entity at any time with or without notice to you. 
 
 
For All others 
 
16. GOVERNING LAW; LOCATION FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES 
 
The laws of England and Wales shall govern the interpretation of these Terms and apply to claims for 
breach of these Terms. The parties specifically exclude from application to these Terms the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. The Contract and any disputes or 
claims (whether contractual or non-contractual) arising out of or in connection with it, its subject matter 
or formation will be subject to and construed in accordance with the law of England and Wales and you 
and we irrevocably consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing and save where consumer law prohibits such actions, Box may bring 
proceedings in the courts of any other state which have jurisdiction for reasons other than the parties' 
choice, for the purpose of seeking: (i) an injunction, order or other non-monetary relief (or its equivalent 
in such other state); and/or (ii) any relief or remedy which, if it (or its equivalent) were granted by the 
courts of England and Wales would not be enforceable in such other state. Nothing in this clause is 
intended to prevent any consumer that is a Customer from relying on the consumer law applicable in the 
jurisdiction in which the Customer resides. 
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Multiple Jurisdictions in ToS  
(arbitration and selected jurisdiction if arbitration is not applicable) 
 
Example of Evernote 
 
Available at:  https://evernote.com 
ToS at: https://evernote.com/legal/tos.php?var=c 
Let us Know About Your Complaint. 
 
We want to know if you have a problem so we encourage you to contact our Customer Support team if 
you have any concerns with respect to the operation of the Service or any Evernote Software, as we want 
to ensure that you have an excellent experience. 
 
Initiating a Formal Claim. 
 
If you conclude that we have not satisfied your concern and that you must pursue legal action, you agree 
that your claim must be resolved by the processes set forth in these Terms. Evernote provides the Service 
to you on the condition that you accept the dispute resolution provisions described below, so if you 
initiate any claim against Evernote in any other manner, you shall be in violation of these Terms and you 
agree that Evernote shall be entitled to have such action dismissed or otherwise terminated and you agree 
to reimburse Evernote for its reasonable costs incurred in defending against such improperly initiated 
claim. You agree that prior to initiating any formal proceedings against Evernote, you will send us a 
notice to our attorneys at legal notice AT Evernote DOT com and state that you are providing a “Notice 
of Dispute.” Upon receipt of a Notice of Dispute, you and we shall attempt to resolve the dispute through 
informal negotiation within sixty (60) days from the date the Notice of Dispute is sent. If the dispute 
remains unresolved, either you or we may initiate formal proceedings according to these Terms. 
 
Except where our dispute is being resolved pursuant to an arbitration (as provided below), if you are a 
resident of the United States or Canada, you agree that any claim or dispute you may have against 
Evernote must be resolved exclusively by a state or federal court located in San Mateo County, 
California. You agree to submit to the exclusive personal jurisdiction of the courts located within San 
Mateo County, California (and, for the avoidance of doubt, to exclude the jurisdiction of any other court) 
for the purpose of litigating all such claims or disputes. 
 
Except where our dispute is being resolved pursuant to an arbitration (as provided below), if you reside in 
Brasil, you agree that any claim or dispute you may have against Evernote must be resolved exclusively 
by the courts in São Paolo-SP, Brasil. You agree to submit to the exclusive personal jurisdiction of the 
courts located within São Paolo-SP, Brasil (and, for the avoidance of doubt, to exclude the jurisdiction of 
any other court) for the purpose of litigating all such claims or disputes. 
 
Except where our dispute is being resolved pursuant to an arbitration (as provided below), if you are not a 
resident of the United States, Canada, or Brasil, you agree that any claim or dispute you may have against 
Evernote must be resolved exclusively by the courts in Zurich, Switzerland. You agree to submit to the 
exclusive personal jurisdiction of the courts located within Zurich, Switzerland (and, for the avoidance of 
doubt, to exclude the jurisdiction of any other court) for the purpose of litigating all such claims or 
disputes. 
 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Process. 
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Unless you are subject to the Arbitration Agreement set out below, and subject to any applicable laws, if 
a claim arises between you and Evernote where the total value of such claim is less than US$10,000, the 
party initiating the claim may elect to have the dispute resolved pursuant to a binding arbitration process 
that does not require attendance in person. This “Alternative Dispute Resolution Process” shall be 
initiated by either party sending notice to the other, in which event you and Evernote agree to use our 
reasonable efforts to agree within thirty (30) days upon an individual or service to manage the Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Process (the “Arbitration Manager”) according to the following requirements: (i) 
neither party shall be required to attend any proceeding in person, (ii) the proceeding will be conducted 
via written submissions, telephone or online communications or as otherwise agreed upon, (iii) the fees 
for the Arbitration Manager will be borne equally by the parties or be submitted to the Arbitration 
Manager to determine as part of the dispute and (iv) the judgment rendered by the Arbitration Manager 
may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction for enforcement. 
 
Arbitration Agreement. 
 
If you reside in the United States or are otherwise subject to the US Federal Arbitration Act, you and 
Evernote agree that any and all disputes or claims that have arisen or may arise between us - except any 
dispute relating to the enforcement or validity of your, our or either of our licensors’ intellectual property 
rights - shall be resolved exclusively through final and binding arbitration, rather than in court, except 
that you may assert claims in small claims court, if your claims qualify. The Federal Arbitration Act 
governs the interpretation and enforcement of this Arbitration Agreement. (Note that if you were an 
Evernote Service user prior to December 4, 2012 and formally elected to opt out of the Arbitration 
Agreement pursuant to the procedures set out in our Terms of Service that were effective as of December 
4, 2012, you are not subject to this Arbitration Agreement.) 
 
Our arbitration proceedings would be conducted by the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") under 
its rules and procedures applicable at that time, including the AAA's Supplementary Procedures for 
Consumer-Related Disputes (to the extent applicable), as modified by our Arbitration Agreement. You 
may review those rules and procedures, and obtain a form for initiating arbitration proceedings at the 
AAA's website. The arbitration shall be held in the county in which you reside or at another mutually 
agreed location. If the value of the relief sought is US$10,000 or less, either of us may elect to have the 
arbitration conducted by telephone or based solely on written submissions, which election shall be 
binding on us subject to the arbitrator's discretion to require an in-person hearing. Attendance at an in-
person hearing may be made by telephone by you and/or us, unless the arbitrator requires otherwise. 
 
The arbitrator will decide the substance of all claims in accordance with the laws of the State of 
California, including recognized principles of equity, and will honor all claims of privilege recognized by 
law. The arbitrator shall not be bound by rulings in prior arbitrations involving different Evernote users, 
but is bound by rulings in prior arbitrations involving the same user to the extent required by applicable 
law. The arbitrator's award shall be final and binding and judgment on the award rendered by the 
arbitrator may be entered in any court possessing jurisdiction over the parties, except for a limited right of 
appeal under the Federal Arbitration Act. 
 
The AAA rules will govern the payment of all filing, administration and arbitrator fees, unless our 
Arbitration Agreement expressly provides otherwise. If the amount of any claim in an arbitration is 
US$10,000 or less, Evernote will pay all filling, administration and arbitrator fees associated with the 
arbitration, so long as (i) you make a written request for such payment of fees and submit it to the AAA 
with your Demand for Arbitration and (ii) your claim is not determined by the arbitrator to be frivolous. 
In such case, we will make arrangements to pay all necessary fees directly to the AAA. If the amount of 
the claim exceeds US$10,000 and you are able to demonstrate that the costs of arbitration will be 
prohibitive as compared to the costs of litigation, Evernote will pay as much of the filing, administration 
and arbitrator fees as the arbitrator deems necessary to prevent the arbitration from being cost-prohibitive. 
If the arbitrator determines the claim(s) you assert in the arbitration are frivolous, you agree to reimburse 
Evernote for all fees associated with the arbitration paid by Evernote on your behalf, which you otherwise 
would be obligated to pay under the AAA's rules. 
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YOU AND EVERNOTE AGREE, AS PART OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, THAT EACH 
OF US MAY BRING CLAIMS AGAINST THE OTHER ONLY ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS AND 
NOT AS PART OF ANY PURPORTED CLASS OR REPRESENTATIVE ACTION OR 
PROCEEDING. WE REFER TO THIS AS THE “PROHIBITION OF CLASS AND 
REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS.” UNLESS BOTH YOU AND WE AGREE OTHERWISE, THE 
ARBITRATOR MAY NOT CONSOLIDATE OR JOIN YOUR OR OUR CLAIM WITH ANOTHER 
PERSON'S OR PARTY'S CLAIMS, AND MAY NOT OTHERWISE PRESIDE OVER ANY FORM OF 
A CONSOLIDATED, REPRESENTATIVE OR CLASS PROCEEDING. THE ARBITRATOR MAY 
ONLY AWARD RELIEF (INCLUDING MONETARY, INJUNCTIVE, AND DECLARATORY 
RELIEF) IN FAVOR OF THE INDIVIDUAL PARTY SEEKING RELIEF AND ONLY TO THE 
EXTENT NECESSARY TO PROVIDE RELIEF NECESSITATED BY THAT PARTY'S INDIVIDUAL 
CLAIM(S). ANY RELIEF AWARDED CANNOT AFFECT OTHER EVERNOTE USERS. 
 
Except with respect to the Prohibition of Class and Representative Actions, if a court decides that any 
part of this Arbitration Agreement is invalid or unenforceable, the other parts of this Arbitration 
Agreement shall continue to apply. If a court decides that the Prohibition of Class and Representative 
Actions is invalid or unenforceable, then this entire Arbitration Agreement shall be null and void. The 
remainder of these Terms and this Section (What Do I Do if I think I Have A Claim Against Evernote?) 
will continue to apply. 
 
Claims Are Time-Barred. 
 
You agree that regardless of any statute or law to the contrary or the applicable dispute resolution 
process, any claim or cause of action you may have arising out of or related to use of the Service or 
otherwise under these must be filed within one (1) year after such claim or cause of action arose or you 
hereby agree to be forever barred from bringing such claim. 
AAA arbitration 
 
Example of Cloud 9 
Available at : https://c9.io/  and ToS at: https://c9.io/site/terms-of-service 
 
14. User Disputes. Your interactions with other Users found on or through the Service are solely between 
you and such other Users. If there is a dispute between you and any third party (including, without 
limitation, any User), Cloud9 IDE, inc is under no obligation to become involved; however, we reserve 
the right, but have no obligation, to monitor disputes between you and other Users. 
15.1 Governing Law. To the fullest extent permitted by law, and except as explicitly provided otherwise, 
these Terms and any disputes arising out of or relating to it will be governed by the laws of the state of 
California, in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act, without giving effect to any principles that 
provide for the application of the law of any other jurisdiction. The United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods does not apply to these Terms. The laws of the jurisdiction 
where you are located may be different from California law. You shall always comply with all 
international and domestic laws, ordinances, regulations, and statutes that are applicable to your purchase 
and use of the Service hereunder. 
 
15.2 Arbitration. If you and we have a disagreement related to the Service or the validity of these Terms, 
we’ll try to resolve it by talking with each other. If we can’t resolve it that way, we both agree to use 
confidential binding arbitration, not lawsuits (except for small claims court cases) to resolve the dispute. 
We agree that any controversy or claim between us will be settled by one neutral arbitrator before the 
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). There’s no judge or jury in arbitration, arbitration 
procedures are simpler and more limited than rules applicable in court, and review is limited. But you are 
entitled to a hearing and the arbitrator’s decisions are as enforceable as any court order. 
 
(a) Arbitration shall be subject to the Federal Arbitration Act and not any state arbitration law. As 
modified by these terms of conditions of use, the arbitration will be governed by the AAA’s Commercial 
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Arbitration Rules and, if the arbitrator deems them applicable, the Supplementary Procedures for 
Consumer Related Disputes (collectively “Rules and Procedures”). We further agree that: (i) the 
arbitration shall be held at a location determined by AAA pursuant to the Rules and Procedures (provided 
that such location is reasonably convenient for you), or at such other location as may be mutually agreed 
upon by you and us; (ii) any claims brought by you or us must be brought in our individual capacity, and 
not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding; (iii) the arbitrator 
may not consolidate more than one person’s claims, and may not otherwise preside over any form of a 
representative or class proceeding; (iv) in the event that you are able to demonstrate that the costs of 
arbitration will be prohibitive as compared to costs of litigation, we will pay as much of your filing and 
hearing fees in connection with the arbitration as the arbitrator deems necessary to prevent the arbitration 
from being cost-prohibitive as compared to the cost of litigation; (v) we also reserve the right in our sole 
and exclusive discretion to assume responsibility for all of the costs of the arbitration; (vi) the arbitrator 
shall honor claims of privilege and privacy recognized at law; and (g) a decision by the arbitrator 
(including any finding of fact and/or conclusion of law) against either you or us shall be confidential 
unless otherwise required to be disclosed by law or by any administrative body. 
 
(b) With the exception of subparts (ii) and (iii) in the paragraph above (prohibiting arbitration on a class 
or collective basis), if any part of this arbitration provision is deemed to be invalid, unenforceable or 
illegal, or otherwise conflicts with the Rules and Procedures, then the balance of this arbitration provision 
shall remain in effect and shall be construed in accordance with its terms as if the invalid, unenforceable, 
illegal or conflicting provision were not contained in these terms of conditions of use. If, however, either 
subpart (ii) or (iii) is found to be invalid, unenforceable or illegal, then the entirety of this arbitration 
provision shall be null and void, and neither your or we shall be entitled to arbitration, and the provision 
below titled “Forum and Jurisdiction” will apply. 
 
(c) For more information on AAA, its Rules and Procedures, and how to file an arbitration claim, you 
may call AAA at 800-778-7879, write the AAA at 1633 Broadway, 10th Floor, New York, New York 
10019, or visit the AAA website at http://www.adr.org. 
 
15.3 Forum and Jurisdiction: You and Cloud9 IDE, inc agree that (i) claims for infringement or 
misappropriation of the other party’s patent, copyright, trademark, or trade secret (including injunctive 
remedies or an equivalent type of urgent legal relief for asserted violation or threatened violation of 
intellectual property rights), (ii) claims for interim equitable relief in court in order to maintain the status 
quo pending the arbitrator’s ruling, and (iii) if this subparts (ii) and (iii) in Section 15.2(a) are held 
unenforceable or any claims, demands, or disputes are initiated, filed, or proceed in court rather than in 
arbitration for whatever reason, such claims, demands, or disputes shall be exclusively resolved by an 
appropriate federal or state court located in the County of San Mateo, California. You and Cloud9 IDE, 
inc agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the courts located in the County of San Mateo, 
California for such purpose.  
 
JAMS arbitration 
 
Example of  Wordpress -  Automattic 
 
Available at: https://automattic.com and https://wordpress.com; ToS at: https://en.wordpress.com/tos/ 
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between Automattic and you concerning the subject 
matter hereof, and they may only be modified by a written amendment signed by an authorized executive 
of Automattic, or by the posting by Automattic of a revised version. Except to the extent applicable law, 
if any, provides otherwise, this Agreement, any access to or use of our Services will be governed by the 
laws of the state of California, U.S.A., excluding its conflict of law provisions, and the proper venue for 
any disputes arising out of or relating to any of the same will be the state and federal courts located in San 
Francisco County, California. Except for claims for injunctive or equitable relief or claims regarding 
intellectual property rights (which may be brought in any competent court without the posting of a bond), 
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any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be finally settled in accordance with the Comprehensive 
Arbitration Rules of the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service, Inc. (“JAMS”) by three arbitrators 
appointed in accordance with such Rules. The arbitration shall take place in San Francisco, California, in 
the English language and the arbitral decision may be enforced in any court. The prevailing party in any 
action or proceeding to enforce this Agreement shall be entitled to costs and attorneys’ fees. If any part of 
this Agreement is held invalid or unenforceable, that part will be construed to reflect the parties’ original 
intent, and the remaining portions will remain in full force and effect. A waiver by either party of any 
term or condition of this Agreement or any breach thereof, in any one instance, will not waive such term 
or condition or any subsequent breach thereof. You may assign your rights under this Agreement to any 
party that consents to, and agrees to be bound by, its terms and conditions; Automattic may assign its 
rights under this Agreement without condition. This Agreement will be binding upon and will inure to the 
benefit of the parties, their successors and permitted assigns. 
Safe Harbor compliance and dispute resolution 
 
Examples of Chargify and Cloudera 
 
Avaliable at: https://www.chargify.com  and http://www.cloudera.com/  
Privacy Policy at: https://www.chargify.com/privacy-policy/ and http://www.cloudera.com/legal/privacy-
policy.html  
 
Chargify:  
 
Safe Harbor Chargify is committed to adhering to the Safe Harbor privacy principles and the 15 FAQs 
that make up the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework. Chargify conducts itself in compliance with the U.S.-
EU Safe Harbor Framework as set forth by the U.S. Department of Commerce regarding the collection, 
use, and retention of personal information from European Union member countries. Chargify has certified 
that it adheres to the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles of notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data 
integrity, access, and enforcement. To learn more about the Safe Harbor program, and to view Chargify’s 
certification, please visit www.export.gov/safeharbor/. 
 
Chargify has committed to refer unresolved privacy complaints under the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Privacy 
Principles to an independent dispute resolution mechanism, the BBB EU SAFE HARBOR, operated by 
the Council of Better Business Bureaus. If you do not receive timely acknowledgment of your complaint, 
or if your complaint is not satisfactorily addressed by Chargify, please visit the BBB EU SAFE 
HARBOR web site at www.bbb.org/us/safe-harbor-complaints for more information and to file a 
complaint. 
 
Cloudera:  
 
Cloudera has been awarded TRUSTe's Privacy Seal signifying that this privacy policy and practices have 
been reviewed by TRUSTe for compliance with TRUSTe’s Program Requirements and the TRUSTed 
Cloud Program Requirements including transparency, accountability and choice regarding the collection 
and use of your personal information. TRUSTe's mission, as an independent third party, is to accelerate 
online trust among consumers and organizations globally through its leading privacy trustmark and 
innovative trust solutions. If you have questions or complaints regarding our privacy policy or practices, 
please contact us at info@cloudera.com. If you are not satisfied with our response you can contact 
TRUSTe here. 
 
The TRUSTe program covers our collection, use and disclosure of information we collect through our 
website, www.cloudera.com, our Platform and does not cover information that may be collected through 
downloadable software or through our mobile applications. The use of information collected through our 
service shall be limited to the purpose of providing the service for which the Client has engaged 
Cloudera. 
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Cloudera complies with the U.S. – E.U. Safe Harbor framework and the U.S. - Swiss Safe Harbor 
framework as set forth by the U.S. Department of Commerce regarding the collection, use, and retention 
of personal data from European Union member countries and Switzerland. Cloudera has certified that it 
adheres to the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles of notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data integrity, 
access, and enforcement. To learn more about the Safe Harbor program, and to view Cloudera’s 
certification, please visit http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/. 
DMCA and Copyright infringement policies 
 
Examples of Sumologic and Sumtotal Systems 
Availbale at: https://www.sumologic.com and http://www.sumtotalsystems.com 
ToS at: https://www.sumologic.com/terms-conditions/  and 
http://www.sumtotalsystems.com/legal/infringement.html  
Sumologic: 
 
COPYRIGHT DISPUTE POLICY. Company has adopted the following general policy toward copyright 
infringement in accordance with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act or DMCA (posted at 
www.lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/legislation/dmca.pdf). The address of Company’s Designated Agent to 
Receive Notification of Claimed Infringement (“Designated Agent”) is listed at the end of this Section. It 
is Company’s policy to (1) block access to or remove material that it believes in good faith to be 
copyrighted material that has been illegally copied and distributed by any of our advertisers, affiliates, 
content providers, members or users; and (2) remove and discontinue service to repeat offenders. 
 
 
 
Sumtotal Systems: 
 
Notice and Procedure for Making Claims of Copyright Infringement 
 
If you believe that your work has been copied in a way that constitutes copyright infringement, please 
provide the SumTotal Systems copyright agent with the written information specified below. 
 
NOTE: THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED EXCLUSIVELY FOR NOTIFYING THE 
SERVICE PROVIDER REFERENCED BELOW THAT YOUR COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL MAY 
HAVE BEEN INFRINGED. ALL OTHER INQUIRIES, SUCH AS REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE, REPORTS OF EMAIL ABUSE, AND PIRACY REPORTS, WILL NOT RECEIVE A 
RESPONSE THROUGH THIS PROCESS. 
 
Written notification must be submitted to the following Designated Agent: 
 
Service Provider(s): SumTotal Systems, LLC; Click2learn, Inc.; Docent, Inc. 
 
Name of Agent Designated to Receive Notification of Claimed Infringement: General Counsel 
 
Full Address of Designated Agent to Which Notification Should be Sent:  
SumTotal Systems, LLC  
2850 NW 43rd Street  
Suite #150, Gainesville  
FL 32606 USA 
 
Telephone Number of Designated Agent: +1 352 264 2800 
 
Facsimile Number of Designated Agent: +1 352 374 2257 
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Email Address of Designated Agent: copyright@sumtotalsystems.com 
 
To be effective, the Notification must include the following: 
1. A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of the 
copyright interest that is alleged to have been infringed; 
2. A description of the copyrighted works that you claim have been infringed and identification of 
the material in such work(s) that you claim to be infringing, or if multiple copyrighted works at a 
single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that 
site; 
3. A description of where the material that you claim is infringing is located on the SumTotal 
Systems site and identification of the material that is to be removed or access to which is to be 
disabled; 
4. Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact you, such as your 
physical address, telephone number, and email address; 
5. A statement by you that you have a good faith belief that the use of the material identified in your 
Notice in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the 
law. 
6. A statement by you that the information in your Notice is accurate and, under penalty of perjury, 
that you are the copyright owner or authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner; and 
7. A statement requesting that SumTotal Systems take a specific act with respect to the alleged 
infringement (e.g. removal, access restricted or disabled). 
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Appendix C 
 
Consumer ADR providers in EU data as provider on 31 s t January 2017 
 
 
  
Binding 
on 
trades 
Bindin
g on 
consu
mers 
and 
trades 
Binding 
upon 
agreeme
nt 
Electric
ity 
Internet 
services 
Other 
(includes 
both 
goods 
and 
services) 
Other 
comm
unicati
on 
service
s 
 Country 
Austria - - - 1 3 1 1 
Bulgaria - - 1 2 1 - 2 
Belgium - 1 - 1 2 2 1 
Cyprus - 1 - 1 1 - 1 
Czech 
Republic 
- 3 - 1 1 2 1 
Denmark - - - 1 2 1 1 
Finland - - - 1 1 1 1 
Estonia - - - 1 1 - 1 
France - - - 2 2 2 1 
Germany  3 - 8 - 2 2 2 
Greece - - - 2 2 2 2 
Hungary  1 - - - - - - 
Ireland - - - 8 1 - - 
Italy - 2 - - 14 4 4 
Latvia 2 - 1 1 1 2 1 
Lithuania - 4 - 2 1 1 1 
Luxembourg - - - 1 1 1 1 
Malta - - 2 1 - - - 
Netherlands - 3 - 1 1 1 1 
Portugal  1 2 10 10 9 10 9 
Slovakia - - 5 2 2 2 2 
Slovenia - 3 - 3 3 3 3 
Sweden  2 - - 1 1 1 1 
United 
Kingdom 
14 5 12 1 5 7 2 
         
The entity 
is 
competen
t for 
disputes 
initiated 
by 
C2B 23 24 39 44 57 45 39 
B2C 0 4 2 1 4 3 2 
Both (C2B 
and B2C) 
0 4 2 1 4 3 2 
         
in writing 22 24 39 43 56 44 39 
orally 23 17 28 33 31 31 25 
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Conduct 
of the 
procedure 
 
in writing, 
orally 
12 17 28 32 30 30 25 
         
The 
physical 
presence 
of the 
parties 
and/or of 
their 
represent
ative 
Not required 
 
13 15 26 22 31 27 23 
Required 10 9 13 22 26 18 16 
         
Fees 
  
No fees have 
to be paid by 
trader 
8 9 17 28 29 21 24 
No fees have 
to be paid by 
consumer 
21 14 29 33 39 34 30 
No fees have 
to be paid by 
consumer and 
trader 
7 8 16 27 27 20 22 
No fees have 
to be paid by 
consumer but 
have to be 
paid by trader 
1
4 
13(
F) 
6 
3(F
) 
1
3 
3(F) 
6 
1(F
) 
1
2 
3(F) 
14 
6(F
) 
8 
1 
(F) 
1(
V) 
3(
V) 
10(
V) 
5(
V) 
9(V) 
8(
V) 
7(
V) 
Fees have to 
be paid by 
consumer but 
not by trader 
1 
1(F
) 
1 
0(F
) 
1 
1(F) 
1 
1(F
) 
2 
1(F) 
1 
1(F
) 
2 
1 
(F) 
0(
V) 
1(
V) 
0(V) 
0(
V) 
1(V) 
0(
V) 
1(
V) 
Fees have to 
be paid by 
consumer and 
by trader 
1 
0(F
) 
9 
3(F
) 
9 
4(F) 
1
0 
2(F
) 
1
6 
2(F) 
10 
1(F
) 
7 
1(F
) 
1(
V) 
4(
V) 
4(V) 
8(
V) 
13(
V) 
9(
V) 
6(
V) 
0(F
&
V) 
2(F
&
V) 
1(F
&V) 
0(F
&
V) 
1(F
&V) 
0(F
&
V) 
0(F
&V
) 
Fees have to 
be paid by the 
consumer 
2 10 10 11 18 11 9 
Fees have to 
be paid by the 
trader 
15 15 22 16 28 24 15 
         
Average 
length of 
the 
procedure  
From 1 to and 
including 30 
days (1 
month) 
6 6 10 8 10 7 6 
From 31 to 
and including 
4 3 12 11 17 12 12 
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60 days (2 
months) 
From 61 to 
and including 
90 days (3 
months) 
12 13 14 25 29 26 21 
More than 90 
days 
1 1 3 0 1 0 0 
         
Table B.  
Bindi
ng on 
trade
s 
Binding 
on 
consum
ers and 
trades 
Binding 
upon 
agreem
ent 
Electri
city 
Intern
et 
service
s 
Other 
(includes 
both 
goods 
and 
services) 
Other 
comm
unicati
on 
service
s 
The entity 
is 
competent 
for 
disputes 
initiated 
by 
C2B 23 24 39 44 57 45 39 
B2C 0 4 2 1 4 3 2 
Both (C2B and 
B2C) 
0 4 2 1 4 3 2 
         
Conduct of 
the 
procedure 
 
in writing 22 24 39 43 56 44 39 
orally 23 17 28 33 31 31 25 
in writing, orally 12 17 28 32 30 30 25 
         
The 
physical 
presence 
of the 
parties 
and/or of 
their 
representa
tive 
Not required 
 
13 15 26 22 31 27 23 
Required 10 9 13 22 26 18 16 
         
Fees 
  
No fees have to be 
paid by trader 
8 9 17 28 29 21 24 
No fees have to be 
paid by consumer 
21 14 29 33 39 34 30 
No fees have to be 
paid by consumer 
and trader 
7 8 16 27 27 20 22 
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No fees have to be 
paid by consumer 
but have to be paid 
by trader 
14 6 13 6 12 14 8 
Fees have to be 
paid by consumer 
but not by trader 
1 1 1 1 2 1 2 
Fees have to be 
paid by consumer 
and by trader 
1 9 9 10 16 10 7 
Fees have to be 
paid by the 
consumer 
2 10 10 11 18 11 9 
Fees have to be 
paid by the trader 
15 15 22 16 28 24 15 
         
Average 
length of 
the 
procedure  
From 1 to and 
including 30 days 
(1 month) 
6 6 10 8 10 7 6 
From 31 to and 
including 60 days 
(2 months) 
4 3 12 11 17 12 12 
From 61 to and 
including 90 days 
(3 months) 
12 13 14 25 29 26 21 
More than 90 days 1 1 3 0 1 0 0 
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